We find a positive association between disproportionate insider control and patent output, quality, creativity, and the efficient use of R&D in innovation. Managers of firms characterized by disproportionate control also take more personal innovative risk by filing their own patents. By controlling for standard entrenchment measures, we also find that insider entrenchment due to superior voting rights is distinct from entrenchment derived from standard antitakeover measures. Disproportionate insider control fosters innovation more than other forms of entrenchment. Positive effects are confined, however, to financially constrained firms and dissipate within ten years following the IPO. Dual class firms with financial constraints prefer to issue debt and are more likely to issue debt after collateralizing their patent portfolio. Our results, which control for self-selection bias by using a sample of dual and single class firms matched on their innovativeness pre-IPO, therefore support the recent call for sunset provisions on dual class shares.
Baran, Lindsay; Forst, Arno; and Via, M. Tony, "Dual Class Share Structure and Innovation" (2019). Accountancy Faculty Publications and Presentations. 6.