

University of Texas Rio Grande Valley

ScholarWorks @ UTRGV

Management Faculty Publications and Presentations

Robert C. Vackar College of Business & Entrepreneurship

2015

If You Can't Take the Heat: Cultural Beliefs about Questionable Conduct, Stigma, Punishment, and Withdrawal among Mexican Police Officers

Jorge A. Gonzalez

The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley

Lorena R. Pérez-Floriano

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.utrgv.edu/mgmt_fac



Part of the [Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons](#), and the [Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Gonzalez, J. A., & Pérez-Floriano, L. R. (2015). If You Can't Take the Heat: Cultural Beliefs about Questionable Conduct, Stigma, Punishment, and Withdrawal among Mexican Police Officers. *Organization Studies*, 36(5), 665–687. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840615571961>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Robert C. Vackar College of Business & Entrepreneurship at ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. It has been accepted for inclusion in Management Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. For more information, please contact justin.white@utrgv.edu, william.flores01@utrgv.edu.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

**If you can't take the heat: Cultural beliefs about questionable conduct, stigma,
punishment, and withdrawal among Mexican police officers**

Dysfunctional misconduct is a problem in many occupations, corporations, and public organizations. Research has shown that emergence, diffusion, and normalization of misconduct depends upon organizational dynamics (Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, & Treviño, 2008; Linstead, Maréchal, & Griffin, 2014; Pinto, Leana & Pil, 2008), as well as the occupational and cultural context that surrounds such behavior (Bond et al., 2004; Jong-Sung & Khagram, 2005; Schein, 2006; Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006).

In this study, we explore the prevalence and outcomes of cultural beliefs about questionable conduct and the awareness of a corrupt stigma. Research shows that stigma awareness can stimulate disidentification and withdrawal from a stigmatized group (Lai, Chan, & Lam, 2013; Major & O'Brien, 2005). Paradoxically, stigma also fosters group identification and solidarity (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999), particularly when it is hard to leave a group. Applying theory from occupational stigma (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; Pinel, 1999) and organizational culture (Hofstede, 1998; Schneider, 1987; Schein, 2006), we surmise that stigma consciousness acts as a catalyst by justifying cultural beliefs that rationalize misconduct. Policing has a “dirty work” stigma (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999) characterized by corruption, coercion, violence, and contact with criminals (Dick, 2005; Punch, 2003; Rubinstein, 1973). We conducted this study in a setting rife with violence and corruption: The police force of a Mexican border city.

We employed a mixed methods design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010) intended to ease potential methodological problems. Misconduct and stigma have a “dark” and “subterranean” nature, and their study presents issues with access, respondent sincerity, fear of repercussion, social desirability, and self-serving bias (Linstead et al., 2014;

1
2
3
4 Skogan & Frydl, 2004). These obstacles are greater in developing countries (Ivkovic, 2005),
5
6 added to troubles with the meaning and translation of Western instruments (Schaffer & Riordan,
7
8 2003). Further, we integrate quantitative and qualitative methods to examine local phenomena in
9
10 a context-oriented manner (Peterson & Søndergaard, 2011; Welch, Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki, &
11
12 Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2011). In the qualitative phase, we explored the prevalence and
13
14 meaning of occupational stigma and beliefs about questionable conduct. The results helped us in
15
16 the development of a culturally-relevant scale of beliefs comprised by cultural artifacts—
17
18 proverbs reflecting common folk wisdom (Leung et al., 2002; Shapin, 2001; Weber, Hsee, &
19
20 Sokolowska, 1988; Yau, 1994). For the quantitative phase, we used survey and objective data to
21
22 assess the interactive role of cultural beliefs and stigma on two sets of outcomes—reprimands, a
23
24 coercive form of persuasion managers use to stimulate conformity or withdrawal (Podsakoff,
25
26 Bommer, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006; Schein, 2006), and withdrawal behavior, which we
27
28 operationalized as absenteeism and turnover.
29
30
31
32
33

34
35 Paying attention to context (Tsui, 2007), we begin by describing the relevance of stigma
36
37 and corruption to the occupational, organizational, and national milieu. We then discuss pertinent
38
39 theory on dysfunctional misconduct (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 2010),
40
41 cultural beliefs (Leung et al., 2002), and occupational stigma (Pinel & Paulin, 2005), and present
42
43 our hypotheses. Subsequently, we discuss the methods and results.
44
45
46
47
48

49 **Occupational, organizational, and national context**

50
51 Misconduct and corruption are common to the police around the world (Frühling, 2007;
52
53 Newburn & Webb, 1999; Rubinstein, 1973), and ascribe the occupation with a negative stigma.
54
55 These problems are more prevalent in developing economies (Ivkovic, 2005), where the police
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 also face greater exposure to crime, danger, and violence, as well as lower pay and access to
5
6 quality equipment (LaRose & Maddan, 2009; Sabet, 2012; Uildriks, 2010). For instance, the
7
8 Mexican police face a high degree of danger and crime impunity (Daly, Heinle, & Shirk, 2012).
9

10
11 Qualitative studies of the Mexican police depict a strong culture and adverse occupational
12
13 characteristics (Azaola, 2009; Botello & Rivera, 2000; Suárez de Garay, 2005). These studies
14
15 describe a complex culture of organized chaos characterized by solidarity, secrecy, and mutual
16
17 reliance, but also a strict hierarchical structure, unfair management, and a competitive climate
18
19 (Botello & Rivera, 2000; Costas & Grey, 2014; Uildriks, 2010). They document deficient
20
21 working conditions, including the need for some officers to personally buy life jackets, bullets,
22
23 and patrol car gasoline.
24
25

26
27 The organizational attributes these studies mentioned above describe is close to the
28
29 notions of *thoroughly corrupt organizations*, where people engage in corruption for both
30
31 personal and organizational benefit (Pinto et al., 2008), and organizational *miasma*—a
32
33 contagious state of darkness and pollution characterized by corruption, silence, lack of
34
35 resistance, and a porous boundary between public and private life, among other problems
36
37 (Gabriel, 2012). Officers rationalize and justify corruption with their low pay and by blaming
38
39 civilians. For example, the dysfunctional practice of withholding effort is illustrated with the
40
41 dictum “if you want to become an old cop, play dumb,” a word-play on a Spanish proverb stating
42
43 that people who follow advice live longer. Examples of institutionalized misconduct include the
44
45 “*mordida*” (verbatim: bite)—bribery involving shared responsibility by the person who gives it
46
47 and the one who receives it—(Bailey & Paras, 2006; Suárez de Garay, 2005), sharing bribes with
48
49 supervisors, and paying them for lucrative assignments (Botello & Rivera, 2000). These studies
50
51 show that corruption is prevalent, but condoned when performed within organizational norms
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 and for the organization's benefit. Nonetheless, severe misconduct carried for personal benefit
4
5 (e.g. collaborating with organized crime) is not considered an institutionalized practice. If
6
7
8 caught, it can lead to repercussions such as being reprimanded, discharged, indicted, imprisoned,
9
10 and even brutalized in the process (Uildriks, 2010).

11
12
13 Socialization processes into unethical cultures can shape the values and moral judgment
14
15 of new entrants (Kammeyer-Mueller, Simon, & Rich, 2012; Treviño et al., 2006). Similar to their
16
17 rich-nation counterparts (Britz, 1997; Van Maanen, 1975, 1978), Mexican police officers go
18
19 through harsh socialization processes in the academy and their organizations. Due to
20
21 occupational stigma, many face a lack of societal integration. They feel trapped and to lack
22
23 behavioral and occupational alternatives (Azaola, 2009; Botello & Rivera, 2000). The metaphor
24
25 of being "*enrejados*" (behind bars) like the criminals they have caught describes their need to
26
27 comply with institutionalized authority that condemns them to complicit impunity (Suárez de
28
29 Garay, 2005). Despite these problems, many officers describe the uniform's strong symbolic
30
31 value and high occupational identification. This echoes Western studies showing that police
32
33 stigma is related to withdrawal, but also solidarity and group identification (cf. Lester & Brink,
34
35 1985; Perrott & Taylor, 1994; Trostle, 2005; Westmarland, 2005).

36
37
38 Moreover, the police organization is embedded in a rigid political system of
39
40 institutionalized secrecy (Arellano-Gault & Lepore, 2011). Organizational culture dynamics and
41
42 coercive persuasion are powerful (Azaola, 2009; Botello & Rivera, 2000), as it is very hard to
43
44 leave the group (Schein, 2006). Rank officers endure the adverse stigma, but a collective and
45
46 high power distance Mexican culture emphasizing hierarchy and subculture distinctions
47
48
49 (Hofstede, 1998; Trice, 1993) shields high-status administrators.
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Theoretical background

Normalized and deviant misconduct

Scholars distinguish across deviant, dysfunctional, and corrupt behavior to examine their antecedents and outcomes. Deviant behavior refers to aberrant conduct that violates organizational norms and threatens its well-being (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). It can be constructive or destructive (Warren, 2003). In contrast, dysfunctional behavior can stem from institutionalized practices that actually are common. Thus, workplace deviance refers to divergence from norms that may or may not be dysfunctional (Griffin & Lopez, 2005).

Corruption refers to the illicit use of position or power for personal or collective gain. It implies a willful perversion of morals, order, and ideals (Ashforth et al., 2008). Corruption can be embedded in organizational processes and routines (e.g., Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Sarchione, Cuttler, Muchinsky, & Nelson-Gray, 1998). People are “infected” or initiate, perpetuate, and succumb to corruption through coercion, or by condoning and complying with dysfunctional practices (Pinto et al., 2008). Attraction-selection-attrition forces (Schneider, 1987) drive people to self-select and be socialized into corrupt settings, while misfits are selected out. Supervisors have an important role as they model (un)ethical behavior to subordinates (Treviño et al., 2006).

Dysfunctional behavior thus includes corrupt behavior that does not deviate from institutional norms (e.g. whistle-blowing is deviant, but not corrupt; Park, Blenkinsopp, Oktem, & Omurgonulsen, 2008). Corrupt behavior is dysfunctional to society, but can benefit the organization and/or the perpetrator (Linstead et al., 2014; Pinto et al., 2008). Therefore, we term dysfunctional and corrupt behavior accepted by the organization *normalized misconduct* and dysfunctional and corrupt behavior going beyond institutionalized norms *deviant misconduct*.

Misconduct, punishment, and withdrawal behavior

1
2
3
4 Punishment is an exercise of coercive power. It consists of the administration of negative
5
6 consequences to modify undesired behavior (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980; Butterfield, Treviño, &
7
8 Ball, 1996; Treviño et al., 2006). Research on workplace punishment is scant as many scholars
9
10 consider it unfair, harsh, as well as ineffective as it has unintended adverse consequences such as
11
12 absenteeism and turnover (Podsakoff et al., 2006). Others consider its ineffectiveness to be a
13
14 misconception (Atwater, Waldman, Carey, & Cartier, 2001). Punishment is common in the
15
16 police and militarized organizations (Cancino & Enriquez, 2004; Godfrey, Lilley, & Brewis,
17
18 2012; Gordon, Clegg & Kornberg, 2009). It is often implemented to correct misconduct, but it is
19
20 also used to coerce people into compliance with normalized misconduct.
21
22
23

24 *Cultural beliefs about questionable conduct*

25
26
27 Corruption is influenced by a nations' political, economic, institutional (Jong-Sung & Khagram,
28
29 2005) and cultural environment (Husted, 2002; Sanchez, Gomez, & Wated, 2008). Culture
30
31 includes values, norms, traditions, assumptions, and beliefs (Hofstede, 1998). This last element
32
33 refers to convictions about the truth or reality of a phenomenon. Cultural beliefs are the basis for
34
35 assumptions (Schein, 2006) and are conducive to behavior and rationalizations for such behavior.
36
37
38 Bond et al. (2004) advanced the concept of social axioms—the “basic premises that people
39
40 endorse and use to guide their behavior in different situations” (p. 288)—to refer to beliefs about
41
42 “the way things are” or how the world works (Leung et al., 2002).
43
44
45

46 We studied beliefs related to the prevalence, justification, and rationalization of
47
48 misconduct in this national, occupational, and organizational context. First, we considered
49
50 cultural beliefs about *greed*—an excessive desire for more of something (Wang & Murnighan,
51
52 2011), such as monetary gain. This belief reflects the idea that money is a valuable and powerful
53
54 resource regardless of the means used to obtain it, and that people with money are admirable and
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 deserve it. Greed is related to ambition, but implies avarice. Greed can elicit unethical behavior
5
6 when people are exposed to opportunities for monetary gain (Gino & Pierce, 2009; Kouchaki,
7
8 Smith-Crowe, Brief, & Sousa, 2013).
9

10
11 Second, we considered cultural beliefs about *wariness*—the notion that people should be
12
13 cautious of out-group members and that silence and secrecy about misconduct is desirable.
14
15 Wariness may stem from the need to comply with perceptions of cultural norms (Costas & Grey,
16
17 2014; Park et al., 2008) and condone the misconduct of others (Gabriel, 2012). Wariness can
18
19 reflect group loyalty used to promote and obtain benefits, such as protection and solidarity
20
21 (Bittner, 1970; Van Maanen, 1978).
22
23
24

25
26 Third, we considered *toughness*, which entails beliefs in roughness and brute force to
27
28 accomplish goals, and the virtuousness of courage and valor to withstand danger. Toughness is
29
30 similar to rugged individualism, a coping strategy common among police officers (Beehr,
31
32 Johnson, & Nieva, 1995). It resembles the Mexican value of “*machismo*,” which equates
33
34 fearlessness, toughness, and bravado with masculinity (Paredes, 1971). Although bravery,
35
36 courage, and valor have positive connotations, toughness can degenerate into ruthlessness,
37
38 cruelty, and brutality.
39
40

41
42 Fourth, we considered *savvy*, which refers to beliefs about the importance of personal wit
43
44 and being “street-smart.” Savvy is related to the use of manipulation to obtain and power and
45
46 influence, and the exercise of authority through “*palancas*” (verbatim: leverage) or influential
47
48 personal connections. Both are common in police organizations (Bittner, 1970). Although
49
50 potentially positive, savvy can degrade into cunning and guile.
51
52

53
54 These beliefs are neither exhaustive nor unique to the present study’s setting. Greed is
55
56 common in other masculine cultures (Hofstede, 1998). Savvy is similar to practices such as the
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 *jeithino* in Brazil (Duarte, 2006), *guanxi* in China (Xin & Pearce, 1996), and machiavellianism,
5
6 which is universal. Toughness is common in assertive and masculine cultures (Aditya & House,
7
8 2002; Hofstede, 1998), “cultures of honor” such as the American south (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle,
9
10 & Schwarz, 1996), and military occupations (Godfrey et al., 2012). Lastly, wariness is common
11
12 in high-power distance (Park et al., 2008) and secretive cultures (Costas & Grey, 2014).

13
14
15 We surmise that these four cultural beliefs are related to individual adherence to
16
17 organizational norms. As we describe later, three of these beliefs conform to police
18
19 organizational and occupational normative expectations. Toughness, greed, and wariness are
20
21 expected in an organization dealing with constant danger, where people need to cover for one
22
23 another, and where money on-the-side is considered the only way to earn a living. People with
24
25 such beliefs fit the organization better and face lower attrition pressures. Thus, they are less
26
27 likely to distance themselves from the organization through absenteeism or to leave it, either
28
29 voluntarily or involuntarily.
30
31
32

33
34 *Hypothesis 1: Cultural beliefs about questionable conduct related to greed, toughness, and*
35
36 *wariness will have a negative effect on (a) reprimands, (b) absenteeism, and (c) turnover.*
37
38

39
40 Beliefs about savvy, however, may lead to reprimands and withdrawal behavior. Savvy may
41
42 help new recruits learn on the street faster and use the cultural structure to their advantage.
43
44 However, people who believe in savvy are likely to rely on individual abilities to manage
45
46 adversity, and to take advantage of questionable opportunities for individual rather than group
47
48 gain. Savvy and cunning are considered positive leadership attributes in Mexico and Latin
49
50 America (Aditya & House, 2002). Nonetheless, savvy may not be desirable or tolerated from
51
52 rank-and-file employees in high power distance and collective cultures. Moreover, organizational
53
54 members in low hierarchical roles are expected to display greater norm conformity or risk being
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 perceived as deviant (Bowles & Gelfand, 2010). Therefore, those who are savvy or cunning may
5
6 be thought to be different, “too smart for their own good,” and to fail to comply with normalized
7
8 misconduct norms. For example, savvy rank officers may be considered the ones who engage in
9
10 deviant misconduct and threaten the organization’s welfare.

11
12
13 *Hypothesis 2: Cultural beliefs about questionable conduct related to savvy will have a*
14
15 *positive effect on (a) reprimands, (b) absenteeism, and (c) turnover.*

16 17 18 *Awareness of a dirty work stigma*

19
20 Dirty work refers to occupational activities considered to be disgusting or degrading (Ashforth &
21
22 Kreiner, 1999). People who perform “dirty” jobs are tainted by others who seek to distance
23
24 themselves from such activities. Researchers have identified three types of occupational stigmas:
25
26 The moral taint of dubious ethics (e.g. exotic dancer, pawnbroker), the physical taint of danger or
27
28 contact with physical or symbolic “dirt” (e.g. miner, garbage collector), and the social taint of
29
30 contact with other stigmatized people (e.g. prison guard) (Ashforth & Kreiner, 2014). Policing
31
32 possesses the three components due to its danger, corruption, brutality, violence, and contact
33
34 with criminals (Dick, 2005; Drew & Hulvey, 2007; Rubinstein, 1973).
35
36
37
38

39
40 Stigma consciousness refers to awareness and sensitivity to a stereotyped status (Pinel &
41
42 Paulin, 2005). It influences behavior given the importance of occupation to people’s self-
43
44 concepts. People identify less and are more likely to leave jobs with a dirty-work stigma (Lai et
45
46 al., 2013), but those who cannot distance themselves from a stigma (e.g. due to low job
47
48 alternatives or sunk costs) may embrace the stigma to maintain self-esteem (Crocker & Major,
49
50 1989; Goffman, 1963). They can rely on social validation from others in the same situation,
51
52 construct a positive identity, and protect themselves from identity threat and marginalization.
53
54
55 They may reframe or change the meaning attached to the occupation, recalibrate the standards
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 used to judge it, and refocus their attention to other occupational attributes (Ashforth & Kreiner,
4
5
6 1999). These identity strategies, common in police organizations (Lester & Brink, 1985; Perrott
7
8 & Taylor, 1994; Pinel & Paulin, 2005), allow the emergence of strong occupational cultures,
9
10 occupational and organizational identification, and stigmatized group solidarity and norm
11
12 conformity (Kreiner, Ashforth, & Sluss, 2006; Manning, 2008).
13
14

15
16 As occupational dirty-work stigmas can lead to withdrawal but also solidarity and
17
18 identification, we do not hypothesize a main effect but explore stigma consciousness as a
19
20 moderator. We posit that people who are more conscious of the police stigma are likely to
21
22 comply with organizational expectations, including condoned normalized misconduct, and to
23
24 justify such behavior. Relying on the premise that beliefs and attitudes interact to influence
25
26 behavior (Bond et al., 2004; Pinel, 1999), we surmise that the role of beliefs about questionable
27
28 conduct on withdrawal behavior and reprimands is contingent upon stigma consciousness.
29
30

31
32 *Hypothesis 3: Stigma consciousness will moderate the relationship between beliefs about*
33
34 *greed on (a) reprimands, (b) absenteeism, and (c) turnover reprimands such that a*
35
36 *negative relationship will be stronger among those with higher stigma consciousness.*
37
38

39
40 *Hypothesis 4: Stigma consciousness will moderate the relationship between beliefs about*
41
42 *toughness on (a) reprimands, (b) absenteeism, and (c) turnover such that a negative*
43
44 *relationship will be stronger among those with higher stigma consciousness.*
45

46
47 *Hypothesis 5: Stigma consciousness will moderate the relationship between beliefs about*
48
49 *wariness on (a) reprimands, (b) absenteeism, and (c) turnover such that a negative*
50
51 *relationship will be stronger among those with higher stigma consciousness.*
52

53
54 As stated earlier, organizational members may consider savvy in rank employees to be
55
56 guile or cunning. People who are stigma conscious and who possess savvy beliefs may be less
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 likely to perceive the bonding effects of stigma given that they may have (or believe to have)
4 the ability to exit the group. They are likely to distance themselves from the identity rather
5 than to display group identification and solidarity, conform to social expectations, or be
6 considered team players. As such, they may deviate from established norms, withdraw, and
7 receive punishments.
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15 *Hypothesis 6: Stigma consciousness will moderate the relationship between beliefs about*
16 *savvy on (a) reprimands, (b) absenteeism, and (c) turnover such that a positive*
17 *relationship will be stronger among those with higher stigma consciousness.*
18
19
20
21
22
23

24 **Method**

25
26
27 Following mixed-method design recommendations (Cassell & Symon, 2004; Creswell & Plano
28 Clark, 2011; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010), we carried the qualitative and quantitative study
29 phases for complementarity and development purposes. This included reflecting upon ongoing
30 results and using findings from one method to inform the issues raised by the other. The qualitative
31 and attitudinal quantitative data were collected in 2006, which coincided with the start of the
32 Calderon presidential administration in Mexico and an intensification of the drug war.
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

41 *Qualitative phase*

42
43 In this phase, we explored the presence and implications of institutionalized beliefs about danger,
44 stigma, and misconduct. We sought to identify and narrow the research focus, develop
45 measurement instruments, and illustrate and interpret quantitative findings (Creswell & Plano
46 Clark, 2011). We used semi-structured interviews. Participants were recruited from a group of
47 organizational members receiving coaching from the second author as part of an administration-
48 initiated change intervention. We implemented purposive (theoretical) sampling. Given potential
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 gender differences and the formation of subcultures across hierarchical roles (Prenzler & Drew,
5
6 2013; Trice, 1993), we further set a premium on gender and role diversity to obtain a broad range
7
8 of experiences (Cassell & Symon, 2004). We recruited to the point of redundancy—when we
9
10 expected no new information from subsequent participants. Ten officers— three male
11
12 administrators and seven municipal officers (including three female officers)—were interviewed.
13
14 The second author conducted the interviews. Using an interpretive approach, we assessed the
15
16 responses to find common patterns and themes (Bluhm, Harman, Lee, & Mitchell, 2011). To be
17
18 reflective (Cassell & Symon, 2004), both authors engaged in an ongoing discussion of the
19
20 responses to critically assess the research process and question presuppositions. For example, we
21
22 disregarded an initial emphasis on crime risk as precursor to withdrawal as we found that
23
24 respondents were well aware of occupational risks and self-selected into a dangerous occupation.
25
26 Although not part of the research design, we were able corroborate our results and interpretations
27
28 with a few police administrators during a formal presentation of the results.
29
30
31
32
33

34 Respondents were initially asked about satisfying and dissatisfying aspects of the job.
35
36 Interview questions then turned to relevant thoughts and experiences on occupational attributes
37
38 emphasized in the literature, such as socialization, “real police work,” and “learning on the street”
39
40 (Van Maanen, 1978). Interview themes were allowed to deviate to give voice to the interviewees
41
42 and focus on their experience. Interviewees were not directly asked about corruption and danger
43
44 due to their sensitive nature, but these themes surfaced naturally.
45
46
47

48 The information gathered helped us understand the relevance of withdrawal behavior in
49
50 this culture and to interpret objective quantitative data. Responses suggested that the receipt of
51
52 formal reprimands itself may be subject to questionable practices such as cronyism and
53
54 favoritism by police superiors, who may pardon or “bend the rules” for officers who are well
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 socialized or liked. Also, police administrators commented about sales of excused absences,
5
6 which we corroborated with local newspaper articles reporting that local state-hospital
7
8 physicians were caught selling formal sick-leave to police officers.
9

10
11 Responses revealed that officers were aware of their corrupt and violent stigma, but that
12
13 those who were ashamed of their occupation were shunned or informally penalized by colleagues.
14
15 Respondents justified questionable conduct, blaming civilians, and the idea of stigma as the
16
17 precursor of a self-fulfilling prophecy resonated with interviewees.
18
19

20
21 *“If they put all corrupt people in jail, who would lock the cell?”*

22
23 *“If you [society] tell me that I am [corrupt], then I am.”*

24
25 *“If the officer never asks for money and the citizens offer it, who is the corrupt one?”*
26

27
28 The idea of toughness arose from the discussion of risk, courage, and “real police work.”
29
30 Contrary to initial expectations, danger was not deemed a negative occupational attribute, and most
31
32 respondents described the importance of toughness, bravery, and valor. Bravery was equated to
33
34 masculinity, a “*professional badge*,” and what it takes to enter an inner-circle.
35

36
37 *“Becoming one of the guys requires behaving like a real man.”*
38

39
40 Respondents manifested that being weak or showing fear was despised. Three officers
41
42 described the story of a colleague who would freeze in encounters when others expected him to
43
44 cover them. He was blamed for the decease of former partners and earned social rejection,
45
46 illustrated by being nicknamed an animal that plays dead when facing danger:
47

48
49 *“The ‘zarigüeya’ [possum] killed three of his partners.”*
50

51
52 Interviewees described the importance of courage in the attraction and retention of police
53
54 officers. One female officer described a criminal chase and cross-fire that required her to slide
55
56 under a Van with the motor running. Her feelings about the episode were positive:
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 *"I felt the adrenaline rush. At that moment I realized that this [being a police officer] was*
5 *what I wanted to do for the rest of my life."*

6
7 Some respondents confounded bravado, courage, and toughness with ruthlessness,
8
9 violence, and lack of mercy. This was justified by the behavior being common and by the
10
11 guilt of presumed criminals:

12
13 *"...we go to 'el bordo' to pick up bums [most are homeless or drug addicts deported from the*
14 *U.S.]... Do I like going? Are you kidding? I love it! We go on the pick-up trucks, chase them like*
15 *rabbits, give them a scolding, and 'pa' dentro' [on to detention]."*

16
17
18 The use of proverbs to justify and explain behavior resonated with interviewees. For
19
20 instance, respondents reiterated a common Mexican proverb used to describe how officers learned
21
22 through socialization, including the spread of misconduct and social stigma. This proverb equates
23
24 institutionalized cheating and learning to cheat to teamwork, consistent with Mars' (1982) animal
25
26 metaphors distinguishing workplaces "cheats" based on how they learn and justify misconduct:
27
28

29
30 *"He who hangs out with wolves learns to howl."*

31
32 The consequences of the stigma were known, but interviewees also described love for the
33
34 uniform and strong occupational identification. A police administrator stated that there is no choice
35
36 but to love what they do because there are few alternatives:

37
38
39 *"Becoming a cop implies entering an industry loaded with opprobrium... if an officer wants*
40 *to change occupation, he [or she] will be told 'you were a police officer, [you will not get this*
41 *job because] we want honest people'... If you worked in the 'ministerio público' [courthouse]*
42 *you can't become a judge even though police work is the natural [job] training because we*
43 *are considered to be 'rats' [thieves]... it's because of the police image that [rank officers]*
44 *can't take other jobs. This leads them to do [corrupt] things."*

45
46
47 Another administrator indicated that the officers who are the most committed and cope
48
49 with adversity are those who join the force due to family tradition and are pre-socialized by
50
51 families. Others supported this:

52
53
54
55 *"My wife divorced me, she could not put up with this. We moved from our house when the*
56 *violence got bad, cars would stop in front every other night and make screeching tire noises...*
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 *but my father was a cop and me and my brothers were always more serious [about being*
5 *police officers] than others... I am also worried about my kids and tell them to be careful.”*
6

7 Being socialized and learning from one another was a common theme, but also the reason
8
9 some “go to the other side” or engage in deviant misconduct. In contrast to other beliefs,
10
11 respondents perceived savvy to be negative and equated it to being “tranza” [displaying cunning
12
13 and guile] and earning the group’s rejection:
14

15
16
17 *“When someone goes to the other side, other people shun him [or her]”*
18

19 *“One year [Jane Doe] was given a medal for being the best police officer in the corporation...
20 A couple of years later she died in jail. She was the commander’s pet, but she got involved with
21 heavy ‘narcos’ and things got rough for her when [police leadership] changed.”*
22

23 A few officers stated that “everybody” was involved in violence or corruption, but also
24
25 that some officers take pride in their ethics and value of the uniform. To show occupational
26
27 pride, some officers described an episode when rank officers were deprived of their guns during a
28
29 corruption investigation. This led to protests, including officers who brought slingshots to work
30
31 and posed with them for newspaper photos.
32
33

34
35 Overall, respondents described the presence of corrupt conduct and questionable behavior
36
37 involving greed, toughness, wariness, and savvy. They described rationalizations through the
38
39 description of dirty-work attributes in other occupations (e.g. politics, law, finance) and the role
40
41 of civilians in bribery. Similar to the idea of corruption in pursuit of a noble cause (Wolfe &
42
43 Piquero, 2011), respondents argued that questionable conduct ultimately helps society, regardless
44
45 of the means. In contrast, another officer described how he fought the stigma via reframing and
46
47 recalibrating (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999) by enhancing occupational ends and means, but not at
48
49 the expense of others.
50
51

52
53
54 *“One evening, my partner and I found a couple stranded on the highway with car problems.
55 We approached them and the woman became nervous and asked us to leave... but we helped
56 them and managed to restart their car [which had California license plates]. They were
57
58
59
60*

1
2
3
4 *grateful and insisted on giving us money, and we said no. They apologized and said they had*
5 *heard many bad stories about us [Mexican police] and thought we were not going to be any*
6 *different. We left and I felt very good about changing their attitude towards us.”*
7

8 *Quantitative phase*

9
10 We gathered quantitative data using a convenience sample. The results of the qualitative study
11 helped the design of this phase and the interpretation of its results. Approximately 600 municipal
12 police officers (constituted by about 2500 members) were provided with a copy of the survey and
13 asked to complete it. We offered either anonymity or confidentiality. 352 officers returned the
14 survey, including 41 police administrators provided with anonymity. Men comprised 92% (n =
15 320) of the total sample. The average age was 32 (SD = 7.59) and the average tenure was 7.44 (SD
16 = 6.79). For the hypotheses tests, we used the sample of 192 rank officers opting for confidentiality
17 We did not find any significant differences in cultural beliefs or stigma consciousness between rank
18 officers who selected confidentiality and those who selected anonymity.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

32 *Reprimands.* Received reprimands represent formal reports of misconduct deemed by the police
33 administration to deserve further inquiry. Reprimands are given due to citizens' complaints for
34 corruption or human rights' abuses, criminal investigations, or supervisor reports. Subsequent
35 consequences depend on investigation outcomes and may consist of a warning, suspension
36 without pay, incarceration (up to 72 hours), definite dismissal, or a criminal process. We used
37 total reprimands in the year of data collection. Reprimands were given to 74 officers in the
38 sample and ranged from 1 to 11 (mean = 1.18, SD = 1.79).
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

48 *Withdrawal behavior (absenteeism and turnover).* We measured absenteeism and turnover using
49 objective data provided by the organization. For absenteeism, we used a logarithmic
50 transformation of the sum of reported absent sick days during the year to normalize the data. We
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 assessed turnover using organizational records. We used a three-year lag due to the low rates of
4
5 exit in the occupation and nation. 55 officers left the organization.
6
7

8 *Mexican cultural beliefs about questionable conduct (MCBQC)*. We developed the MCBQC
9
10 scale to assess the extent to which people believe that behavior with questionable ethical
11
12 underpinnings is widespread among their peers and community and represent life or “the way
13
14 things are.” The scale consists of common Mexican proverbs (Pérez Martínez, 2002). Adages,
15
16 sayings, or proverbs are objective cultural artifacts and examples of folk wisdom used by
17
18 members of a culture to communicate common sense and experiential knowledge to one another.
19
20 As such, they express societal norms and values (Sellers, 1994). Proverbs can be used to
21
22 rationalize questionable behavior since they are dicta or rule-like propositions that shape
23
24 judgment and guide conduct (Shapin, 2001). Researchers have used them as objective measures
25
26 of culture, value orientation, and risk-taking behavior (Weber et al., 1988).
27
28
29
30
31

32 Several proverbs were retrieved from a dictionary of Mexican proverbs (Pérez Martínez,
33
34 2002). We selected 150 proverbs relevant to cultural beliefs about dysfunctional misconduct and
35
36 general work-related issues. We included proverbs resembling Bond et al’s (2004) “societal
37
38 cynicism” belief. We used a pilot study involving 630 Mexican college students to gauge clarity,
39
40 recognition, and relevance to stigma, misconduct, and danger. We selected 48 proverbs from this
41
42 pilot study, including 30 proverbs judged to be related to these issues based on pilot comments
43
44 and author agreement, and 18 general work-related proverbs. A second pilot study of 171
45
46 Mexican working professionals was used to corroborate the results. A preliminary exploratory
47
48 factor analysis involving the two pilot study samples yielded four factors (greed, toughness,
49
50 wariness, and savvy) (eigenvalues > 1.0) explaining 53% of the variance.
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 The final MCBQC scale focuses on proverbs related to beliefs about ethics, misconduct,
5
6 and a certain disdain about “the way things are.” We included the 48 proverbs (including work-
7
8 related proverbs) in the final scale to present it as an assessment of how proverbial wisdom
9
10 reflects reality. The participants were instructed: “Think of your daily life as a police officer and
11
12 resident of (your city) and indicate how much you agree (5) or disagree (1) with the following
13
14 proverbs.” An option for not understanding a proverb was provided, but no one selected it.
15
16

17
18 We conducted an exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation of the 30 relevant
19
20 proverbs and retained 22 proverbs loading in 4 factors (greed, wariness, toughness, and savvy)
21
22 explaining 53% of the variance. The final scale is shown in the appendix, and reliabilities are
23
24 reported in table 1. We explored convergent validity using Rosenbaum and Kuntze’s (2003)
25
26 measure of anomie, which assesses disdain for human nature and mistrust in social institutions.
27
28 Anomie was related to greed ($r = 0.45, p < .001$), toughness ($r = 0.36, p < .001$), wariness ($r =$
29
30 $0.40, p < .001$), and savvy ($r = 0.35, p < .001$).
31
32
33

34 We further conducted a CFA with maximum likelihood estimation using AMOS. The
35
36 four-factor model showed good fit using recognized standards ($\chi^2 [197] = 382.00, p < .001$, the
37
38 comparative fit index = .93, root mean square error of approximation = .05, standardized root
39
40 mean square residual = .05). All indicator items loaded significantly on their specified latent
41
42 construct. Standardized factor loadings ranged from .53 to .75, averaging .62. This model
43
44 showed superior fit than several alternative models, including a single-factor model ($\chi^2_{diff} [6] =$
45
46 $64.45, p < .001$), a three-factor model where the covariance between toughness and savvy was
47
48 fixed to one ($\chi^2_{diff} [1] = 16.89, p < .001$), and all other possible three-factor models.
49
50
51

52 *Stigma consciousness.* We modified three items from Pinel’s (1999) stigma consciousness scale:
53
54 “Most people believe that police officers are dishonest,” “People from (city) see the police as an
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 outsider army,” and “people in (city) do not respect police officers”. We complemented them with
4
5 three proverbs implying that some people suffer stigmatization: “He who hangs out with wolves
6
7 learns to howl,” “there are no poor people with bad intentions,” and “he who does the most is
8
9 thanked the least.” The scale showed adequate reliability ($\alpha = .70$). A principal component
10
11 analysis yielded a single component. In support of convergent validity, this measure was related
12
13
14
15
16 ($r = 0.21, p < .001$) to anomie.

17
18 *Controls.* We controlled for tenure and gender on all outcomes, as they could affect results
19
20 (Godfrey et al., 2012; Prenzler & Drew, 2013). We also controlled for workplace injury on
21
22 absenteeism and turnover using a self-reported statement. 24% of officers reported having been
23
24 injured while on duty.
25
26
27
28
29

30 **Results**

31
32 Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in table 1. Correlations and preliminary
33
34 analyses helped our results interpretation. Tenure and greed were significantly correlated,
35
36 suggesting that those who have been in the organization longer have become greedier (or believe
37
38 greed is commonplace). Savvy was significantly correlated with age ($r = .13, p < .05$), but not
39
40 with tenure. Police supervisors held stronger beliefs in greed (Means = 2.45, 2.14, $t = 1.98, p <$
41
42 $.05$) and marginally significant stronger beliefs in toughness (Means = 3.17, 2.65, $t = 1.77, p <$
43
44 $.10$) and wariness (Means = 3.30, 2.87, $t = 1.87, p < .10$). This suggested that administration and
45
46 rank officers were different subcultures, and that rank officers could be socialized through top-
47
48 down processes. Savvy beliefs were relatively high for both roles. Moreover, a culture equating
49
50 toughness with masculinity may have been harsher for women. Gender was significantly
51
52 correlated with turnover, indicating that women were more likely to leave despite having
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

marginally significant ($p < .10$) lower stigma consciousness than men. We did not find significant gender differences in cultural beliefs.

[Insert Table 1 about here]

We tested the hypotheses about reprimands and absenteeism with moderated OLS regression. The results are in tables 2 and 3, respectively. We implemented logistic regression to test hypothesis about turnover, and the results are in table 4. Interaction effects were computed using centered predictors. Significant effects were plotted at one standard deviation above and below the mean. For clarity, we describe the results by outcome rather than hypotheses order.

Reprimands. Main effect results show that none of the beliefs were related to reprimands, failing to support hypotheses 1a and 2a. Model 2 incorporates the interaction effect and showed significance for the interaction of toughness and stigma ($\beta = -.24, p < .05$). The interaction plot in figure 3 depicts that toughness was related to reprimands, but only for people with low stigma consciousness. In support of hypothesis 4a, beliefs in toughness led to lower reprimands among people high in stigma consciousness. Hypotheses 3a and 5a, related to greed and wariness, were not supported. The results also showed a significant interaction for savvy and stigma consciousness on reprimands ($\beta = .22, p < .05$). The plot in figure 3 shows that savvy was related to reprimands for people with high stigma consciousness, supporting hypothesis 6a.

[Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 about here]

Absenteeism. None of the beliefs had a significant main effect on absenteeism, failing to support hypotheses 1b and 2b. Nonetheless, wariness beliefs had a significant correlation with absenteeism ($r = .15, p < .05$), suggesting that there is a relationship independent of other variables and controls. Furthermore, model 2 results show that the interaction of savvy and stigma was significant ($\beta = -.22, p < .05$), although the plot shows that it was in the opposite

1
2
3 direction of the one hypothesized. Savvy was positively related to absenteeism for people with
4 low stigma consciousness. These results fail to support hypotheses 3b, 4b, 5b, and 6b.
5
6
7

8 [Insert Table 3 and Figure 2 about here]
9

10 *Turnover.* Main effects results showed that none of the beliefs were significantly related to
11 turnover, failing to support hypotheses 1c and 2c.
12
13

14 We did not hypothesize a main effect for stigma consciousness, but it is noteworthy that
15 stigma consciousness had a significant positive correlation with turnover ($r = .14, p < .05$). Also,
16 although the role of stigma consciousness on turnover in the regression was marginal ($B = .40, p$
17 $< .10$), a post-hoc one-way ANOVA showed that leavers were more conscious of stigma than
18 stayers (Means = 3.63, 3.33, $F = 3.89, p < .05$).
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

27 The interaction of greed and stigma consciousness was significantly related to turnover (β
28 $= -1.09, p < .01$). Its plot showed that greed was negatively related to turnover for those with
29 high stigma consciousness, supporting hypothesis 3c. The interaction of stigma consciousness
30 and toughness was not significant, and hypothesis 4c was not supported. The interaction of
31 wariness and stigma consciousness was negatively related to turnover ($\beta = -.73, < .05$), and the
32 plot indicated that wariness was negatively related to turnover for those with high stigma
33 consciousness, supporting hypothesis 5c. The interaction of savvy and stigma consciousness was
34 significantly related to turnover ($\beta = .89, p < .05$). The plot indicated that savvy was positively
35 related to turnover among those with high stigma consciousness, supporting hypothesis 6a.
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

48 [Insert Table 4 and Figure 3 about here]
49
50
51
52

53 Discussion 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

1
2
3 We explored the prevalence of cultural beliefs and stigma about questionable conduct and their
4 impact on organizational behavior using a sample of border-city Mexican police. This study
5
6 relies on and joins past research exploring the occupational culture of police officers in
7
8 developed (e.g., Manning, 1978; Van Maanen, 1975, 1978) and developing economies (e.g.,
9
10 Azaola, 2009; Botello & Rivera, 2000; Cruz, 2010; Ivkovic, 2005).
11
12
13
14

15 We paid attention to the occupational, organizational, and national cultural context of the
16
17 setting (Tsui, 2007). We also acknowledged the dark and subterranean nature of misconduct
18
19 (Linstead et al., 2014; Skogan & Frydl 2004) and the potential shortcomings of studying
20
21 Mexican police behavior. Accordingly, we focused on the moral stigma of corruption and
22
23 cultural beliefs related to questionable behavior rather than actual corrupt behavior. We
24
25 presented a novel manner to assess related phenomena—the presence of stigma consciousness,
26
27 cultural beliefs related to the rationalization and justification of misconduct, and their interactive
28
29 effects on withdrawal behavior and reprimands. Triangulating quantitative and qualitative
30
31 methodologies, we assessed the pervasiveness of cultural beliefs and stigma, and their role on
32
33 punitive responses, absenteeism, and turnover. Qualitative phase findings helped us interpret
34
35 quantitative phase results, which showed that, contingent upon stigma consciousness, cultural
36
37 beliefs about questionable conduct influenced received reprimands, absenteeism, and turnover.
38
39
40
41
42

43 *Key Findings*

44
45
46 *Stigma consciousness.* We addressed dirty work stigma as a catalyst, relying on past literature
47
48 showing equivocal results for the role of stigma consciousness on withdrawal, identification, and
49
50 solidarity (Pinel & Paulin, 2005; Perrott & Taylor, 1994; Westmarland, 2005). Consistent with
51
52 this literature, we found that a corrupt and violent stigma is a central component of police officer
53
54 consciousness. Qualitative phase findings indicated that the dirty work stigma was central to
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 occupational identity, but that people implement strategies to enhance their self-image (Ashforth
4 & Krainer, 1999; Crocker & Major, 1989). Police officers described strategies to rationalize it
5
6 and reduce its adverse identity effects.
7
8

9
10 *Reprimands.* Consistent with our hypotheses, beliefs about savvy were related to more formal
11 reprimands received, contingent upon high stigma consciousness. Guided by qualitative findings,
12 this suggests that wit, “street-smarts,” and personal connections were perceived to be guileful
13 and cunning. The contingent role of stigma consciousness may mean that savvy is a desirable
14 personal attribute, but only for high-status administrators and perhaps insiders who are deemed
15 to use their savvy for the group’s benefit. Also contingent on stigma consciousness, toughness
16 beliefs were related to lower reprimands. In contrast to savvy, being tough was consistent with
17 norms and led to lower disciplinary problems. This means that officers who believed in
18 toughness did not deviate from organizational norms, or that their superiors overlooked their
19 transgressions. Conversely, showing cowardice led to social rejection and punishment. In other
20 words, normalized questionable conduct may not have led to reprimands, but misconduct that did
21 not conform to norms was penalized.
22
23

24
25 *Absenteeism.* The results for absenteeism were more limited than those for the other two
26 outcomes. Contrary to our hypotheses, people who were highly aware of their stigma and
27 believed in savvy were less absent. One explanation would be that savvy helps stigma-aware
28 people to reduce stress, cope with problems, and be healthier, resulting in less sick days.
29

30
31 However, this would imply a similar effect with toughness as rugged individualism is a common
32 police-stress coping strategy (Beehr et al., 1995), which was not present in our results.
33

34
35 Qualitative study findings denoting the sale of formal sick-leave suggest alternative explanations.
36

37
38 Either guile and low stigma consciousness was related to purchasing sick-leave, or people high
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 in savvy and stigma awareness were able to be absent without having to resort to this practice.
5
6 Given the negative connotations of savvy, this suggests that further research on stigma,
7
8 questionable beliefs, and absenteeism would be fruitful.
9

10
11 *Turnover.* Quantitative results indicated that cultural beliefs about greed, wariness, and savvy
12
13 predicted turnover, contingent upon stigma consciousness. Such results echo past work
14
15 indicating that stigma fosters group solidarity and identification (e.g. Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999;
16
17 Westmarland, 2005). Officers who had beliefs justifying greed and were aware of their stigma
18
19 stayed in the organization. Potentially, those who believed that there were lucrative opportunities
20
21 in the organization stayed, even if such opportunities had questionable ethics. Also, wariness
22
23 beliefs were negatively related to turnover among officers who were more stigma-conscious.
24
25 Wariness implies justifying a culture of silence, but low wariness could also be based on trust
26
27 and solidarity. Officers with low wariness beliefs and low stigma consciousness stayed in the
28
29 organization. This implies that retention may depend on a complex balance between secrecy and
30
31 trust. For instance, those who stayed may trust their colleagues, but be secretive with outsiders
32
33
34
35

36
37 In contrast, officers who believed in savvy and had high stigma consciousness were more
38
39 likely to turnover. Qualitative phase results implied that savvy among rank-and-file officers is
40
41 considered guile and cunning (e.g. “*pasarse de listo*” or being “too smart for their own good”)
42
43 for individual gain. We should also note that the interactive effect of savvy and stigma was
44
45 similar for both reprimands and turnover. Although reprimands were not significantly related to
46
47 turnover, these results reinforce the idea that savvy beliefs were inconsistent with cultural
48
49 expectations. Thus, officers considered to be cunning may have been pushed away.
50
51

52
53 Acknowledging the lack of job alternatives, another interpretation is that savvy is related to
54
55 influential connections and the ability to pursue other job opportunities.
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 *Limitations and directions for future research*

5
6 As in all studies, a number of limitations have to be considered. First, we were not able to
7
8 differentiate between voluntary and involuntary turnover. The lack of alternatives and the
9
10 socialization processes present in the setting may blur this distinction, and our hypotheses were
11
12 related to turnover in general; however, this distinction may be relevant in future studies.
13
14 Second, we were not able to measure actual or self-reported corrupt behavior given the theme's
15
16 sensitive nature and sample characteristics. Nonetheless, we provided a novel manner to measure
17
18 cultural beliefs about questionable conduct. Third, our measure of absenteeism relied on
19
20 management records of excused absences. Organizational rules implied that absences should
21
22 occur due to illness, but we had to consider the possibility that some absences are not
23
24 documented and that participants engage in the purchase of sick leave. We interpreted the limited
25
26 and counterintuitive findings with these possibilities in mind. Fourth, the theory behind stigma
27
28 consciousness referenced mechanisms such as psychological withdrawal, group solidarity,
29
30 cynicism, and identification, but we did not measure these variables in the quantitative phase.
31
32 Nonetheless, qualitative phase findings suggested that these mechanisms were present.
33
34
35
36
37
38

39 The study was carried in a unique geographic and cultural context, and caution should be
40
41 exercised when generalizing these results. Despite the setting's uniqueness, the cultural beliefs
42
43 and behaviors studied are relevant to other nations, occupations, and organizations. For instance,
44
45 the police and the military around the world share similar stigmas, but also a "heroic"
46
47 component. This identity has implications for positive deviance behaviors such as principled
48
49 dissent and whistle-blowing (Treviño et al., 2006). Toughness can become ruthlessness, but also
50
51 foster the courage and valor to be ethical and not conform to corrupt organizational norms. Being
52
53 conscious of a stigmatized identity but able to reject it from one's self-concept could incite
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 principled dissent that resembles heroic behavior. Moreover, high-status professions mentioned
5
6 by the respondents (e.g. politics, law, finance) possess negative stigmas. Our findings may
7
8 generalize to those contexts, but future research in such settings would be fruitful.
9

10
11 The MCBQC employed the use of objective cultural artifacts—proverbs. The use of
12
13 culturally relevant methodologies to capture implicit meaning, metaphorical nuance, and
14
15 contextual idiosyncrasies is a fertile area. Proverbs are cultural artifacts, but have been used
16
17 scantily (Bond et al., 2004; Shapin, 2001; Weber et al., 1988). Scholars can continue to use
18
19 proverbs and beliefs to study sensitive subjects such as corruption, stigma, and ethics. This opens
20
21 the door to future inquiry employing our scale in other Latin American organizations. Scholars
22
23 may also develop similar proverb-based instruments to fit other languages and cultural contexts.
24
25
26

27
28 The results also suggest that the meaning of organizational metrics (e.g., absenteeism and
29
30 reprimands) depend on context. Despite our unique setting, our results suggest that rich
31
32 contextual description is helpful to quantitative analyses. Future mixed-method approaches can
33
34 inform archival and self-reported measures to understand turnover, leader-member exchange,
35
36 person-environment fit, and incentives driving (un)ethical behavior. Implementing longitudinal
37
38 designs can reveal how beliefs and stigma awareness change as people are socialized or rejected
39
40 from a group. Future research may also investigate cognitive and affective processes related to
41
42 dirty work and stigmatized identities. Cultural beliefs can be studied at group and dyad (e.g.
43
44 partners) levels to assess cultural strength and person-organization (or person-person) fit.
45
46
47

48 49 *Implications for Policy and Practice*

50
51 This research ended at a time when the Mexican government embarked in an ongoing police
52
53 cleanup involving confidence control testing and dismissals, which has had positive but also
54
55 unintended adverse consequences (Sabet, 2012; Uildriks, 2010). Policy implications derived
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 from the present study are consistent with radical organizational change involving “weeding out
5
6 rotten apples” through dismissals. Nonetheless, our results further imply that such efforts could
7
8 be futile if (un)ethical leadership and socialization processes are not addressed.
9

10
11 Our results also have an optimistic managerial implication, ratifying organizational
12
13 change through development, training, and identity management. Management efforts to address
14
15 misconduct and promote ethical behavior should address stigma and cultural beliefs, particularly
16
17 in strong cultures. Occupational stigmas can stimulate a self-fulfilling prophecy by reinforcing
18
19 misconduct and its rationalization and justification. Occupational identity strategies can serve to
20
21 help workers distance themselves from the adverse aspects of stigmatized identity, and
22
23 dysfunctional and corrupt behavior may be reduced through identity management.
24
25
26

27
28 Adverse stigmas influence the rationalization and justification of misconduct, but
29
30 managers can use identity strategies to enhance group solidarity and identification by refocusing
31
32 on positive occupational identity characteristics. Managing stigmatized identities can reduce the
33
34 adverse-attribute salience, offer defensive tactics, and change occupational ideologies (Ashforth
35
36 & Krainer, 2014). Promoting or debunking beliefs can change attitudes and behavior, guide
37
38 ethical decisions, and promote the retention of principled employees. Symbolic management
39
40 through positive storytelling can be included into training and development. In addition,
41
42 management can disseminate values and beliefs informally. These initiatives could include hero
43
44 stories of people who exhibited positive but culturally consistent behavior, such as depicting the
45
46 toughness of principled dissent. Given the importance of socialization and informal learning,
47
48 managers should understand and manage members’ formal and informal interaction. Lastly, the
49
50 prevalence of top-down processes in corrupt organizations implies that concerted efforts to
51
52 change culture and behavior must start at the top.
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

References

- 1
2
3
4
5
6 Aditya, R. & House, R. J. (2002). Interpersonal acumen and leadership across cultures: Pointers
7 from the GLOBE study. In R. E. Riggio & S. E. Murphy (Eds.), *Multiple intelligences and*
8 *leadership* (pp. 215-240). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- 9
10
11 Arellano-Gault, D., & Lepore, W. (2011). Transparency reforms in the public sector: Beyond the
12 new economics of organization. *Organization Studies*, 32, 1029-1050.
- 13
14 Arvey, R. D., & Ivancevich, J. M. (1980). Punishment in organizations: A review, propositions,
15 and research suggestions. *Academy of Management Review*, 5, 123-132.
- 16
17
18 Ashforth, B. E., & Anand, V. (2003). The normalization of corruption in organizations. In R. M.
19 Kramer & B. Staw (Eds.), *Research in Organizational Behavior*, vol. 25 (pp. 1-52).
20 Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- 21
22
23 Ashforth, B. E., Gioia, D. A., Robinson, S. L., & Treviño, L. K. (2008) Re-viewing
24 organizational corruption. *Academy of Management Review*, 33, 670–684.
- 25
26 Ashforth, B. E., & Kreiner, G. E. (1999) “How can you do it?”: Dirty work and the challenge of
27 constructing a positive identity, *The Academy of Management Review*, 24, 413-434.
- 28
29
30 Ashforth, B. E., & Kreiner, G. E. (2014). Dirty work and dirtier work: differences in countering
31 physical, social, and moral stigma. *Management and Organization Review*, 10, 81-108.
- 32
33
34 Atwater, L. E., Waldman, D. A., Carey, J. A., & Cartier, P. (2001). Recipient and observer
35 reactions to discipline: Are managers experiencing wishful thinking? *Journal of*
36 *Organizational Behavior*, 22, 249-270.
- 37
38
39 Azaola, E. (2009). The weaknesses of public security forces in Mexico City. *Professional Issues*
40 *in Criminal Justice*, 4, 9-34.
- 41
42
43 Bailey, J., & Paras, P. (2006). Perceptions and attitudes about corruption and democracy in
44 Mexico. *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos*, 22, 57-82.
- 45
46
47 Beehr, T. A., Johnson, L. B., & Nieva, R. (1995). Occupational stress: Coping of police and their
48 spouses. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 16, 3-25.
- 49
50
51 Bittner, E. (1970). *Functions of the Police in Modern Society*. Washington, DC: NIMH.
- 52
53
54 Bluhm, D. J., Harman, W., Lee, T. W., & Mitchell, T. R. (2011). Qualitative research in
55 management: a decade of progress. *Journal of Management Studies*, 48, 1866-1891.
- 56
57
58 Bond, M. H., Leung, K., Au, A., Tong, K. K., De Carrasquel, S. R., Murakami, F., & Sam, D. L.
59 (2004). Culture-level dimensions of social axioms and their correlates across 41
60 cultures. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 35, 548-570.

- 1
2
3
4 Botello, N. A., & Rivera, A. L. (2000). Everything in this job is money: Inside the Mexican
5 police. *World Policy Journal*, 17, 61-70.
6
- 7 Bowles, H. R., & Gelfand, M. (2010). Status and the evaluation of workplace deviance.
8 *Psychological Science*, 21, 49-54.
9
- 10 Britz, M. T. (1997). The police subculture and occupational socialization: Exploring individual
11 and demographic characteristics. *American Journal of Criminal Justice*, 21, 127-146.
12
- 13 Butterfield, K. D., Treviño, L. K., & Ball, G. A. (1996). Punishment from the manager's
14 perspective: A grounded investigation and inductive model. *Academy of Management*
15 *Journal*, 39, 1479-1512.
16
17
- 18 Cancino, J. M., & Enriquez, R. (2004). A qualitative analysis of officer peer retaliation:
19 Preserving the police culture. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies &*
20 *Management*, 27, 320-340.
21
22
- 23 Cassell, C., & Symon, G. (2004). *Essential guide to qualitative methods in organizational*
24 *research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
25
26
- 27 Cohen, D., Nisbett, R. E., Bowdle, B. F., & Schwarz, N. (1996). Insult, aggression, and the
28 southern culture of honor: an "experimental ethnography". *Journal of Personality and*
29 *Social Psychology*, 70, 945-960.
30
31
- 32 Costas, J. & Grey, C. (2014). Bringing secrecy into the open: Towards a theorization of the
33 social processes of organizational secrecy. *Organization Studies*, 23, 1423-1447.
34
- 35 Creswell, J. W., & Plano Clark, V. L. (2011). *Designing and conducting mixed methods research*
36 (2nd ed). Sage: Thousand Oaks, CA.
37
38
- 39 Crocker, J., & Major, B. (1989). Social stigma and self-esteem: The self-protective properties of
40 stigma. *Psychological Review*, 96, 608-630.
41
- 42 Cruz, J. M. (2010). Police misconduct and democracy in Latin America. *Americas Barometer*
43 *Insights*, 33, 1-5.
44
45
- 46 Daly, C., Heinle, K., & Shirk, D. A. (2012). Armed with impunity: Curbing military human
47 rights abuses in Mexico. *Special Report of the Trans-Border Institute*. San Diego: University
48 of San Diego.
49
- 50 Dick, P. (2005). Dirty work designations: How police officers account for their use of coercive
51 authority. *Human Relations*, 58, 1363-1390.
52
53
- 54 Drew, S. K., & Hulvey, M. (2007). Cops, crimes, and community policing. In S. K. Drew, M.
55 Mills, & B. M. Gassaway (Eds.). *Dirty work: The Social Construction of Taint*, (pp. 169-193).
56 Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3
4
5 Duarte, F. (2006). Exploring the interpersonal transaction of the Brazilian *jeitinho* in
6 bureaucratic contexts. *Organization*, 13, 509-527.
7
- 8 Frühling, H. (2007). The impact of international models of policing in Latin America: The case
9 of community policing. *Police Practice and Research*, 8, 125–144.
10
- 11 Gabriel, Y. (2012). Organizations in a state of darkness: Towards a theory of organizational
12 miasma. *Organization studies*, 33, 1137-1152.
13
- 14 Gino, F., & Pierce, L. (2009). The abundance effect: Unethical behavior in the presence of
15 wealth. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 109, 142-155.
16
- 17 Godfrey, R., Lilley, S., & Brewis, J. (2012). Biceps, bitches and borgs: Reading *Jarhead's*
18 representation of the construction of the (masculine) military body. *Organization*
19 *Studies*, 33, 541-562.
20
- 21 Goffman, E. (1963). *Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
22 Prentice-Hall.
23
- 24 Gordon, R., Clegg, S., & Kornberger, M. (2009). Embedded ethics: discourse and power in the
25 New South Wales police service. *Organization Studies*, 30, 73-99.
26
- 27 Greve, H. R., Palmer, D., & Pozner, J. E. (2010). Organizations gone wild: The causes,
28 processes, and consequences of organizational misconduct. *Academy of Management*
29 *Annals*, 4, 53-107.
30
- 31 Griffin, R. W., & Lopez, Y. P. (2005). "Bad behavior" in organizations: A review and typology
32 for future research. *Journal of Management*, 31, 988-1005.
33
- 34 Hofstede, G. (1998). Attitudes, values and organizational culture: Disentangling the
35 concepts. *Organization studies*, 19, 477-493.
36
- 37 Husted, B. W. (2002). Culture and international anti-corruption agreements in Latin
38 America. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 37, 413-422.
39
- 40 Ivkovic, S. K. (2005). Police (mis)behavior: A cross-cultural study of corruption seriousness.
41 *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, 28, 546-566.
42
- 43 Jong-Sung, Y., & Khagram, S. (2005). A comparative study of inequality and corruption.
44 *American Sociological Review*, 70, 136-157.
45
- 46 Kammeyer-Mueller, J. D., Simon, L. S., & Rich, B. L. (2012). The Psychic Cost of Doing
47 Wrong Ethical Conflict, Divestiture Socialization, and Emotional Exhaustion. *Journal of*
48 *Management*, 38, 784-808.
49
- 50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3
4 Kouchaki, M., Smith-Crowe, K., Brief, A. P., & Sousa, C. (2013). Seeing green: Mere exposure
5 to money triggers a business decision frame and unethical outcomes. *Organizational*
6 *Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 121, 53-61.
7
- 8 Kreiner, G. E., Ashforth, B. E., & Sluss, D. M. (2006). Identity dynamics in occupational dirty
9 work: Integrating social identity and system justification perspectives. *Organization Science*,
10 17, 619-636.
11
- 12 Lai, J. Y., Chan, K. W., & Lam, L. W. (2013). Defining who you are not: The roles of moral
13 dirtiness and occupational and organizational disidentification in affecting casino employee
14 turnover intention. *Journal of Business Research*, 66, 1659–1666.
15
16
- 17 LaRose, AP & Maddan, SA (2009). Reforming la policía: Looking to the future of policing in
18 Mexico. *Police Practice and Research*, 10, 333-348.
19
- 20 Lester, D., & Brink, W. T. (1985). Police solidarity and tolerance for police misbehavior.
21 *Psychological Reports*, 57, 326-326.
22
23
- 24 Leung, K., Bond, M. H., de Carrasquel, S. R., Muñoz, C., Hernández, M., Murakami, F., &
25 Singelis, T. M. (2002). Social axioms: The search for universal dimensions of general
26 beliefs about how the world functions. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 33, 286-302.
27
28
- 29 Linstead, S., Maréchal, G., & Griffin, R. W. (2014). Theorizing and researching the dark side of
30 organization. *Organization Studies*, 35, 165-188.
31
32
- 33 Major, B., & O'Brien, L.T. (2005). The social psychology of stigma. *Annual Review of*
34 *Psychology*, 56, 393-421.
35
36
- 37 Manning, P. K. (1978). Lying, secrecy, and social control. In P. K. Manning and J. Van Maanen
38 (Eds.) *Policing: A View from the Streets* (pp. 115-128). New York: Random House.
39
- 40 Manning, P. K. (2008). Goffman on organizations. *Organization Studies*, 29, 677-699.
41
42
- 43 Mars, G. (1982). *Cheats at work: An anthropology of occupational crime*. London: Allen and
44 Unwin.
45
- 46 Newburn, T., & Webb, B. (1999). *Understanding and preventing police corruption: Lessons*
47 *from the literature*. London: Research Development Statistics.
48
49
- 50 Paredes, A. (1971). The United States, Mexico, and "Machismo". *Journal of the Folklore*
51 *Institute*, 8, 17-37.
52
- 53 Park, H., Blenkinsopp, J., Oktem, M. K., & Omurgonulsen, U. (2008). Cultural orientation and
54 attitudes toward different forms of whistleblowing: A comparison of South Korea, Turkey,
55 and the UK. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 82, 929-939.
56
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3
4 Pérez Martínez, H. (2002). Los refranes del hablar mexicano en el siglo XX [The proverbs of
5 Mexican speech in the XX century]. México: El Colegio de Michoacán.
6
- 7 Peterson, M. F., & Søndergaard, M. (2011). Traditions and transitions in quantitative societal
8 culture research in organization studies. *Organization Studies*, 32, 1539-1558.
9
- 10 Perrott, S. B., & Taylor, D. M. (1994). Ethnocentrism and authoritarianism in the police:
11 Challenging stereotypes and reconceptualizing ingroup identification. *Journal of Applied*
12 *Social Psychology*, 24, 1640-1664.
13
14
- 15 Pinel, E. C. (1999). Stigma consciousness: The psychological legacy of social stereotypes.
16 *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 76, 114-128.
17
18
- 19 Pinel, E. C., & Paulin, N. (2005). Stigma consciousness at work. *Basic and Applied Social*
20 *Psychology*, 27, 345-352.
21
22
- 23 Pinto, J., Leana, C. R., & Pil, F. K. (2008). Corrupt organizations or organizations of corrupt
24 individuals? Two types of organizational-level corruption. *Academy of Management Review*,
25 33, 685-709.
26
- 27 Podsakoff, P. M., Bommer, W. H., Podsakoff, N. P., & MacKenzie, S. B. (2006). Relationships
28 between leader reward and punishment behavior and subordinate attitudes, perceptions, and
29 behaviors: A meta-analytic review of existing and new research. *Organizational Behavior*
30 *and Human Decision Processes*, 99, 113-142.
31
32
- 33 Prenzler, T., & Drew, J. (2013). Women police in post-Fitzgerald Queensland: A 20 year
34 review. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 72, 459-472.
35
36
- 37 Punch, M. (2003). Rotten orchards: "Pestilence," police misconduct and system failure. *Policing*
38 *and Society*, 13, 171-196.
39
- 40 Robinson, S. L., & Bennett, R. J. (1995). A typology of deviant workplace behaviors: A
41 multidimensional scaling study. *Academy of Management Journal*, 38: 555-572.
42
43
- 44 Rosenbaum, M. S., & Kuntze, R. (2003). The relationship between anomie and unethical retail
45 disposition. *Psychology & Marketing*, 20, 1067-1093.
46
47
- 48 Rubinstein, J. (1973). *City police*. New York: Hill and Wang.
49
- 50 Sabet, D. (2012). *Police reform in Mexico: Informal politics and the challenge of institutional*
51 *change*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
52
- 53 Sanchez, J. I., Gomez, C., & Wated, G. (2008). A value-based framework for understanding
54 managerial tolerance of bribery in Latin America. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 83, 341-352.
55
56
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3
4 Sarchione, C. D., Cuttler, M. J., Muchinsky, P. M. & Nelson-Gray, R. O. (1998). Prediction of
5 dysfunctional job behaviors among law enforcement officers. *Journal of Applied*
6 *Psychology*, 83, 904-912.
7
- 8 Schaffer, B. S., & Riordan, C. M. (2003). A review of cross-cultural methodologies for
9 organizational research: A best-practices approach. *Organizational Research Methods*, 6,
10 169-215.
11
- 12 Schein, E. H. (2006). From brainwashing to organizational therapy: A conceptual and empirical
13 journey in search of 'systemic' health and a general model of change dynamics. A drama in
14 five acts. *Organization studies*, 27, 287-301.
15
16
- 17 Schneider, B. (1987). The people make the place. *Personnel Psychology*, 40, 437-453.
18
- 19 Sellers, J. M. (1994). *Folk wisdom of Mexico*. San Francisco: Chronicle Books.
20
- 21 Shapin, S. (2001). Proverbial economies: How an understanding of some linguistic and social
22 features of common sense can throw light on more prestigious bodies of knowledge, science
23 for example. *Social Studies of Science*, 31, 731-769.
24
25
26
- 27 Skogan, W., & Frydl K. (2004). *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence*.
28 Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
29
- 30 Suárez de Garay, M. E. S. (2005). Armados, enrejados, desconfiados. Tres breves lecturas sobre
31 la cultura policial mexicana. *Política y sociedad* [Armed, behind bars, and distrustful...
32 three short lectures on Mexican police culture. *Politics and Society*], 42, 87-102.
33
34
- 35 Tashakkori, A., & Teddlie, C. (2010). *Sage handbook of mixed methods in social & behavioral*
36 *research* (2nd ed) Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
37
38
- 39 Treviño, L. K., Weaver, G. R., & Reynolds, S. J. (2006). Behavioral ethics in organizations: A
40 review. *Journal of Management*, 32, 951-990.
41
42
- 43 Trice, H. M. (1993). *Occupational subcultures in the workplace*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
44 Press.
45
- 46 Trostle, L. C. (2005). Police solidarity and tolerance for police misbehavior, revisited.
47 *Psychological Reports*, 96, 26-28.
48
- 49 Tsui, A. S. (2007). From homogenization to pluralism: International management research in the
50 academy and beyond. *Academy of Management Journal*, 50, 1353-1364.
51
52
- 53 Uildriks, N. (2010). *Mexico's unruly law: Implementing human rights in police and judicial*
54 *reform under democratization*. Lanham, MA: Lexington Books.
55
56
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3
4 Van Maanen, J. (1975). Police socialization: A longitudinal examination of job attitudes in an
5 urban police department. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 20, 207-228.
6
- 7 Van Maanen, J. (1978). Kinsmen in repose: Occupational perspectives of patrolmen. In P. K.
8 Manning and J. Van Maanen (Eds.) *Policing: A View from the Streets* (pp. 115-128). New
9 York: Random House.
10
- 11 Wang, L., & Murnighan, J. K. (2011). On Greed. *Academy of Management Annals*, 5, 279-316.
12
- 13 Warren, D. E. (2003). Constructive and destructive deviance in organizations. *Academy of*
14 *Management Review*, 28, 622-632.
15
16
- 17 Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Sokolowska, J. (1998). What folklore tells us about risk and risk
18 taking: Cross-cultural comparisons of American, German, and Chinese proverbs.
19 *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 75, 170-186.
20
21
- 22 Welch, C., Piekkari, R., Plakoyiannaki, E., & Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, E. (2011). Theorising
23 from case studies: Towards a pluralist future for international business research. *Journal of*
24 *International Business Studies*, 42, 740-762.
25
26
- 27 Westmarland, L. (2005). Police ethics and integrity: Breaking the blue code of silence. *Policing*
28 *and Society*, 15, 145-165.
29
30
- 31 Wolfe, S. E., & Piquero, A. R. (2011). Organizational justice and police misconduct. *Criminal*
32 *Justice and Behavior*, 38, 332-353.
33
- 34 Xin, K. K., & Pearce, J. L. (1996). Guanxi: Connections as substitutes for formal institutional
35 support. *Academy of Management Journal*, 39, 1641-1658.
36
37
- 38 Yau, O. H. M. (1994). *Consumer behaviour in China: Customer satisfaction and cultural values*,
39 London: Routledge.
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

CULTURAL BELIEFS AND STIGMA CONSCIOUSNESS

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

Variables	Mean	S.D.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1 Reprimands	1.18	1.79											
2 Absenteeism	.84	1.26	-.03										
3 Turnover	--	--	-.03	.18*									
4 Tenure	7.44	6.79	.10	.15*	.09								
5 Gender	--	--	.09	.01	.17*	-.14**							
6 Workplace Injury	--	--	-.01	.28*	.13	.25**	-.06						
7 Greed	2.22	.86	-.07	-.06	.06	.12*	-.02	.03	(.85)				
8 Toughness	2.77	.97	-.08	-.09	.09	.04	.04	.04	.48**	(.81)			
9 Wariness	3.00	.94	-.05	.06	.09	.09	-.03	.09	.41**	.62**	(.77)		
10 Savvy	3.23	1.00	-.02	.00	.07	.07	-.04	.02	.50**	.56**	.56**	(.70)	
11 Stigma Consciousness	3.45	.94	-.01	-.07	.14*	.06	-.09	.08	.40**	.36**	.35**	.24**	(.70)

Note: N = 352 (N = 192 for variables 1-3) Two-tailed tests. Coefficient alphas are in parentheses along the diagonal. Absenteeism is a logarithmic transformation. Turnover is coded left = 1, stayed = 0. Gender is coded female = 1, male = 0. Workplace injury is coded yes = 1, no = 0. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$

Table 2

Regression Analyses Results for Reprimands

Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Tenure	.11	.12
Gender	.05	.07
Greed	-.08	-.10
Toughness	-.08	-.01
Wariness	-.03	-.04
Savvy	.08	.03
Stigma	.07	.05
<i>Interactions</i>		
Greed x Stigma Consciousness		-.01
Toughness x Stigma Consciousness		-.24*
Wariness x Stigma Consciousness		-.03
Savvy x Stigma Consciousness		.22*
R ²	.02	.07
R ² change		.05*

Note: Results are standardized regression coefficients, * $p < .05$.

Table 3

Regression Analyses Results for Absenteeism

Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Tenure	.13	.12
Gender	.04	.07
On-the-job Injury	.25**	.25**
Greed	-.08	-.06
Toughness	-.16	-.22
Wariness	.22†	.21
Savvy	-.00	.02
Stigma Consciousness	-.13	-.11
<i>Interactions</i>		
Greed x Stigma Consciousness		-.06
Toughness x Stigma Consciousness		.24
Wariness x Stigma Consciousness		-.08
Savvy x Stigma Consciousness		-.22*
R ²	.13	.17
R ² change		.04*

Note: Results are standardized regression coefficients, † $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$.

Table 4

Logistic Regression Analysis Results for Turnover

Variables	B	SE	Wald	Model Statistics
<i>Step 1</i>				
Tenure	.03	.03	1.55	
Gender	1.68**	.59	8.00	
On-the-job Injury	.55	.41	1.75	
Greed	-.18	.27	.47	
Toughness	-.03	.27	.01	
Wariness	.05	.26	.04	
Savvy	.16	.25	.41	
Stigma Consciousness	.40†	.22	3.37	
-2 Log Likelihood Estimate				197.67
Chi Square				15.18
Pseudo R ²				.11
<i>Model 1 - Step 2</i>				
Tenure	.04	.03	2.11	
Gender	1.94**	.67	8.50	
On-the-job Injury	.65	.43	2.25	
Greed	.22	.32	.46	
Toughness	-.08	.37	.04	
Wariness	.32	.29	1.27	
Savvy	-.21	.31	.45	
Stigma	.37	.26	2.03	
Greed x Stigma Consciousness	-1.09**	.40	7.29	
Toughness x Stigma Consciousness	-.02	.37	.00	
Wariness x Stigma Consciousness	-.73*	.30	5.71	
Savvy x Stigma Consciousness	.89*	.35	6.34	
-2 Log Likelihood Estimate				180.22
Chi Square				14.38
Pseudo R ²				.24

Note: Pseudo R² computed using Nagelkerke method. Overall correct classification of stayers and leavers was 75.4%, † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60




Figure 1. The relationship between beliefs about questionable conduct and reprimands moderated by stigma consciousness.




Figure 2. The relationship between beliefs about questionable conduct and absenteeism moderated by stigma consciousness

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60




Figure 3. The relationship between beliefs about questionable conduct and (log odds) turnover moderated by stigma consciousness.

Appendix
The Mexican Cultural Beliefs about Questionable Conduct scale

Proverb	EFA Factor Loading
<i>Greed</i>	
God gives us money, only fools work to get it	0.69
Whatever falls here stays here	0.68
The one who pays, rules	0.67
The pig with the biggest mouth gets the best corn	0.65
The dog dances with money (<i>money can accomplish anything</i>)	0.63
The smart eat from the dumb, and the dumb only from their work	0.59
Even if coming from dirty hands, money always smell like roses	0.59
For those who have money, even their farts smell good	0.58
<i>Toughness</i>	
Cowards never fill graveyards (<i>as if stated by a valiant person</i>)	0.71
Fear is like blood, it runs in all veins (<i>as if stated by a valiant person</i>)	0.64
If your tail is made of grass, don't approach the fire	0.61
If they smell that you are scared you are screwed	0.56
For a coward, fear is mere prudence (<i>as if stated by a valiant person</i>)	0.55
<i>Wariness</i>	
You should not stir the waters you do not intend to drink (<i>stay away from what is none of your business</i>)	0.71
You don't judge what you can't see	0.70
Shit: either try it or cover it	0.63
Under distrust you have security	0.63
For trust and secrets there are no subjects (<i>trust no one</i>)	0.49
<i>Savvy</i>	
Better to be in good standing than in good sitting (<i>good sitting means clout, good sitting means a job title</i>)	0.68
Better to have guile than to be strong	0.63
Shame is to steal and get caught (<i>but it is not shameful to steal and not get caught</i>)	0.61
Without oil, machines don't run (<i>do not do a favor without reciprocity or gain</i>)	0.57

Note: The Spanish version is available upon request. Wording in parentheses is for interpretation and not part of the scale.