11-2013

The status of women and the Arab Spring

Karen Pimentel

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THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND THE ARAB SPRING

BY

KAREN PIMENTEL

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY OF THE COLLEGE OF
LIBERAL ARTS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES

WITH CONCENTRATION IN SOCIOLOGY

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THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND THE ARAB SPRING

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THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT BROWNSVILLE

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KAREN PIMENTEL
NOVEMBER 2013
The Status of Women and the Arab Spring

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Abstract:

The social movement known as the Arab Spring brings together various groups, including educated women, demanding the overthrow of decades-old dictatorial regimes. It begins in Tunisia and then extends to neighboring Arab-speaking countries of North Africa, Egypt and Libya. Similar social, cultural, and economic conditions are conducive to the unfolding of a single social movement across national borders. After the successful overthrow of dictatorships, groups that collaborated in it, clash against each other. Despite the fact that the movement was initiated by middle-class youth advocating a Western-style model of democracy, Muslims succeed in gaining control of “democratic,” majority-rule governments in Egypt and Tunisia. Military force is needed to put down the rise of militant Islam. The goals, including women’s rights, advocated by secular-modernistic-democratic sectors of the population are not attained and Islam surges with renewed vigor in a continued but muted post Arab Spring period of unrest.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The social movement called the Arab Spring comes at a time of broader and more intense contact among nations and cultures. Traditional patterns of life are upset by the penetration of foreign cultures that maintain and advocate values of personal utility in a marketplace that offers an ever greater supply of material and cultural products for consumption. The West and, particularly, the United States, have opened wide doors of long-standing cultural isolation. Western culture, including values of democracy and freedom, education and personal development, high standards of material enjoyment, pleasures to be found in life along with styles of being and behavior, has raised the expectations of people everywhere on the planet. The Arab and Islamic world is faced with challenges that generate admiration and contempt. Women in the Middle East, particularly, find themselves at a crossroads of intense social and personal conflict. This thesis will examine the Arab Spring on the groundwork of previous generations, not as a unique event that appears in our present, but as the culmination of a process lasting more than a thousand years of human history.

For many years the Middle East has been a region of intense economic, social and political unrest. A period of social and political upheaval that began in Tunisia on December 17, 2010, quickly spread to neighboring countries of North Africa and then on to other countries of the larger Middle East, including Jordan, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates and Syria. In the latter the popular revolt has become a full-blown civil war with much broader international implications. At the time of this writing, the movement seems
to have extended to Turkey, a majority Muslim country that straddles the geographic separation between Europe and Asia, usually considered democratic and stable. This movement, initially called “Arab Spring,” appears to be the result of repressed social anxieties felt by large sectors of the region’s population that found the opportunity to be expressed in mass demonstrations of unprecedented force that challenged the legitimacy of long-standing dictatorial regimes. Mass protests have raised the hope of advancement in human rights, particularly those of women. Perhaps the most visible obstacles to change in the Middle East lie in religious traditions and long-standing practices of authoritarian rule. Authoritarian rule is characterized by the concentration of state power in the hands of a leader and a small group of associates not elected by the people. A semblance of democracy is maintained by periodic elections in which the outcome is assured through manipulation and fraud. Authoritarian rule is often exercised by a dictator who may have charismatic qualities and rules with the support of the military.

This thesis is a study of the Arab Spring Movement as a contemporary historical event utilizing sociological theory as a guide. By tracing the movement since its inception for a period of three years, from country to country—Tunisia, Egypt and Libya—this thesis seeks to make a contribution to such sociological theory. This is further validated by the fact that this study focuses on the participation of women in a process of such vast implications. Studies of women’s liberation movements have been generally confined to the attainment of reforms within Western nation- states. Here I am focusing on a social phenomenon of cross-national and cross-cultural reach which may have implications for change in the basic structure of Middle Eastern societies. In other words, the women’s
movement in dominant Muslim societies has intimations of truly revolutionary change in the basic social structure of the region.

As a theoretical guide to explain the sociology of the Arab Spring I have chosen Neil Smelser’s general framework of analysis for social movements and collective behavior (Smelser, 1962). A full discussion of it will precede my analysis of the events that began in Tunis on December 17, 2010.

Looking at the world as a whole it appears that a majority of states, poor and rich, first and third world, urban and rural, have advanced toward some form of democracy, except the Arab states (Diamond, 2003). Some journalists have dubbed the Arab Spring as the fourth wave of democratization (Elhusseini, 2013). Democratization is the transition to a more socially representative order sometimes following civil revolt, a revolution, or imposition by foreign intervention. This process is influenced by social, political, economic and historical factors. Democracy is a political system that promotes active civil participation, protects human rights, replaces governments by free and fair elections, and promotes individual autonomy, civil liberties and the rule of law (Stanford.edu; Rummels, 2002). Democratization in the Middle East offers a distinct difficulty as Islam is the cultural foundation of the region. Islam’s basic tenet is the submission to God, and in most Muslim states this submission appears to be transferred to rulers—religious or not— who may lead autocratic regimes. Liberal rights such as dissent, carry with them the intimation of apostasy, as they may question the obedience to rulers assumed to represent Islamic traditions of explicit or implicit divinely sanctioned authority.
For centuries the condition of women in Middle Eastern Islamic societies has been characterized by a lack of individual autonomy. Ideally, individual autonomy within Western democracies is understood as the right of a person to be independent, to live life according to reasons of one's own and not constrained by external forces other than nation-state secular rules, to enjoy the freedom to express oneself, and not to be someone else’s property. All this limited by the framework of laws that guarantee the same rights and privileges, without distinction, to all members of society. The foundation of such democracy is secular philosophy and not religious dogma. Within Christianity, by and large, the separation of church and state is deemed to be a fundamental principle of civil society. On the other hand, political rights within conservative Islam are thought to be divinely granted and, as such, unchangeable. This has led to a culture of persistent discrimination and inequality towards women. There is as yet a lack of scholarly analysis about the condition of women following the overthrow of dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Inevitably, a thesis focusing on the condition of women in this North African region assumes that the status of women in the modern nations of the West can be a standard in terms of which women’s status elsewhere in the world can be measured. This is not to say that the status of Western women is “ideal,” but it does represent the achievement of modern liberal ideology that recognizes individual rights of significance to women and legitimizes their opportunity to attain social, economic and political equality with relation to men.

A period of chaotic confrontations has largely left women, for the most part, out of the visibly active roles which were evident in the initial stages of the movement. What
has been accomplished is the fact that large sectors of the population have been mobilized in pursuit of goals seldom considered possible before, but such goals have become deeply differentiated. Islamic fundamentalists have surged from a dormant state imposed on them by secular dictatorships, to forcefully demand the application of religious principles by agencies of the state.

The aim of this thesis is to understand the social, economic, and political conditions of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya to explain the Arab Spring movement’s progression and what it could mean for the condition of women. I will analyze the organization and aims of various religious groups and their influence before and during the movement. I will also identify women’s organizations participating in the protests and the goals they pursue. Smelser analyzes the emergence of a social movement by isolating six determining factors or conditions that must be present for it to occur: structural conduciveness, structural strain, generalized beliefs, precipitating factors, mobilization for action, and the operation of social control.

The value-added theory refers to the increasing importance of goals to be attained as the movement advances through stages of collective action. Social movements begin with a period of active disorder following a precipitating crisis that spontaneously mobilizes people. The active disorder merges diverse groups that are unified by a common sentiment of critique and opposition to the established power. When governments are toppled various factions become divided by differences about what should be done next. The process of largely spontaneous social action is called “collective behavior.” But, beyond the highly emotional and heroic actions of
undifferentiated masses may lie the hopes and aspirations of different groups who sense the opportunity for change and the fulfillment of their dreams. The dreams of many educated women in these societies for individual autonomy and freedom have been a significant force for social action toward change. Collective behavior, a necessary component of social movements, is defined as the actions undertaken by members of a society who are united by a sense of grievance toward a system they define as oppressive and even corrupt in its overt or covert suppression of their right to express themselves and live according to values they consider just. Such members of society adopt strategies of action in pursuit of goals consistent with their values, they organize themselves to exchange information and to coordinate action. Social movements generate episodic and protracted acts of protest and rebellion of the type sociologists call collective behavior. Social movements may pursue reforms that do not transform the basic institutional foundations of society but, sometimes, they may become powerful forces that seek to transform society in fundamental ways, which is to say, revolutions.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Since the Arab Spring is an ongoing process, which has extended well beyond its original countries to engulf most of the broader Middle East leading to a bloody civil war in Syria, still unresolved, and threatening to cast Lebanon and Iran into violent internal and international confrontations, not to mention the breakdown of a quasi-democratic resolution attained in Egypt, comprehensive works of social science analysis are as yet scarce. There is, however, an abundant supply of mostly documentary and descriptive materials that give accounts from various perspectives of events taking place every day. In some significant ways this thesis is opening new ground. It is analyzing a large international social movement with broad implications for truly revolutionary change. To be sure, it is a rather small sector of educated women, which has been actively involved in the movement. While I present a picture of the larger social forces operating in various countries, I focus on the particular problems faced by these women who must face not only the forces of a traditional and paternalistic religious culture, but also consider diverse definitions of what it means to be a female person in the contemporary world. While world standards of contemporary personhood may be Western in origin and non-Islamic, “freedom” has also been defined, or redefined, in conservative and even Islamic fundamentalist terms, thus dividing women as a social force even within a movement that could be called liberationist.

Research by social scientists including sociologists, on the Arab Spring covering the period 2010-2013, deal for the most part with the establishment of democratic institutions, the effects of the movement on the economy, the expansion of civil liberties,
and the role played by Islam in the process. The causes and goals of the movement are prominent in the works by Springborg (2011); Salime (2010); Bix (2011); Laramont, (2012); Dajani (2011); Salih (2013). Each of these studies focuses on a particular country explaining the uprising as the consequence of economic, social and political grievances largely ignored by the dictatorial regimes under popular attack. Kamal Eldin Osman Salih (2013) analyzes the nature of the regimes ousted during the Arab Spring. Salih finds that the repressive and violent character of each of the ousted regimes was among the major factors leading up protests. Other factors prevalent in his analysis include economic deprivation, corruption, and suppressed individual liberties. Building on Mohammed Farazmond (2011), Salih analyzes both structural and direct events triggering the protests. The author goes on to discuss the need for a political methodology that would explain people’s loss of fear in the pursuit of a restored sense of dignity. Of importance for the fulfillment of this thesis is an analysis of the structural factors leading to the protests and the structuring of a social movement. These factors include state oppression, repression of civil liberties, marginalization from the political processes of a properly functioning democracy, and the continued economic disadvantages and lack of opportunities experienced by many people, particularly of women.

Important studies published since 2010 deal with the role of Islam in the processes of modernization and democratization pursued by the Arab Spring: Abbasi (2012); Haas & Sigona (2012); Chertoff and Green (2012); Dalacoura (2012); Totten (2012); Rachwani (2012); Hamoudi (2012). Arshad M. Abassi (2012) analyzes the
interplay between democratic ideals and the Muslim ideology from a historical vantage point. Abassi evaluates various Islamic groups and Islamic political parties and any correlations among them and democratic principles. The author delineates democratic aspirations in the Arab world through Western colonial rule. Democracy is pitted against Islamic ideals because it is seen as a Western construct. Western interests in the Arab world would be threatened by Islamic rule in the region. Instead of providing support towards democratic ideals in the region, the West supported the current autocratic rulers.

Of importance for this thesis is the analysis of Islamic groups and political parties as they relate to democracy. As Arab societies hold Muslim majorities, Islam has powerful relevance for the establishment of democratic institutions.

The direct and indirect, tacit or explicit, participation of foreign countries, more prominently Western, in the movement is addressed by Erekat (2012); Taheri (2011); Khondker (2011); Hamoudi (2012); Bix (2011). Haider Ala Hamoudi (2012) analyzes the duality of the attitudes and policies about Western democratization of the region. The author discusses the paradoxical relationship between Western democratic ideal and the West’s authoritarian imposition. During the Arab Spring uprisings foreign intervention was necessary in Libya. Western international and humanitarian aid has been necessary as some states begin a democratic transition. This article analyzes various foreign interventions in the region and their effects on state policies and internal political processes. Of importance to this thesis is the analysis of externally imposed forms of “democracy” particularly U.S. interventions to advance its own national interests. The definition of democratic revolutions, through internal and external means discussed in
this article are useful to outline the tentative steps toward democracy in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.

A few published articles analyze the popular mandates in transitional governments installed since the outbreak of the Arab Spring and their effect on democratization: Liolos (2013); Downes (2011); Aziz (2013); Amar (2011). Sahar F. Aziz (2013) analyzes Egypt’s election laws before and after the January 25 revolution. The author finds that the election laws following the ouster of Mubarak are still insufficiently transparent. The new election laws continue to marginalize voters and prevent minorities from civic participation. Of importance to this thesis is the analysis of election laws as they reflect a move toward democratization after the overthrow of Mubarak and before the military overthrow of Morsi. This will be used to assess the condition of women in the public political sphere. John Liolos (2013) discusses the necessary elements that national constitutions should contain. Liolos distinguishes between aspirational and functional elements within constitutions; aspirational elements articulate the state’s commitment towards democratic ideals, whereas functional elements articulate the rules of governance. Post Arab Spring states must contain aspirational elements that promote and defend democratic goals. The article also outlines the past constitutions of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and outlines the aspirational and functional elements necessary in each state’s constitution to further promote democratic ideals. Analysis of past constitutions would make possible a comparison with newly drafted constitutions.
Of importance for the methodology utilized in this thesis are studies dealing with the role played by social media outlets: Castells (2012); Marzouki, Skandrani-Marzouki, Bejaoui, Hammoudi, and Bellay (2012); Forstenlechner, Rutledge, and Alnuaimi (2012); Khondker (2011). Yousri Marzouki, Ines Skandrani-Marzouki, Moez Bejaoui, Haythem Hammoudi, and Tarek Bellaj (2012) analyze the role social media played in Tunisian protests. The authors analyze the extensive use of Facebook during the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. The article claims that Facebook was a major catalyst for the protests. The authors developed a questionnaire for online survey on the use of Facebook and its importance to promote protests. 352 online anonymous men and women participated in this study; the vast majority of the participants used Facebook daily, and believed it was a major political tool used to organize and spark the 2011 revolution. Habibul Haque Khondker (2011) also analyzes the importance of social media outlets to the Arab Spring movement. Khondker remarkably finds that although the region is not as industrialized and economically advanced, there has been an increased use of technological media outlets. These outlets helped give form to the movement as it progressed from Tunisia to Egypt to Libya, and so on. Of methodological importance to this thesis is the intensive use of social media to link and unify collective action. As the participants of the Arab Spring were largely secular youth, social media outlets like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and MySpace have become a powerful tool for collective behavior. These outlets have provided marginal groups, like women, the opportunity to play a more inclusive role in the movement.
Manuel Castells’ *Networks of Outrage and Hope* (2012) deserves particular mention as a sociological analysis of the social media’s importance in unifying collective action especially as women used it to advance their interests. College educated young people figure promptly as actors using such media.

Women’s participation in the movement, their grievances, their goals, and their activist participation, are described and analyzed by: Harod-Basch (2011); Detzner-Middleton, Slutzker, Sokol-Chapple, and Mahmood (2011); Amar (2011); Moghadam (2012); Khamis (2011); Fassin (2011); Lughod-Abu and El-Mahdi (2011); NCAFP (2011); Coleman (2011); Amar (2011). It is important to note that these studies on the condition of women are rather sketchy as though the issue of women’s status was not of much significance. Only one study by Heidi Harod-Basch (2011), gives prominence to the historical women’s rights struggle. This study refers only to the beginning of the protests, and does not include the 2013 developments, particularly in Egypt. For the most part attention is called to the differences between women participating in the movement and those marginal to it. This article analyzes the struggle for women’s rights in Kuwait, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. The brief analysis does not include a comprehensive analysis of women’s participation during and since the Arab Spring. It leaves the academic reader with the expectation that the current movement may bring change, but it offers no concrete discussion of it. Paul Amar (2011) analyzed the persecution women faced before the Arab Spring protests in Egypt. Amar analyzes sexual harassment and highlights the need for gender-sensitive security forces in Egypt. It also explains the use of sexual assault and harassment against women as a way to punish and
limit their political dissent and participation. Forms of increasing assertive women’s rights agencies appeared during the Arab Spring both domestically and internationally. The article analyzes early international laws and policies developed to protect women as they participated in reform movements in their own countries. Of importance to this thesis is the role that feminist organizations, national and international, have played throughout the movement. The increase in gender violence reflects the deep-rooted rejection of women when they appear in the public sphere. This is important as the condition of women is analyzed before during and after the movement on the assumption that progress towards democracy will be of benefit for women.

It is evident that there is a lack of comprehensive sociological research that analyzes the Arab Spring as a social, political, economic, and cultural phenomenon and, even less, analyzing the continuing struggle for women’s rights in the region. The women’s movement is not seen as a social movement on its own, but a minor process within the larger Arab Spring movement. Thus, the Arab Spring can then be looked at as a revolutionary movement and the Women’s Movements as a subsidiary reform movement, assisting revolution as it attempts to be part of a basic transformation in social values, and reformist as it seeks an accommodation for women within it. This thesis will provide a comprehensive analysis of the Arab Spring, and the condition of women within it in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. This analysis will build on the studies already done and emphasize the reformist aspects of the social movement as they pertain to the expansion of women’s rights. This thesis will contribute to the understanding of the women’s rights
movement within the context of the Arab Spring movement in its social, political, economic, technological, and international dimensions.
III. THEORY

1. Social Movements Theory

A social movement is defined as an organized effort to promote or resist change in a society relying in part on political action, resource availability, and social cohesion. Two aspects of collective behavior that relate to a social movement include collective behavior theories and strain theories. Collective behavior theories are explanations based on rapid social change. Strain theories stem from shared individual frustration over a period of time caused by various combinations of political, economic and social stress. Collective behavior theory asserts that groups of people who share stress and interests will adopt organizational strategies to build a movement and change society or institutions within it. This theory utilizes the concept of crowd behavior, which involves episodes of spontaneous action in public places necessary to call attention to demands for change which is deemed just and necessary. This theory emphasizes an evolutionary tendency or imprint for people to cooperate in pursuit of shared goals. It explains that a mass of individuals can become a group united in time and space to press for change according to what participants think is just and necessary. A social movement will develop out of the collectively shared definition of the situation and the place of individuals within it.

Theories of social movements include: relative deprivation, resource mobilization, culture, political process, organizing for action, mass society, among others. Relative deprivation theory states social movements arise from the frustration of being deprived of something physically, mentally or culturally compared to others; Resource mobilization
theory asserts social movements arise not from grievances but from disparate access and control of scarce resources, whether economic, political, cultural or human. Culture theory analyzes social movements generated by collective beliefs or ideologies within society. Political process theory analyzes social movements by the political opportunities available. Organizational theory analyzes social movements from an organizational structural standpoint by emphasizing their importance in social transformation. Mass society theory analyzes the process whereby isolated groups, perhaps minorities may become unified by mass media.

This thesis is a systematic approach to the understanding of contemporary historical events utilizing the conceptual framework of sociological theory.

2. **Collective Behavior Theories**

Collective behavior occurs when people are drawn to social interactions in response to a perceived hostile environment. A hostile environment is created around a social problem that the established order, through its controlling elite supported by large sectors of the population, regard normal and legitimate. However, some sector or sectors of the population, define them otherwise. A process of communication follows whereby the latter become consolidated as a block of opinion and dissent. Collective behavior will be discussed in this thesis as an event or events of spontaneous action of resistance, protest and/or aggression against agencies or symbols of the established order. During the initial protests of the Arab Spring, the problem was defined as a lack of economic opportunity, repressed individual freedom, and cultural stagnation. However, Islamic
fundamentalist groups reacted to what they thought was the State’s sponsorship of change contrary to the moral precepts of Islam. Collective behavior begins as rumors, panics and mass hysteria that lead to the formation of crowds and mobs that operate nullifying individual judgment. Crowds are defined as a temporary group of individuals who are close enough in space and time to interact as a social unit. Crowds vary from casual, conventional, expressive, acting, to solidaristic yet organized collectivities. The Arab Spring was composed of both acting and solidaristic crowds as they were unified by the single goal of opposition to the dictatorship, protested and rioted. Mobs are emotionally aroused crowds with the potential for violence. Panics tend to be associated with disasters as they are reactions to real or perceived threats. Rumors are defined as unverified information communicated from person to person quickly. Mass hysteria is understood to be widespread anxiety caused by an irrational belief or definition of a situation.

Collective behavior can be energized by a variety of factors. These include psychological factors that predispose individuals toward collective action, social structural conditions that encourage active participation, and frustration or aggression as a response to strain or anger towards political, economic, or social deprivations. Activism emerges from strong positive attitudes towards collective action. This can stem from prior experience with activism, membership in activist organizations or groups, or reaction to social constraints on one’s willingness and ability to act in opposition to existing conditions.

Some theories of collective behavior include contagion theory, convergence theory and emergent norm theory. Contagion theory holds that individuals imitate
behaviors they see in others within certain social situations; this is understood as a “herd mentality”. Convergence theory affirms that collective behavior results from the shared interpretation of events perceived by people. Emergent norm theory holds that collective behavior is guided by new norms that change prevailing culture. During protests like those of the Arab Spring, new norms would emerge out of the shared experiences of participation in collective behaviors. These norms will guide protesters’ behavior throughout the movement and dictate what is acceptable and what is not.

Neil Smelser’s theory of collective behavior or value-added theory analyzes collective behavior as it relieves socioeconomic and political strain when people are unable to do so through conventional channels within society. Smelser named his theory of collective behavior “value added” theory because there is a need for a combination of all necessary conditions for collective behavior to take form as a process; this provides a blueprint for the structured analysis of collective behavior or behaviors within a social movement. Societal values provide the general ideological framework for state organization; norms follow by providing the general rules that define the rights and duties of individuals; structured organizations provide the roles and relationships with which social action is facilitated. Finally, situational facilities provide the means for meaningful social interaction for collective behavior to occur. According to Smelser’s value added theory, collective behavior arises from collective values, norms, social organization and resources. It seeks to reduce the indeterminacy of collective behavior in social movements. He differentiates between collective outbursts and collective movements. Collective outbursts are defined by Smelser as panics, crazes and episodes of hostile
outbursts. Collective movements on the other hand have a goal to modify norms or values in a given society. Collective behavior, inherent in collective movements, is defined as the mobilization towards the modification, recreation, or protection of norms or values in the name of a generalized belief. Social movements are collective movements as understood by the larger public.

According to Smelser’s theory there are six conditions necessary to develop a social movement. These conditions include structural conduciveness, structural strain, generalized beliefs, precipitating factors, mobilization for action, and the breakdown of social control. The *structural conduciveness* concerns the possibility for demanding changes to the norms or rules within society’s classes. Structural conduciveness is the reception that these changes receive at the political level. When there is a lack of differentiation, protests against social values arises. The *structural strain* concerns the overwhelming tension felt by the society and social institutions. *Generalized beliefs* concerns the cohesive definition of what the social problem is. Through technological globalization, internet usage provides a mechanism for immediate worldwide connection. Common ideologies can also provide inclusive definitions or slogans that enhance the groups’ collective awareness and solidarity. The *precipitating factors* concern the specific actions that sparked the movement. The *mobilization for action* concerns the call to arms for people to unite. Since the movement may require a reconstruction of the entire social order from top to bottom, the mobilization for action may relate to the inability of social control agent’s to act leading to the *breakdown of social controls*. The
social control agents in a movement are mostly pro-government supporters, police and military agents.

Smelser differentiates between reform and revolutionary movements within his theory of collective behavior. Reform movements or norm oriented movements are those movements which seek to change the norms or rules of everyday life leaving the overall values of society unchanged. Revolutionary movements or value oriented movements are those movements which seek to transform the fundamental values of a society. Smelser states that a reform movement could become revolutionary if the agents of social control are weak and ineffective allowing it to go beyond the attainment of reform goals and seek a total social transformation. This can lead to the overthrow of government that opens the door for a challenge to the fundamental values of society.

Giddens, Duneier, Appelbaum, and Carr (2011), find Smelser’s model to be comprehensive and complete to analyze sequences of events in the development of a social movement.
IV. METHODOLOGY

Recently developed technologies of communication have opened vast opportunities for the study of social events taking place contemporaneously anywhere in the world. I am utilizing a large quantity of materials made available daily on the electronic media: newspapers, eyewitness reports, websites of organizations active in the movement, official public information outlets, visual materials produced by professional media and private individual witnesses utilizing cell-phone cameras, Facebook and private information exchange networks, etc. I am conscious of the fact that this same kind of information technology makes possible for people to communicate with each other and increase substantially the dynamics of social interaction. In a way, I think that I am breaking into new research possibilities, which would not have been available even ten years ago. I have also made extensive use of published materials produced by professional social scientists, including sociologists, who interpret the events and processes that occur contemporaneously. This study is a historical comparative analysis analyzing the Arab Spring movement’s democratic goals and its effect on the condition of women. As such, this study analyzes the historical context surrounding Tunisia, Egypt and Libya before the movement to propose feasible propositions.

To measure the changes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya after the first protests began, I will use as many sources of information as I can have access to: News articles, international agencies reports, women’s organizations progress reports, documentaries and scholarly papers. The changes analyzed toward a more progressive order will include civil liberties, women’s rights, free elections, freedom of speech and dissent, and
collaboration of men and women in drafting new laws. I will analyze the process whereby religious fundamentalist groups with adherence to Sharia utilize legal and illegal means to attain power.

To analyze changes regarding women’s rights I will review reports by women’s organizations such as Action Tunisienne des femmes democrats, ATFD, in Tunisia, the New Woman Foundation in Egypt, and Libya’s Karama women’s organization. To measure the changes in the condition of women I will analyze international agencies’ reports that monitor educational opportunities and achievement of women.

Many news reports refer to the Arab Spring as a movement toward democratization. However, democracy is defined differently by liberal progressive groups or conservative and fundamentalist groups. For progressive groups democracy is understood as representative democracy that guarantees individual freedoms. For most fundamentalist Muslims democracy is understood as rule by a supreme leader who speaks for the majority of the population assumed to be Muslim. From this perspective also, democracy is defined by Muslim majorities as rule by the majority, severely limiting the rights of minorities. I will analyze tribal allegiances and sectarian divisions as they compete for power. Women as interested participants in the process will also be considered. Of particular importance is the influence of religion in regarding women as proper actors or not in public affairs.

The status of women will be assessed in terms of what could be called Liberal feminism in Western countries. Liberal feminism is understood as the right to individual
autonomy and civil liberties, and equality with men as citizens of a nation. Liberal feminism holds that politically, laws and governmental institutions must protect and promote gender equality and autonomy (Blore, 2010; Cherif, 2010; Gumuchian, 2011). Women’s condition before and through the period of protest will signal the direction of change for women in the future.

As Islam is the primary cultural force influencing politics and regulating social status and relations, I will use the Quran to cite specific verses that outline and define traditional women’s roles in Muslim societies (Kazemi, 2000; Barazangi, 2009; Kirmani & Phillips, 2011; Blore, 2010; Mernissi, 1987; Al-Saeid, 2012).

Although many scholars have written about the legal and social practices concerning women in the Middle East, the Arab Spring, and the overthrow of dictatorial regimes, have not as yet provided a full analysis of the changes in the condition of women. The expectations are high that reconstituted societies and government institutions, closer to Western models, will allow women to benefit as individuals and as an important sector of society.

Some of the international agencies reporting on change toward democracy with reference to the Arab Spring include: the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (2012); Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (2010); British Council Report (2013); International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) (2012); United Nations Development Program, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Arab Gulf Program For United Nations Development Organizations (2005); European Council for Foreign
Relations (2013); Human Rights Watch (2012); United Nations Development Programme (2011); United Nations Development Programme (2011). Some of the scholarly reports used appear in *The Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication* and *The Political Science Quarterly*, like Nadje Al-Ali’s “Gendering the Arab Spring” (2012), Toby Dodge’s *After the Arab Spring: Power shift in the Middle East.* (2012) and Daniel Byman’s *Regime change in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects* (2012). Although these reports all analyze the Arab Spring’s progress, few focus specifically on women’s rights; even fewer analyze women’s role and condition before, during and after the movement using Smelser’s (1962) theory of collective behavior as a theoretical framework to highlight the duality of the Arab Spring. Not only as a norm oriented movement seeking reform but as a value oriented movement striving toward revolutionary change.
V. BASIC THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS

In order to adequately analyze the changes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya’s sociopolitical environment I will briefly outline several theoretical propositions based on Smelser’s theory (1962). In order to present the necessary conditions for a social movement to occur: structural conduciveness, structural strain, generalized belief, precipitating factors, mobilization for action, and the breakdown of social controls. I will add: the overthrow of dictatorships, breakdown of generalized beliefs, democracy as Muslim rule, the disenchantment of women and the educated classes, arriving to the present period of chaos-management by force, a kind of “reign of terror” by military or religious fundamentalist armed factions.

1. General strain unified different sectors of society in opposition to the regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Using Smelser’s Theory of Collective Behavior (1962), a period of violence followed pitting opponents and defenders of the regime. This period became known as The Arab Spring.

2. The culmination of strain, presence of structural conduciveness, and the development of generalized beliefs lead to a precipitating factor birthing the Arab Spring revolution or value-oriented movement. This event—the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi further emphasized the growing socioeconomic and cultural disparities in the region. Through massive protests organized and actively promoted by both men and women, the autocratic leaders in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya were ousted. In the case of Libya, France and the European Union and,
also, the United States provided military support that was determinant in overthrowing the dictatorship.

3. There is a demonstration effect whereby the processes initiated in one country generate replications of the same in neighboring countries. The social controls, external and internal, deemed in the past impossible to breach, are breached. If that happens in one country the same can happen in other similar countries.

4. After the overthrow, the problem of reorganizing government divides the—up to this point—cooperating opposition forces. In the case of Egypt a weakened military becomes the interim government. The present situation prevails for several months of virtual chaos.

5. Longstanding religion-based values and norms are used to legitimize collective behavior that seeks change. Since, within the international context of modernity there is a generalized social environment that recognizes as legitimate conservative but secular alternatives to prevailing liberalism, legitimation is needed. In order to mobilize large, less educated sectors of the population, divine legitimation is summoned. As Islam continues to be the predominant religion that assumes Sharia to be supremely important, secular ideals and values that are inconsistent with it, are evidently rejected.

6. Women’s participation is based on the expectation that democratization will improve their status. This would be the case if democracy is patterned after the Western ideal that includes the rule of law, individual freedom, universal suffrage,
orderly transfer of power, and representation of all sectors of the population in a legislature or parliament charged with enacting laws.

7. The norm-oriented women’s movement continues during the transitional period. In the general social context in which women occupy statuses confined to private and domestic spaces, activist women in mass protests are deemed out of place and therefore subject to various forms of harassment: personal space is violated, bodies are vulnerable to touching, verbal intimidation, and rape. Gang rapes in which men act as teams forming barriers to repeal forces of order and other men who would defend the women, occur with certain regularity. Sexual norms break down and assaults against women are blamed on the victims.

8. If democratic ideals are established through military power it can be challenged in the name of democracy and legitimacy. A well-organized group capable of intimidation and control of the larger population (which can happen when a religion-inspired group is capable of utilizing such methods assumes crowd and mob leadership women become more vulnerable as a consequence).

9. The force of arms monopolized by the State would in each case succeed in putting down the protests, except for a split in the armed forces (Egypt), or the intervention of Western democratic countries that view the popular insurrection as an effort to overthrow illegal regimes and establish a democratic order (Tunisia, Libya). Syria is an example of a dictatorial regime capable of utilizing armed force to put down a mass popular insurrection. Western democratic countries that
are ready to intervene on the side of rebels, do not, because the rebel ranks are thought to include Muslim terrorists.

10. If democracy means majority rule, in countries that are largely Muslim, it would legitimize practices that limit or exclude minorities, including women, to participate and be represented in governing bodies. The suppression of secular educational opportunities for women will be expected, especially if Sharia becomes integrated into the constitution.

11. Then again, as in the past, after the revolt and the violence subside, societies may return to their original state as in the eve of the precipitating event. The military has been sometimes, as in Turkey, the mechanism whereby religious fundamentalism has been kept in check and secular change toward a modern democracy can be promoted. This outcome is less likely to occur if the movement has engaged large sectors of the population in defiance of the States’ police and military.

12. If these principles fail to establish modern institutions the population in each country will likely lose faith in pursuing democratic principles. If these principles fail to establish adequate institutions, the populous in each state will likely lose faith in pursuing democratic principles.

13. In some important ways the Arab Spring has strengthened the determination to defend Islam on the part of radical and even moderate Islamists. Western influence leading toward a liberalization, modernization, and democratization of society is viewed as dangerous because of what is thought to be its immoral
cultural content. The liberation of women’s dress, particularly, is more than a symbolic aspect of such influence: it signals the beginning of the collapse of Muslim society at the level of personal behavior. If women in Muslim societies become indistinguishable from Western women, a basic and important value is destroyed: The cultural representation if women as depositories of sexual purity protected by men West with its godless sexual immorality will have succeeded in destroying Islam. Despite the fact that educated women, Western educated or not, were present since the beginning of the Arab Spring participating actively, as conditions stand in mid 2013, more than two years after the immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia, it is hard to conclude that they have achieved significant social and political gains. There is, on the other hand, evidence that many among them have opted for leaving their countries with destinations to Europe and the Americas or have been reminded of their proper place in Muslim society.
VI. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In order to understand the Arab Spring’s impact on the condition of women I must construct an image of culture and society as it has developed over time with emphasis on the often conflictive relationship with the West. At present, and for at least the last century, the West has been a model of economic, scientific and technological development and, more importantly for an analysis of the Arab Spring, Western concepts of freedom and democracy have inspired larger segments of the population as well as important institutional sectors, particularly the military. With that in mind, I will draw a summary of the historical background with a description of Islam as a religion and its importance in establishing a place for women in society.

Most of the Middle Eastern culture is defined by Islam. Islam means submission. It is a monotheistic religion based on Judaism and Christianity, but also extensively on pre-Islamic traditions of the Arabian Peninsula. The Quran, basic sacred revelation attributed to Muhammad is not a theological treatise or a compilation of writings by various prophets or patriarchs, the way the Bible and the New Testament are, but a “recitation.” In this sense the Quran is representative of Arabic traditions that emphasized poetry as a mode of religious expression. However, contrary to those traditions, the Quran is a break from polytheism and proclaims Allah as the one and only God. Allah is the Arabic name for the Hebrew names of God, thus, Jews, Christians and Muslims, believe in the same almighty and omniscient deity. Islam holds that Muhammad is the last and most important prophet in a line of recipients of divine revelation that began with Adam and includes Jesus, next to last.
1. **Birth of Islam**

The early history of Islam established some fundamental patterns for the future. First of all, Muhammad’s incorporation of various roles deemed necessary and, in fact, divinely sanctioned: spiritual leader, head of state, and chief of the army. Second, since upon his death in 632 CE his authority was assumed by one of his close collaborators, Abu Bakr, a fact that represented a break from tribal tradition, opposition arose defending the principle of bloodline inheritance. Bakr sent Islam into the Byzantine and Persian Empires through various conquests following the Prophet’s death. Defenders of Ali, Muhammad’s cousin and son in law, fought against the rule of Abu Bakr and other collaborators of the Prophet. This established the schism between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. The Sunni that regard Islam as a religion for all people and the Shiite who regard it as fundamentally a religion ruled by Allah through the bloodline of its founder which gives preference to Arabic, the language of Allah and those who speak it. (Fisher, 1979). Conflict between the two established a pattern of legitimate and sacred warfare, *Jihad*, extended also to relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. The first four caliphs following the Prophet’s rule extended Islam to the entire Arab Peninsula conquering Palestine, Syria, Egypt, Iraq and most of Persia (Stewart, 1967).

2. **Five Pillars of Islam/ Sharia Law**

Islam has a system of duties, moral values and religious beliefs regarded as the five pillars of Islam; a declaration of belief in Allah and his Prophet, five daily prayers acknowledging Allah’s supremacy, the donation of alms to the poor, fasting during the month of *Ramadan*, and a once-in-a-lifetime pilgrimage to Mecca. Islamic law or Sharia
is derived from the Quran and also from the five pillars, the collective consensus of Muslims, and the traditions or hadiths recorded by the Prophet’s collaborators, including his personal example. Sharia law is deemed applicable to all state, civil, religious, private and personal disputes. Fundamentalist Muslims regard Sharia to be the proper foundation for all nation-state legislations.

Many of the revelations within the Quran set strict social guidelines for Muslims to follow. As Islam evolved and controlled vast territories, tribal traditions of the Arabian peninsula were retained. Over time, because of the lack of a central religious authority, a variety of Islamic strains have developed often according to the political ideologies pursued by local or regional leaders (Fisher, 1979). In addition to the two main divisions there are a number of sectarian groups including the Muslim Brotherhood, Wahhabis, Ishmailis, Sufis, Taliban, Salafists, etc.

Tribalism remains a form of social organization based on kinship. Tribes often do not challenge existing national governments, but provide local leadership to ethnic communities. Salafists are a fundamentalist group that began as a minority in the Indian subcontinent under British rule. Their main difference from other groups is their strict adherence to the Quran as the rule for daily life (Bokhari, 2012). The Muslim Brotherhood is an important political group active in the Middle East. It was organized in 1928 by Hassan al Banna in Cairo, Egypt, with the purpose of unifying Arab states under Islamic law. The overall objective of this group is to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate, which is a pan-Islamic spiritual leadership to implement Sharia worldwide (Strategic Engagement Group, 2012).
3. High Culture in the Middle Ages

The Umayyad dynasty was the first great Muslim dynasty to rule the empire of the Caliphate (661–750 AD). Under the Umayyad Arabic became the official language of large territories and peoples. In the 9th century, Islamic academic pursuits thrived with the influence of Greek, Persian, and Indian science, literature and philosophy. The Mu’tazilite theological school was founded for scholars to apply reason and logic to examine their faith and cultivate other academic feats. Islamic culture thrived in Spain; translations of classic Greek philosophers served as the curriculum foundation for the earliest European Universities (Stewart, 1967; Menocal, 2002).

The Abbasid dynasty overthrew the Umayyad caliphate in 750 AD and reigned in Baghdad until its destruction by the Mongols in 1258. Between 750 and 833 AD the Abbasids promoted commerce, industry, arts, and science. This allowed the dynasty exposure to new cultures, ideas, and practices that enriched its own culture and further promoted its influence. Under this dynasty Baghdad became the most cultured city in the world (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013; Saylor.org, 2012).

Byzantium became since the fourth century eastern branch of Christianity. Patriarch Alexius I asked Pope Urban II for help combating the Seljuk Turks. This resulted in the First Crusade of 1094. Through the Crusades Constantinople became a cultural Mecca. The Ottoman Empire replaced the Byzantine Empire and ruled from 1301 to 1922. At its height the Ottoman Empire extended to Syria, the Balkans, Mesopotamia, Arabia, Egypt, and Central Asia, North Africa, East Asia, and the Balkans (Fisher, 1979). The state’s political and social institutions were centralized. Its strong
military presence and its adherence to and defense of Islam garnered faithful alliances. The Empire’s capital, Constantinople, became a hub for international trade, and became a highly cultured city. During its last century the provinces became independent and established their own states. After World War I the Ottoman Empire collapsed after taking the side of the Central Powers. In 1922 the Ottoman Empire was officially replaced by the Republic of Turkey. General Mustafa Kemal Ataturk built a modern secular state that sought to expunge traditional Muslim traditions and practices.

4. The Crusades

In 638 Muslims conquered Jerusalem, a holy city for Jews and Christians thus becoming also, after Mecca and Medina, a holy city for them. A tradition that the Prophet ascended to heaven from Jerusalem began. As Muslim forces had extended dominion over vast regions in North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia Minor, now they approached Constantinople. In 1094 Byzantine Patriarch Alexius I, requested Western Christian assistance to repel Muslim forces and regain possession of the Holy Land. Retaking the Holy Sepulcher from the hands of infidels was a duty that Christians must assume. Pope Urban II called on Christian kings and nobles to take up arms and undertake such mission. A force of 60,000 European Christians committed indiscriminate atrocities and succeeded in taking Jerusalem in 1099. This Crusade will remain impressed in the collective memory of Arab Muslims. It has all but been forgotten by Western Christians.

A total of nine Crusades were organized over a period of three centuries as the accomplishments of the First Crusade were reversed by Muslims. In 1187 unified Arab forces under Saladin restored Muslim control over Jerusalem until the 20th century. In
1947 the United Nations Organization created the State of Israel, which in following decades killed and expelled Arab Palestinians declaring Jerusalem as its capital (Pappe, 2007). As of 2013 the international community has refused to recognize such claim. In 2001, United States President, George W. Bush, initiated a “War on Terror” calling for a Crusade against “the forces of evil” begun with a massive attack against Iraq. Ten years later the “War on Terror” continues beyond the Arab Middle East to include other Islamic nations such as Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The United States invasion of Iraq has unleashed a wave of sectarian violence and war among Muslims themselves, most notably in Syria, where tens of thousands of people have been killed. The West, directly and indirectly has been an active participant in these upheavals. The use of high technology weapons, such as Drones, has introduced a new element of questionable legality into the tragic experience of civilian Muslim populations. Norman Housley (2007) relates the Crusades to the now infamous jihads or holy wars waged against presumed enemies of Islam. Arabs continue to see the Crusades as a barbarian invasion. The recent reminiscent ‘crusade’ occurred in 2003 with the US invasion of Iraq.

5. **Centuries of Conflict with the West**

The rise of European colonialism in the Arab world was facilitated by the industrial revolution that widened the development gap between the two. In 1798 a French campaign landed in Egypt, and carried a campaign against the Turks as far as Syria in 1799. British influence and presence and in the region grew after 1908 when oil was discovered in Iran (Fisher, 1979). Toward the end of the 19th century, Germany joined Russia, England, Austria and France in spreading colonialism in the Middle East.
Following the end of World War I, Britain took control of Egypt while France took control of Algeria and Morocco. The Treaty of Versailles allowed the former Ottoman states to be granted formal independence; however they remained under the watchful mandates of the colonial powers (Ali, 2002). The Turkish war for independence (1919-1922) ended with the Mudanya Armistice of 1922, and the Lausanne Peace Treaty. The 1917 Balfour Declaration opened the possibility of creating a homeland for Jews in Palestine. After World War II a nation for Jewish immigrants was created in Palestinian lands unleashing the protractive state of war between Israel and Arab neighbors until the present.

Gamal Abdel Nasser’s regime of Egypt promoted Arab nationalism creating the United Arab Republic in 1956 after a brief war against the combined forces of Britain, France and the United States. Nasser succeeded in placing the Suez Canal under Egyptian sovereignty (Ali, 2002).

As the Cold war made of the Middle East a battlefield for the ideological conflict between Socialism and capitalism Israel became for the United States a strategically important ally. Weapons technologies and economic aid built Israel as a first rate military power, clearly dominant in the region. The 1967 war between Israel and the combined forces of Egypt, Syria and Jordan for the control of Palestinian territories ended in a catastrophic defeat for the Arabs. Israel annexed the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt and the Golan Heights from Syria.
The increasing importance of energy to support the expansion of industrialism in the West turned the Middle East into the world’s most important supplier of oil. As the United States presence increased, Western media penetrated ever deeper into Muslim societies generating resistance and bitter opposition. Interventions in Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria have sharpened the rise of Anti-Western, Anti-American fundamentalism.

Mohammad Akef Jamal (2013) distinguished two kinds of foreign intervention: Humanitarian aid and Political aid. Humanitarian aid is unbiased, it uses government and non-governmental organizations to reduce human suffering. Political advantage intervention is biased, and its goal is to gain the power to control nations. Both kinds of intervention can, and often do, involve the use of national groups and agencies that share in the benefits and advantages of intervention. Colonial and neo-colonial interventions have been justified as beneficial to individual countries and foreign powers. Military power is required for the latter and the former may produce an entry point for military intervention.

The United States has become the latest chapter in the continuous process of Western penetration into Middle Eastern society. Hundreds of American military bases have been established for the purposes of securing the supply of oil and provide a strategic presence for the military control of various continents. Also, military presence makes possible the control of markets for products, services and, importantly for capitals used by oil. American culture would in time become ubiquitous in the region thanks to the technologies of communication that penetrates cultural barriers. American
advertising, television, movies, Protestant missionaries, college professors doing research, merchants selling a great variety and quantity of products, soldiers, the English language, etc. with all the images that are commonplace within the United States were becoming also commonplace in societies that had been for a long time closed to foreign influences. The nudity of women was particularly offensive to people who regarded women’s bodies as protected and private property of men within families. Inevitably barriers would be raised to prevent such cultural penetration that increasingly would be defined as "evil" by Muslim Fundamentalists.

The establishment of the State of Israel by the United Nations in 1948 and the unconditional support of it by the United States until the present, which is viewed generally by Arab Muslims as a distinct form of aggression, has sharpened the opposition to American culture, presence, influence, and power. Israel has come to be identified as a military extension of the United States in Arab lands and the illegal and continued expansion of Israeli settlements in Palestinian territories, which the United States has been unable or unwilling to control, has diminished its prestige as a model of democracy, modernity, and international fair-play. The invasion of Iraq, of course, has been regarded as another instance of evident American hostility toward Muslims in general and Arabs, in particular.

After the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, peace accords between Egypt and Israel signed in 1979 allowed Egypt to regain Sinai in exchange for a non-aggression treaty. Neighboring countries regarded Egypt’s action as a kind of betrayal to Palestinians and Arabs in general.
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has become the stalwart in the defense of Islam and Middle Eastern culture. In order to understand Iran’s position toward the West it is necessary to recall the 1953 overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in a coup carried out with the collaboration of American intelligence services. The Pahlavi dynasty was returned to power until 1979. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi grateful relationship with the United States allowed for the latter’s increasing influence in the region. American corporations enjoyed privileges and advantages for the extraction, processing, and distribution of oil and its derivates (Merica and Hanna, 2013).

The Israeli occupation of lands granted to Palestinians by the United Nations act that created the State of Israel, which has continued since 1948 to the present, which has put into question the viability of an independent nation for Palestinians, is particularly offensive to Arab sensibilities. The construction of a wall that isolates Palestinian enclaves within the territory occupied by the Israeli army and the declaration by Israel that Jerusalem is the legitimate and undivided capital of Israel, have further angered Arabs many of whom define Israel as an illegitimate presence in the region. Fundamentalist Muslims, particularly, view Israeli military power as a threat to Arabs as a people.

The United States efforts to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians have failed. The Oslo (1993) and Camp David (1978, 1979, 2000, 2011) talks and accords have briefly raised the hope for peace only to be followed by continued acts of hostility on both sides. Israel defends the position that peace must come from negotiations between the two parties involved in the conflict, whereas the Palestinian Authority
appeals to the international community to participate in negotiations appealing to the
principles of International Law. Since the United States has supported Israel with military
and economic aid totaling 3 billion dollars a year, it is assumed that its interests are tied
to the interests of Israel. The United States Congress has been unwavering in its support
of Israel interests (Jewish Voice for Peace, 2013; Zanotti, 2013).

6. Terrorism

Mahmood Mamdani’s *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim* (2004), discusses the
stereotypes given to Muslims since the September 11th terrorist attacks. Good Muslims
are seen as those who join the West against Muslim Fundamentalists; Muslims who have
been westernized. Bad Muslims are seen as those who adopt anti-western Muslim
fundamentalist ideals: terrorists. Through culture talk—the essence that defines a given
culture which serves to explain its political ideologies, Mamdani argues that what the
West calls “terrorism” is an old religious duty for Muslims to defend Islam when
threatened by infidels. Here ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘moderate’ Muslims differ in defining
situations created by the West as Threats to Islam or not.

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks on American targets, symbolic of
Western power and hegemony, President George W. Bush declared a *War on Terror* (Ali,
2002). Government agencies and media contributed to create an atmosphere of
impending threat by terrorists. A shared consciousness of war as necessary was created
against *Terror*. Never had the United States been attacked by a foreign force within its
own territory. Slogans appeared calling for Americans to unite. God was summoned to
assist Americans in this moment of need. American Evangelical Christians regarded the situation in apocalyptic terms as the ‘end of times’. Tim LaHaye’s books sold widely and they contributed to build the immediacy of an Armageddon battle between the forces of Good and Evil. The stereotype of Arabs as evil and terrorists became widely assumed.

According to Richard A. Clarke (2004), at a high-level meeting of the President’s national security advisors following the 9/11 attacks, he was surprised that discussions focused on plans to invade Iraq rather than organize the forces necessary to capture those who planned and carried out the attack.

Soon later the attacks were attributed to Al-Qaeda, a terrorist organization founded by Osama Bin Laden. The invasion of Iraq was devastating and it did nothing to eradicate terrorism, rather it gave rise to a re-invigorated hatred of the United States among Muslim Fundamentalists, many of whom moved farther east, to Afghanistan and Pakistan, to escape capture and continue planning action against the United States. In 2011 President Barack Obama took credit for the assassination of Bin Laden. Obama carried further the use of Drones, remote-controlled pilotless aircrafts, initiated by G.W. Bush, to inflict damage on ‘terrorist’ targets killing Al Qaeda leaders and unknown numbers of collateral victims. Yemen, in the Arabian Peninsula, was hit by a number of Drone strikes.
VII. DEMOCRACY AND ISLAM

Democratization is defined as the transition from traditional or autocratic rule toward a democratic order in which the population at large has access to the formation of government and shares in its benefits. A democracy is a system that promotes active civil participation, protects human rights, establishes a government through free and fair elections that protects individual autonomy, civil liberties and the rule of law (Stanford.edu; Rummels, 2002). The Arab Spring movement can be seen as an initial attempt towards liberalization leading to the establishment of democratic institutions. It is important to note that democracy does not necessarily mean majority rule, as that would marginalize minorities, particularly women. Under transitional and democratic states, the separation of church and state is important to allow the agency of secular laws necessary to protect citizens from abusive religious practices.

Three political systems have emerged as transitional from Islamic to democratic rule. The first is the dual legal system which accepts government secularization but limits familial and financial affairs to Sharia laws. Examples of this political system include Lebanon and Indonesia. The second transitional system is government under God, in which countries adopt Islam as the official state religion with Sharia as the basis of legislation. Examples of this political system in practice include Saudia Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain to name a few. The third and final transitional system is a completely secular government in which Muslim-majority countries adopt secular constitutions. Current examples are in Turkey and Somalia.
A 2010 Pew Research study found strong support for democracy in Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, but accepted as beneficial Islamic influence in state legislation. However, the majorities in Muslim societies included in this survey agreed that democracy is the best form of government.

Muslim scholars have pointed to the *Fitnah* and *Ikhtilaf* as indicators that democracy is not compatible with Islam. *Fitnah* is translated as civil disorder. Islamic law opposes anything that threatens the Islamic community and the faith of Muslim believers. This limits citizens’ right to dissent. *Ikhtilaf* is translated as diversity in Islamic jurisprudence. An example of *Ikhtilaf* is the Sunni tradition that accepts multiple caliphs. Islam’s main religious tenet is the strict acceptance of one and only God—*Tawheed*. Under this concept the sovereignty of Allah cannot coexist with the sovereignty of the people, a basic democratic ideal. This position makes Islam incompatible with liberal Democracy, which is fundamentally secular.

There are scholars who point out the election of caliphs from several candidates as a similarity to democratic elections. However, in Muslim states Islamic law—Sharia—covers all aspects of social and state life.

The possibility of an Islamic democracy has also been argued by the principal of a *soft jihad*, which is the right to command what is noble and right and forbid what is wrong according to Quranic principles. This has been taken to mean that if a ruler does not follow such principles it is the responsibility of the people to remove him from office.
(Malinova, 2012). This sense of religious responsibility can be assumed motivated many Muslims to participate actively in the Arab Spring movement.
VIII. THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN TRADITIONAL ISLAM

Islam is a monotheistic and Abrahamic religion articulated by the Quran, which is considered to be the verbatim word of Allah, and by the teachings and normative example called the hadiths, of Muhammad, considered by them to be the last prophet of God. All three monotheisms: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have a patriarchal foundation. God is a male figure and he creates man in his image. Woman is an afterthought created for companionship and service to man. Anthony Pagden (2013) quotes Spanish Benedictine Benito Jeronimo Feijoo that all books written about women and the condition of women have been written by men using man’s subjective self-interests. Women have been depicted as achieving less than men, as being less capable than men, to serve men’s exalted opinion of themselves. Under Islam, social practices are governed by Sharia, which impede women’s access to full citizenship status. Women are seen as deficient in intelligence, faith, reliability, and character and, therefore, lack equal standing with relation to men in basic legal prescriptions such as citizenship, inheritance laws, marriage and divorce laws.

However, according to some Muslim scholars these limitations were placed on them by men who derive their legitimacy from religion (AbuKhalil, 1993; Abi Talib and Balagha, 2010). Women’s education and participation in the labor force are seen as core rights under democratic governments as they foster feminist ideals and form a foundation from which other rights may be derived. By acquiring a stronger foothold in the labor force through education, women gain individual advances like autonomy, and access to political participation. Increasing political parties’ interest in women’s rights will likely
increase their attraction for women. Education is a primary variable as it not only affords women greater economic independence, but it also promotes individual growth and autonomy. The current status of women under Sharia in Muslim states is defined by oppressive symbols and practices like female genital mutilation, de-personalization through burkas, abayas or veils, harassment in public places, domestic abuse in private spheres, and polygamy. While polygyny was not unusual in Hebrew patriarchal society, Christianity, although directly based on the Old Testament, disavows it. It must be here established that, within the context of modern liberal ideology, polygamy, if it represents a privilege for men from which women are deprived, is conceptually and sociological discriminatory as it places women as accessories to men’s needs. Polyandry is not acceptable to any of the three monotheisms. Polyandry, in terms of modern liberal ideology, however, is acceptable and lies within the rights of a “liberated” woman. Forms of polyandry are recognized as legitimate by the modern secular state, as sequential monotheisms: marriage, divorce, and remarriage. State laws in the region are largely influenced by Islam and as such, women’s emancipation conflicts with the interests of local patriarchs, village elders, religious leaders, and government officials.

The economic progress and modernization achieved by the Middle East has not been paralleled by social or cultural progress. Sociological modernization is understood as the transformation from a traditional, rural, agrarian society to a secular, urban, industrial society. The region has embraced economic modernization and has implemented secular government policies that repressed and marginalized religious fundamentalists in the past. With the vast oil and gas reserves in the region economies
have flourished. However, changes promoted through Western influence in both political and social spheres have been slow to be embraced. This is most prominently seen in the continued suppression of women’s rights. Many state laws forbid women to travel without a male companion; women are underrepresented in political parties and representation in state agencies; in Saudi Arabia women are not allowed to drive vehicles. State laws in Egypt allow women may mix their public and private lives without undermining their main roles as mothers and wives. The social reality for women in the Middle East as a whole is confined to the roles of mothers and wives.

Muslim societies are dominated by Islamic principles. These laws are rooted in the Quran which is written and interpreted by religious leaders, all of them males. Like most religion based states, societal regulations and practices are strongly patriarchal. Nawal El Saadawi used her personal experiences as a woman and a medical practitioner in Egypt to describe the patriarchal oppression Muslim societies inflict on women. In her book, *The Hidden Face of Eve* (1980), she traces the deprivation of power and status women in Muslim societies have faced beginning with the transition from polytheism to monotheism. One of the main differences between Islam and the other monotheisms is its open acceptance of the importance of a good sex life for both men and women. The prophet Muhammad spoke of the importance for men to satisfy the needs of their wives, and the importance for women to satisfy their husband’s needs (El FekI, 2013). Gender inequality lies in the opportunities available for men and women to satisfy those needs. Patriarchal societies are protective of men’s needs to safeguard their legacy and heritage. “It was necessary for society simultaneously to build up a system of moral and religious
values, as well as a legal system capable of protecting and maintaining these economic interests.” (El Saadawi, pg. 41). Many people profit from the oppressive practices enforced on women; these include female genital mutilation, veiling, bans from academic and employment pursuits etc. Nurses, doctors, tribal dayas, religious leaders, fathers, all make a living from treating and promoting these practices. Before the advent of agriculture many tribal societies worshipped female Gods. In the religious transformation from polytheism to monotheism, women lost power and status. Morality came to be defined in terms that favored men’s status over women’s. The moral restrictions imposed on women are a product of a male redefined morality. In Muslims societies maintaining the cultural continuity of Islam is of utmost importance, hence, the ‘family unit’ is considered the untouchable part of Muslim identity. To safeguard this women are repressed through strict codes of conduct. The control of women is an economic issue (as women are regarded as property), disguised as religious dogma. Some examples of the economic manipulation and control of women include polygyny, transitional or temporary marriages, female genital mutilation, veiling, and a woman’s legal inferiority to men. Marriage and divorce retain feudalist traits as women are seen as men’s property. As such, a man may do to his wife as he pleases: exploit, beat, or even sell her through divorce. As many of the hadiths and Sharia are interpreted by men, state laws that determine a woman’s life are based on a purely male perspective. Under these conditions women’s emancipation is rendered nearly impossible.

Sharia is composed of hadiths, which are collections of the Prophet’s practices and teachings. These hadiths have been developed into various Islamic schools which
include, Sunni, Shiite, Salafism, Hanbali, and Maliki, to name a few. Within Sharia there are five main hadd crimes: unlawful sexual intercourse, false accusation of unlawful sexual intercourse, wine drinking, theft, and highway robbery. Punishment for any of these crimes vary from stoning, amputation, exile to execution. One very specific practice, prevalent in many Muslim countries include honor killings. Honor killings typically affect women, who are murdered by a family member as a proper sanction for bringing dishonor to one’s family. National Geographic News (2002) ran an article regarding honor killings. In it Hillary Mayell, interviewed several experts and researched human rights reports showing honor killings are practiced in deeply religious societies. Honor killings occur because women are seen to be vessels of a family’s reputation. This practice has continued partly because of the sacralization of Islamic texts, and partly because of the complicity and adherence to these texts by fellow women. Government officials within countries where these practices are either ignored or allowed, have often said that the concept of women’s rights is not culturally relevant and therefore this practice is not criminalized. This has led many international agencies to promote the secularization of government institutions which would restrict the power of religious beliefs to repress women and prevent progress toward women’s rights.

Bill Warner (2010) analyzes what Sharia meant for Muslims as well as non-Muslims in Sharia Law for the Non-Muslim. Warner gives insight into the comprehensiveness of Islam asserting that Islam is, itself, a complete civilization that provides a detailed framework for both social rules and political policies. Although Islam was the first religion to recognize certain women’s rights in the Quran, these rights
actually affirmed women’s inferiority to men. Because men are legally given control over women, these represent their honor outside their homes. This makes women the vessels of their families’ reputation and honor. Violence is a mechanism used to insure women’s compliance inside and outside the home. Warner analyzed the status of women in the Quranic text. There are many verses that praise mothers, while there are many verses that affirm women as inferior. The author took all Quran verses that mention women and sorted them into four categories: high status, low status, equal status and neutral. 71 Percent of the texts depict women as low status; 23 percent as equal status, while only 5.3 percent as high status. Islam is mainly composed of the written text, the Quran, and the oral hadiths containing the Prophet’s sayings. The present disadvantaged status of women results from legislation that modern states draw from both sources. Warner goes on to depict the dualities inherent in the Quran and the Sunni school of Islam; these include legal dualism and dualistic ethics. Legal dualism refers to the political and social rights of Muslims and Non-Muslims or Kafirs. Secular constitutional laws conflict with the very essence of Sharia. Submission to Allah is the key to Islam, everything else, including legalities, are inferior and must co-exist with Islamic ideals. Dualistic ethics refer to the paradox within Islam. Islam advocates for equality, however women and non-Muslim minorities are seen as inferior. In many verses within the Quran, jihad is encouraged against all Non-Muslims, particularly Christians and Jews. This leads to Warner’s explanation of tayseer and darura. Tayseer literally means to lighten one’s load or to make it easier. This explains the idea that when Muslims cannot practice their belief or religious practices, Allah understands and lightens their load. Darura, which means
necessity, explains the idea that if necessary, upholding certain religious customs or practices is not obligatory. An example would be making up for missed prayers if one cannot do them because of work or school. These concepts give a certain amount of leeway and duality to an otherwise strict religion.

1. *Feminism in the Middle East*

The term feminism can be seen as a political movement based on the belief that women suffer social, economic and political inequalities. In this study feminism will be discussed as an egalitarian liberal feminism, which holds that women have a right to individual and political autonomy equal to men’s. The political goal is then to repeal unequal, unfair, and sexist laws that repress women and to promote women’s equality and autonomy. These goals have been championed by Simone de Beauvoir (1949) who pioneered the idea that sexual equality will come to fruition by exposing the patriarchal sexual objectification and exploitation of women. The concept of feminism used in this study is derived from the Feminist movement in the United States. Some would argue that the Women Rights Convention held at Seneca Falls, New York in 1848, marks the beginning of this long and continuing struggle, but the legal foundation of gender inequality can be found in the United States Declaration of Independence (‘all men’) and its Constitution (which denies women the right to vote). Abigail Adams discussed the need to include women’s rights in the declaration in her writings to her husband, John Adams. In 1793, England’s Mary Wollstonecraft, defended the political and social rights of women in her *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*. Wollstonecraft is held to be the founder of Western feminism. She defined the conditions under which women lived and
called on society to change them. She considered education as the primary means whereby women could achieve liberation. In 1851 feminists, called suffragettes, joined the abolitionist movement already underway. Finally, in 1920 the Nineteenth Amendment granted women the right to vote.

Important gains made by American women include: 1963, Congress passed the Equal Pay Act; 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut the Supreme Court repealed the state bans on contraceptive use; 1966, the National Organization for Women (NOW) was founded, which worked to expand Affirmative Action policies of 1965; 1970’s sex discrimination in education was banned. The Roe v. Wade Supreme Court Decision of 1973 granted women the right to abort, and the first marital rape laws were enacted. In the 1990’s formerly all-male military schools began admitting women. The right to sue for damages in cases of sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and assault victims has been utilized successfully by women in state and federal courts (History Art and Archives, 2013).

The Women’s Liberation Movement in the United States has inspired women in other countries, including the Middle East, where the issue has been heatedly discussed. There have been many debates over the role of feminism in Muslim countries. There are distinctions between Non-feminist Islamists and Non-Islamic feminists that must be reconciled. Islamic feminism arose in the 1980’s to counter Western feminism’s universalism (Blore, 2010). Islamic feminists drew from the intellectual foundation of Islam to comprehend women’s issues; secular Muslim feminism lobbied for the implementation of secular universal women’s rights (Barlow & Akbarzadeh, 2006).
Darvishpour (2003) analyzes Islam’s compatibility with feminism by discussing Jan Hjarpe’s (1995) feminist trends in Islamic countries. Hjarpe points out four emerging feminist trends: Atheist feminism, secular feminism, Muslim feminism and Islamic feminism. Atheist feminism states that religion is innately against women; secular feminism argues that the relationship between Islamic beliefs and women stem from the existing dominant views in society; Islamic feminism argues that Islam is dominated by a patriarchal version of Islam; Muslim feminism states Islam emancipates women through the Quran and hadiths and does not acknowledge gender inequalities. Cassandra Balchin (2003) aptly argues that feminism and Islam are studied in three broad categories: those who view religion as an obstacle to feminism, those who view religion as the most significant issue in the development of feminism, and those who see Islamic feminism as a developmental solution.

Two schools of feminist thought have emerged in the Arab world from these debates. One is the Apologetic Islamic School, which claims that Islam has liberated women as opposed to subjugated or oppressed them. The apologetic school does not promote the reinterpretation of Islamic texts, but calls for the strict adherence to Sharia. A branch of the apologetic Islamic school blames male jurists for the oppressive conditions Arab women face. This school acknowledges the existence of gender inequalities within Muslim societies. The third branch of the apologetic Islamic school is a feminist movement that reinterprets Islamic texts from a female perspective. This school focuses on the misinterpretation of the Islamic texts by male jurists. Reformist Feminism, a part of the apologetic Islamic school, also attempts to reconcile the Islamic faith with the
struggle for gender equality (Kirmani & Phillips, 2011). Valentine Moghadam (2004) distinguishes Islamic feminism as oppression rooted in culture and patriarchy from which women must reclaim their religion to profess the true egalitarian Islam.

The opposing school is the Theologocentric School which argues Islam is the source with which to explain Muslim behavior. This school focuses only on the religious aspect of an individual’s behavior; it dismisses social and cultural norms (AbuKhalil, 1993). Valentine Moghadam (2004) further distinguishes Islamic feminism from Muslim feminism; Muslim feminists use the established interpretation of Islam with secular approaches to discuss feminism. This form of feminism in the Middle East focuses on reconciling gender equality with religious beliefs.

Many scholars have analyzed the duality cultural norms play within Islamic feminism. Many suggest the revival of the Hijab and veiling practices in response to the cultural infringement of capitalist modernization. Veiling is regarded as a protective defiance against westernization in favor of Islamic identity. Still, critics argue that veiling does not prevent the increased assaults and harassment against women.

Moghissi (1999), argues that feminism is in fact consistent with Islam. Feminism’s core ideal acknowledges that although men and women do have biological differences, these should not be translated into state laws or regulations. For democratic feminism to take root in the Middle East, some scholars have advocated for a reduction of Islamic identity in favor of a political and social component. The reduction of Islam to a cultural ideal and the separation of state affairs from religious mandates would afford
women greater opportunities. This essentially means the separation of church and state (Bloore, 2010).

Fatima Mernissi’s, *The veil and the male elite: A feminist interpretation of women’s rights in Islam* (1987), embraces the reinterpretation of the Quran. For Mernissi it is not the Quran or Islamic traditions, but male elite interests that conflict with women’s civil liberties and social advancement. The dominant male position within Muslim culture and society has been made sacred through the subjective interpretation of holy texts by male jurists. “…the Prophet, during a troubled period at the beginning of Islam, pronounced a verse that was so exceptional and determining for the Muslim religion that it introduced a breach in space that can be understood to be a separation of the public from private, or indeed the profane from the sacred, but which was to turn into a segregation of the sexes. The veil that descended from Heaven was going to cover up women, separate them from men, from the Prophet, and so from God.” (Mernissi, 1987, p. 101). Mernissi bases her argument on *hadiths*, citations from the Quran, that explicitly refer to the role of women in Muslim societies. By tracing each hadith to its historical roots, Mernissi makes the point that the male elite has used and continues to use the Quran to hinder women’s rights for their convenience. “The verse of the hijab descended in year five of the hijra. This was the year that the hypocrites seized Medina, stirring up fears and chaos” (Barlow & Akbarzadeh, 2006, pg. 1487). Nowhere in the Quran are practices such as veiling explicitly established for the ‘protection’ of women, they are instead explicitly explained as necessary for protection of men’s own inherent immorality. “Protecting women from the change by veiling them and shutting them out of
the world has echoes of closing the community to protect it from the West.” (Mernissi, 1987, p. 99). Much like Edward Said in *Orientalism*, Mernissi acknowledges the threat of Western colonialism, past and present, posed to the Orient. Her analysis calls attention to the threat Muslim men perceive in Western influences towards their women. Past colonialism has been implanted in the minds of Muslim men compelling them to define and preserve their Islamic identity. As a result, government institutions in the Middle East have criticized women’s organizations labeling them as nothing more than an attack on traditional Muslim values.

Many women’s rights activists strive to reform Sharia-based laws in each Muslim state. This has become a struggle because these laws place women in inferior positions to men’s. As their legitimacy derives strictly from Islam, reform is close to impossible. Kirmani and Phillips (2011), suggest that the best way to reconcile Islam and feminism in the Middle East would be to garner support from religious leaders in each Muslim country. The involvement of religious leaders in the feminist movement would garner support from both men and women who adhere to certain Islamic principles. The use of respected religious leaders would deflect accusations that feminism is a Western ideal.
IX. SOCIETY AND CULTURE ON THE EVE OF THE ARAB SPRING

The Arab Spring movement was mostly initiated by younger people in the educated middle to upper social classes, who, along with broad sector of the popular classes felt the weight of arbitrary rule, developmental lag with respect to the West, as well as social, economic and political alienation. Students, unemployed college educated people, lower class workers, Islamic fundamentalists, and many women—mainly of the educated middle-class—worked together during the protests to topple the regimes (El-Hamalawy, 2011; Fahim & El-Naggar, 2011; Al Jazeera, 2011; Kanalley, 2011; Slackman, 2011; Lam, 2012; Abu Nimah, 2011; Al Jazzera, 2012). On the eve of the Arab Spring movement Tunisia, Egypt and Libya had similar sociopolitical conditions affecting similar sectors of society. I will briefly outline each country’s cultural background, social classes, rural and urban populations, religious groups, educational policies, economic factors and military presence to draw a clear picture of the prevalent conditions at the time of the precipitating factor that triggered the Arab Spring protests.

Cultural Background:

Tunisia, Egypt and Libya are Muslim-majority countries. Each country has integrated Islam into the national constitution, but in Egypt, fundamentalist Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood have been outlawed since Sadat’s assassination in 1981. Each country upholds freedom of religion, but Christian Copts have been targets of continuous attacks. There is also a small Jewish minority.
Western Influence:

The relationship between Tunisia and France has been close since the nineteenth century. In the first decade of the 21st century the close relationship between Sarkozy government of France and the Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia, gave rise to a renewed perception of a neocolonial dependence between the two countries. Egypt’s regime likewise has maintained close relations with the West, particularly, the United States in matters of trade and economic aid. The peace accords between Egypt and Israel, signed by Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin in 1979 was promoted by the United States as a way to end the state of war that existed between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Western corporations took advantage of the new climate to re-establish intense business relations in the region, including tourism, which became one of the most important sources of income for Egypt. Libya on the other hand, oil rich, denounced Western influence by engaging in international terrorism against the West. Gaddafi’s absolute rule due to his charismatic qualities, established a family-centered system that could not be challenged internally. Internationally, however, Libya came to be recognized as a promoter of anti-Western terrorism. By 2010, Gaddafi had managed to recast his image as peaceful and friendly to the West.

Social Classes:

Class distinctions within Tunisia are distinguished by educational levels. The capitalist class is composed of business owners, often cronies of the regime in power, and military personnel in active duty or retired. The educated, including professionals and young graduates of national and foreign universities, have either joined the ranks of
regime supporters or critics of it. The next social stratum includes land owners and agricultural business operators. Eighty percent of the entire population is considered part of the middle class. The working class is composed of the service sector laborers including tourism workers. Urban working class workers are paid higher wages than rural peasants and self-employed street vendors. Rural workers often live in villages, are mostly uneducated, follow traditional religion, identify with tribes, and mostly work the land (Agence Tunisienne de Communication Exterieure, 2008). Unemployment in each country was very high, in part due to the international economic crisis of 2008. Unemployment affected mostly the working poor and college graduates.

In Egypt, the old elite that favored the monarchy lost its political influence after the 1952 Revolution, but its investment in education enabled its children to emerge as the upper-class of the new regime. Joint ventures and partnerships with foreign firms along with commissions from them contributed to the formation of a new entrepreneurial class in following decades.

Under Gaddafi’s regime, Libya has remained a class society. State property was given to the capitalist ruling class, closely associated with the regime, to facilitate economic growth. Social gaps grew as a consequence, increasing unemployment rates among middle class youth and lower classes. Social policies and programs were artificially reduced to meet international aid conditions, which lead to increasing poverty in Libya (US Department of State, 2011).
**Rural and Urban Populations:**

A majority of Tunisians and Egyptians live in urban centers, with approximately thirty five percent of Tunisians living in rural areas (Tunisian Agency of Exterior Communication, 2011). In urban settings specialized jobs are occupied mostly by men. This has created a feminization of the agricultural sector as men leave farmlands in search for higher wage employment. In terms of occupation the lower class is comprised of three main groups: service providers, skilled, and unskilled workers.

Rural populations in each country remain linked by lineage, tribal, and family identities. Rural society has not evolved at the same pace as urban society. Religious fundamentalism remains strong in rural areas especially among disadvantaged youth.

**Religious Groups:**

During the Arab Spring, religious minorities have actively participated hoping for greater influence in government affairs (International Religious Freedom Report, 2012). The majority of the population in each country follows Sunni Muslim traditions. Although religious conversion is considered legal, converting from Islam to Christianity or Judaism would most likely result in social ostracism (Ryan, 2011; Mackey, 2011; Eltahawy, 2011).

Following a failed assassination attempt on Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood was formally banned in Egypt and forced to go underground where it continued its operations. The Muslim Brotherhood is regarded by many as a tribal sect
operating mostly out of rural areas. It garners its support from the uneducated, lower classes.

Salafist groups have been active in Tunisia and Egypt. Although not as prevalent as the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists have used violence against civilian and government officials.

Libya had a strong Islamic influence promoted by Gaddafi, who has engaged in attacks against western values, women’s rights, and civil liberties (BBC, 2013; History World, 2013). Libya’s religious sects operate through regulations and rules of tribal beliefs and traditions. This is primarily seen, in Tunisia and Egypt among rural populations where local government is enforced through tribal and religious sects (US Department of State, 2012).

Education:

European and Western influences are prevalent in education and commerce in Tunisia and Egypt; women particularly benefit from it (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2012). Adult literacy in Tunisia is sixty nine percent: fifty eight percent women and eighty percent men. Adult literacy in Egypt is seventy two percent: sixty four percent women and eighty percent men. In Libya adult literacy is eighty nine percent: eighty three percent women and ninety five percent men. Boys and girls are mandated by government to enroll in educational programs by the age of six until the age of sixteen. Students who are financially able continue on to higher education either locally or abroad. In Libya,
Gaddafi’s regime censored religious material and enforced the teaching of Islamic principles in the educational system.

*Economic Factors:*

A diverse market economy in Tunisia and Egypt is based on agriculture, manufacturing, and a thriving tourism sector. Tunisia has a fairly large service sector, employing about fifty five percent of the entire labor force. The main service sector in Tunisia is tourism, and is found primarily around the Tunisian coast and historical sites.

Egypt’s access to the Nile River has provided the country year-round irrigation for the growing agricultural sector. Egypt also has oil and gas reserves which draw significant revenues from global exports. As in Tunisia, foreign investment and tourism are also major contributors to its thriving economy (Heritage Foundation; 2013).

Libya’s strong economic foundation is based on its oil and natural gas exports. The oil boom dramatically changed the economic and residential distribution of the population as many male workers flocked to urban areas leaving behind farmlands to be run by tribal sects and women.

*Military Presence:*

Mubarak created an elaborate security force in Egypt to repress public dissent and limit civil liberties. Egypt’s army has been dependent on US foreign policies as it received substantial US military assistance. Military and state police contribute to the corruption in each country by serving the interests of the regime rather than the public
good. In Libya, Gaddafi has held tight control of the military by concentrating power within family and close associates.

*Political Influences:*

Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali belongs to the Democratic Constitutional Rally, which was formerly known as Destourian Socialist Party or Neo-Destour. Hosni Mubarak belongs to the National Democratic Party. Under Mubarak’s rule the NDP has adopted measures to limit the political influence of Islamist groups and banned the Muslim Brotherhood (Sayigh, 2012). For three decades he has ruled Egypt using emergency laws, which bypass the nation’s constitution and legislation. To consolidate tribal support in Libya, Gaddafi turned to the Revolutionary Command Council or RCC, which established the Arab Social Union. Gaddafi developed the RCC after effectively carrying out a coup against King Idris in 1969. The country’s political guidelines were written in Gaddafi’s *Green Book.*

*Women:*

Women born into wealthy families in each country are usually sent abroad to further their education. Women born among the rural poor are seldom educated and are usually the victims of religious oppression. Gender relations are maintained within the same social class. Many women have actively participated in protests, they have often been educated in foreign countries, like France. Women in Tunisia and Egypt have been encouraged to not wear their hijab in public as a symbolic sign of modernity. However,
women in lower classes belonging to fundamentalist Islamic sects followed Sharia regardless of state laws.

Social changes, especially in education, have placed women in public spheres. Given the strict religious practices, veiling and gender segregation at schools, work, and recreation have become commonplace. Lower class families have tended to withdraw girls from school as they reached puberty to minimize their interaction with men because their suitors prefer to marry women who have had little to no contact with men. The higher educated social classes allow for the advancement in women’s rights through education either locally or abroad (US Department of State, 2011). Although women still follow traditional familial roles as mothers and wives, women are employed in the service sectors much more than men. Women make up the majority of the educated working teachers in Libya. Administrative and clerical work in banks, service sector employment in department stores, and domestic services were dominated by women. The restrictions women face in each country are mainly due to the application of Sharia rules.
X. THE ARAB SPRING

On December 17, 2010, Mohammed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor set himself on fire after having his fruit cart and scales confiscated for not having the necessary legal permits. Bouazizi was unemployed and resorted to selling fruits and vegetables on the street. Following his death protests erupted against Ben Ali’s regime. Protesters clashed with security forces for 10 days until President Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia. This became known as the *Jasmine Revolution* in Tunisia and quickly inspired the youth in neighboring Arab states to revolt.

In Egypt protesters organized a sit-in for January 25, 2011 through Facebook. It is estimated that over 850 people were killed during these protests from January to February 2011. After 18 days of protests President Hosni Mubarak resigned. From Egypt the protests spread to Libya. On February 17, 2011 a peaceful demonstration in honor of the Abu Salim massacre of 1996 turned into a violent armed conflict that lasted 8 months, killing thousands and displacing thousands more. From Libya the movement inspired protests in Bahrain, Yemen, Syria, Qatar, Jordan and Morocco. The linear movement became known as the "Arab Spring" in anticipation of the new democracies that were to flourish in the Middle East. The Arab Spring model has been compared by some scholars to the 1848 Spring of Nations as an aspiring movement toward democratic values (Packer, 2003; Ibrahim, 2005). I will analyze what has become known as the Arab Spring movement as it transpired in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya using Neil Smelser’s theoretical framework.
Smelser’s theory of collective behavior analyzes the collective behavior as it relieves strain. For collective behavior to form a social movement, the appearance of strain must be present. Smelser goes on to distinguish between reform movements and revolutions. Revolutions seek to restore, protect, modify or create new values within society. They envision a complete reconstruction of values, a redefinition of norms, and a redefinition of situational facilities within society. In value-oriented movements the values promoted are different from the established values in society. Essential preliminary conditions for a revolution are widespread acceptance of grievances by the masses. Revolutionary strain may lead to a reform movement as they render established values inadequate.

1. Value-Oriented Movement:

The Arab Spring officially began on December 16, 2010. A twenty six year old street vendor by the name of Mohammed Bouazizi was arrested in Tunis for not having the necessary legal permits (Ryan, 2011). On December 17, 2010 Bouazizi, frustrated by the economic deprivation he was experiencing set himself on fire in front of the Tunisian police station (Al Jazeera, 2010). The economic deprivation experienced by many like Bouazizi is part of the strain that led to the Arab Spring protests. By-standers videotaped his self-immolation and posted the graphic depiction of his protest on YouTube, Facebook and Twitter. From these social media sites Bouazizi’s video spread rapidly and helped create a collective identity for a majority of Tunisians (Shehata, 2011). Social media sites were instrumental is spreading the population’s grievances in repressive social environments.
Bouazizi’s self-immolation sparked indignation and frustration toward the sociopolitical corruption in the regime. On January 4, 2011 Mohammed Bouazizi died from his wounds while 5000 Tunisians demanded Ben Ali’s resignation in Sidi Bouazid (Reuters, 2010). By January 14 Ben Ali stepped down and fled to Saudi Arabia (PBS, 2011). Tunisia was left with a political void that weakened the social control agent’s power and influence over protesters. This allowed the Arab Spring movement to flourish as the beginning of the value oriented movement.

As a result of Tunisia’s early success, Egyptian youth began organizing for similar protests (Hauslohner, 2011). Meanwhile in Tunisia on January 16, 2011 Tunisian Prime Minister Mohammed Gannouchi began creating a provisional governing body while elections were organized (AFP, 2011). Through social media sites Egyptian revolutionaries learned first-hand what was occurring in Tunisia. After the overthrow of Ben Ali’s regime, Egyptian protesters adopted similar techniques to oust Mubarak and his regime. In Egypt protests calling for Mubarak’s resignation began on January 25, 2011. This day became known as the Day of Rage (Ahmed, 2011). Meanwhile in Tunisia the interim government called on Interpol to issue an arrest warrant for Ben Ali (Saleh, 2011). On the 1st of February 2011, Mubarak announced he would not be running for re-election during the next election (Landler, Cooper and Kirkpatrick, 2011). Egyptian citizens lacked a social medium through which they could participate in the public sphere. Protesters in Egypt cited similar generalized beliefs as those in Tunisia. Economic, social and political reform was cited as top priority by protesters. Women merge women’s rights reforms into the revolutionary goals in Egypt. Other marginalized
groups like the Muslim Brotherhood joined the protests to depose Mubarak. On February 2, 2011 armed civilians attacked protesters in Tahrir Square. This day became known as the Battle of the Camel. Many alleged that these armed thugs were in fact hired by Mubarak to repress protesters (Fathi, 2012). Nine days later, on February 11, 2011, Mubarak officially resigned the office of the Presidency of Egypt (Al Jazeera, 2011). Mubarak’s resignation marked the success of the initial goals of the value oriented movement in Egypt.

After Mubarak’s ouster military forces joined the protesters in the secondary goals of democratizing the state. The protests in Egypt were organized by youth revolutionaries including the ‘April 6 youth movement’ (Frontline, 2011). This group had previously organized against the state for economic and social equality. Through their Facebook site they organized other youth to join in massive protests against the state with the purpose of ousting Mubarak. The sociopolitical concerns Egyptian protesters were focused on include: police brutality, state of emergency laws, free and fair elections, freedom of speech, political corruption and economic disparities. Egyptian women played a crucial role in the development of social grievances against the state (Fahim, 2011).

Social media sites like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube played an integral role in spreading the grievances of the Egyptian protesters (Smith, 2011). Twenty-six-year-old blogger, Asmaa Mahfouz, organized the initial protests in Egypt by posting a video blog a week before National Police Day in which she urged the Egyptian people to join her on January 25, 2011 in Tahrir Square to bring down Mubarak's regime. Mahfouz’s video went viral and attracted 80,000 attendees through the group’s Facebook page.
On February 17, 2011 Libyan protesters organized a day of revolt. The previous success in Tunisia and Egypt became the precipitating factors prompting Libya to join in protest against Gaddafi’s regime (Issa, 2011). The armed conflict in Libya began in remembrance of the Abu Salim prison massacre of 1996 (Al Hussaini, 2011). Gaddafi ordered the state military to clear the protesters by any means necessary. The following day internet access was shut down in an attempt to disrupt organization of further protests. During the initial protests the state interrupted internet connections around Libya to prevent further organization and spread of dissent (De Clases, 2011; Kreiba, 2012).

On February 19, 2011 Gaddafi ordered helicopter gunships to target and kill individual protest organizers. On February 21, 2011 Gaddafi’s eldest son appeared on national TV warning the Islamic emirates of a pending civil war. The following day Gaddafi appeared on national TV blaming the US and Al-Qaesa for Libya’s civil unrest. On February 24, 2011 Libyan rebels announced they controlled Tobruk near the Egyptian border. On February 27 the National Transitional Council is announced in Libya to be headed by the former Minister of Justice, Mustafa Abdul Jalil. By March 10, 2011 France recognized the NTC as the legitimate government in Libya. Seven days later the UN Security Council voted in favor of resolution 1973 which disabled Gaddafi’s air-force benefitting the rebels. As rebel forces continued to fight Gaddafi, NATO approved air-raids and bombed a Tripoli residential area killing one of Gaddafi’s sons and three grandchildren.

On May 1, 2011 several Libyan embassies and UN locations were attacked by pro-Gaddafi supporters. The following day President Gaddafi’s Swiss bank accounts were frozen. On May 5, 2011 the NTC granted Libyan rebels a loan using Gaddafi’s assets.
NATO then proceeded to conduct an intensive raid over Tripoli on May 10, 2011. By May 16, 2011 the International Criminal Court announced it would seek arrest warrants for Gaddafi and his sons. From May 20 to May 24, 2011 Western states funding armaments and provided international policy aid in support of Libyan rebels (Al Jazeera, 2011; Bakhack, 2011).

Libya was the first state to receive foreign aid during the protests to oust Gaddafi. It was also the first state to escalate into an armed conflict. Gaddafi refused any form of concession toward protesters, instead he used the state military to murder protesters. The lack of sociopolitical inclusion in Libya provided the movement with the necessary strain leading to the Arab Spring protests. Marginalized minorities like women, low income families and rural tribes were denied any public participation in state run institutions. Gaddafi’s resignation was the initial goal of the value-oriented movement in Libya. Social and political reforms were secondary goals to be established after Gaddafi’s ouster.

Meanwhile in Tunisia, on February 27, 2011 the Interim Minister was replaced by Fouad Mebazaa (Willsher, 2011). On May 27, 2011 Egyptians began to protest against the continued rule of the military council. They rallied for early elections as soon as possible. The following day in a historic move, Egypt re-opened its border crossing with the Gaza Strip (The Guardian, 2011; Michael, 2011).

In Libya the continued armed conflict took a turn in favor of the rebels as 120 army officials resigned their posts to join the rebel cause (Stephen, 2013). NATO
announced on June 1, 2011 that its operation with the rebel forces in Libya would continue until September 1 (BBC News, 2011). That same day Cairo’s judicial system announced it would try Mubarak on August 3rd (AFP, 2011). On June 9, 2011 Gaddafi was accused of ordering soldiers to use rape against the rebel forces by the International Criminal Court. By June 27, 2011 the International Criminal Court formally issued arrest warrants for Gaddafi and his son (The Guardian, 2011; Al Jazeera, 2011; News Wires, 2011). Following Ben Ali and Mubarak’s ouster, organizations were formed to follow through with the revolution’s goals as well as prepare the foundation for democratic elections. In Libya international organizations intervened to help rebels oust Gaddafi and end the armed conflict.

In Egypt the deputy Prime Minister resigned on July 12, 2011 after persistent protests (Yan, 2011). Investigators concluded that the former speaker of the upper house of the Egyptian Parliament was the organizer of the infamous “Battle of the Camel” (Al Jazeera, 2011). On July 15-20, 2011 protesters denounced the military council until it revealed its plans for Egypt’s upcoming elections and reshuffled its council members (Daily News, 2011; Associated Press, 2011). In Libya the US formally recognized the National Transitional Council as the legitimate authority in Libya (Fraser, Schemm, Hubbard, 2011). Without international recognition Gaddafi’s forces lost control of Libya. The weakened social control agents gave the revolution the conditions necessary to begin the transition toward democracy in Libya. Egypt’s transition continued with the announcement that Mubarak and his sons would be prosecuted for the deaths of protesters in Tahrir Square. By August 3, 2011 Mubarak’s trial began (Allam, 2011).
Libyan rebels continued to gain ground against Gaddafi’s forces with UN humanitarian aid, and French NATO support (News Desk, 2011). Rebels infiltrated Tripoli on August 22, 2011 (AFP, 2011).

Meanwhile Egyptian protesters began to polarize during an Egyptian soccer tournament on September 7, 2011. Three days later protesters attacked the Israeli embassy in Cairo (Head, 2011). Libyan rebel forces continued to receive international recognition with the World Bank recognizing the NTC as Libya’s legitimate authority. Finally on September 16, 2011 Libyan rebels advanced into Gaddafi’s hometown of Sirte (News Wires, 2011; Black, 2011). On September 18, 2011 the head of the national election committee announced the elections would begin in November (Associated Press, 2011). On October 2, 2011 the Revolutionary Council of Tripoli was formed in Libya. By October 20, 2011 Gaddafi was captured and killed by rebel forces in Sirte (Maclean, 2011; Sheridan, 2011; Malone, 2011). Following the capture and consequent murder of Gaddafi, the National Transitional Council began to establish organizations to promote elections. After the overthrow of Gaddafi’s regime, the social control agents in power became rebels themselves. Gaddafi’s military supporters found themselves overpowered and quickly lost control and influence over the protesters; this gave the value oriented movement in Libya a chance to flourish.

The first elections after the initial protests were held in Tunisia on October 23, 2011. That same day Libya was declared liberated by the National Transitional Council (Shemm, 2011; Beardsley, 2011; Al Jazeera, 2011). On October 27, 2011 protests erupted in Tunisia over the cancellation of the Popular List party’s seats in Parliament
In November the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood held a meeting for its first congress in 25 years. That same month Egyptian protesters organized against the Military Council’s rule in Egypt.

In Tunisia the Constituent body held its first session since the Arab Spring (Al Arabiya, 2011; Lyon & Perry, 2011; Al Jazeera, 2011). By late November 2011 Egypt held its first elections since the Arab Spring. In December Libya’s interim government announced its deadline to disarm civilians in Tripoli. Tunisia successfully elected Dr. Marzouki as President on December 12, 2011 (The Guardian, 2011; Sherlock, 2011; Toumi, 2011; Al Arabiya, 2011). By mid-December Egypt held its second round of elections for the lower house of Parliament. Islamic parties held they won over 70 percent of the votes. During this period, Egyptian protesters organized against the continued police brutality in Cairo (BBC News, 2011; Issacharoff, 2011; Mackenzie, 2011).

New institutions were developed to foster the democratic goals initiated through the Arab Spring. Plans for elections were carried out and once marginalized groups began to expand their influence politically and socially. Islamic groups once denied a public forum gained prominence among rural uneducated masses, while the educated youth joined women to reform Sharia-based laws and regulations. The first elections within each country marked the beginning of the value changes the Arab Spring initiated. Citizens took part in free and fair elections for the first time in decades.

The beginning of the New Year held elections for Parliamentary seats in Egypt while Mubarak’s trial continued (CNN Wire Staff, 2012; Al Jazeera, 2012; Wang, 2012;
While Presidential campaigns continued in Egypt, on January 23, 2012 the People’s Assembly met for the first time as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces transferred power to them, just in time for the one year anniversary of the Arab Spring movement in Egypt (Lee, 2012; Al Arabiya, 2012; Euronews, 2012). Meanwhile in Tunisia protests began against the new Islamic government (AFP, 2012). Egyptian protesters became increasingly polarized during the Egyptian soccer stadium conflict of February 1, 2012 (Spencer, 2012). On February 15, 2012 Libya made headlines as sectarian conflicts threatened to destabilize the newly freed country (BBC News, 2012).

On March 11, 2012 an Egyptian army doctor was acquitted of carrying out virginity tests on female protesters. During the protests in Egypt women were arbitrarily arrested and forced to undergo ‘virginity tests’ as a measure to deter their participation in the protests (Kirkpatrick, 2012). Soccer games were formally suspended due to previous clashes (Dymond, 2012). Meanwhile in Egypt the deadline for presidential nominations neared on April 8, 2012 (Al Jazeera, 2012). Ten candidates lost their appeals against disqualification on April 17, 2012. By May 10, 2012 Egypt held its first televised Presidential debates for the upcoming elections (Wanted in Africa, 2012; Al Jazeera, 2012; Hendawi, 2012; Fayed & Zayed, 2012).

On June 2, 2012 Mubarak was sentenced to life in prison for the death of Egyptian protesters during the Arab Spring protests (Pizzey, 2012; BBC News, 2012). The Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court declared Parliament invalid on June 14, 2012 while the Presidential runoff elections began the following day (Kirkpatrick & Fahim, 2012; Fahmy & Levs, 2012). As a result the Military Council granted itself sweeping

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powers to manage the elections (Leyne, 2012; Spencer, 2012). By June 24, 2012 the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, Mohamed Morsi, was declared Egypt’s new President and was sworn in on June 30, 2012 (Hussein & Broker, 2012; Al Jazeera, 2012). In his first Presidential speech, Morsi declared the revolutionary goals complete, and maintained his commitment toward the peaceful democratization of Egypt. The US secretary of state, Hilary Clinton visited the newly elected President on July 15, 2012 (Kirkpatrick, 2012).

President Morsi replaced top generals to acquiesce the military and asserted himself the power the military had taken for itself. Morsi sided with Western forces against Syria calling for the end of its armed conflict (Associated Press, 2012; End Times News, 2012; Associated Press, 2012).

The Presidential elections in Tunisia and Egypt introduced democratic political and legislative foundations. Marginalized groups were able to partake of the electoral process. Social reforms, particularly women’s rights were debated and ardently addressed during the electoral processes.

On September 12, 2012 the US embassy in Libya was attacked by Islamic militants killing four Americans including ambassador Stevens (Kirkpatrick & Meyers, 2012). The embassy attack was initially blamed on an anti-Islam film produced in the US by a Christian radical pastor. Tunisian Islamists briefly stormed the US embassy as a response to that film on September 14, 2012, while Egypt’s Prime Minister advised the

Morsi continued to try to appease protesters by pardoning anyone who was arrested during the Arab Spring protests. However, he did allow the Mubarak-era chief prosecutor to keep his position (AFP, 2012; BBC News/Reuters, 2012). Meanwhile in Libya Ali Zidan, an independent congressman and human rights lawyer was elected as the interim Prime Minister (Mohamed, 2012). In Tunisia Islamic conservatives began to use the pulpit as a way to spread their traditional values. Islamists condemned the Tunisian government’s relations with the West as the root of its corrupt culture (MacFarquhar, 2012).

Throughout the end of the year President Morsi led a successful mediation between Hamas and Israel. As the international community praised Morsi, he issued an executive decree banning challenges to his decrees, laws or decisions (Fadel, 2012; Kirkpatrick, 2012). Egyptian citizens, the Supreme Judicial Council and several NGO’s protested the newly established presidential powers the following day. On November 27, 2012 protesters gathered in Tahrir Square once against to force Morsi into withdrawing his decree or resigning the presidency (Cole, 2012; Glaser, 2012; Casey & Parker, 2012). The Egyptian Constitutional Assembly worked on finishing the new constitutional draft. On November 29, 2012 an Islamic led assembly passed the Egyptian constitutional draft that included Sharia (CBS Interactive, 2012; Kirkpatrick, 2012). On December 1, 2012 Morsi announced the constitution would be put to referendum by December 15. In protest several judges refused to oversee the vote on the new constitutional draft and the

Two years after the initial protests Tunisia remained mired with high unemployment, rising sectarian violence, and corrupt government institutions. Libya remains divided by armed militias, while the Egyptian President continues to impose curfews and biased legislation in favor of Islamic conservatives (Khalil, 2012; Stratfor, 2012; Mansur, 2012; PBS, 2012; Milwaukee Public Radio, 2013; Huffington Post, 2013).

Alfred Stephan (2013) found several reassuring trends during a November 2012 research visit in Tunisia. Stephan found the parties in the Constituent Assembly supported the belief of incorporating every political faction in building a favorable constitution. They also expressed their belief in holding free and fair elections in a timely manner. During the initial transition the Constituent Assembly favored a parliamentarized semipresidentialism similar to Portugal’s. Although Egypt has had a harder time
transitioning, the Arab Spring revolution ended the ‘presidents for life’ trend prevalent in the region.

Daniel Byman (2012) analyzed the changes brought on by the Arab Spring. In Tunisia Ben Ali was ousted and free and fair elections placed an Islamic party—Ennahda, in power. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak was ousted and free and fair elections placed an Islamic party—the Muslim Brotherhood in power. In Libya Muammar Gaddafi was ousted through armed conflict between rebels and government forces. Rebels received international intervention and aid to combat Gaddafi’s forces. Sectarian and tribal conflicts erupted as the state was divided among armed groups. “The Arab Spring has the potential to dramatically reshape regional alliances with the issue of democratization—whether pro or con—being diplomatic driver.” (pg. 34) The Middle Eastern region, including states indirectly affected by the movement began implementing more democratic policies as a way to appease the masses. Some of the pending changes in the region include expanding social policies to provide women greater liberties. Regional alliances, western alliances—specifically with the US, cooperation with Israel, and counterterrorism policies are expected to change as a result of the Arab Spring.

Toby Dodge (2012) categorized Arab Spring states into three categories. The first includes monarchies and Gulf States where the regimes survived the protests by appeasing the masses through political reforms. The second category includes states like Libya and Syria that have undergone the protests and as a result have ascended into a civil war. The final category includes Tunisia and Egypt as they emerged from the Arab Spring with new governments and continue the peaceful transition.
2. **Norm-Oriented Movement:**

Reform movements or *norm-oriented movements* attempt to restore, modify, and protect norms in the name of a generalized belief. These movements expand existing norms or create new norms without changing the overall values within a society. Reform movements in capitalist systems form adjuncts to revolutions. Revolutions form the backdrop for reform movements. Smelser defines reform movements as organized hostile outbursts. For norm-oriented movements to develop the social bases for the existing norms must be different from the social bases seeking to modify, restore or create new norms.

In each of the Arab Spring states women have had a long history of marginalization and subjugation. The religious patriarchal foundation of Muslim states do not recognize women's rights as universal human rights. During the initial revolutionary protests many women were assualted and harassed as a way to keep them from the public sphere. Some journalists argue it stems from the deterioration of the traditional roles men play in Muslim societies; in a sense it was a way to control something in an otherwise chaotic environment. Deniz Kandiyoti (2013) defined this post-revolutionary violence against women as *masculine restoration*. Masculine restoration is defined as the use of manipulation and coercion against women as a result of the increased female presence in the public sphere. It is a tool men use to return to the traditional religion-based roles (Zatari, 2013). Women participating in the Arab Spring protests were fighting two revolutions; a political and social revolution. Strain in the norm-oriented movement is based on a culmination of violence, sociopolitical marginalization and a lack of mediums
through which to change their condition, i.e. educational opportunities, employment. Honor killings, underage forced marriages, temporary marriages, gendered segregation in schools, violence against female students, sexual torture, forced veiling, polygamy, and Sharia based laws are all examples of the forms of strain women in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have faced. These conditions are predicated upon religious norms that govern social practices and traditions in Muslim states which make them nearly impossible to modify (Aslan, 2013; Chen, 2013; Ibrahim, 2013; Feminist Majority Foundation, 2013; Sher, 2013; Ya’ar, 2013; Amara, 2013; Mayell, 2013; Feminist News, 2013; Feminist News, 2013; McGrath, 2013; Mosireen, 2013; Yasin, Gaylor, Hussain & Makki, 2013; 4oD Documentaries, 2013; Gah, 2013).

Many women saw the Arab Spring as an opportunity through which they could expand their rights and reform existing social standards. The physical risk many women faced by protesting in the public sphere became symbolic of the resistance within the norm-oriented movement (Jadaliyya, 2013; Mikhaki, 2013; Seikaly, 2013; Real News, 2013; World News Tube1, 2013; Real News, 2012). The assaults, harassment and political marginalization women continually experienced after the overthrow of regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya made it clear that the Arab Spring provided an opportunity for change that was just beginning for women (Slavin, 2012; Alaouï, 2013).

In norm-oriented movements generalized beliefs arise from the failure of the existing normative regulations. After the Arab Spring revolution women’s rights were placed secondary to economic and political reforms; once again women were marginalized and the existing normative regulations failed to provide women the
necessary reforms they sought. Women’s lack of political and social integration into the newly formed sociopolitical environment in these states threatened to dismantle previous advancements in women’s rights (Euronews, 2013; Benmehdi, 2013; Morgan, 2013; Thompson, 2013; Mekhemmet, 2013; Giacomo, 2012; Steavenson, 2012; Tallawy, 2013; Upali Newspapers, 2013; Greenfield, 2013; Akande, 2013; New Woman Foundation, 2011; Muravchik, 2013; Bassem, 2013; Schetina, 2013). Women spread the defined goals central to the movement in each state by blogging, interviewing, videotaping and posting protest videos on social media sites (Ghafour, 2013).

Nadje Al-Ali argues Egyptian women were ready for reform because of the prior normative movements in the state. History shows women have been routinely marginalized during political transitions. During the Arab Spring protests Egyptian women were forced to undergo virginity tests, and were strip searched and accused of prostitution. In Libya women were raped by pro-government forces as a way to limit their participation. In Tunisia new forms of protests like FEMEN’s topless jihad were forbidden, and a publicized rape of a Tunisian woman by policemen who apprehended her and her fiance in their car created further indignation. As the previously oppressive regimes were ousted, Islamic political groups emerged as legitimate organized democratic contenders. “…there is no doubt that Islamist groups are not only the best organized in terms of political parties but they also appear to be well placed to convince many people that they would provide a viable alternative to the previous secular authoritarian regimes.” (Al-Ali, 2012, pg. 30).
Smelser’s norm-oriented precipitating factors are defined as either the opponent’s power or the proponent’s chances for success. The women’s movement after the Arab Spring was limited by the violence women faced in the public sphere. Many women became prevalent bloggers, journalists and commentators on social media sites expanding their opinions and grievances (Arabia, 2013). The Arab Spring revolution gave individuals great power as they noticed the larger the protests the greater the chances for success (Daoud, 2013; Delong-Bas, 2013; OHCHR, 2013; Sherwood, 2013; Daloglu, 2013). Women’s representation in the transitional governing structures decreased. This fostered the development and coalition of several womens organizations throughout the region (Bertrand, 2013; McLarney, 2013; Arshad, 2013). The primary roles available to women after the Arab Spring revolution were confined to those of mothers and wives (Globe Editorial, 2013; Alijla, 2013). Nadje Al-Ali (2012) discussed the gendered politik of the Arab Spring. Women played a central role in the construction of new communities after the Arab Spring. They participated both directly and indirectly by protesting alongside men in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. In Tunisia Maha Issaoui, the leader of the Karama women’s group, posted videos on social media sites that helped organize protesters who consequently toppled Ben Ali’s regime (Mandraud, 2011). In Egypt Mona Seif and Gigi Ibrahim both actively protested alongside men in Tahrir Square. Both women were arrested and forced to undergo virignity tests by army physicians. Ibrahim led a lawsuit against the Egyptian army physicians which declared virignity tests unlawful (Naib, 2011). In Libya Salwa Bugaighis, a prominent human rights activist and lawyer, joined the National Transitional Council following the fall of Gaddafi’s regime.
She was among the government officials who protested and called for transparancy during the political transition in Libya (Stephen, 2011).

Womens organizations saw the Arab Spring as the perfect conduct through which reform may be possible. Smelser’s norm-oriented movement’s three phases of mobilization: incipient phase, enthusiastic mobilization phase and the period of institutionalization and organization correlates with the expansion of women’s rights during the Arab Spring. During the Arab Spring revolution women’s objectives were focused on expelling the ruling regime, but elections took place women were excluded from the political transition. As a result women began to focus on the expansion of their rights and liberties (Pratt, 2013). The incipient phase of the women’s norm-oriented movement is defined by the continued study and publication of womens rights expansion in the region. The second phase is characterized by the Arab Spring revolution; women began to enthusiastically mobilize by protesting during significant days, i.e. International Women’s Day. In this phase women gave testimonies describing the harassment, assault, rapes they experienced during the movement (Pratt, 2013; Bacchi, 2013; Abadi, 2013; Stewart, 2013; Preston, 2013). In the final phase of mobilization women’s rights began to institutionalize in the region. Women’s organizations organized for the implementation of expanded women’s rights socially, economically, educationally, and politically (AnsAmed, 2013; Patheos, 2013; Economist, 2013; Bryant, 2013; Sana, 2013; Casserly, 2013).

Gulf states and Arab monarchies were among the first to reform social policies granting women more individual rights. A new form of protest called the topless jihad
generated by the Ukrainian group FEMEN, also gained prominence in the Middle East, specifically in Tunisia. The traditional norms of the region began to evolve. Despite the extensive social control agents, i.e. traditional religious figures, and government authorities, women made significant advances in organizing and mobilization for the expansion of women’s rights in each country.

3. *Tunisia’s Norm-Oriented Movement*

In Tunisia women were subjected to various forms of violence including sexual harrassment and rape during the Jasmine protests. During the movement the *Association tunisienne des femmes democrates (ATFD)* reported two girls were raped by security forces. Several female protesters were raped while they were detained in the Interior Ministry. On January 29, 2011 female protesters were assaulted by groups of men degrading them yelling slurs for them to ‘return to their kitchens’ (UPI, 2011). These forms of continued sexual violence have contributed to the strain between the normative standards women wished for and the existing normative standards. By protesting and risking serious physical assault women helped define the failures in the existing normative regulations (The Atlantic, 2013; Beardsley, 2011). Tunisian women continued to be marginalized throughout the transitional period.

Gabriella Borovskv and Asma Ben Yahia (2012) analyzed women’s political participation in Tunisia after the revolution. Many of the participants in their study believed that women should play a private role in Tunisian society. Equality was used in terms of social classes and regional representation politically and economically instead of gendered terms. Women in the study expressed greater concern over their day to day
physical security. Both men and women agreed that civil society is a better avenue for women’s participation than political parties. “Participants particularly young women, had difficulty believing that an idealized future was possible given mounting concerns over corruption and the disappointing pace of reform.” (pg. 13). However as the transition took place, economic/political regulations took priority over advancing women’s rights in the state. This fueled the continual protest for political and economic concessions benefiting women and the expansion of the previously acquired rights under Ben Ali’s regime, i.e. CEDAW and Personal Status Code (PSC).

In Tunisia educated women formed large coalitions that promoted women’s rights. Correlating with Smelser’s precipitating factors: the proponents chances for success—educated women were prepared to take part in the decision making process during the political transition. Women understood that bringing democracy into Tunisia meant the inclusion of women in the transitional process. “The Tunisian feminist activists declare it essential that the CSP be enshrined in the new Constitution that is expected to be drafted by the representatives of the Constituent Assembly to be elected on October 23, 2011. Maya Jribi, Secretary General of the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) remains optimistic in spite of the difficulties the country is going through. She believes it will be possible to establish the foundations of a democratic regime. This will be possible if we get closer to the Tunisian citizens’ concerns and avoid political divisions and sterile polemics. As Tunisia was about to celebrate the promulgation of the Code of Personal Status that, she says, is the illustration that Tunisian society is tending toward emancipation and reform.” (Maya Jribi, 2011; GlobalNet, 2011; Arfaoui, 2012).
Women joined men in the Arab Spring protests in Tunis square with the hope that the democratization of Tunisia would lead to the expansion of women’s rights. This correlates with Smelser’s first phase in mobilizing for action in norm-oriented movements. Following the overthrow of Ben Ali’s regime, women’s organizations campaigned to take part in elections. Political parties included women in their parties and allowed them to participate as candidates and party members. “Within the High Commission [for the fulfilment of the goals of the revolution], women mobilised to achieve the adoption of a provision in the new electoral law requiring parity on electoral lists and the mandatory alternation of male and female candidates. We had to counter arguments such as: ‘there are no competent women’, ‘women do not want these responsibilities’, ‘victory should outweigh considerations of gender’” (Khadija Cherif, FIDH, 2011). Following the first elections in Tunisia women’s representation in government decreased from 4 out of 45 member government in early 2011 to 3 out of a 41 member cabinet in October 2011. In the final phase of mobilization—institutionalization and organization, Tunisian women expanded legislation through established womens rights groups: Association tunisienne des femmes democrates (ATFD), National Union of Tunisian women, Trade Union movement, and Association des Femmes pour la Recherché sur le Development (AFTURD).

In the final mobilization phase women began participating in the political realm by demanding reform on current legislation through established women’s NGOs. The transitional government conceded by becoming the first Arab Spring state to remove their reservations on the Convention to Eliminate Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
Feminists in Tunisia have consistently relied on *ijtihad* or the reinterpretation of the Quran to change legislation in favor of women’s rights. The transitional government led by Essebsi only had two women out of 23 Cabinet members. By the 2011 elections only one woman was a part of the transitional government—Dr. Lilia Labidi as the head of the Ministry of Women’s affairs. Women and culture and arts promoters have been targeted in Tunisia after Islamic political parties gained power. This has fueled fears that Tunisia was reverting into Islamic governance. Women now fear losing the rights they had during Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s regimes.

4. *Egypt’s Norm-Oriented Movement*

In Egypt women’s rights have been championed for decades. During the revolution women were violently harrassed as a way to drive them off the public sphere (Al-Aswany, 2012; 4oD Documentaries, 2012). Women participated in the protests both actively protesting and passively blogging, videotaping and uploading protest footage. The infamous ‘virginity tests’ were imposed on female protesters as a way of shaming them to draw them away from the public sphere (Adel, 2012; Amnesty International, 2012). After Mubarak’s ouster, power was transferred from Mubarak to the army which then created the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces—SCAF (Karon, 2011). Women challenged their exclusion from the decision-making process during the political transition on March 8, 2011 only to be met with physical and sexual violence by military and state police forces (Chick, 2011; Al-Shalchi, 2011). Their presence in the public sphere, participating politically by protesting correlates with Smelser’s structural conduciveness.
The transitional government in Egypt neglected women’s issues in general. After two cabinet changes in the political transition only one female Minister represented Egyptian women. “The Egyptian Coalition of Feminist Organizations considers the absence of women ministers in the new Cabinet reshuffle unacceptable and unfitting of a revolutionary government that should represent the interests of all the people holding sit-ins in the central squares around the country during the second wave of the revolution. It is, moreover, an absence that breaches the principles of citizenship, equality, and social justice, which form the governing foundations of Egypt in the light of our glorious revolution.” (New Woman Foundation, 2011). This correlates with Smelser’s generalized beliefs within a norm-oriented movement as normative regulations in Egyptian societies were marked by the continual marginalization of women from the public sphere. These norms did not correlate with the greater sociopolitical freedoms enjoyed by other previously marginalized groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.

Post Mubarak, the constitutional draft promises to include Sharia, much like Egypt’s 1971 Constitution. The Personal Status laws in Egypt are based solely on Sharia. Correlating with Smelser’s precipitating factors: the opponents power—Islamic political parties and religious fundamentalists, were given greater influence and opportunities than women. Women were marginalized while Islamic parties gained power in all government areas (FIDH, 2012; Tayel, 2011). Following the transition women’s representation in government decreased from three ministers to two ministers as of January 2012. Women won only 9 seats out of the 508 seats in the People Assembly in parliament. In total
women represented only 2% of the representatives in the transitional government (FIDH, 2012).

Correlating with Smelser’s first phase of mobilization, the coalition of women NGOs in Egypt called for the dissolution of the National Council of Women as it did not adequately represent Egyptian women abroad. The National Council of Women was established and promoted by Mubarak’s wife. It never denounced the violations perpetrated against Egyptian people since the January 25 revolutionary protests. “Firstly: We refuse the illegitimate National Council of Women or its representation of Egyptian women and the feminist efforts in Egypt and confirm the illegitimacy of its representation in international events. Secondly: We call for the rapid dissolution of the National Council of Women and the prevention of its leaders of benefitting from any authorities in representing Egyptian women internally or internationally. Thirdly: We reconfirm the demand included in our first statement about the urgent need to establish through consensus among the national forces a temporary civil presidential council that will be responsible of establishing a temporary committee composed of women’s figures well known for their independence, integrity and efficiency, formed by consensus among women organizations and the Civil Society in order to represent Egyptian women at the local, Arab and international levels and ensure women’s participation in shaping the political life during the current period.” (New Woman Foundation, 2011). During the second phase of mobilization women joined men in Tahrir square to oust Mubarak (Johnson and Harding, 2011; Bialer, 2011). In the final phase of mobilization—
institutionalization and organization, Egyptian women further expanded legislation through developing more women's rights groups (Gender Across Borders, 2009).

Smelser’s final mobilization phase—institutionalization and organization, correlates with the contributions women continue to make during the transitional period. Women's organizations formed coalitions that formally rejected the Constitutional revisions drafted by the transitional government. These organizations also rejected the continued military rule. “Thus we state our rejection of the proposed constitutional amendments, both in form and content; and we call upon holding a referendum on a temporary constitutional declaration. We demand the formation of a temporary presidential council that would take over power from the Military Council, reflect the spirit of the Revolution and lead the country towards achieving the demands of the Egyptian People’s Revolution.” (New Woman Foundation, 2011).

5. Libya’s Norm-Oriented Movement

During the Arab Spring movement Libyan women protested alongside men following the successful overthrow of decades old regimes in Tunisia and Egypt (Birke, 2011; Shelton, 2011). Female revolutionaries were involved in transmitting information, smuggling weapons and carrying for the injured and their families. In retaliation Gaddafi’s forces raped female protesters leading many to flee to neighboring countries (Cole, 2011). Women in Libya received the right to vote in the 1960's. The 1997 Charter of Rights and Duties allowed women to participate in political institutions. Under Gaddafi’s regime women gained access to education and the workforce although the political realm was still dominated by men (FIDH, 2012). Women directly participated in
the protests to oust Gaddafi. However, they were aggressively persecuted and physically violated as a way to prevent them from participating. Libyan women found that the lack of freedom of expression and assembly indirectly affected their participation in the public sphere (Birke, 2011).

The National Transitional Council asserted complete control after Gaddafi’s capture and murder. The NTC failed to ensure women’s representation and participation in the transitional government. The representation of women in government fell from four under Gaddafi to two under the NTC. The Council developed a new constitution which established Islam as the state religion and Sharia as the principal source of legislation (FIDH, 2012). Many female activists feared they would lose the few rights they had garnered under Gaddafi. Under Islamic regulations women’s rights would be marginalized much like in Tunisia and Egypt. Sharia continued to regulate civil laws (Mekhennet, 2011).

In the transitional period in Libya women’s rights were marginalized for the sake of stability. The political void the Gaddafi regime gave tribal groups the opportunity to legitimately control certain areas. Each group remained loyal to different leaders with varying religious backgrounds. This created a lack of cohesive leadership and government authority which in turn prevented the democratization of the state. Without adequate institutions women remained secluded from the political sphere. “Failure to ensure the inclusivity of women and cultural minorities obliges the Libyan Women’s Platform for Peace (LWPP) to highlight the deep and imminent threat to Libya’s democratic transitional process.” (lwpp.org). Correlating with Smelser’s precipitating
factors, Islamic political parties and religious fundamentalists were given greater influence and opportunities than women.

The Libyan Women’s Platform for Peace partnered with the Karama foundation in 2011 to network and expand the women’s movement in Libya. This correlates with the first phase of mobilization in Smelser’s norm-oriented movements. Coalitions of women’s groups began networking and working together to gain access to the political sphere.

“The Libyan Women’s Platform for Peace (LWPP), along with a coalition of Libyan civil society organizations, coordinated a national campaign and lobby for a more inclusive electoral law, which launched in June at a two-day consultation organized in partnership with Karama. A corresponding campaign “Together Men and Women We Will Write Our Constitution” has also been launched. Together, the LWPP and its partners have proposed a mixed electoral system which combines the individual system and the closed “zipper list” system to ensure the inclusive representation of the Constitutional Assembly. The proposal guarantees 24 women within the 60-member body of the Constitutional Assembly. Under this proposal, 48 seats of the assembly will be allocated to party lists, with alternating male and female candidates.” (lwpp.org). This correlates with Smelser’s second phase of mobilization in norm-oriented movements. With the enthusiastic merging of social groups women’s rights were continuously championed. In essence women banned from the political decision making processes forced their ideas onto the Constitutional Assembly. Through protests and negotiations women managed to convince the Assembly to adopt a ‘zipper list’ which allowed women access to electoral campaigns and parties. “In last year’s GNC election, 33 women were elected. Thirty-two of them
won seats due to the adoption of a zipper list, which guaranteed women seats from those allocated to political lists.” (lwpp.org). This correlates with Smelser’s last phase of mobilization where women’s groups organize for the creation or modification of new normative standards. In Libya, women campaigned for their representation in the Constitutional Assembly, thereby securing the direct representation in the legislative drafting of Libya’s new laws and regulations.
XI. OUTCOMES

Some of the international reports analyzing the progression of democratic principles in the Middle East since the Arab Spring include: the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (2012); Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (2010); British Council Report (2013); United Nations Development Program, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Arab Gulf Program For United Nations Development Organizations (2005); European Council for Foreign Relations (2013); Human Rights Watch (2012); United Nations Development Programme (2011); United Nations Development Programme (2011). Some of the scholarly reports appear in The Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication and The Political Science Quarterly including Toby Dodge’s (2012) and Daniel Byman’s (2012). These reports highlight the political, economic, and social differences after the Arab Spring movement. Following the revolution in each state, previous power holders were ousted, political institutions were demolished and free and fair elections brought a resurgence of Islamic governance.

The Arab Spring ended decade long regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and initiated free and fair elections. The democratic principles people protested for were institutionalized with the transfer of power from one person to an interim governing assembly which organized for the first democratic elections in each of the Arab Spring states.

The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (2010) analyzed the Arab Spring’s goals and repercussions. Protesters in the region were largely disenfranchised youth
organized through social media sites. In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya the authoritarian rulers were the sole guarantors of sociopolitical stability. The Arab Spring removed these leaders allowing fundamentalist groups to participate in the new government. After the overthrow of the leaders in each state, Islamic groups became the only alternatives because they were the only political group organized to campaign for elections. Once the fervor of the initial protests and gains passed, it became clear the region did not have the necessary democratic institutions to sustain the revolutionary goals. Islamic doctrines and traditions are in direct contrast to basic democratic principles. A dichotomy has emerged between the regions cultural identity and the desire for democratic progress. Human rights violations were not a priority for the transitional governments. They were seen as an elitist issue. Unfortunately, it was during the transition that military offices in charge began committing the gravest human rights violations against revolutionaries. These included extending its military jurisdiction to all branches of government, limiting free speech and expression, blocking human rights advocates and organizations, violently disbursing protesters, failing to protect religious minorities, and the continued arbitrary arrest and torture of civilians.

Following elections in Tunisia and Egypt, Islamic political groups won majority seats in Parliament and the Presidential elections (Al-Amin, 2011; Al-Amin, 2011). In Libya the transitional government failed to recall all weapons from the rebels and has not been able to centralize state authority. The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (2012) analyzed the repercussions since the Arab Spring. In Tunisia and Egypt constitutional drafts, ballot boxes and new state legislation has been used to implement
new forms of religious autocracy. Under Islamic governments minorities and women have seen an increase of assaults and harassment. Political and sectarian violence has also increased as tribal and non-state parties have become more violent during marches and sit-ins (Reuters, 2013; New York Post, 2011; Reuters, 2013).

According to the European Council for Foreign Relations (2013), each Arab Spring country continue to struggle toward democratic values. Egypt remains polarized under the Muslim Brotherhood’s governance. The Muslim Brotherhood has consolidated its power in each state institution by appointing Brotherhood members to essential posts. During Egypt’s constitutional drafting Brotherhood members lacked cohesion with secular political groups, resulting in the dissolution of Parliament. The new state constitution was voted for under a rushed referendum resulting in a Sharia ridden document. Morsi went as far as to grant himself executive rights that would make his decisions final, essentially becoming a dictator. Under Morsi’s administration Egyptian press and social media sites were investigated for criticism against the new government. Journalists and leading commentators were arrested for criticizing the presidency. Opposition parties like the National Salvation Front boycotted elections and constitutional drafts by withdrawing from the legislative forum. This allowed Morsi’s government to pass legislation that directly countered the revolution’s goals.

Tunisia’s Islamic-led government threatens the secular history of the state. Radical groups like the Salafists threaten to destabilize the country further. As in Egypt, the ruling Ennahda party is Islamic. Religious groups in Tunisia have increased since the Arab Spring. Compromise with oppositional forces resulted in the implementation of a
semi-presidential system composed of both Islamic and secular political groups. Tunisia faced similar struggles during the constitutional drafting. Compromise was slow and arduous, but the biggest criticism came from the international community as the newly drafted constitution would trump prior international conventions. This would limit the expansion of women’s rights by allowing Sharia to govern every aspect of Tunisian society. The European Union has advised Tunisia to compromise with oppositional groups in all governing decisions.

Libya’s government is reported to still be lacking any central authority. Libya is a unique case in the Arab Spring because it lacked multiple political parties under Gaddafi’s regime. Since 2012 Libya has elected a General National Congress (GNC) and a Prime Minister. The lack of any previous political culture in Libya has made it difficult to transition into a democratic country. Libya’s Commission for Integrity and Patriotism was established by the transitional government, however it has received criticism because it has the power to exclude individuals from the public sphere. To this day, much of the country remains in control of armed groups.

The United Nations Development Programme (2011) analyzed the constitutional drafting in Tunisia and Egypt. During the transition Tunisia’s previous constitution remained enforced while in Egypt the transitional government headed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), oversaw the process of a new constitutional draft. The Tunisian leadership worked to follow an open and democratic transition while Egypt postponed elections until political coalitions agreed upon them. As both countries move forward in the drafting of a new constitution, they remain determined to ensure that
the presidency does not emerge as an all powerful entity unaccountable to the state. Both Tunisia and Egypt continu to declare Islam as the official religion, and maintain Sharia as the basis of legislation. Since the July 2013 military coup that removed Morsi from the presidency in Egypt, amendments were proposed by a ten person committee that adequately represented the country.

The Human Rights Watch (2012) analyzes human rights throughout the world. Social and political progress through the Arab Spring were expected to increase human rights advances in the region. Human rights in Egypt remain the same from 2011-2012. During the transitional period thousands of protesters were continuously arrested, tortured and repressed. Female protesters were submitted to virginity tests and sexual assaults by members of the military. Egypt’s military was found to use excessive force to break up demonstrations following the Arab Spring. 846 protesters were said to have been killed during the initial protests in Egypt. Mubarak has been tried for the murder of all these protesters, however as of August 2013 Mubarak was released on bail (Moheyeldin, Gubash, and DeLuca, 2013; Al Jazeera, 2013). Many journalists were arrested and sentenced to prison terms for covering the Arab Spring protests and for criticizing the transitional government. “News media enjoyed greater freedom in the aftermath of the ouster of Mubarak on all issues except those concerning the military. As of September the military prosecutor under the SCAF had summoned at least nine activists and journalists for questioning on charges of ‘insulting the military,’ but released most without charge. An exception was blogger Maikel Nabil, whom a military tribunal in April sentenced to three years imprisonment for ‘insulting the military’ and ‘spreading
false information’ on his blog. At this writing Nabil remained in prison while awaiting his retrial, scheduled for November 27.” (pg. 561). Religious persecution continued against Coptic Christians since the Arab Spring. Censorship has also continued as the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) passed legislation criminalizing strikes as they affect the greater social apparatus. SCAF also amended the existing Political Rights Law to cancel the necessary quota of 64 seats for women in the People’s Assembly.

In Tunisia, the elected Constitutent Assembly adopted a pluralist electoral law, lifted CEDAW reservations, and adopted new press codes and laws. More than 106 new political parties were legalized following the Arab Spring. The interim government freed over 500 political prisoners and it established a national commission to investigate abuses committed during the initial protests. The new press codes eliminated the criminalization of state defamation or slander. However, the interim government failed to defend free speech when the controversial film Persepolis was released. The Tunisian personal status codes outlawed polygamy, repudiation and established 18 years as the minimum age for marriage.

The British Council Report (2013) analyzes the youth’s perception of the sociopolitical progress since the Arab Spring. The youth in Egypt stated mosques and churches became politicised. In Libya female protesters participated in larger numbers. In Tunisia, disadvantaged youth have developed indirect forms of political participation that allows them to participate in the decision making processes. In all three states there is dissatisfaction and disillusionment among the youth since youth coalitions were not included in the decision making processes (Al Jazeera, 2013). Following the regime
changes the youth generation were both praised for their collective unity and enthusiasm but were also deemed inexperienced. In each state all generations hold severe suspicions over the transitional government.

The United Nations Development Programme (2011) analyzes the economic challenges facing the Arab Spring countries. Oil-led economic growth and weak political/administrative accountability mechanisms have led to the destabilization and perpetual neglect of the Arab people. Since the Arab Spring, the disparity between the rural and urban populations have led to a radical destabilization in each country.

Since the ouster of the autocratic regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya the three states have undergone an attempt towards the democratization of the region. This attempt began with the formation of interim governments tasked with the continuation of the revolution’s goals. Part of the continuation of the revolution’s goals included organizing the first free and fair elections for each country. These elections began with Parliament seats, cabinet seats, and presidential campaigns. An influx of political parties emerged since the Arab Spring, many of them founded on religious principles. In each state Islamic parties were free to politically organize and participate in the elections. In Tunisia and Egypt Islamic led political parties were the big electoral winners. Once Islamic parties were in power the marginalization of women, minorities, and the youth became quite apparent (Benstead, Lust, Malouche, Soltan and Wichmann, 2013; Asher, 2013). Islamic parties limited the definition of democracy as a winner take all principle. This was especially true in Egypt when the Muslim Brotherhood began appointing Brotherhood members to important governmental positions and refused to compromise with secular
parties during the constitutional drafting. This led to the most recent Egyptian blunder, the July 3, 2013 military coup that removed the elected president Morsi from power (Elmasry, 2013; Dettmer, 2013; El Sheikh, 2013; Hessler, 2013; Hamilton, 2013; Kuran, 2013; Azikiwe, 2013; Kirkpatrick, 2013; Israel News, 2013; Michael, 2013). Many journalists and commentators believed the coup marked the need for a second revolution that limited religious political group’s participation (Zakaria, 2013; Tryphon, 2013).

In both Tunisia and Egypt Islamic groups emerged victorious. However, the Ennahda-led government in Tunisia showed more cooperation in decision making strategies and plans (Amara and Heneghan, 2013; Ahmad, 2013; Amara and Heneghan, 2013). Tunisia has progressed in the drafting of a constitution that should be finished and voted on by this Fall 2013. Oppositional parties have been set back with the murder of two leaders in one year (The Guardian, 2013; Hlaoui, 2013). Youth in Tunisia remain in precarious socioeconomic conditions. The continued persecution of journalists and commentators undermine the press and media liberties founded under the Arab Spring (Aliriza, 2013). The unequal appropriation of economic funds within the National Constituent Assembly has angered many revolutionaries who continue to struggle economically. Since the Egyptian coup this past summer 2013, Tunisians have mimicked protests to depose the elected Islamic government. In contrast to Egypt, Tunisian officials have opted for diplomatic cooperation and cabinet reshuffling (Chaieb and Ben Hedi, 2013; Yahia, 2013).

In Libya the establishment of a central authority has been impossible. Libyan oil fields have been controlled by jihadist groups that have effectively seceded from Libya
to sell oil to foreign companies (El-Khabar, 2013). Since the September Embassy attack that killed four Americans including Ambassador Stevens, Libya has received international aid and scrutiny for being unable to effectively control armed groups. As in Egypt and Tunisia, terror groups have collided and used Libya as a harbor to recruit disenfranchised youth (Busch and Pilat, 2013). This has led to the resignation of the Libyan Deputy Prime Minister as he was unable to carry out his post’s requirements (Al Jazeera, 2013). The first elections in Libya were to form the General National Congress (GNC) in 2012. With the ascension of radical Islamists in the political sphere, the democratic progression has been thwarted. With the recent Egyptian coup the region has been thrown into further chaos as conflicted groups search for other methods to bring about change. The most significant obstacle in the region is the increasingly violent sectarian strife among Sunni and Shiite Muslims (Hannan, 2013; Rahim, 2013).

Some scholars have argued that the ongoing democratic transition will require more time to establish adequate institutions changing the region’s sociopolitical foundation. The Arab Spring movement continues to unfold in the Middle Eastern region. The establishment of democratic values in each country remain to be seen. Time will tell if democratic values are compatible in the region (Ben-Meir, 2013).
XII. WOMEN’S CURRENT STATUS

The United Nations Development Program, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Arab Gulf Program For United Nations Development Organizations (2005) summarized the precarious condition of women in Arab states in 2005. The report found women’s morbidity and mortality remained high, illiteracy and educational enrollment rates remained stagnantly low, employment rates remained low as traditional roles circumvented jobs for men. This in turn led to women’s dependence on male counterparts which weaken their autonomy and individual liberty. Legal structures in almost all Arab states promote women’s rights, however do not actively enforce them. In urban areas the female political representation has been conditional, or purely symbolic. Rural areas are still largely defined by the religious tenet that depict women as inferior to men. This report analyzed the condition of women in all Arab states and concluded that women’s liberation is a prerequisite to an Arab renaissance. A revolution like the Arab Spring is the only way to bring about regional reform.

In Tunisia women under Ben Ali’s regime held progressive rights in the region. The first women’s association: the Tunisian Women’s Islamic Union, was created in 1938 and fought for their independence. Once Tunisia won its independence the Personal Status Code was established that benefitted women by replacing Sharia laws with democratic principles. Data has shown that regardless of legislative progression gender roles remain deeply entrenched in social norms enshrined with Islamic traditions. Following the Arab Spring protests Islamic political parties rose to power. Many female
activists, protesters, academics etc., fear they will lose their sociopolitical rights under the new Islamic governance (Ben Salem, 2010).

In Egypt social movements pertaining to gendered issues were much less common than political revolutions. Under Sadat and Mubarak’s regime women’s rights progressed by limiting Islamic practices like female genital mutilation and obligatory veiling. Domestic violence abuses and spousal rape were criminalized, however in rural areas honor killings and FGM continued. Private sectors undermine national legislation in favor of patriarchal values and Islamic traditions. Women have gained access to employment and higher education, however rural areas remained marginalized. Female activists, women’s rights groups and NGOs across Egypt hope the Arab Spring could bring the opportunity for social reform specifically for women’s rights. The political results from the first free and fair elections in Egypt regressed into Islamic rule. Under Morsi’s governance women have been subjected to an increase in sexual assaults and harassment. Women’s roles in political, social and economic reform, have decreased since the Arab Spring (Tadras, 2010).

In Libya women were ruled by a series of legislative drafts Gaddafi wrote in his Green Book. Sharia laws governed all civil and family disputes; children born of non-Muslim fathers were treated as secondary citizens regardless of the mother’s nationality or religious background. Honor killings are much more common in Libya than in Tunisia and Egypt. Social rehabilitation is often times forced upon women found to be deliberately disregarding gender laws in Libya. During social rehabilitation women are essentially confined to one room and withheld any social contact with friends, family etc.
Polygamy remained legal in Libya under Gaddafi, and domestic abuse and spousal rape were not criminalized. Under Gaddafi’s regime there were no legally independently established NGOs promoting women’s rights. Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, Libyan families are not forced to educate their female offspring. As a result unemployment rates among Libyan women were significantly higher. Economic dependence on male figures has subjected women to debilitating dependence and a severe lack of opportunities (Pargeter, 2010).

UNESCO released a report in 2012 that outlined the progress the international community has made to expand educational opportunities to all regions and to all individuals regardless of gender. The report found girls have made unprecedented progress in terms of access, retention and progression into education programs. Female enrollments has increased worldwide, however girls continue to face discrimination as they access education. One poignant example of this is of the Pakistani young scholar, Malala Yousafzai. Malala was targeted by Taliban insurgents and shot in the head for continuing her education (Feminist News, 2013). Women have made gains in education, employment and political participation rates in the last years. However as in the case of the Arab Spring countries, a resurgence of traditional religious fundamentalism threatens to undo this progress. Fatma El-Zanaly and Ann Way (2008) analyzed a sample of women ages 15-49 to study health and demographic progress. The authors found fertility rates decreased in urban areas while rural area saw an increase in fertility rates. In urban areas contraceptive uses increased as well as family planning. As women became more and more educated they postponed marriage and family plans. As of 2008 the authors
found 91 percent of the interviewees had been circumcised, however the practice is said to be decreasing. The positive perceptions related to Female Genital Mutilation has decreased from 82 percent to 63 percent among the interviewees.

Under the previous regime in Tunisia, the representation of women in government was confined to 4 out of 45 members in government. The lower house of the chamber of deputies imposed a quota of thirty percent of women in electoral lists. In the upper house of parliament, 17 women sat among 112 councilors. The constituent assembly was composed of 59 women out of 217 members. In 2010, women accounted for twenty seven percent of seated judges, and thirty one percent of working lawyers.

Tunisia ratified CEDAW in 1985, but modified it to adhere to Islamic law and practices. For example Tunisia objected to articles 9(2), 16(g)(h), and 16 (c)(d)(f), which deal with the transfer of nationality from mother to offspring, transfer of family name to children, marriage, divorce, and custody of children. Tunisia made it very clear that the state religion took precedence to the convention. The Tunisian constitution was ratified in 1959 and made no initial mention of prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of gender (FIDH, 2012). After the ouster of Ben Ali’s regime, the representation of women in government decreased from 4 women out of a 45 member government to 3 women out of a 41 member government. In Parliament legislation post Ben Ali conceded half of the candidacy seats to Parliament for women. The results were 59 women out of 214 seats in the lower house of Parliament and 17 women out of 112 councillors in the upper house of Parliament (FIDH, 2012).
Before the movement in Egypt, three women were represented in the Ministry of international cooperation, the ministry of immigration and the ministry of the state for the family and population. In 2009, 64 seats were reserved for women in the lower house of parliament. In 2004, 11 women were appointed to the upper house of parliament, and in 2007, 10 women campaigned for election out of a total of 609 candidates. In 2007 a ban against female judges was finally lifted and 30 women were appointed to civil courts.

Egypt ratified CEDAW in 1981, but held several reservations on articles 2, 9(2), and 16. These articles dealt with the elimination of discrimination against women, the transfer of nationality from mothers to their offspring and equal rights in marriage and divorce. Although Egypt’s 1956 constitution granted women the right to vote and stand for office, it failed to address gender discrimination. Egypt’s 1971 constitution also lacked any mention of discrimination on the grounds of gender. It did however dictate that the principle source of all Egyptian legislation was to lie in Sharia or Islamic law (FIDH, 2012). After the ouster of Hosni Mubarak’s regime, women’s participation rate decreased from 3 women out of 37 ministers in government to 2 women out of 31 ministers in government. In Parliament legislation under Mubarak conceded 64 Parliament seats for women out of 518. Under Mubarak 380 women stood for election while 62 won seats in 2010. After Mubarak’s ouster female candidates won only 9 seats out of 508 seats in the People’s Assembly. In 2007, 9 women were appointed and one elected to the 264 member council of the upper house of parliament. After Mubarak only one woman won a seat out of 180 in the upper house of parliament in 2012 (FIDH, 2012).
Before the Arab Spring in Libya four women occupied ministerial posts in the ministries of culture, media, social affairs and women. 36 women out of 468 members obtained seats in parliament in 2009, but at the local level patriarchal and tribal roots limited the political participation of many women. Estimates have shown that as of 2010, 50 women presided as judges throughout Libya. Libya’s constitution did not initially assert the equality of citizens based on gender. Libya ratified CEDAW in 1989 but held reservations to articles 2 and 16(c)(d) which dealt with inheritance laws, marriage and divorce laws and custody of children. Libya asserted these areas would be governed by Sharia law (FIDH, 2012). Under Gaddafi 4 women occupied ministerial posts in government. Following Gaddafi’s ouster, under the transitional government one woman was established out of 14 members. Later on a new 28 member cabinet was established which included 2 women. In Parliament under Gaddafi 36 women obtained seats out of 468 members in Parliament. After Gaddafi new legislation was drafted that established half of the candidates on electoral lists must be women, however it was not legally enforced (FIDH, 2012).

The following tables show the gender discrepancies in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya on employment, literacy rates, and political representation from 2004 to 2010. Derived from World Bank databases, the percentages of female progression in each category show slight increases, but when compared to the male percentages women are at a significant disadvantage in each state in each category.
1. **TABLES 1.1**: These tables indicate that there is a broad differentiation between men and women in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya concerning political participation and representation, literacy rates and labor participation.

### Status of Women in Tunisia (2004-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population Total</td>
<td>9,93</td>
<td>10,02</td>
<td>10,12</td>
<td>10,22</td>
<td>10,32</td>
<td>10,43</td>
<td>10,54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate, adult female (% of females ages 15+)</td>
<td>6.53%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>6.85%</td>
<td>7.10%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate, adult male (% of males ages 15+)</td>
<td>8.34%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>8.61%</td>
<td>8.64%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+)</td>
<td>2.41%</td>
<td>2.43%</td>
<td>2.45%</td>
<td>2.47%</td>
<td>2.49%</td>
<td>2.51%</td>
<td>2.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor participation rate, male (% of male population ages 15+)</td>
<td>6.90%</td>
<td>6.83%</td>
<td>6.85%</td>
<td>6.88%</td>
<td>6.91%</td>
<td>6.94%</td>
<td>6.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of women in ministerial level positions</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.71%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.71%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments</td>
<td>2.28%</td>
<td>2.28%</td>
<td>2.28%</td>
<td>2.28%</td>
<td>2.76%</td>
<td>2.76%</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(World Bank Data)

### Status of Women in Egypt (2004-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population Total</td>
<td>72,84</td>
<td>74,20</td>
<td>75,56</td>
<td>76,94</td>
<td>78,32</td>
<td>79,71</td>
<td>81,12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate, adult female (% of females ages 15+)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>5.94%</td>
<td>5.78%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>6.35%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate, adult male (% of males ages 15+)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>8.30%</td>
<td>7.46%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>8.03%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+)</td>
<td>2.00%</td>
<td>2.06%</td>
<td>2.09%</td>
<td>2.28%</td>
<td>2.31%</td>
<td>2.33%</td>
<td>2.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor participation rate, male (% of male population ages 15+)</td>
<td>7.47%</td>
<td>7.58%</td>
<td>7.35%</td>
<td>7.37%</td>
<td>7.38%</td>
<td>7.40%</td>
<td>7.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of women in ministerial level positions</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.59%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.65%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.94%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments</td>
<td>0.29%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>1.27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(World Bank Data)
The Middle Eastern Program in the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars celebrated International Woman’s Day 2012 by compiling interviews from female activists, scholars, feminists, protesters, and representatives from the Middle Eastern states engaged in the Arab Spring movement. In Egypt activists like Moushira Khattab actively participated in the Arab Spring protests. With the fall of Mubarak’s regime female activists like Khattab were marginalized through harassment and assaults. As women celebrated the 2011 International Women’s Day female protesters were beaten, stripped from their clothing and harassed off the public sphere (Chick, 2011).

Dali Ziada from Egypt noted a divide among women themselves into two categories: the grassroots and the elite, i.e. rural and urban women. In Tunisia Omezzine Khelifa positively noted that female protesters and activists remained direct participants in the decision making processes following the fall of Ben Ali’s regime. Electoral party lists maintained the necessary condition of allowing women to represent 50% of the
candidates (Ben Bouazza and Schemm, 2011). The transitional government in Tunisia also showed great signs of progress in women’s rights as it lifted all CEDAW reservations (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Isobel Coleman noted women in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya faced severe political limitation in representation in all key government institutions. In Egypt women won less than two percent of the 498 parliamentary seats. In Tunisia women’s rights were maintained as the winning Al Nahda party did not change the Personal Status Code exemplifying women’s rights in the Arab world (Exclusive Analysis, 2013). In Libya the transitional government indicated Sharia would remain the main source of state legislation and any and all laws objecting to Sharia would be abolished (Gamel, 2011).

The 2011-2012 UN Women Report, focused on the empowerment of women in rural areas worldwide. This report analyzed the work done through and by the UN to better the condition of women worldwide. Of interest to this study, the UN Development Programme, the Egyptian High Judicial Elections Committee and the Egyptian Centre for Women’s Rights collaborated to politically mobilize women during and after the Arab Spring protests. The UN coalition emphasized the need to incorporate women in the decision making process in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya to fully achieve the democratic goals of the Arab Spring revolution. These coalitions helped locally mobilize women in the voting process raising women’s voting rates from 40 to 46 percent. Safe Cities Initiative, UN Women, UNICEF, UN Habitat and leading women’s rights NGOs in the greater Middle Eastern region worked to reduce sexual harassment and assaults due to the changing sociopolitical values.
The European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies analyzed Tunisia’s gender equality policies in 2012. Women’s rights in Tunisia remained the most progressive of the region. Women’s political participation rates prior to the movement were 27.9 percent in 2009. After the movement the transitional government adopted an electoral system that separated half of the candidacy for women. Among the elected members of the Constituent Assembly, 27 percent were women. In 2010 63 percent of higher education graduates were women; however they represented only 25 percent of the total labor force as of 2010. In 2012 Tunisia lifted all CEDAW reservations and applied an inclusive zipper electoral system. Women take more responsibility in the household regardless of their profession. The report states that as of 2010 31.6 percent of women have faced physical violence in Tunisia. As progressive as Tunisia has been the Arab Spring movement has given Islamic political groups greater liberties and has allowed them significant influence in the new sociopolitical environment. This has ultimately sacrificed women’s rights as traditional roles have been upheld (Dahlerup, Danielsson, & Johansson, 2012). The National Democratic Institute analyzed the Tunisian women’s political participation after the Arab Spring revolution in 2012. Gabriella Borovsky and Asma Ben Yahia held 15 focus groups with a total of 151 male and female participants. The authors found participants to marginalize gender equality, and use the word equality in terms of social class and regional representation as opposed to gender. The majority of participants believe women should play a bigger role in the private sphere than in the public sphere. Some participants went so far as to suggest men and women have different mental and physical capabilities. Inheritance laws under Sharia were cited as the main
reason why women cannot be equal to their male counterparts. Female participants reported no longer feeling comfortable in public spaces alone since the Arab Spring. Women expressed more apprehension for their physical safety than men did, citing specific harassment and assault cases. Political parties in Tunisia were not perceived as welcoming of female participants, which has led large groups of young women to abstain from voting in the new political sphere.

From Tunisia, Egypt, Libya to Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria women took the opportunity the Arab Spring provided to expand women’s rights in each Arab state. In Tunisia women’s rights coalitions actively participated in the decision making processes during the transitional period. Legislation implemented in this period included the division of candidacy through the zipper electoral system that gave women half of the candidacy seats for the Constituent Assembly (Ajmi, 2011; D’Almeida, 2011). In Egypt women were marginalized from the decision making processes in the transitional governance. This was noted by women’s rights coalitions on March 8 during their protest march in honor of the 2011 International Women’s Day. It became clear with the rising Islamic political parties that the few rights women had under Mubarak would be threatened by the newly elected Parliament, Presidency and Cabinet (Chick, 2011; CIHR, 2013). During the drafting of the constitution in 2012 language form the previous constitution was kept, and gender discrimination was mired with religious precedents. The traditional roles of mother and wife were further emphasized in the new constitution (McLarney, 2013). Egypt continues to face sectarian strife and corrupt government officials. As of this past July 3, 2013 Morsi was removed from the presidency by the head
of the Egyptian military—General Al-Sisi, in a controversial military coup (Read, 2013; Kingsley, 2013). In Libya women have been kept out of the decision making processes. As Libya continues to fight rebel groups for control of the state, women’s rights have been neglected. Although the majority of the populous agree on implementing Sharia as the main source of legislation in the newly freed Libyan government, women’s representation in the National Transitional Council has been meager. Women’s rights groups have formed coalitions in Libya to draft grievances and constitutional amendments protecting their previous rights and expanding their representation in the new government (IPS, 2013; AWID, 2012; Mandraud, 2011; Alija-Fernandez, 2013).

In Yemen protests erupted in 2011 with University students clamoring for the resignation of the President. The Transitional National Unity government included 3 women, an increase from the two female members in Saleh’s government. Women’s rights in Yemen still lag behind as women are treated as inferior to men in legislation. In Bahrain women began the protests in 2011. Although women have increased access in education and employment they remain underrepresented in Parliament, the Judiciary and in political parties. Two female ministers serve out of 23 since 2012. In Syria the Arab Spring protests began in 2011 with violent repressive government arrests and torture. There have been widespread reports of rapes and assaults against female protesters by government forces. Political participation is repressed by the restriction of freedom of expression and assembly. Sharia has been implemented in all civil and family laws which have kept the condition of women in Syria in stagnant regression. In Algeria the National Coordination for Change and Democracy (NCCD) has organized a series of protests
against the government; however it has failed to establish mass demonstrations. Although
the constitution explicitly affirms women’s equality, only three women serve out of 38
members in government. In Morocco protest demands have been met with concessions
by King Mohamed VI. It has withdrawn its reservations to CEDAW and has promoted
gender equality in the new constitution. As of 2012 only one female minister has served
in a 30 member government (FIDH, 2012).
The Arab Spring revolution did not change the fundamental values within Tunisia, Egypt and Libya from authoritative non-inclusive regimes to freely elected democracies. As the movement ousted decade old regimes and implemented transitional governments, women in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya advocated for the implementation of gender equality in the newly established institutions, constitutional drafts and legislation. Their demands were met with harassment, sexual assault and a decrease in their representation in government. After elections took place in each state women were marginalized from candidacy lists and from the electoral process. Islamic groups gained power in Tunisia and Egypt in 2012. As these groups began implementing their religious influence on the state’s legislation women were increasingly nudged off the public sphere. The value oriented movement in each state succeeded in bringing about new democratic political values. However these political values were defined solely by the ballots (Chalfaouat, 2013). The winners in each state took these new political gains and sanctified their legislative decisions as ‘God sent’ or ‘divinely inspired’. It became increasingly clear that the initial revolutionary goals of freedom, individual liberty and autonomy would not be realized for half of the populous as Islam would dictate all civil legislation and judicial decrees. The norm-oriented movement pushing the enshrinement of women’s rights in the new democratic states continued to face setbacks as women held limited representation in all decision making processes and institutions. The changes in normative regulations within the new democratic value system mobilized women’s groups to participate indirectly by continued protests, sit-ins, and marches (Slavin, 2012).
This thesis covers a period between December 2010 until the fall of 2013. As of this date the movement continues not only in the three initial countries but has also spread at various times to Yemen, Jordan, Mali, Bahrain, and Dubai. In Syria it has precipitated a bloody civil war that has forced the international community to intervene. The presence of fundamentalist Islamic groups such as Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda within the ranks of the rebels opposing the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad has prevented, as of this date, direct Western influence as it occurred in Libya and Tunisia.

1. Correlating Smelser’s theory of collective behavior, socioeconomic strain united men and women in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya under the common goal of deposing the existing regimes. Through adequate structural conduciveness generalized beliefs or goals were formed. These goals were a response to the social and economic strain experienced by the populous. The main response was to oust the existing regimes as they were seen as the primordial source of strain.

2. The culmination of the strain, conduciveness and generalized beliefs led to the precipitating event of Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation. Through social media sites Tunisians spread Bouazizi’s protest throughout FaceBook, Twitter and YouTube. These sites served to transcend national boundaries that promoted the movement across the entire Middle Eastern region.

3. Through Social media sites, internal controls are breached and the movement’s goals are replicated from one state to the other. From Tunisia the precipitating event was posted on social media sites and replicated in Egypt. After the successful ouster of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, Libyans protested against
Gaddafi’s regime. Through international cooperation and intervention Libyan rebels were able to oust Gaddafi’s regime.

4. After the overthrow of the existing regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya the cooperating forces become divided as they compete for electoral offices and governmental power. Fundamentalist groups in each state began radically defending radical Islam. Women were increasingly harassed and assaulted as a result.

5. As the presence of religious fundamentalist groups increased after the ouster of each state’s regime, the religious-based values prevalent in the region were used to legitimize the collective behavior exhibited in the Arab Spring movement. These values were taken as divine legitimation which gathered the vote of large uneducated masses. This helped Islamic political parties win the first elections in Tunisia and Egypt.

6. The Arab Spring’s revolutionary goals were not carried through. The democratic principles many protesters initially sited as the commencement of the Arab Spring, were not carried out after the ouster. Had these democratic goals and principles been carried through, the condition of women would have significantly increased.

7. Women who had actively participated in the Arab Spring protests were marginalized during the transitional decision making processes. This did not deter the norm-oriented movement as women continued to protest in each step of the decision making process in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The results have been an
increase on sexual assaults, harassment, rape and verbal aggression against female protesters. This has deterred the progression of women's rights, or the norm-oriented movement in each Arab Spring state.

8. The values the Arab Spring initially brought, democratic principles in their simplicity, gave way to the participation of Islamic fundamentalist groups in the political sphere after being repressed under the previous regimes. Many of these groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda saw the Arab Spring as an opportunity with which to return to the public sphere. Many scholars have noted that the past regimes, as oppressive as they had been for years, retained fundamentalists and allowed each state to join the modernization taking place worldwide. The groups that came to power after the first elections usurped the Arab Spring's goals for the benefit of their Islamic agendas.

9. In Egypt the military ceased protests calling for Morsi's resignation by carrying out a military coup. This made way to the formation of new Constitutional Assemblies drafting a more cohesive state constitution, but also gave way to the incorporation of secular political groups in state affairs.

10. The democratic values, as understood by the region, were redefined by the Islamic groups in power as a winner take all/ majority rule. This definition was rendered by the Islamic principle of one divinely chosen leader; a clear indication that Islam is thoroughly incompatible with democratic political ideals like autonomy, rule of law, civil liberties etc. In Egypt, Morsi drafted an executive decree making
him the sole source of rule. In Libya and Tunisia, oppositional forces were marginalized in all decision making processes, erupting into massive protests.

11. The region experienced a paradigm shift from modern traditionalist values to regressed Islamic rule. The Islamic resurgence triggered a regression to stricter traditionalist values particularly in issues pertaining to women’s rights. Under the previous regimes Islamic fundamentalism was seen as an obstacle to modernizing the states. As such they were brutally repressed and forced underground. As previously stated, women under the past regimes were confined politically but were provided educational and employment opportunities. Women gained many rights and liberties under the pretense of appearing modern internationally. The Arab Spring provided the opportunity to expand what they had previously gained. Now two years later women fear losing the rights they had previously held.

12. The values and norms promoted by activists during the Arab Spring movement have failed to take hold as of yet. The elections have ushered in an Islamic resurgence akin to the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution. This has prompted by educated men and women to migrate to moderate Arab states, the US, and Europe.

13. The Middle Eastern region is operating under a new social paradigm after the Arab Spring movement. The norms directing the condition of women in the region have unfortunately regressed. This regression has been caused by the Islamic resurgence within political parties who usurped the Arab Spring’s goals to further their influence. Using Smelser’s concepts and theory to evaluate the Arab
Spring movement has shown the value and norm oriented movements in each state have collided. The initial values the Arab Spring promoted have fundamentally changed once again after the first elections. The results have propelled political Islam back into the forefront, which ultimately erases the progression and expansion of women’s rights.
XIV. A CRITIQUE OF SMELSER’S THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

The transformation of values did not occur after the overthrow of the regime, as assumed by Smelser’s theory. As the people involved in the movement split according to political factions, traditionalist and fundamentalist Muslims were able to mobilize the rural and small town masses that were not involved directly in the overthrow of the dictatorship, disappointing the liberal, secular and moderate Muslims who are the majority in the population and a majority of those who were active in the movement. The national election supervised by the military was won by the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies placing in power Mohammed Morsi, its leader.

Smelser’s theory of collective behavior adequately synthesizes both value and norm oriented movements. As previously discussed, value oriented movements are revolutionary in nature, they intend to change some fundamental values on which social institutions rest. Norm oriented movements are reform movements that modify or re-create behavioral rules within societal institutions without transforming society. For each social movement Smelser analyzes, there are six determinants that precipitate and maintain it. These determinants build the movement’s character and make possible the changes the movement eventually brings. In the Arab Spring, the value oriented movement failed to change the fundamental political order long established in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Such political order was maintained by autocratic leaders that marginalized the majority of the population. After the ouster of each leader and the collapse of the regimes they maintained, Islamic political parties rose to power. The
protesters initial goals included the creation of more inclusive legislatures committed to improve the economic conditions of the largely disaffected classes and groups. Transitional military governments vowed to advance democracy. Elections held under the watch of the military allowed previously proscribed groups (such as the Muslim Brotherhood) to participate openly and freely. To the surprise of many, Islamists led by the Brotherhood, won majorities in Egypt’s Constituent Assembly, Parliament, and Presidency. Much the same happened in Tunisia. Libya sank into chaos as armed religious factions battled each other and caused panic in the larger population

Meanwhile, the norm oriented movements in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya demanding women’s rights failed as Islamists used force and intimidation to create anxiety and fear among women and their supporters. The results have been not only a return to the conditions preceding the episodes of collective behavior: protests, demonstrations, confrontations with the forces of order, that followed the precipitating event, but a worsening of such conditions as mobs of Muslim fundamentalists have inflicted violent attacks against women and liberal groups in society. Militant women, Coptic Christians and others who have applauded military intervention have become targets of irate Muslim fundamentalists and their sympathizers. Contrary to the aims of the Arab Spring movement, societies have witnessed a resurgence of radical fundamentalist Islam. In Tunisia women were able to get gender equality language in the constitution draft. In Egypt women were viciously assaulted during demonstrations while being marginalized in the drafting of a Constitution. In Libya women pushed for an adequate representation in committees charged with drafting a Constitution in 2013
(Giacomo, 2012; Lynch, 2012; Villa, 2012). In each draft Sharia continues to be the main source of legislation and Islam is still defined as the state’s official religion. There is no guarantee constitutional or otherwise that would protect women against discrimination.

Women who took part in the norm-oriented, reform movement, who may have also pushed for a value-oriented revolutionary movement, were educated, middle and upper class, whose hopes for significant change have been defeated, look with dismay at the women who wear *burqas* who declare that wearing such veils (curtains really) is a personal choice based on their religious conviction to obey the teaching of the Prophet and Allah’s commandment.

The Arab Spring movement did not follow each determinant as outlined in Smelser’s theory of collective behavior. Smelser outlines the progression of a movement that covers each of the determinant factors leading to the establishment of new fundamental values; however the Arab Spring has experienced a revolution and a counter-revolution that did not usher in new modernistic values but regressed farther back from the point that military regimes led nations forward from cultural and institutional backwardness.

Obviously, Smelser published his book long before the current revolution in electronic media. He assumed the physical contact among people as necessary to energize movements. Much, if not most, of what we have seen in the Arab Spring has involved the social media as a powerful tool of communication, contagion, planning and action. In this sense, Smelser is clearly obsolete.
His value-added theory has been of limited value in the writing of this thesis as his linear progression assumptions have not held in a case where those united against the regime held doctrinal positions that turned out to be incompatible with each other. What would have been revolutionary for one group would have been reactionary for another. Signs of such incompatibility began to manifest themselves in Egypt and Tunisia, for example, as women were assaulted by Islamists who joined in the protests. The unity of the movement was only held by hatred toward the regime and not by a commonly understood democratic ideal.

This study is left inconclusive, as the situation in reality is inconclusive. The concluding chapters of the Arab Spring remain to be lived and to be written about.
XV. CONCLUSION

As the Arab Spring further unfolds in the coming years, the condition of women within the Muslim Middle East will be an important marker of development toward democracy. Further research will validate, modify, or nullify the propositions posed and advanced in this study. While a linear process is assumed in Smelser’s theory, human events can take unforeseen turns toward unexpected results. While earlier in the process of rebellion to dictatorial power it may have been possible to foresee outcomes of progress toward democracy and with it an improvement in the status of women, recent events have dampened such optimism. But, the process is not over, while Muslim social forces seem to have gained the upper hand, the secular forces that initiated the movement are far from dormant. In any case, modern-minded women have gained a sense of their own social and political strength and that, not the least, is a significant accomplishment of the Arab Spring to date. The general population has lost the fear of autocratic regimes that generations of Arabs had lived under. The Arab Spring allowed the people the opportunity to visualize their social potential.

In Tunisia protests began because of the socioeconomic despair experienced by many young university graduates. With Ben Ali’s ouster, power was transferred to the Prime Minister, Ghannouchi. Elections for the Constituent Assembly were quickly organized for October 2011. The estimated turnout was 52 percent of Tunisian registered voters. Ennahda, the once outlawed Islamist party won the majority of the seats for the Constituent Assembly. That same year Ennahda’s candidate Jebali became the new Prime Minister. The power of drafting the new constitution respecting the revolution’s goals fell
on the Ennahda dominated Constituent Assembly. Women’s rights under the new constitution are still in jeopardy as are freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, religion etc. Women remain underrepresented in all government agencies. It must be emphasized that under Ben Ali’s regime Tunisian women held the most progressive rights in the entire Middle East. The condition of women in Tunisia, although still undefined in the new government, promises progressive fruits in coming years due to their greater participation in rights groups and coalitions (Freedom House, 2013).

Following the July 3, 2013 Egyptian coup, disenfranchised Tunisians began protesting for the resignation of the Ennahda government (Ben Bouazza, 2013; Al Arabiya, 2013). Under International and domestic pressure Ennahda was forced to negotiate with opposition parties (Ryan, 2013). The latest Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, 2013, analyzed popular dissatisfaction about the newly elected leaders. The Ennahda Islamic political party has decreased in popularity by 25 percent. A large majority of respondents were disillusioned with the way democratic ideals have been implemented. However, the majority still favor democracy over authoritarianism and accepted the inclusion of Islamic traditions and ideologies. Most Tunisians think that economic conditions under Ben Ali’s regime were much better than at present. They further stated that economic stability was a priority for the establishment of democratic institutions (Pew Research, 2013). Much the same can be stated about Egypt; things have turned for the worse rather than for the better.

Democratic elections have not yet established cohesive normative regulations by which the condition of women would improve. Many women in Tunisia have reverted
into using the prevalent veiling practices as a form of dissent against Western influences. Through the elected Ennahda party, religion-based values were promoted. Government institutions failed to restrain violence from religious fundamentalist groups like the Salafist, now a powerful militia in Tunisia.

In Egypt Arab Spring protests began as indignation spread across the region over the increased corruption within the government. Having seen Tunisia’s early success, anti-government coalition groups like the April 6 Movement began organizing and coordinating protests that gathered large crowds on January 25, 2011. Mubarak stepped down on February 11 and relinquished control to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). SCAF organized elections for the lower house of Parliament in three rounds beginning November 28, 2011. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party won the majority of seats. Elections for the upper house of Parliament were held on January 29-February 7, 2012. Again the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party won the majority of seats. In June 2012 the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, Mohammed Morsi, was elected President of Egypt. Upon his election, Morsi began by taking control of the judiciary, bribing military officers, and drafting an executive decree that turned him into a dictator. Morsi eventually agreed to rescind his executive decree and rushed a referendum for the 2012 constitution. Under Morsi’s leadership Egyptian sectarian strife increased, specifically the violence between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. The Coptic Christian minority was incessantly attacked, and sexual assaults and harassment against women increased. Freedom of the press, assembly, and expression has been thwarted by the newly elected government. In July 2013 the Egyptian military
carried out an effective coup against Morsi. Morsi was arrested and kept in an undisclosed location while Muslim Brotherhood affiliates and sympathizers staged massive and violent protests. These protests quickly replicated the Arab Spring rallies and sit-ins (Wedeman, Sayah and Smith, 2013; Al Jazeera, 2013).

Under Morsi’s rule, women’s participation and representation in the new government was severely limited and was constantly attacked. The constitution limited women’s rights to Sharia (Walt, 2012). With the increased instability in Egypt after the coup, women’s rights have been reduced yet again and many fear a regression and loss of what little rights they held under Mubarak’s regime (Freedom House, 2013).

Women in Egypt have been deemed out of place during the Arab Spring protests. This has led to a severe increase in sexual assaults, harassment and rape. Under the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership religion-based values were promoted and expanded, much more than in the Mubarak era. After Morsi’s removal in July 2013, religious fundamentalist groups have been violently suppressed. These groups had claimed legitimate rights and democratic power to adopt religious dogmas. As groups claimed divine power, women were forced to observe to veiling and confinement to private spaces. Noisy protests against Western corrupt influences were staged.

In Libya protests began on February 2011 after many disenfranchised youth peacefully organized a march in memory of the Abu Salim massacre victims of 1996. Rebel militias were being organized to counter the army’s violent response to these peaceful marches. NATO intervened in March by declaring a no-fly zone, crippling
Gaddafi’s military. An unelected National Transitional Council was formed in early 2011 representing the Rebel movement, which was quickly recognized by some Western countries as the legitimate government of Libya. In the first parliamentary election on July 7, 2012, more than 100 political parties participated to create the General National Congress (GNC) which replaced the NTC. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party won 17 out of 200 seats in the interim Congress. The GNC was in charge of creating a committee to draft the new state constitution. A civil war among rebel groups remained a strong concern for the interim government.

Democratic principles like freedom of political association and expression saw an increase following the protests and violence of the Arab Spring. However, trade unions have received little recognition, academic freedoms have not increased, educational curricula have not changed, sectarian strife continues, Salafist groups continue to vandalize mosques and government buildings, and government agencies have been unable to halt disorder (Gradstein, 2012). Women hold 33 seats in the GNC and only two seats in the NTC. Women remain underrepresented and with the rise of fundamentalist groups like the Salafist, many women have reported harassment, assaults and rape (Freedom House, 2013; The Tripoli Post, 2013).

The impact of the Arab Spring has been profound, but it has not transformed the Middle East. The movement challenged existing alliances: Turkey and Kurdish Muslim Brotherhood axis, Iran and Shiite axis, and Saudi Arabia’s support for the existing monarchies. The uprisings weakened authoritarian regimes affecting these alliances and reintroduced Islamic political players (Cagaptay and Khanna, 2013). Although the Arab
Spring ended regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and challenged existing monarchies and regimes in Yemen, Syria, Morocco and Jordan, it has also led to an unprecedented increase in violence. Muslim Brotherhood parties and leaders won the first elections in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. This had led to the resurgence of political Islam, which in no way benefits the condition of women (Avineri, 2013). The challenge Tunisia, Egypt and Libya face is to persuade Islamic fundamentalist groups that the protection of minorities, is crucial for the peaceful change in sociopolitical values (Monroe, 2013). The main obstacle toward the implementation of the Arab Spring’s democratic goals is the increasingly violent sectarianism. It is most prevalent between Sunni and Shiite Muslims.

In an effort to balance the Sunni-Shiite divide, Sunni led Iraq was fundamentally altered by the American overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the transfer of power to the Shiite minority (Ward, 2013). Geneive Abdo (2013) analyzed the new sectarian divide following the Arab Spring. Abdo believes the sectarian divide stems from the Sunni Islamic rise in Tunisia and Egypt, the civil war in Syria, and the continuous international intervention and interference. “…the increase in sectarian conflict is primarily the result of the collapse of authoritarian rule and a struggle for political and economic power and over which interpretation of Islam will influence societies and new leaderships.” (pg.5).

A 2013 Pew Research report found that world’s Muslims, despite the regional upsheaval caused by the Arab Spring, an overwhelming majority in the Middle East favor democracy over authoritarian rule (Pew Forum, 2013). However, the study also found that 65 percent of Muslims favor the inclusion of religious leaders in democratic process. Here I find the long-established religion-based values are still prevalent in the region over
secular democratic. In Egypt and Tunisia, Muslims referred Islamic political parties over secular or liberal (Pew Forum, 2013). Unfortunately, the majority of Muslims questioned in this study do not extend democratic ideals to women’s rights. The majority of Muslims believe that women should obey their husbands and wear the hijab while out in public. Sharia in constitutions and legislation was also favored, and women’s rights is still seen by many as a female issue. As such, more women than men favor reforms guaranteeing women’s rights (Pew Forum, 2013). The process of democratization has not been fully implemented in the region. The ‘free’ elections experience is deemed to have marked the end of the democratic transition. It is important to note that American definitions of democracy often do not apply to the religious environment of the region.

Monopolized force, specifically in Egypt, has culminated in an unelected military leadership. In Libya, sectors of the state remain under the control of various tribal militias. In Tunisia a popular revolt against the Ennahda government has forced it to resign and negotiate for new elections with oppositional forces.

What can we expect now? The Arab Spring has not changed fundamental sociopolitical values of the region. Islamic groups usurped the movement to influence legislation in their favor and, in essence, create an Islamic resurgence in the region much like the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Unfortunately, the goals of the movement are far from being realized. Democratic goals inspired by the West lie farther in the future, should we judge from the experience of the last three years. Still, women, their groups and coalitions, have learned from the experience and have been reinvigorated as much as they have been disappointed. Will the Arab Spring’s dream of democracy last? It is
impossible to objectively know, however the masses in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya will never accept an authoritarian government which is not their own. The conflict between the Western ideal of democracy and the authoritarian nature of Islam remains unresolved. The military establishments continue to represent the only force that can effectively deal with fundamentalist Islam’s claim that divine power supercedes human power.
XVI. Appendix A

Methodology: News Media Sites

- The New York Times
- Gulf News
- BBC News
- NPR radio
- The New Yorker
- Ms. Magazine
- Al Jazeera News
- Le Monde news
- Jadaliyya News
- CBS news
- New woman foundation
- Karama women's organization
- Tunisienne des femmes democrates or ATFD
- National Democratic Institute for International Affairs Tunisian study
- English. Al-Akhbar News
- Middle East Monitor.com
- Freedom House Reports
- United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)
- United Nations progress reports/publications
- World Bank
- British Council
- International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
-United Nations Development Programme
-European Council on Foreign Relations
-Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies
-Human Rights Watch
-Regional Bureau for Arab States (RBAS)
-US Department of State progress reports
-Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
-Open Democracy.com
-Socialist World.net
-European Parliament progress reports
-Strategic Engagement Group
-"The Arab Awakening" documentary
Table 1: Chronological List of Arab Spring Events December 2010-January 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-Dec-10</td>
<td>Tunisia: street vendor, Bouazizi is arrested and has cart confiscated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-Dec-10</td>
<td>Tunisia: Bouazizi self-immolation in protest of dire economic conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Jan-11</td>
<td>Tunisia: Bouazizi dies of wounds. 5000 people protest in Sidi Bouazid asking for Ben Ali’s resignation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Jan-11</td>
<td>Tunisia: Ben Ali steps down and flees to Saudia Arabia</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-Jan-11</td>
<td>Egypt: protestors begin clamoring for Mubarak’s resignation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-Jan-11</td>
<td>Tunisia: Interim Minister Mohammed Gannouchi works to create provisional governing body while elections are held</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-Jan-11</td>
<td>Jordan: 5000 people protest in Amman because of taxation and fuel prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Jan-11</td>
<td>Algeria: Protestors march to parliament, 42 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-Jan-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Day of Rag: thousands protest for Mubarak’s resignation</td>
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<tr>
<td>26-Jan-11</td>
<td>Tunisia: Interim Government asks Interpol to issue an arrest warrant for Ben Ali</td>
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<tr>
<td>27-Jan-11</td>
<td>Yemen: 16,000 protestors gather in Yemeni demanding President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s resignation</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-Feb-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Mubarak announces he will not run for re-election</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-Feb-11</td>
<td>Jordan: King Abdullah dissolves government &amp; Marouf al-Bakhit to create new cabinet</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-Feb-11</td>
<td>Yemen: President Saleh announces he will not run for re-election</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-Feb-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Armed thugs raid Tahrir Square; known as “battle of the camel”</td>
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<tr>
<td>12-Feb-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Mubarak announces he will step down as Egyptian President</td>
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<tr>
<td>14-Feb-11</td>
<td>Bahrain: Crowds gather in Manama to protest the ruling monarchy</td>
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<tr>
<td>17-Feb-11</td>
<td>Libya: A day of revolt is organized; Gaddafi orders brutal force to clear the streets</td>
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<tr>
<td>18-Feb-11</td>
<td>Libya: Internet access is cut off to hamper protest organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>18-Feb-11</td>
<td>Bahrain: Government forces attack armed protesters</td>
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<tr>
<td>19-Feb-11</td>
<td>Libya: Helicopter gunships target protesters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-Feb-11</td>
<td>Morocco: protesters call for a legitimate democracy in existing institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>21-Feb-11</td>
<td>Libya: Gaddafi’s oldest son appears on national TV warning of Islamic emirates pending civil war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Feb-11</td>
<td>Libya: Gaddafi delivers speech on national TV blaming the US and Al-Qaeda for unrest in Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>22-Feb-11</td>
<td>Bahrain: Martyrs march to commemorate fallen protesters</td>
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<tr>
<td>24-Feb-11</td>
<td>Algeria: President Bouteflika lifts the emergency rule</td>
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<tr>
<td>24-Feb-11</td>
<td>Libya: Libyan rebels announces their control over Tobruk near Egyptian border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-Feb-11</td>
<td>Tunisia: Interim Minister Gannouchi steps down &amp; is replaced by Fouad Mebazaa</td>
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<tr>
<td>27-Feb-11</td>
<td>Libya: Formation of a National Transitional Council (NTC) is announced, headed by former minister of Justice, Mustafa Abdul Jalil</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-Mar-11</td>
<td>Libya: France recognizes NTC as the legitimate government in Libya.</td>
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<td>16-Mar-11</td>
<td>Syria: Security forces break up 150 protesters in Damascus</td>
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<td>17-Mar-11</td>
<td>Libya: Rebels continue to fight with Gaddafi’s forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>18-Mar-11</td>
<td>Yemen: President Saleh announces emergency rule after brutal force against protesters</td>
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18-Mar-11 Syria: Security forces kill three peaceful protesters
20-Mar-11 Yemen: President Saleh fires his entire cabinet
23-Mar-11 Syria: Security forces kill six peaceful protesters
24-Mar-11 Syria: President Assad announces emergency rule lift and formation of a committee to increase living standards
1-Apr-11 Syria: Security forces kill four protesters
8-Apr-11 Syria: Security forces kill twenty seven people in Daraa
10-Apr-11 Libya: Migrant ship arrives in Tripoli, 9 survivors from 42
23-Apr-11 Yemen: President Saleh signs document stipulating his resignation in thirty days
25-Apr-11 Syria: Armed Forces attack Daraa and Doura
26-Apr-11 Syria: UN security general calls for probes into the killings under Syrian forces
27-Apr-11 Syria: President Assad orders reinforcements and continue rampage against protesters
30-Apr-11 Libya: NATO air-raids bomb Tripoli residential area killing one of Gaddafi’s sons and three grandchildren
1-May-11 Libya: Several embassies and UN locations are attacked by pro-Gaddafi supporters.
1-May-11 Syria: Security forces arrest 500 people to end demonstrations
1-May-11 Syria: US imposes targeted economic sanctions on President Assad’s family
2-May-11 Libya: President Gaddafi’s assets in Swiss banks are frozen
3-May-11 Libya: Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan urges Gaddafi to end attacks
4-May-11 Syria: 1000 protesters march in solidarity towards Daraa’s citizens
4-May-11 Libya: International humanitarian organizations express concern for the Berber population in Libya
5-May-11 Libya: NTC grants loan to Libyan rebels using Gaddafi’s frozen funds
6-May-11 Syria: Security forces increase their presence throughout Syria
7-May-11 Syria: Security forces storm Baniyas, kill six
7-May-11 Syria: Human rights organizations estimate 800 dead since Syrian uprising
10-May-11 Libya: NATO conducts an intensive raid over Tripoli
13-May-11 Libya: Transitional Council leader Jalil holds meetings with Obama administration officials
14-May-11 Syria: Security forces crack down Talkalakh, bordering Lebanon
16-May-11 Syria: Talkalakh crack down continues with security force snipers deployed to calm any unrest
16-May-11 Libya: International Criminal Court announces it will seek arrest warrants for Gaddafi and his affiliates
18-May-11 Libya: Ambassador al-Hadi announced his and his staff’s defection and announced they would join the rebel cause
20-May-11 Libya: NATO sinks eight Libyan war ships
20-May-11 Syria: Security forces fire live ammunition at unarmed demonstrators
22-May-11 Yemen: President Saleh refuses to step down
22-May-11 Libya: France sends helicopters to Libya to get closer to the ground
24-May-11 Libya: NATO carries out most intense raid on Tripoli
25-May-11 Syria: EU countries condemn Syria’s use of force against protesters
26-May-11 Libya: Ambassador al-Hadi announced his and his staff’s defection and announced they would join the rebel cause
27-May-11 Egypt: Protestors gather against the continual rule of the military council
28-May-11 Egypt: Rafah border crossing with Gaza Strip is re-opened
29-May-11 Yemen: Security forces storm freedom square against protesters
29-May-11 Morocco: Police disperse 15,000 protestors
30-May-11 Libya: 120 army officials deserted their posts
30-May-11 Libya: South African President Jacob Zuma visits Tripoli in an effort to reach a cease fire
30-May-11 Yemen: Police disperse demonstrators using live ammunition
1-Jun-11 Libya: NATO announces its operation in Libya will be prolonged to Sept 1
1-Jun-11 Egypt: Cairo Judge announces Mubarak's trial will begin August 3
3-Jun-11 Yemen: President Saleh sustains injuries after attack on palace, Vice President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi is acting President
7-Jun-11 Libya: Spain's foreign minister Jimenez states Spain recognizes Transitional Council as the legitimate government in Libya
9-Jun-11 Libya: International Crime Court accused Gaddafi of ordering his soldiers to use rape as a weapon during the repression of the revolts
16-Jun-11 Syria: UN commissioner for Human Rights claims that over 1000 people have been killed since the uprisings
28-Jun-11 Egypt: Demonstrators clash with police as they march in remembrance of fallen protesters since the beginning of the uprisings
29-Jun-11 Libya: France admits to air lifting weapons to rebels in Libya
1-Jul-11 Morocco: A popular referendum is held concerning constitutional amendments limiting King Mohammed's influence
2-Jul-11 Libya: African EU would not execute arrest warrants for Gaddafi
3-Jul-11 Libya: Turkey recognizes rebels in Benghazi as legitimate ruling body in Libya
6-Jul-11 Syria: Amnesty International calls Security Council of UN to discuss human rights violations in Syria
8-Jul-11 Syria: half a million protestors gathered in Hama
12-Jul-11 Egypt: deputy Prime Minister resigns after persistent demands by protesters
14-Jul-11 Egypt: Investigators conclude former speaker of the upper house of Egyptian parliament was the mastermind behind the "battle of the camel"
15-Jul-11 Egypt: Protesters demand change and voice disapproval of military council in Egypt
16-Jul-11 Libya: The US formally recognizes the National Transitional Council of Benghazi as the legitimate representative of Libya
20-Jul-11 Egypt: Military Council reveals plans for Egypt's upcoming elections
21-Jul-11 Egypt: Military Council reshuffles council to appease protesters
26-Jul-11 Syria: President of Israel Peres urges Syrian President Assad to resign
27-Jul-11 Libya: Britain recognizes the Transitional National Council as the legitimate representative of Libya
28-Jul-11 Egypt: Egypt's Justice Ministry announces Mubarak and his sons will be charged with the deaths of protesters in Tahrir Square
29-Jul-11 Bahrain: King Isa approves parliamentary reforms
3-Aug-11 Egypt: Trial against Mubarak begins
3-Aug-11 Syria: UN Security Council formally condemns violence against civilians
17-Aug-11 Yemen: National Revolution Council is formed to establish a new government
18-Aug-11 Libya: Rebels take control of a major oil refinery
22-Aug-11 Libya: Rebels infiltrate Tripoli
25-Aug-11 Libya: UN announces Gaddafi's frozen assets are made available in humanitarian aid to Libya
2-Sep-11 Libya: President Sarkozy announces NATO mission would continue as long as it needs to
7-Sep-11 Egypt: Political tensions lead to clashes in Cairo during the Egyptian Cup game 1
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<td>Egypt: Protesters attack the Israeli embassy in Cairo</td>
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<td>Libya: World Bank recognizes the Transitional National Council as the legitimate representative of Libya</td>
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<td>Syria: Activists form the Syrian National Council</td>
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<td>Libya: Rebels enter Gaddafi's stronghold in Sirte</td>
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<td>Egypt: Head of the national election committee announces first elections will begin in November</td>
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<td>Bahrain: Court of Appeals handed a life in prison verdict to 20 protesters</td>
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<td>Egypt: Security forces storm Al Jazeera offices</td>
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<td>Yemen: President Saleh announces he will not step down if his rivals are allowed to run for office</td>
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<td>Libya: A second armed council is formed: The Revolutionary Council of Tripoli</td>
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<td>Libya: A recording from Gaddafi emerges urging Libyans to protest rebels</td>
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<td>Egypt: Coptic Christians protest the burning of a church in Aswan</td>
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<td>Libya: Gaddafi is captured &amp; killed</td>
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<td>Libya: UN Human Rights commission demands an official investigation over the death of Gaddafi</td>
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<td>Libya: NATO states no fly zone over Libya will be dissolved by the end of the month</td>
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<td>23-Oct-11</td>
<td>Tunisia: First elections since Arab Spring</td>
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<td>23-Oct-11</td>
<td>Libya: National Transitional Council declares Libya liberated</td>
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<td>Tunisia: Protests erupt after cancellation of Popular List party's seats</td>
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<td>1-Nov-11</td>
<td>Qatar: Announces elections are scheduled for 2013</td>
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<td>Syria: Syrian government accepts several measures aimed at easing the Syrian population's suffering</td>
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<td>Syria: Syria is officially suspended from the Arab League</td>
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<td>Libya: Libyan Muslim Brotherhood congregates for its first congress in 25 years</td>
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<td>Egypt: Thousands protest the Military Council's ruling of Egypt</td>
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<td>Libya: Gaddafi's oldest son is arrested in Libya</td>
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<td>Tunisia: Constituent body holds its first session</td>
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<td>23-Nov-11</td>
<td>Yemen: President Saleh sign document that transfers power to vice president</td>
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<td>27-Nov-11</td>
<td>Syria: Arab League votes in favor of imposing sanctions against Syria</td>
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<td>28-Nov-11</td>
<td>Egypt: First elections are held</td>
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<td>6-Dec-11</td>
<td>Libya: Interim government announces deadline for disarmament for civilians in Tripoli</td>
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<td>Syria: Assad denies killing Syrian protesters</td>
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<td>12-Dec-11</td>
<td>Tunisia: Dr. Moncef Marzouki is elected President</td>
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<td>14-Dec-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Second round of elections for lower house seats in Egyptian parliament</td>
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<td>18-Dec-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Islamist parties claim to have obtained at least 70 percent of votes</td>
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<td>20-Dec-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Thousands of protesters against police brutality</td>
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<td>1-Jan-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Military Council moves up elections for upper house in parliament</td>
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<td>2-Jan-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Egyptians vote in third round</td>
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<td>4-Jan-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Mubarak is wheeled back into court</td>
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<td>5-Jan-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Prosecutors request death penalty for Mubarak</td>
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<td>Syria: Regime vows to confront foes and strike with an iron fist</td>
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<td>Syria: Arab League demands an end to bloodshed</td>
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<td>10-Jan-12</td>
<td>Syria: President Assad makes his first TV appearance and blamed uprisings on Western conspiracies</td>
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<td>11-Jan-12</td>
<td>Syria: French TV reporter Gilles Jacquier is killed</td>
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<td>14-Jan-12</td>
<td>Egypt: ElBaradei end Egyptian Presidential run</td>
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<td>22-Jan-12</td>
<td>Syria: Arab League demands Assad’s departure from Syria</td>
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<td>Egypt: People’s Assembly met for the first time; Supreme Council of the Armed Forces transfers power to them.</td>
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<td>28-Jan-12</td>
<td>Tunisia: Protests against Islamic Extremism in government</td>
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<td>1-Feb-12</td>
<td>Egypt: 74 people killed in Egyptian soccer stadium</td>
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<td>2/4/2012</td>
<td>Syria: UN draft resolution condemning Syria fails to be adopted</td>
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<td>13-Feb-12</td>
<td>Bahrain: Activists are attacked with tear gas</td>
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<td>15-Feb-12</td>
<td>Libya: Armed militias threatening to destabilize country</td>
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<td>16-Feb-12</td>
<td>Syria: UN assembly votes in favor of resolution condemning human rights violations in Syria</td>
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<td>22-Feb-12</td>
<td>Syria: Two foreign correspondents are killed</td>
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<td>Tunisia: World conference is held in Tunisia to solve Syrian violence</td>
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<td>25-Feb-12</td>
<td>Syria: Syria holds votes on new constitution</td>
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<td>Yemen: President Saleh officially resigns and transfers power to vice president Al-Hadi</td>
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<td>1-Mar-12</td>
<td>Syria: Red cross tries to enter Homs to deliver food and medicine</td>
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<td>3-Mar-12</td>
<td>Syria: Syrian forces deny red cross access</td>
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<td>7-Mar-12</td>
<td>Libya: Syria’s deputy oil minister announces his resignation via YouTube</td>
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<td>10-Mar-12</td>
<td>Syria: Assad tells UN envoy no diplomatic dialogue can succeed with armed terrorists</td>
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<td>Egypt: Egyptian military court acquitted army doctor of carrying out &quot;virginity tests&quot; on women protesters</td>
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<td>Syria: Syrian protesters urge military action and humanitarian aid</td>
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<td>Egypt: Coptic Christian Pope Shenouda III dies</td>
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<td>23-Mar-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Clashes break out over football club suspension</td>
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<td>27-Mar-12</td>
<td>Syria: Syrian authorities begin targeting children</td>
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<td>1-Apr-12</td>
<td>Syria: Syrian National Council says rebels will begin receiving salaries for fighting the government</td>
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<td>Syria: Syria agrees to a ceasefire deadline in April 10</td>
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<td>Yemen: President Al-Hadi fires army officers loyal to his predecessor</td>
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<td>Egypt: Presidential nominations deadline</td>
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<td>10-Apr-12</td>
<td>Syria: President Assad fails to withdraw troops</td>
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<td>11-Apr-12</td>
<td>Syria: UN ceasefire comes into effect</td>
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<td>Egypt: Ten candidates who applied to run in the presidential election lose their appeals against disqualification</td>
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<td>Syria: UN and Syria reach a deal outlining rules for deployment of observers monitoring ceasefire</td>
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<td>4-May-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Ruling military council imposed an overnight curfew</td>
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<td>10-May-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Egypt held its first live TV presidential debates</td>
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<td>12-May-12</td>
<td>Syria: Online video by al-Nusra Front claims responsibility for Damascus blast</td>
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<td>21-May-12</td>
<td>Yemen: Suicide bomber kills 100 Yemeni troops</td>
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<td>22-May-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Egyptians prepare to vote in first free election</td>
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<td>23-May-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Presidential elections</td>
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<td>Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood candidate could face former regime figure Ahmed Shafik</td>
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<td>Syria: Protests erupt over Houla massacre</td>
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<td>Egypt: Presidential race will be Morsi vs. Shafik</td>
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<td>31-May-12</td>
<td>Syria: Investigations over Houla massacre blames rebels</td>
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<td>Egypt: Mubarak is sentenced to life in prison for protester's deaths</td>
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<td>Egypt: Protests erupt over Mubarak's trial</td>
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<td>Syria: Al-Assad denies government forces role in Houla massacre</td>
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<td>Egypt: Supreme Constitutional Court declared parliament invalid</td>
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<td>15-Jun-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Presidential run-off begins</td>
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<td>Syria: Security forces used sexual violence to torture people in detention and sexually abused women and girls during raids</td>
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<td>Egypt: Ruling Military Council issues declaration granting itself sweeping powers</td>
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<td>Egypt: Former President Mubarak is reported to be very ill and near death</td>
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<td>20-Jun-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Election results delayed by election authorities</td>
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<td>Egypt: Islamist Mohamed Morsi declared Egypt's new President</td>
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<td>30-Jun-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Morsi is sworn in as Egypt's first democratically elected President</td>
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<td>6-Jul-12</td>
<td>Syria: Military commander defects from Syrian military</td>
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<td>Egypt: Military Council warms Morsi dissolution of parliament must be upheld</td>
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<td>Syria: International Committee of the Red Cross calls Syrian violence a civil war</td>
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<td>Egypt: US Secretary of State Clinton meets head of Egypt's top military council</td>
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<td>Syria: Defense minister, security adviser, and interior minister are killed</td>
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<td>19-Jul-12</td>
<td>Syria: Syrian rebels capture border posts</td>
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<td>Syria: Two more Senior Syrian diplomats deflect Syrian regime</td>
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<td>Syria: Assad declares fate of Syria depends on conflict between rebels and government forces</td>
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<td>Egypt: Gunmen attack Egyptian-Israeli border killing 15 Egyptian policemen</td>
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<td>Syria: Syria's president welcomes top official from Iran</td>
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<td>Egypt: Morsi replaces top generals and reasserts power military took for itself</td>
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<td>Syria: UN ceasefire observer mission in Syria ends</td>
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<td>Syria: Syria's deputy Prime Minister declares government is ready to discuss Assad's exit</td>
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<td>Egypt: Morsi calls for support against Syrian crisis at the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Iran</td>
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<td>4-Sep-12</td>
<td>Syria: Refugees flee Syria in record numbers</td>
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<td>11-Sep-12</td>
<td>Libya: US embassy is attacked, four killed including US ambassador Stevens</td>
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<td>Yemen: Demonstrators storm US embassy and burn US flag in response to anti-Islam film</td>
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<td>14-Sep-12</td>
<td>Lebanon: Pope Benedict XVI urges Christians, Jews and Muslims to root out fundamentalism</td>
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<td>Tunisia: Protesters briefly storm US embassy in response to anti-Islam film</td>
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<td>15-Sep-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Prime Minister Qandil said US must do all it can to stop people from insulting Islam</td>
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<td>Syria: Al-Assad says he is committed to resolving the crisis in Syria as long as peace efforts are conducted in neutrality and independence</td>
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<td>Egypt: Authorities charged 7 Christians living in the US and one Florida pastor with insulting Islam and inciting sectarian strife</td>
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<td>Syria: Rebel command moved into Syria from Turkey</td>
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<td>29-Sep-12</td>
<td>Syria: Government forces and rebels fight to control Aleppo</td>
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<td>4-Oct-12</td>
<td>Jordan: King Abdullah dissolves parliament and calls for elections in new year</td>
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<td>Jordan: Thousands protest demanding political reforms</td>
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<td>Egypt: President Morsi pardons all protesters arrested during uprisings</td>
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<td>Syria: US troops deployed to Turkey to monitor chemical weapons in Syria</td>
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<td>Yemen: Worker in US embassy killed</td>
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<td>Egypt: Morsi announces he has allowed Mubarak era chief prosecutor to keep his job</td>
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<td>Libya: Ali Zidan is elected interim Prime Minister</td>
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<td>Syria: Human Rights organizations announce 28,000 civilians have disappeared after being abducted by government forces</td>
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<td>Syria: Government forces observe a ceasefire for Muslim holiday</td>
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<td>Qatar: Prime Minister states Syria is waging a 'war of extermination' against its own people</td>
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<td>Egypt: Coptic Christians pick Bishop Tawadros Theodons II as new pope</td>
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<td>Qatar: Representatives make progress towards new leadership body</td>
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<td>Syria: Cleric chosen to lead opposition</td>
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<td>Tunisia: State battles over Muslim pulpits</td>
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<td>Syria: France and US support new coalition of Syrian dissidents</td>
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<td>Gaza: Israel-Gaza ceasefire fails</td>
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<td>Egypt: Morsi leads mediation between Hamas and Israel to end attacks</td>
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<td>Gaza: Ceasefire holding between Hamas and Israel</td>
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<td>Egypt: Morsi issues a declaration banning challenges to his decrees, laws and decisions</td>
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<td>Egypt: Israel and Hamas begin indirect Gaza ceasefire talks</td>
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<td>29-Nov-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Islamist run assembly backs constitution draft including Sharia mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-Nov-12</td>
<td>Palestine: Palestine wins status of state in UN assembly vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Nov-12</td>
<td>Israel: Israel authorizes construction of 3000 housing units in East Jerusalem and West Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Dec-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Islamist backers rally for Morsi's decree</td>
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<td>Egypt: Thousands demonstrate in Cairo protesting referendum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Dec-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Egyptians vote on referendum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-Dec-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Ruling Freedom and Justice Party declare citizens approve draft constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-Dec-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Egypt's new public prosecutor offers to resign after protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-Dec-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Egyptians vote in second round for draft constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Dec-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Egypt's vice president resigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-Dec-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Two thirds of voters supported new constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-Dec-12</td>
<td>Syria: Military police chief al-Shallal defects and joins the people’s revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Jan-13</td>
<td>Syria: Death toll estimated at 60,000 people according to UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Jan-13</td>
<td>Iran: Protesters call for the release of prisoners and the resignation of Shiite premier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-Jan-13</td>
<td>Syria: In TV address Al-Assad denounced opponents as 'enemies of God and puppets of the West'</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-Jan-13</td>
<td>Egypt: Morsi supports calls by Syrian people to try al-Assad for war crimes</td>
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<tr>
<td>14-Jan-13</td>
<td>Tunisia: Two years after uprisings Tunisia still suffers high unemployment and rising violence in its politics</td>
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<tr>
<td>15-Jan-13</td>
<td>Dubai: Reports surface that uprisings have cost the region $225 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-Jan-13</td>
<td>Egypt: Government imprisons family for conversion to Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-Jan-13</td>
<td>Mali: French intervention in Mali over Algerian hostage crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 21-22, 2013</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia: Social and economic summit to improve Arab Spring countries meet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Jan-13</td>
<td>Israel: Israeli legislative elections begin</td>
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<tr>
<td>23-Jan-13</td>
<td>Jordan: Parliament elections begin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-Jan-13</td>
<td>Libya: Secretary of State Clinton testifies over Benghazi attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-Jan-13</td>
<td>Egypt: Morsi imposes 30 day curfew</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
XVIII. Appendix C

- Arab Spring Revolution Theoretical Correlation Table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date:</th>
<th>Events:</th>
<th>Smelser's determinants:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-Dec-10</td>
<td>Tunisia: street vendor, Bouazizi is arrested and has cart confiscated</td>
<td>Strain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-Dec-10</td>
<td>Tunisia: Bouazizi self-immolation in protest of dire economic conditions</td>
<td>Precipitating Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Jan-11</td>
<td>Tunisia: Bouazizi dies of wounds. 5000 people protest in Sidi Bouazid asking for Ben Ali's resignation</td>
<td>Precipitating Factor/Mobilization for action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Jan-11</td>
<td>Tunisia: Ben Ali steps down and flees to Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-Jan-11</td>
<td>Egypt: protesters begin clamoring for Mubarak's resignation</td>
<td>Structural Conduciveness/Mobilization for action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-Jan-11</td>
<td>Tunisia: Interim Minister Mohammed Gannouchi works to create provisional governing body while elections are held</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-Jan-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Day of Rag: thousands protest for Mubarak's resignation</td>
<td>Structural Conduciveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-Jan-11</td>
<td>Tunisia: Interim Government asks Interpol to issue an arrest warrant for Ben Ali</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
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<td>1-Feb-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Mubarak announces he will not run for re-election</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-Feb-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Armed thugs raid Tahrir Square; known as &quot;battle of the camel&quot;</td>
<td>Strain</td>
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<td>11-Feb-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Mubarak announces he will step down as Egyptian President</td>
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<tr>
<td>17-Feb-11</td>
<td>Libya: A day of revolt is organized; Gaddafi orders brutal force to clear the streets</td>
<td>Mobilization for action/ Precipitating factor</td>
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<tr>
<td>18-Feb-11</td>
<td>Libya: Internet access is cut off to hamper protest organization</td>
<td>Strain</td>
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<tr>
<td>19-Feb-11</td>
<td>Libya: Helicopter gunships target protesters</td>
<td>Precipitating Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-Feb-11</td>
<td>Rebels Seize Benghazi; Thousands protest</td>
<td>Mobilization for action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-Feb-11</td>
<td>Libya: Gaddafi's oldest son appears on national TV warning of Islamic emirates pending civil war</td>
<td>Strain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Feb-11</td>
<td>Libya: Gaddafi delivers speech on national TV blaming the US and Al-Qaeda for unrest in Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>24-Feb-11</td>
<td>Libya: Libyan rebels announces their control over Tobruk</td>
<td>Mobilization for action</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Mobilization for action</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>near Egyptian border</td>
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<tr>
<td>27-Feb-11</td>
<td>Tunisia: Interim Minister Gannouchi steps down &amp; is replaced by Essebsi</td>
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<td>27-Feb-11</td>
<td>Libya: Formation of a National Transitional Council (NTC) is announced, headed by former minister of Justice, Mustafa Abdul Jalil</td>
<td>Mobilization for action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-Mar-11</td>
<td>Libya: France recognizes NTC as the legitimate government in Libya.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17-Mar-11</td>
<td>Libya: Rebels continue to fight with Gaddafi’s forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>30-Apr-11</td>
<td>Libya: NATO air-raids bomb Tripoli residential area killing one of Gaddafi’s sons and three grandchildren</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-May-11</td>
<td>Libya: Several embassies and UN locations are attacked by pro-Gaddafi supporters.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-May-11</td>
<td>Libya: President Gaddafi’s assets in Swiss banks are frozen</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-May-11</td>
<td>Libya: NTC grants loan to Libyan rebels using Gaddafi’s frozen funds</td>
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<td>10-May-11</td>
<td>Libya: NATO conducts an intensive raid over Tripoli</td>
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<td>13-May-11</td>
<td>Libya: Transitional Council leader Jalil holds meetings with Obama administration officials</td>
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<td>16-May-11</td>
<td>Libya: International Criminal Court announces it will seek arrest warrants for Gaddafi and his affiliates</td>
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<tr>
<td>20-May-11</td>
<td>Libya: NATO sinks eight Libyan war ships</td>
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<td>22-May-11</td>
<td>Libya: France sends helicopters to Libya to get closer to the ground</td>
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<tr>
<td>24-May-11</td>
<td>Libya: NATO carries out most intense raid on Tripoli</td>
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<tr>
<td>26-May-11</td>
<td>Libya: Ambassador al-Hadi announced his and his staff's defection and announced they would join the rebel cause</td>
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<tr>
<td>27-May-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Protestors gather against the continual rule of the military council</td>
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<tr>
<td>30-May-11</td>
<td>Libya: 120 army officials deserted their posts</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-Jun-11</td>
<td>Libya: NATO announces its operation in Libya will be prolonged to Sept 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-Jun-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Cairo Judge announces Mubarak's trial will begin August 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>7-Jun-11</td>
<td>Libya: Spain’s foreign minister Jimenez states Spain recognizes Transitional Council as the legitimate government in Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
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<td>Precipitating Factor</td>
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<tr>
<td>9-Jun-11</td>
<td>Libya: International Crime Court accused Gaddaфи of ordering his soldiers to use rape as a weapon during the repression of the revolts</td>
<td>Precipitating event/ Breakdown of social control agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-Jun-11</td>
<td>Libya: The International Crime Court issues an arrest warrant for Libyan leader Gaddaфи and his son.</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-Jun-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Demonstrators clash with police as they march in remembrance of fallen protesters since the beginning of the uprisings</td>
<td>Precipitating Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-Jun-11</td>
<td>Libya: France admits to air lifting weapons to rebels in Libya</td>
<td>Mobilization for action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Jul-11</td>
<td>Libya: African EU would not execute arrest warrants for Gaddaфи</td>
<td>Precipitating Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Jul-11</td>
<td>Libya: Turkey recognizes rebels in Benghazi as legitimate ruling body in Libya</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
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<tr>
<td>12-Jul-11</td>
<td>Egypt: deputy Prime Minister resigns after persistent demands by protesters</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Jul-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Investigators conclude former speaker of the upper house of Egyptian parliament was the mastermind behind the &quot;battle of the camel&quot;</td>
<td>Strain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-Jul-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Protesters demand change and voice disapproval of military council in Egypt</td>
<td>Generalized Beliefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-Jul-11</td>
<td>Libya: The US formally recognizes the National Transitional Council of Benghazi as the legitimate representative of Libya</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
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<td>20-Jul-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Military Council reveals plans for Egypt's upcoming elections</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-Jul-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Military Council reshuffles council to appease protesters</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
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<tr>
<td>27-Jul-11</td>
<td>Libya: Britain recognizes the Transitional National Council as the legitimate representative of Libya</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-Jul-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Egypt's Justice Ministry announces Mubarak and his sons will be charged with the deaths of protesters in Tahrir Square</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Aug-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Trial against Mubarak begins</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-Aug-11</td>
<td>Libya: Rebels take control of a major oil refinery</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
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<td>25-Aug-11</td>
<td>Libya: UN announces Gaddaфи's frozen assets are made available in humanitarian aid to Libya</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-Sep-11</td>
<td>Libya: President Sarkozy announces NATO mission would continue as long as it needs to</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-Sep-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Political tensions lead to clashes in Cairo during the Egyptian Cup game 1</td>
<td>Precipitating Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-Sep-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Protesters attack the Israeli embassy in Cairo</td>
<td>Precipitating Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>13-Sep-11</td>
<td>Libya: World Bank recognizes the Transitional National Council as the legitimate representative of Libya</td>
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<td>16-Sep-11</td>
<td>Libya: Rebels enter Gaddafi’s stronghold in Sirte</td>
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<td>18-Sep-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Head of the national election committee announces first elections will begin in November</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
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<td>29-Sep-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Security forces storm Al Jazeera offices</td>
<td>Precipitating Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Oct-11</td>
<td>Libya: A second armed council is formed: The Revolutionary Council of Tripoli</td>
<td>Mobilization for action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-Oct-11</td>
<td>Libya: A recording from Gaddafi emerges urging Libyans to protest rebels</td>
<td>Precipitating Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-Oct-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Coptic Christians protest the burning of a church in Aswan</td>
<td>Mobilization for action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-Oct-11</td>
<td>Libya: Gaddafi is captured &amp; killed</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Oct-11</td>
<td>Libya: NATO states no fly zone over Libya will be dissolved by the end of the month</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-Oct-11</td>
<td>Tunisia: First elections since Arab Spring</td>
<td>Structural Conduciveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-Oct-11</td>
<td>Libya: National Transitional Council declares Libya liberated</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-Oct-11</td>
<td>Tunisia: Protests erupt after cancellation of Popular List party's seats</td>
<td>Precipitating Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-Nov-11</td>
<td>Libya: Libyan Muslim Brotherhood congregates for its first congress in 25 years</td>
<td>Mobilization for action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-Nov-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Thousands protest the Military Council's ruling of Egypt</td>
<td>Precipitating Factor</td>
</tr>
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<td>19-Nov-11</td>
<td>Libya: Gaddafi's oldest son is arrested in Libya</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Tunisia: Constituent body holds its first session</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-Nov-11</td>
<td>Egypt: First elections are held</td>
<td>Mobilization for action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-Dec-11</td>
<td>Tunisia: Dr. Moncef Marzouki is elected President</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Dec-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Second round of elections for lower house seats in Egyptian parliament</td>
<td>Mobilization for action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-Dec-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Islamist parties claim to have obtained at least 70 percent of votes</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-Dec-11</td>
<td>Egypt: Thousands of protesters against police brutality</td>
<td>Precipitating Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Jan-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Military Council moves up elections for upper house in parliament</td>
<td>Mobilization for action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Jan-12</td>
<td>Egypt: Egyptians vote in third round</td>
<td>Mobilization for action</td>
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<td>14-Sep-12</td>
<td>Tunisia: Protesters briefly storm US embassy in response to anti-Islam film</td>
<td>Precipitating Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-Oct-12</td>
<td>Egypt: President Morsi pardons all protesters arrested during uprisings</td>
<td>Breakdown of social control agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Oct-12</td>
<td>Libya: Ali Zidan is elected interim Prime Minister</td>
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<td>Egypt: Morsi issues a declaration banning challenges to his decrees, laws and decisions</td>
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<td>Egypt: Egyptians vote on referendum</td>
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<td>Egypt: Ruling Freedom and Justice Party declare citizens approve draft constitution</td>
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<td>Egypt: Morsi imposes 30 day curfew</td>
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XIX. References


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