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## **“Standing in the Crater of a Volcano”: Anti-Chinese Violence and International Diplomacy in the American West**

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# “Standing in the Crater of a Volcano”

Anti-Chinese Violence and International Diplomacy in the American West

**ABSTRACT** This study investigates anti-Chinese violence in the American West—focusing primarily on events in the Arizona Territory between 1880 and 1912—and the role of diplomatic relations between the United States and China in tempering the worst excesses of that violence. Recent scholarship asserts that the Chinese rarely suffered lynching and were commonly targeted for other types of violence, including coercion, harassment, and intimidation. Building on that work, this study advances a definition of racist violence that includes a broad spectrum of attacks, including the threat of violence. While affirming that such “subtler” violence achieved many of the same objectives as the “harsher” violence, it seeks to explain why whites used such radically different and less openly violent methods against this minority and explains why this difference mattered. Using these insights to interrogate the complex relationship between the United States and China, this essay shows that Chinese diplomatic influence stifled anti-Chinese mob violence by white Americans. It argues that this relationship denied white racists the same agency against the Chinese immigrants as they possessed against other racial and national minorities and thus forced them to “choose” the “subtler” acts of violence against this group rather than those usually employed against these others. **KEYWORDS:** Chinese immigration, white supremacy, racist violence, lynching, American West, Arizona Territory, international diplomacy

“**T**HE CHINESE MUST go,” declared the *Daily Tombstone* in 1886, in a well-worn summation of anti-Chinese sentiment in the American West. Those white Americans who allowed the Chinese to enter or to remain in the country, it added, “might as well try to prevent the water from flowing over Niagara [F]alls as to stem the current of Anti-Chinese opinion.” Those in the southeastern Arizona Territory were eager to do their part to stem the current and to “rid Tombstone and Cochise county from the blighting Chinese curse.”<sup>1</sup> In a later dispatch, the *Tombstone*—again demonstrating its

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ability to harness metaphors—warned that the Chinese and any white person who supported them were “standing in the crater of a volcano.”<sup>2</sup> The anti-Chinese sentiment revealed in the *Tombstone* provides a sobering portrait of some attitudes held by whites across the West at that time. It also offers an opportunity to investigate not only that sentiment’s role in stoking anti-Chinese violence there, but also the role of diplomatic relations between the two countries in tempering the worst excesses of that violence. While this essay will focus on events in the Arizona Territory, it begins with an overview of anti-Chinese sentiment across the American West and assesses the relevant scholarship.

During the study period, anti-Chinese sentiment was widespread in the American West. It had developed over three decades largely in response to two significant events. The first was the gold rush, which began in 1849, attracted thousands of Chinese immigrants to California, and prompted thereafter the passage of state laws targeting them. The second was the signing of the Burlingame Treaty in 1868, which affirmed the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of China, provided for reciprocal free immigration and emigration, asserted “the same privileges, immunities, or exemptions” common to citizens of other countries with “most favored nation” status, and expanded trade opportunities between the two countries.<sup>3</sup> Given its openness to immigration, this treaty greatly amplified anti-Chinese sentiment in the West, leading to an ever-quickening series of restrictions on immigration by the Congress.

Beginning in 1875, the Page Act—the first significant challenge to the Burlingame Treaty—prohibited immigrants from “China, Japan, or any Oriental country, without their free and voluntary consent” (a provision also in the Burlingame Treaty) or, if female, “for the purposes of prostitution.” This act placed departure and arrival controls on such immigrants and assigned financial penalties or prison terms on those involved in such offences.<sup>4</sup> In 1880, the Angell Treaty received Chinese recognition of America’s right to “regulate, limit, or suspend” (but “not absolutely prohibit”) the immigration of Chinese laborers if it became necessary in the judgment of the U.S. government. However, it explicitly exempted Chinese “teachers, students, merchants” and “Chinese laborers who are now in the United States,” and it accorded them “all the rights, privileges, immunities, and exemptions” consistent with China’s most-favored-nation status.<sup>5</sup> Less than two years later, but consistent with the provisions in the Angell Treaty, the Chinese Restriction Act suspended the future immigration of Chinese skilled and unskilled laborers for ten years. For those protected by that Treaty, however, the Act required the U.S. authorities to register all Chinese travelers entering or leaving the country and to provide them with certificates identifying their vocational status. For those who violated the Treaty, the Act specified penalties.<sup>6</sup> However, it did little to diminish anti-Chinese sentiment among the white citizens in the West or for their legislators demanding far more stringent restrictions on immigration.

The various reasons for this anti-Chinese sentiment were later articulated by prominent contemporaries and by historians. Responding to heightened fear among whites, the California State Senate in 1876 established a Special Committee on Chinese Immigration, which would eventually disparage every aspect of Chinese character, physiognomy, morality, and political fitness, and enumerate many of the slanders that generations of whites

would use to defame persons of Chinese descent. “The Chinaman has brought to us and planted within our border all the vicious practices and evil tendencies of his home, aggravated somewhat, perhaps, by the circumstance that he has lost what little restraint his home government imposed upon him, without submitting to the restraint of ours,” explained the committee’s published report in 1878. “Their civilization is so ancient that it has become rotten.”<sup>7</sup>

In his papers, Horace Davis—a prominent businessman, U.S. Representative from California from 1877 to 1881, and leading Republican opponent of Chinese immigration—captured his own role in roiling the racist mood, campaigning against Chinese immigration, and promoting the legislation restricting the Chinese in 1882.<sup>8</sup> In 1878, he delivered a speech in the House of Representatives in which he charged that the “Chinaman” was spreading like a pestilence and that “to-day he is found in every village, in every mining camp, utterly an alien in the body-politic, and like some foreign substance in the human body, breeding fever and unrest till that system is relieved of its unwelcome presence.” Davis worried that “so large a foreign body unable or unwilling to assimilate to our ways renders them a dangerous element to society and a grave peril to the State; second, that their presence is a menace to free labor.”<sup>9</sup> Sharing Davis’s views, an editor in the late 1870s remarked that the Chinese “are rapidly absorbing industries that should be in the hands of white men and women.”<sup>10</sup>

Besides this perceived economic threat, whites feared the disproportionately male composition of the Chinese residents in the United States, the result of a mix of factors: the anticipated temporary nature of their migration, the Chinese cultural prohibition against the migration of women and children, and the aggressive effort by American policymakers limiting the immigration of Chinese women who would deliver children entitled to U.S. birthright citizenship. Beth Lew-Williams addressed some of these factors in her description of the many young Chinese men who originated in Guangzhou (Canton) and migrated to America in the nineteenth century. When they left their villages in southeast China in the 1860s en route to their point of departure in Hong Kong, they were “part of a wave of predominately young, male, lower-middle-class migrants venturing out of Guangdong Province in search of opportunity. For generations this same demographic group had left home to seek work in neighboring towns, provinces, or nations. Now with the help of new transportation lines, they crossed the Pacific.”<sup>11</sup>

In 1909, Senator Francis G. Newlands of Nevada added another reason that white fears toward the Chinese persisted into the early twentieth century. In “A Western View of the Race Question,” he lamented that—try though they might—whites had not succeeded in entirely shutting out these immigrants and, consequently, they worried that migrants from China and across Asia might eventually overrun the West and seize it from its white occupiers, just as whites had wrested the West from ethnic Mexican and Indian peoples earlier (see Figure 1). “Confronting our Pacific Coast lies Asia, with nearly a billion people of the yellow and brown races, who, if there were no restrictions, would quickly settle upon and take possession of our entire western coast and inter-mountain region,” he wrote. “Race tolerance, under such conditions, means race amalgamation, and this is undesirable.”<sup>12</sup>




**Figure 1.** In this 1879 cartoon, Thomas Nast epitomized the fear among whites that Chinese immigrants would overrun the West and seize it from its white occupiers, as whites had wrested it from Indians. The “Red Gentleman” suggests this as he whispers in the ear of the “Yellow Gentleman” that “Pale face” (the white inhabitant) was afraid that the Chinese would “crowd him out, as he did me.” Above their heads is a drawing of a train from the eastern United States chasing an Indian west (“Go West!”) in previous decades; beneath it is the drawing of a Chinese man chasing a now mangled train back east (“Go East”).  
*Courtesy of Library of Congress*

Periodically, therefore, whites in the West violently asserted their anti-Chinese sentiment. In 1871, rioters attacked the Chinese in Los Angeles in a massacre that claimed the lives of eighteen immigrants.<sup>13</sup> In 1880, a mob annihilated nearly every house and business in the Chinese quarters within Denver, Colorado, and lynched a launderer named Sing Lee. In 1885, a white mob rampaged against the Chinese in Rock Springs, Wyoming, killing twenty-eight, wounding fifteen, expelling five hundred or so, and torching seventy-nine of their homes and businesses.<sup>14</sup> Throughout, whites instituted sundown practices that banished the Chinese, keeping them from living in or even visiting such towns.

Occasionally, they resorted to racist violence to achieve or enforce these practices. During a gold boom in Quigley, Montana, in 1896, whites warned Wong Ying, the only Chinese resident, that theirs would be an all-white town. When he refused to leave, a mob burned his house and shot him when he ran outside. “His death was at the hands of men who did not want him or any other Chinaman in the camp.”<sup>15</sup>

In her study, which reached into the early twentieth century, Jean Pfaelzer found that the bulk of anti-Chinese violence in the West occurred in the four decades after the onset of the Gold Rush.<sup>16</sup> Lew-Williams later argued that the 1880s constituted its high tide. “Over a period of eighteen months in 1885 and 1886, Chinese across the American West experienced violence on an unprecedented scale.” After demonstrating that the series of riots and expulsions had wrought profound “collective and cumulative effects” on the Chinese, she concluded that this outbreak reflected an explosion of barely suppressed fury among whites over the failure of the 1882 Chinese Restriction Act to dampen what they viewed as the deleterious effects of the Chinese already in the country or those still entering as undocumented aliens, often through Mexico. To the Chinese, she observed, it “seemed a coordinated attack” toward a specific objective. Ah Hung, a Chinese resident of California, declared as much in early 1886: “The Chinese . . . have come to the conclusion



**Figure 2.** This Thomas Nast cartoon from 1869 provides an ironic glimpse at the “encouragement” provided by whites on the West Coast to Chinese immigration in that period, encouragement that came in the form of violence aimed at curbing their arrival. Reflecting white perceptions of Chinese men as sexually perverse, the image portrays the white man as powerful and manly and the Chinese man as weak and feminized. *Courtesy of Library of Congress*

that the present movement is different from preceding ones, that it will prove to be a permanent one.” The violence had convinced Hung that “[the people of the] Pacific Coast are earnest in their desire not only to restrict [us] coming into the country, but to expel those already here.” Hung understood immigration restriction and violent expulsion as two prongs of a single attack. Together, law and violence sought to deny the Chinese any place in America (Figure 2).<sup>17</sup>

For the Chinese in the West, “standing in the crater of a volcano” meant enduring mob violence of all types. Yet scholars like Pfaelzer and Lew-Williams assert that the Chinese who suffered mob violence there rarely became victims of the targeted violence against individuals so characteristic of the attacks on African American and ethnic Mexican victims. Instead, they argue, the Chinese usually confronted mass expulsions. In her study, Pfaelzer identifies over two hundred “roundups” in California between 1849 and 1906.<sup>18</sup> Lew-Williams observes that, although lynchings occurred, whites more commonly “drove them out using subtler forces of coercion, harassment, and intimidation. They posted deadlines for the Chinese to vacate town, leaving unspoken the consequences of noncompliance. They locked up leaders of the Chinese community and watched as the rest fled. They called for boycotts.” Because of these less violent approaches to racist violence by white mobs, she concludes that historians underestimate not only the scope and scale of the violence against the Chinese but the significance of the threat of violence as well. “When we use black oppression and Indian extermination to define racial violence,” she continues, “Chinese expulsions seem insignificant. Or, even more accurately, they appear not to be violent at all.”<sup>19</sup>

This study agrees with Lew-Williams’s assertion that, to be useful, the definition of “racist violence” must encompass both violence of all types and the *threat* of violence.<sup>20</sup> It also concurs with her view that the types of often lethal violence used against other racial groups help conceal the significance of the threat of violence deployed against the Chinese. Crucially, this study asserts that these differences are not only significant, as Lew-Williams argues, but they are dependent as well upon the prevailing assumption that the white perpetrators involved enjoyed unfettered agency.

While Lew-Williams was correct in arguing that the more common use of “subtler forces” achieved many of the same objectives as the more restrictive use of the harshest ones, she did not explain why whites “decided” to use such radically different—and less openly violent—methods against this racial minority. Nor did she address why this difference matters. Building on her foundational work, this essay attempts to answer these questions. It interrogates two of the many strengths of her book—the focus on the interests of the U.S. government in securing and eventually dominating the “open door” trade relationship with China, and the recognition of the consequent leverage afforded to the Chinese government and its diplomats in their negotiations with their counterparts in Washington, despite China being a relatively weak state during that period.<sup>21</sup> Recent work by historians like William D. Carrigan and Clive Webb, Monica Muñoz Martinez, and myself demonstrate that the influence of foreign governments and their diplomats, and their active intervention into incidents of racist violence against their nationals in the United States, have played a significant, though wholly underappreciated, role in mitigating this violence by placing pressure on American officials to constrain their citizens.<sup>22</sup>

Using these insights to interrogate the complex relationship between the United States and China detailed so effectively by Lew-Williams, this essay shows that Chinese diplomatic influence stifled anti-Chinese mob violence by white Americans. It argues that this relationship denied white racists the same agency against the Chinese immigrants as they possessed against other racial and national minorities, and as a result it forced them to “choose” the “subtler” acts of violence against this minority rather than those usually employed against these others—although they probably would have, had they felt empowered to do so.

Most of the scholarship on anti-Chinese sentiments and violence has focused on the Pacific Coast, particularly California, which had high concentrations of Chinese, and increasingly in areas of moderate concentrations, such as the interior mountain states and cities like Montana and Denver.<sup>23</sup> The lack of it in places like the Arizona Territory, with its small Chinese population, is likely predicated on the assumption that few Chinese immigrants “decided” to settle there, making it a useful focus for a local study or two but of relatively little significance to the larger story of the West or of America more generally. As suggested by the concept of sundown towns, however, this work operates on the assumption that the Chinese did not actually “decide” not to settle in Arizona in larger numbers; instead, they reacted to widespread banishment by whites from towns across the territory—and, as suggested by the case in Montana, all across the West. The story of racism and racist violence in California is *obvious*—the Chinese arrived, concentrated, came into conflict with whites, and suffered ruthless, often spectacular, hostility and oppression. By contrast, the story of racism and racist violence in Arizona is *not obvious*; in fact, it does not even appear to be a story until one recognizes that *absence* can be a sign of oppression—the Chinese arrived in small numbers, concentrated in a few places, suffered banishment in town after town, and largely fled Arizona in search of more hospitable climes.

This study focuses primarily on the Arizona Territory between 1880 and 1912, the year it attained statehood. Geographically, it centers on the southeast and particularly on the counties of Pima, Cochise, and Graham until 1909, when the last named was divided longitudinally to create Greenlee County to the east and Graham to the west. Within these counties the study targets the larger urban places like Benson, Bisbee, Clifton, Douglas, Tombstone, and Tucson. Nevertheless, it draws upon analogous events from states elsewhere in the American West when these corroborate, contextualize, or advance the story.

Organizationally, the study addresses its subject matter in three sections. In the first, it investigates the racist fever of the 1880s—and particularly 1886—during an influx of Chinese from California into the Arizona Territory. In the second, it assesses the role of the Geary Act in 1892 in the facilitation of anti-Chinese intimidation during the 1890s and 1900s. In the third, it evaluates the response of whites to another influx of Chinese workers in late 1909 or early 1910. In terms of its sources, the study relies on local and national newspapers, international treaties and acts of Congress, the relevant federal censuses, the papers of Horace Davis, the aforementioned congressman from California, and the correspondence of Carroll Cook, the racially liberal white counsel for the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA), which was known too as the Chinese Six Companies, based in San Francisco, and responsible for defending the interests of the



Chinese in America through its cultivation of political and legal institutions domestically and the maintenance of strong ties to China itself.<sup>24</sup>

The experiences of the Chinese in the Arizona Territory differed greatly from those in California. Driven from gold mining in California and targeted with racist practices there, desperate Chinese sought employment with the railroads under construction across the West. At the time that the Southern Pacific Railroad reached Tucson in 1880, the Census reported that there were then in the Territory 1,630 Chinese, 1,153 of whom lived in Pima County alone. With the completion of the railroad, many of them moved on. However, a small number remained, some finding work as cooks, waiters, domestic servants, and section hands; others became market gardeners near the growing urban centers.<sup>25</sup> Throughout the remainder of the territorial period, the Chinese never again numbered more than they did in 1880. According to the federal censuses, they accounted for a total of 1,170 individuals in 1890, 1,410 in 1900, and then 1,305 in 1910 when they constituted only 0.6 percent of the total territorial population.<sup>26</sup> In southeastern Arizona, the Chinese lived in very small numbers. In Pima County, they numbered 299 in 1890, 254 in 1900, and 285 in 1910. In the same period, they declined steadily from 173 to 111 to 93 in Cochise County; and they increased from 86 to 140 to 141 in Graham County.<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, given the sundown practices in effect in urban centers large and small, few Chinese actually lived in those places. Consequently, a very small and vulnerable population was the target of the racist sentiment documented in the area, was generally consigned to more rural locations outside of the larger towns, and was in the real sense standing in the “crater of a volcano.”

Nonetheless, like whites across the West, those in the Arizona Territory were consumed with fear of the Chinese in the 1880s. They erupted into paranoia in the spring of 1886, when they became aware that the ongoing offensive against the Chinese elsewhere was pushing refugees from those places into their own—a plague to be unleashed upon innocent whites, as they saw matters. “Every town and village on the Pacific coast is driving them away,” fretted the *Daily Tombstone Epitaph* in February. “If this community will only take a common-sense view of things they will readily see that Arizona and New Mexico are the only places left for them, and it naturally follows that here they will come, and come in immense squads.”<sup>28</sup> To avert this, white Arizonans undertook to banish those Chinese immigrants who had already arrived there and, more importantly perhaps, to establish a fearsome reputation for intolerance that would deter others from coming. They received an assist from newspaper editors, local businessmen, and municipal politicians who whipped up anti-Chinese sentiments and exacerbated racist stereotypes to promote their own ideological agendas, as historian Kathryn Reisdorfer demonstrates in her study of Jerome, Arizona.<sup>29</sup>

As anti-Chinese agitation seized Willcox, the *Stockman* advocated the use of whatever methods necessary to rid the town of its immigrants. “If we but work together earnestly and intelligently,” it argued, “Willcox can be ridden of the Celestials within thirty days, and their places filled with people of our own civilization. Then we will be happy.”<sup>30</sup> In Tombstone, a place that hardly needed encouragement, the *Epitaph* whipped up hatred in editorials such as “The Chinese Are Coming,” a screed that praised the efforts of white Californians to expel the Chinese and called on local residents to pursue a similar course.

It warned that “if something is not done, and done at once, to prevent these California pests from entering our borders, this little city will be overrun with these people.” It added that “immediate and decisive action is required upon the part of our citizens if they desire to stop the influx of these barbarians.”<sup>31</sup>

In some places, whites formed Anti-Chinese Leagues that agitated against the Chinese and devised means of expelling them. To that end, leaders in Tombstone organized a public spectacle in March 1886. “On Saturday evening last a stand was erected facing the Occidental Hotel, and sounds of music and the announcement that there would be an Anti-Chinese meeting, attracted an audience of over five hundred people,” observed the *Epitaph*. “A large number of ladies were present, and seemed to be heart and soul in the movement.”<sup>32</sup> A few weeks later, the *Epitaph* fawned over the group. “If it had not been that an Anti-Chinese League had been formed in Tombstone—with the bone and sinew of the city—to-day Tombstone (the banner city of Arizona) would have been overrun by the pig-tailed Mongolians.” Through what it viewed as the noble “efforts of the Anti-Chinese League fully 500 Chinamen have steered clear of this American city.”<sup>33</sup>

Led by prominent men, the Tombstone League held open meetings in which whites hashed over what they emphatically labeled peaceful methods required to expel the Chinese from their town. One Judge Peel rose to address a crowd there, explaining “that he was heart and soul in the movement” and advocating a “boycott, because that was a peaceful and effectual way of making John [Chinaman] go.” After he resumed his seat to thundering applause, another prominent citizen affirmed the judge’s sentiments, advising listeners about “how towns in California got rid of the Chinese inhabitants simply by resorting to the boycott.” In relating the story of a boycott in Nevada, he added that a similar ploy in Tombstone would unify whites in their purpose, not only fostering intra-racial goodwill but simultaneously driving away an enemy alien. In expelling Chinese launderers from Carson, Nevada, he quipped, “a dirty shirt for about a month, [had been] an honorable passport into good society and any parlors in that city.”<sup>34</sup>

Rallying behind such sentiments, businessmen in Tombstone pledged to neither employ the Chinese nor patronize those who did. Although not all whites signed on, many did.<sup>35</sup> Several months later, the Tombstone League adopted an even uglier tone. In its so-called Declaration of Principles, the League condemned the Chinese in racial and moral terms, and vowed not to disband until it had achieved its purpose: “the complete expulsion of the Chinese from Cochise County, from the present time and forever.”<sup>36</sup> Similarly, several white men—including another judge—met in Willcox in March 1886 to discuss “taking some action towards ridding the town of Chinese,” reported an observer. “After considerable informal discussion it was decided to call a mass meeting for Thursday next to organize for boycotting the Celestials.”<sup>37</sup>

If whites did not establish sundown bans with the founding of their towns (and some evidence suggests they did), they probably did so during the hysteria of 1886. Although residents decades later disavowed knowledge of exactly how or when they banned the Chinese from Bisbee, conventional wisdom in the 1930s asserted that the miners who founded the town had begun the tradition in 1880 with the town’s establishment. “There was a great deal of Chinese litigation along the Pacific coast, and miners who came from California probably brought with them the prejudice formed there against Orientals,”

wrote Annie M. Cox, a graduate student at the University of Arizona, in her 1938 thesis.<sup>38</sup> Contemporary evidence suggests that Bisbee was sundown by at least 1886, when the *Epitaph* observed that “there are no Chinese there.”<sup>39</sup> Even if they could not recall the precise origins of the practice, residents of Bisbee half a century after its founding agreed that, “with few exceptions, no Chinaman has ever allowed darkness to overtake him in the Mule Mountains.”<sup>40</sup>

On some occasions, local newspapers documented violent attacks against the Chinese. In the spring of 1882, white workers building a railroad near Fort Crittenden clashed repeatedly with Chinese workers imported as cheap labor. In one of these attacks the “white men, by firing over the heads of the Chinamen, sought to frighten them and succeeded in doing so effectually, as [the latter] ran, leaving their tools in the road and would not venture to return for them.”<sup>41</sup> Weeks later, the whites marched “in a body to the Chinese camp and ordered them to go, and upon their refusing violence was resorted to and under the pressure of rocks and pick handles a stampede was gotten up.” After the riot, they rounded up the Chinese, forced them onto a train, and expelled them.<sup>42</sup> Hours later, a train pulled into Benson carrying the banished, “as miserable looking a crowd, we are informed, as could well be imagined.”<sup>43</sup>

Likely, whites attacked the Chinese in other unrecorded or undiscovered violent incidents. However, based on the evidence, they probably deployed less *physical violence* against the Chinese than they did against other groups across the country in the decades after the Civil War. In the Northeast and the industrializing areas of the Midwest and West, white business leaders targeted workers, often Catholic and Jewish European immigrants who struggled against corporations to create unions and secure rights, a struggle that often put them at odds with the armed representatives of the state—police officers, militiamen, and soldiers—who clubbed, beat, and shot them.<sup>44</sup> In the South and Midwest, racial conservatives banded together to maintain white supremacy, lynching, whipping, raping, and generally terrorizing blacks.<sup>45</sup> Across the West, the U.S. military, abetted by white settlers, annihilated Indian populations or corralled them on reservations defined by hunger, oppression, and death.<sup>46</sup> In the Southwest, white mobs hanged and shot ethnic Mexicans to suppress and subordinate these people. In short, during these years, whites appealed to unbridled racism, classism, and religious bias, and used violence bordering on warfare against those unlike themselves.<sup>47</sup>

Given the savage violence of the period, it is worth pondering why white Arizonans may *not* have used greater physical violence against the Chinese, even during the hysteria of 1886. This study argues that the reasons for this were twofold. First, ordinary whites understood, at least in some vague sense, the importance of international trade with a weak but immense China. Second, in the context of this market-based arrangement between the two countries, Arizona whites also recognized the leverage held by the Chinese government to press for investigations into acts of violence against their nationals, investigations that could result in the payment of indemnities to China by the U.S. government and—as ordinary whites feared—in the possibility that federal authorities would punish either individual perpetrators or the municipalities in which such violence occurred. Evidence of that possibility was publicly available, as when, for example, the *New York Herald* in early 1886 speculated that China could hold the U.S. government liable for claims

previously made against it as a result of earlier episodes of violence against the Chinese and extract massive financial penalties.<sup>48</sup>

An incident in the Idaho Territory provides a remarkable glimpse into the fear that whites across the West experienced over diplomatic intervention into incidents of anti-Chinese violence. In September 1885, a mob hanged five Chinese men near Pierce City, purportedly for the murder of a white merchant. White locals boasted of their deed. In October, however, a Chinese delegation from Oregon arrived in Pierce City to investigate the incident. Based on its reports from the Chinese witnesses, the delegation rejected the white-authored story—one of besieged whites forced to defend themselves from the criminal Chinese—and countered that whites had murdered the men based on racist hatred.<sup>49</sup> Thereafter, Chinese representatives pressured the U.S. government to investigate the incident and warned of their intention to seek indemnities.<sup>50</sup> In mid-1886, the *Portland Oregonian* reported and the *Lewiston Teller* prominently reprinted an article on the results of their efforts. “The Chinese government [has] recently made a demand on the secretary [of state] of the United States for an investigation,” it stated. “They demand money damages.”<sup>51</sup>

Rattled by the findings of the Chinese delegation and the Chinese government’s subsequent demands, white Idahoans repeatedly tailored the facts to mitigate their responsibility. On October 16, 1885, the *Semi-Weekly Idaho World* claimed that the Chinese delegation had endorsed the hangings and expressed “themselves satisfied . . . that the parties who were hung were guilty.”<sup>52</sup> As fear mounted, whites circulated another story—possibly true—that officials had placed a white man disguised as an Indian and conversant in Cantonese into the jail cell with the five Chinese prior to the hangings and—probably untrue—that he had overheard them admitting to the crime.<sup>53</sup> Once it became clear that the Chinese would press for an indemnity, whites in Idaho and elsewhere in the West further distanced themselves from the lynching. Now, asserted the *World*, they claimed that the Nez Perce Indians had perpetrated it to avenge the killing of the white trader with whom they had dealt as “their best friend” by lynching the Chinese merchants who had repeatedly cheated them. Consequently, “it is thought by many that these Indians joined with some white men determined to revenge the death of their friend.”<sup>54</sup> When Governor Edward A. Stevenson indicated, nine months after the incident, that he would conduct his own investigation, the *Lewiston Teller* reprinted a dispatch from the *Portland Oregonian* expressing its hope that he could “unravel the mystery.” In a revealing phrase, however, that dispatch asserted that the “Indian” story, which it and like-minded whites had now cobbled together, contained “the probable facts.”<sup>55</sup> In another article weeks later, it peddled the Indian story once more, insisting that “this will probably be accepted as the correct history of the tragedy.”<sup>56</sup> Almost thirty years later, however, the *Wallace Miner*, an Idaho newspaper no longer concerned about the consequences, offered its reminiscences, leaving no doubt that the lynching was an act of white violence against the Chinese.<sup>57</sup>

With its reference to the Idaho lynching, this study does not suggest that white Arizonans knew about that incident specifically or that it shaped their behaviors. Instead, it details the incident as a stark illustration of the influence that China *did* exercise and how its intervention could impact the behavior of local white Westerners. Nonetheless, evidence supports the argument that influential white Arizonans understood that anti-

Chinese violence could attract unwanted legal and political problems for themselves. In fact, on March 6, 1886, the *Tombstone Daily Epitaph* devoted most of a page to the Chinese demands for an indemnity related to an earlier riot in San Francisco. Citing a wire report, the *Epitaph* indicated that “this was an ultimatum” and, if the United States refused to pay, “the Chinese government [would] immediately proceed to collect the indemnity from American citizens” operating businesses in Chinese territory. In a companion editorial entitled “China Makes a Stand,” the *Epitaph* called this “grave and important news” and added that “it is not at all surprising that such a step has been taken, by China. The only wonder is that something of the sort has not been done before.” In a clear indication that white Arizonans understood the lesson that the Idahoans were then learning, the *Epitaph* concluded: “It will need the best efforts of our greatest minds to pilot us safely through the dangers that now threaten. Meantime, it will be well for communities throughout the country, to act with caution and avoid throwing unnecessary difficulties in the way of the national government.”<sup>58</sup>


Indeed, the prominent local leaders of the Anti-Chinese Leagues were frequently at pains to promote only nonviolent measures against “the Mongolian curse.”<sup>59</sup> As noted earlier, Judge Peel denounced the Chinese in Tombstone, supported the use of the boycott, and eschewed the use of violence. As he put it, he “was opposed to any violence, but believed that all hands would stand together and refus[e] to patronize any person who employed or patronized Chinese.”<sup>60</sup> When some members of the Tombstone League proposed violence shortly thereafter, its president resigned, declaring his willingness “at all times to assist by all lawful and peaceful means in the eviction of the Chinese” but opposing any of “the extreme measures adopted by [the] Executive Committee.”<sup>61</sup> A month later the League issued a “Declaration of Principles” that stressed nonviolence and acknowledged thereby the preference of a majority of its members. “We are not in favor of unlawful methods, but so firmly are we impressed with the great importance of discouraging the employment of Chinese that we recommend that they not be patronized in any way and we will boycott any person or persons who employ Chinamen directly or indirectly.”<sup>62</sup> Based on a perusal of the appendices in *Forgotten Dead* by Carrigan and Webb, white Arizonans had no similar qualms about lynching persons from neighboring Mexico, a weak nation which had suffered a grievous military defeat by the United States between 1846 and 1848, lost the northern third of its territory to the invading power, and possessed significantly less diplomatic leverage than did distant China.<sup>63</sup>

Because the Restriction Act of 1882 applied only to immigrant laborers from China not already in the United States and because it specifically excluded other types of Chinese immigrants, it failed to quell the anti-Chinese sentiment. In addition, it spurred the routine entry of many undocumented Chinese immigrants along the Mexican border, which historian Grace Peña Delgado described as “a veritable gateway for the illegal entry of Chinese.”<sup>64</sup> To facilitate their entry, those seeking it turned increasingly to smuggling rings, which could be both costly and dangerous but still offered better odds than federal legislation and a bureaucracy designed to thwart them.<sup>65</sup> In an essay written in 1909, entitled “How Can We Enforce Our Exclusion Laws?,” Marcus Braun, an immigrant inspector for the Department of Commerce and Labor in Washington, D.C., remarked indirectly on the costs and the dangers to the immigrants then utilizing these rings. The

“smuggling of Chinamen . . . is a regular profession,” he wrote, “it is not a very risky undertaking, and it pays very well, from \$25.00 to \$200.00 per head. When I say that it is not a risky undertaking,” he added, “I mean to indicate thereby that the smuggler of Chinamen . . . very seldom crosses the border line; he merely brings his wards to the border and he tells them to run across.”<sup>66</sup> Historians like Robert Chao Romero and Lawrence Douglas Taylor Hansen have since addressed the motivations, risks, and rewards associated with this practice.<sup>67</sup>

While the smugglers themselves assumed few risks, smuggling was very risky for the Chinese.<sup>68</sup> In 1910, the *Tucson Citizen* reported that “a coroner’s inquest was held this afternoon at 3 o’clock on the case of the unidentified Chinaman whose skeleton was found Saturday evening on the De La Canon ranch, about 35 miles southwest of [Tucson], and a verdict was rendered that the deceased met his death by murder at the hands of persons unknown.” The newspaper then speculated, on the basis of the available information, that smugglers had killed him.<sup>69</sup> Yet, given the ugly strain of anti-Chinese racism common in Mexico, Chinese immigrants could face equally dangerous circumstances by simply remaining there.<sup>70</sup>

In response to the growing numbers of legal and illegal Chinese immigrants, the perceived failure of the Restriction Act, and the escalating anti-Chinese sentiment in the United States, the American and Chinese governments undertook to resolve their differences on immigration through negotiations. In 1888, they concluded the Bayard-Zhang Treaty, which provided for the suspension of Chinese immigration to the United States—“save only for merchants, students, diplomats, and laborers who had immediate family or a thousand dollars in property or debts”—for twenty years and the denial to Chinese laborers of their right to return to the United States following visits to China, a right guaranteed in the Angell Treaty but now limited to only those who met specifically defined financial thresholds or familial relationships. In return, the U.S. government agreed to provide better protection to Chinese immigrants and their property.<sup>71</sup> Because this treaty was not well received in China, the U.S. government acted unilaterally, passing the Scott Act, which banned all Chinese laborers, “whether or not they had previously resided in the United States,” and denied Chinese immigrants visiting China the right to return unless they met similar financial and familial conditions put forward in the Bayard-Zhang Treaty. In so doing, it invalidated thousands of return certificates previously granted to Chinese immigrants and denied entry to hundreds already in transit back to the United States. However, once again it included protections for the Chinese still residing in America.<sup>72</sup> Shortly after signing the Scott Act, President Grover Cleveland tried to placate Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard and the Chinese Government by successfully prevailing upon the Congress to pay an indemnity of \$276,619.75 to China, an amount negotiated originally as part of the failed Bayard-Zhang Treaty for recent violence against the Chinese in America.<sup>73</sup> Just four years after passage of the Scott Act, the U.S. government passed the Geary Act, which not only extended the relevant provisions of the 1882 Restriction Act and the Scott Act for another decade, but mandated as well that all the exempted classes of Chinese living in the United States carry, at all times, resident permits (“affirmative proof”) attesting to their legal status and that those caught without them would be subject to



**Figure 3.** In this 1889 cartoon, Uncle Sam (representing a white, male embodiment of America) attempts to hold in place a door (symbolizing the 1888 Scott Act, one of several Chinese restrictions imposed in the 1880s) that has been broken from its hinges. Epitomizing white fears of the Chinese in this period, the cartoon shows Chinese immigrants, rendered as grotesque and almost vermin-like caricatures, sneaking through the broken door, the floorboards, and holes in the wall.

*Courtesy of Library of Congress*

deportation or a year in jail.<sup>74</sup> It then made the Geary Act permanent when it was renewed in 1902 and affirmed in 1904 (Figure 3).<sup>75</sup>

Although traditionally weak in its relationships with the West (particularly Great Britain and France) and increasingly so with Japan, China had negotiated a mutually beneficial immigration and trade treaty with the United States in 1868. However, the United States took advantage of growing Chinese weakness in 1880 when it successfully negotiated the Angell Treaty, which uncoupled those two interests. Over the course of the next twelve years, it succeeded in greatly limiting Chinese immigration while advancing its trade interests in China.<sup>76</sup> After upstart Japan humiliated China in the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), the Western powers expanded their spheres of influence there. In the wake of the war, a Western journalist concluded that China “has lost her prestige which was nothing but the shadow of a great name; that she lies exposed as a carcass in the neighborhood of which a cloud of eagles is hovering.”<sup>77</sup> Similarly, in 1899, Secretary of State

John Hay tacitly acknowledged the decline of Chinese prestige when he circulated the “Open Door Notes” to the Western powers, Russia, and Japan—in his view the countries with a stake in China—but failed to send copies to China itself.<sup>78</sup> Nevertheless, U.S. policymakers still tried to avoid offending China with unbridled racist violence in the American West because they did not wish to jeopardize their position in the world’s largest market or provoke violence against American officials, businessmen, or missionaries located there, fears realized in the bloody but short-lived and peasant-led Boxer Rebellion targeted at foreign powers and foreign influences in 1900–1901.<sup>79</sup>

Although the federal government exempted Chinese merchants and certified their status, the officials enforcing those laws at the local level often failed to honor either. In response to a complaint from the CCBA to the office of President William H. Taft about local officials in Tucson interfering “with the movements of Chinese merchants,” the U.S. secretary of commerce and labor equivocated about the difficulty the federal government faced in its efforts to balance the malignant intentions of its immigrant legislation with its official obligations to its trading partner, especially when the political pressure exerted by racists at home so clearly outweighed the weakness of China abroad.<sup>80</sup>

Despite the increasingly aggressive restrictions imposed on the Chinese immigrants by the U.S. government and the steady decline in international influence of the Chinese government after the first Sino-Japanese War, white Arizonans remained largely cognizant of the limits imposed on them by the treaty obligations between the two countries and acted cautiously. While they continued to deploy repressive methods against the Chinese, they avoided openly violent ones or found arguments to explain them favorably. Across the area, for example, they maintained their local blanket bans on persons of Chinese descent, even though they had no lawful grounds for excluding anyone on the basis of their race. As a consequence, they achieved the desired result through the *assertion* of their racist rules and the refusal of the authorities to challenge them. Writing of Bisbee, Cox recognized that “any attempt to enforce such a rule would have been illegal, but it proved effective, nevertheless.”<sup>81</sup> For the local Chinese, the white residents of Bisbee sounded a bugle daily at 4:00 P.M., reminding them to leave town posthaste; for unknown Chinese who passed through, they made their antipathy clear by running them out of town.<sup>82</sup>

Despite the rapid growth of Bisbee in the 1890s and 1900s, the *Evening Star* marveled at how strictly the residents had maintained their sundown practices. “Bisbee is . . . a merchandise center for all the adjacent country, including northern Mexico,” it explained. “The population, including the suburbs of Warren and Lowell, is about 20,000, 50 per cent of whom are employed in the mines. They are almost entirely native-born Americans, with a very few Mexicans. There are no Chinese.”<sup>83</sup> Bisbee was so closely identified with anti-Chinese practices that, when it announced a baseball tournament in 1905, the *Tucson Citizen* joked that “it may be stated here that no visiting team will be fed at a Chink restaurant.”<sup>84</sup>

In Tombstone, whites feared a “Chinese invasion” and worked tirelessly to “oust” the few Chinese who settled there. Delgado explained that “the tenor of anti-Chinese agitation was much more subdued than in . . . Bisbee, but in all cases the outcomes were the same.” Eschewing violence, the white business and working classes in Tombstone united to keep out the Chinese by denying them jobs. “Though contending that the ‘Chinese must go,’”



city leaders “adamantly opposed acts of bloodshed and murder. Good citizens, [one of them] asserted, must take a positive stand against such heinousness. [He] believed in the promises made by Chinese launderers to leave Tombstone once they were ready or ‘when the washing gave out.’”<sup>85</sup> With this assertion, this community leader affirmed the point made earlier, that influential whites feared that violent acts against the Chinese could provoke serious repercussions for the perpetrators and the community at large.

It is tempting to see Bisbee and Douglas as sundown towns because of their complete ban on Chinese people, but not Tombstone and Clifton, since both towns tolerated at least some Chinese. However, it is more appropriate to view them all as sundown towns, with varying degrees of strictness determined by local labor needs. Local demand for cheap labor provided some measure of safety for some Chinese—especially when influential people deemed a degree of tolerance necessary. In my recent study of anti-black violence in the Midwest, I expanded the theoretical understanding of sundown towns in a passage that might equally apply to anti-Chinese sundown towns in the Arizona Territory: “Even in the strictest sundown jurisdictions, however, whites occasionally allowed a limited number of blacks for very particular reasons.”<sup>86</sup> I found that mobs or police officers would repeatedly drive out most—if not all—blacks when their numbers spiked beyond what whites regarded as an acceptable threshold. Before long, a few blacks would again collect in small numbers in search of work, beginning the process anew.

With the support of immigration officials and their collusion with the local authorities, whites in Clifton kept the Chinese off-balance with raids on their community and deportation proceedings against individuals, as permitted under the Geary Act. “A couple of interesting Chinese cases were tried before U.S. Commissioner Reshau in Clifton last week,” the *Copper Era* reported in 1902. “The chinks had been arrested for being illegally within the domain of Uncle Sam.” Endorsing the vigorous prosecution of one case, the newspaper betrayed its pleasure at the result. One of the Chinese tried “had been in this country many years, as he spoke English very well.” Nevertheless, the “commissioner held [him] guilty, hence [he] will be deported to China.”<sup>87</sup> In 1909, whites there pressed for the deportation of eight Chinese residents, including Quong Wo, “who claims that he has lived in Clifton for 12 years and who objects to being sent back to his native land.” Betraying its attitude toward the Clifton deportations, the *Tucson Citizen* headlined its story “Chinks Don’t Want to Vamos.”<sup>88</sup>

In Clifton, too, white officials seemed disinclined to investigate or punish anti-Chinese crimes. Rather than admit the racist violence against the Chinese, they framed these attacks as robberies. “A brutal murder occurred at the Chinese garden a few miles above Clifton Friday,” reported the *Copper Era* in 1903. When two Chinese came to town to trade, someone raided their residence, stole their money, and killed Young Chew, an elderly man who had stayed at home. “A coroner’s jury was impaneled by Justice Boyles, which returned a verdict to the effect that death had been caused by knife wounds inflicted by parties unknown.” Noting that Chew was “very popular” among the Chinese (likely a euphemism for community leader), the newspaper added that the authorities had “made no arrests” but had supposedly “been vigilant since the murder.” It then ended its report by placing much of the blame for the crime on the victims themselves and by justifying its assertion by the frequency of such incidents elsewhere. “Chinese gardeners have long

been a prey to outlaws, and it would seem that they should eventually learn that the safest place to keep their money is in the banks. Chinese gardeners have been robbed and murdered in all sections of this country.”<sup>89</sup> By claiming that Chew had been killed in a robbery-gone-wrong and that he had brought the killing upon himself by keeping his money at home, the *Copper Era* minimized the possibility that Chinese officials would investigate the case. In addition, by claiming that similar incidents were both common and widespread, it hinted at the likelihood that white newspapers and public officials elsewhere likewise recognized the merits of obscuring the nature of these killings.

Like their counterparts in neighboring cities, whites in Douglas were determined to keep their city free of the Chinese. Shortly after two Chinese men entered town on business in 1902, a white mob formed, manhandled the visitors, stole their money, and then purchased rounds of drinks for the white townspeople. Unequivocally, the mob delivered a crystal-clear message about its intention to keep Douglas sundown; the *Copper Era* reaffirmed their message by headlining its story “No Chinamen Wanted.” Immediately after the incident occurred, a prominent white man—aware perhaps of the potential consequences of such violent acts—put the two victims up in a hotel until they could leave town safely the next morning. Notably too, the author of the newspaper account wrote it in a vague, jokey, and euphemistic way—one that would amuse knowing readers, maintain plausible deniability, and minimize any legal jeopardy to the town or its residents. The entire account read as follows:

Two sleek celestials dropped down in Douglas the other day with a view to business, and the show down they got for their money would curl the paint on a water bucket. A couple of prominent citizens organized a party to show the distinguished strangers around town, and the way they looked after their job was remarkable. They started from the Hotel Ord. There are thirty-one saloons in that salubrious burg, and the pig tails were enlightened as to the interior arrangement of every one of them and compelled to treat as the price of their information. The crowd swelled as it proceeded till the chinks, towards the last, had to dive to the bottom of their baggy pants to settle with the bar. When they had been shown all the artistic intricacies of business life in Douglas, they were advised to sell their certificates and go. They were even given a start when Captain Rynning took them to a hotel over night and saw them depart in peace the next morning.<sup>90</sup>

In late 1909 or early 1910, influential landowners in Cochise County began to backslide on their long-standing insistence on Chinese exclusion and to recruit Chinese as the cheapest available labor. Shortly thereafter, an unknown number of Chinese laborers apparently responded affirmatively. Many local whites reacted angrily against the ranchers they considered responsible for a Chinese invasion and to the threat anti-sundown landowners posed to the county’s long-standing traditions. The *Bisbee Daily Review* gave voice to the white rage. “In Douglas and in Bisbee and the Country surrounding both cities Chinese have been noticeably absent,” it mused. “In Bisbee Chinamen were always barred and such was also the case in Douglas. No Chinaman restaurants and laundries were to be seen in either city and the surrounding districts were imbued with the same anti-Oriental feeling.” It added that the Chinese “were unwelcome [and] they learned this and they staid

[sic] away.” The *Review* also addressed the breach among the ranchers when it asserted that “there were signs appearing of a threatening race trouble in the Sulphur Springs valley,” with some ranchers “aroused at what they fear is an invasion of Chinese labor.” According to the paper, pro-sundown ranchers vowed that they would “not stand for an Asiatic invasion and that newly arrived Chinese must go.” In addition, they asserted that “they will see that white labor is used in this section.”<sup>91</sup>

Given the aggressive response of pro-sundown ranchers, it is unclear who among them might have been responsible for the “invasion.” Since the area was amid an overall population boom, some of those importing the Chinese workers may have been newcomers unacclimated to the sundown traditions in the area.<sup>92</sup> Others may have been local ranchers who had met the competitive challenge introduced by the newcomers but had quickly disavowed it as soon as the uproar over the immigrant labor erupted.

Coincident with the reported Chinese influx in Cochise County, white men killed two Chinese laborers in separate incidents across the region. In December 1909 near Clifton, Antonio Nardelli—likely a person of Italian descent and one whose whiteness under other circumstances might have been in dispute—killed Lem King (or Lin Kong), a cook. The *Copper Era* observed that local white sentiment was decidedly with the shooter. Nardelli claimed King had attacked him with a knife and that he had responded in self-defense. The only other witness was a bookkeeper named W. E. Kelly. Although asleep nearby “when the shooting occurred, [he] testified at the preliminary trial at Clifton that he heard the Chinaman speak several words before the shot was fired, but that he did not see anything until after the man was dead.” With its convoluted language, the *Copper Era* hinted that the authorities and jurors had strained to arrive at their decision: “The coroners [sic] jury rendered a verdict exonerating [sic] Nardelli, as it appeared to them that the killing was done in self defense.”<sup>93</sup> At the trial conducted in April 1910 and pursued at the behest of the Chinese community, a jury freed Nardelli despite physical evidence indicating he had shot the alleged knife-wielder in the back—a difficult fact to reconcile with the gunman’s claim of self-defense.<sup>94</sup>

In a letter sent after the trial to Carroll Cook in San Francisco, Lew Beck Chang of Clifton explained that Nardelli had been freed through “bribe and corruption” and that the prosecutor hired by the Chinese had been “a bad attorney” who had “work for both side.”<sup>95</sup> In a second letter signed by “All Chinese citizens of Clifton,” Chang wrote: “We ask you tell us what can we do for him if have any chance or any way can rearrest the defendant we will do it wish you give us advise before we do anything we all anxious to hear from you.” Noting that the killing and the white support for it had only amplified already elevated racist hatred, Chang told Cook “we need you [to] help us” because, in his words, “if this defendant not convict all Chinese in this district be no protection cannot live here at all.”<sup>96</sup> In reply, Cook conceded that the Chinese could expect no justice. “I am very sorry to hear that Lem King’s alleged murderer was turned loose. If he was tried before a Jury, and the Jury rendered a verdict finding him not guilty, there is nothing more that can be done. It is too bad, but there is nothing more that you can do at all.”<sup>97</sup> Despite the irregularities in the legal process, the coroner’s jury and the trial jury afforded Nardelli and the white residents in Clifton the imprimatur of legal legitimacy and made improbable an investigation by

Chinese officials, an outcome which Cook acknowledged with certitude to his Chinese clients after the trial.

Then, in September 1910, an “American” (white) man robbed and shot two Chinese gardeners traveling near Bisbee, killing one and injuring the other. The *Bisbee Daily Review* claimed that “reports differ as to the circumstances leading to the shooting. One report is that the Chineman [*sic*] who was shot made a move as if to grapple with the robber after he had secured the money. Another is that the highwayman shot down the man and his companion without the least provocation.”<sup>98</sup> Regardless of the differences in the reports on the incident, the local authorities seemed disinclined to undertake a serious investigation, as the *Review* made clear: “The residents of Hereford notified Sheriff Jack White, of Tombstone, of the robbery and murder and he in return notified Constable McRae of [Bisbee]. Officer McRae started to Hereford on horseback and went as far as the San Pedro river. He did not secure any trace of the slayer. Ranchers along that vicinity had been previously advised of the affair and kept a diligent search for the fugitive, but secured no trace of him.”<sup>99</sup>

Furthermore, in a letter to the Cochise County district attorney in Douglas after this “robbery,” Cook wrote that concerned parties had requested that he “write to you, relative to the murder of a Chinaman in your County, named Fong Gee King, to ascertain whether you have yet any clew [*sic*] to the murderer, and if so, whether in the presentation of the cause you desire any assistance.” Cook also advised him that the CCBA was “an Association to which all Chinese in the United States are entitled to appeal for assistance and where one of their number has been murdered they are ready to lend any assistance possible towards the prosecution of the murderer.” Cook volunteered his organization’s assistance “either in the detection of the murderer of the Chinaman or in the prosecution of him, if arrested.” If the district attorney replied to Cook, there is no record of it.<sup>100</sup>

As they had elsewhere, the officials in Cochise County, its residents, and the regional press reacted to this killing in a way that downplayed anti-Chinese violence and minimized thereby any potentially negative consequences that might result from it. In a period when whites normally pursued alleged crimes by minorities with the formation of posses that hunted for fugitives and often rounded up large numbers of loosely defined “suspects,” they reacted in Cochise County to the killing of a Chinese resident in a wholly lackluster way. By dispatching a single lawman on horseback across a wide area in a fruitless search for suspects, by maintaining a “diligent search for the fugitive” by local ranchers, by keeping the investigation in the hands of the local district attorney, and by publicizing their efforts positively in the local press, the white community did what was necessary to achieve their racist objectives and make a Chinese investigation unlikely. Coincidentally, a week after the killing, the *Bisbee Daily Review* reported that law enforcement officials and ranchers managed to scramble a sizable party to pursue those suspected of a property crime against wealthy local white residents: “Horses Lost by Ranchers,” it screamed: “Posse Is Out.”<sup>101</sup>

Cook’s correspondence regarding the murder cases involving Chinese immigrants near Clifton and Bisbee provides additional evidence of China’s continued willingness—despite its diminished stature—to intervene in incidents of anti-Chinese violence, elevating the anxieties of local white leaders and officials. In a letter to California’s governor, James N.

Gillett, protesting agitation by organized white anti-immigrant groups in San Jose, Cook emphasized that China was likely to elevate similar issues diplomatically. He warned the governor that the Chinese consul general “has requested me to prepare this correspondence to be sent to the Chinese Minister at Washington that, through him, it may be brought to the attention of the State Department.” In signing off, the CCBA counsel added: “Hoping that you may find some way to [persuade] the authorities [in San Jose] to interfere with this unlawful interference with the business of the citizens of a friendly nation.”<sup>102</sup>

This study advances the scholarship by answering the two unaddressed questions stated in the introduction. First, why did whites use such radically different—and less openly violent—methods toward the Chinese in the American West than they did toward other racial minorities there? Second, why did this matter? In response to the first question, this work finds that whites took a less violent (and often overtly “peaceful”) approach to the Chinese immigrants because they recognized the importance of their recourse to the protections negotiated between their internationally weak but economically important homeland and the economic opportunities and political influence to the United States. Whites did not *choose* to use “subtler” methods against the Chinese than they did against blacks, ethnic Mexicans, or Indians; they simply capitulated to circumstances beyond their control. While the United States was inclined to show less respect for China after the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, it still sought to bolster its economic and political influence in that country and to avoid anti-American reprisals against its own citizens. Accordingly, federal authorities tried to keep local officials attentive to the need to avoid racist violence against Chinese immigrants.

In the Arizona Territory, whites—particularly influential whites—opted in most instances for cruel but nonviolent methods of repression because they recognized that they or their municipalities could face serious consequences for acts of overt violence. Aside from the occasional act of mob violence or individual homicides, they usually responded with collective anti-Chinese intimidation through Anti-Chinese Leagues, anti-Chinese meetings, and economic boycotts devised to drive the Chinese away. Judges clearly hostile to Chinese immigrants opposed violence against them, and the president of the Tombstone Anti-Chinese League resigned in protest in response to members advocating it. In towns like Clifton, Bisbee, and Douglas, local officials and juries manipulated investigations and the law to create plausible deniability and thereby protect white residents and their communities from liability. The white press routinely crafted stories that used robberies-gone-wrong scenarios to obscure white violence, and “humor” to mask what appeared to be a beating and robbery of two Chinese businessmen.

Outside Arizona, whites were similarly aware of and fearful about the consequences of white violence against Chinese immigrants. In 1885, those in Idaho—initially proud of their handiwork—lost little time in distancing themselves from the lynching of five Chinese victims and in concocting absurd stories about the incident once they learned that the Chinese government was investigating it, demanding indemnities, and requesting action by the U.S. government. During the height of the national frenzy against the Chinese in 1886, the *New York Herald* bemoaned the amount of the indemnity already owed by the U.S. government to its Chinese counterpart. Even in 1910, when the Chinese government

was under tremendous political pressure internally and externally, Carroll Cook wielded the threat of Chinese diplomatic intervention to spur investigations into anti-Chinese incidents or deter subsequent acts of violence in places like Arizona and California. While influential whites in the Arizona Territory may not have been aware of any or all of these particular warnings, they were, as their actions demonstrated, clearly aware of the checks on white supremacy.

In response to the second question—Why did this matter?—this study shows that white racists were fundamentally rational in their approach to the enforcement of white supremacy. While historians often imply that racist mobs possessed unlimited agency in the United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, forming at will and wreaking unchecked havoc, this work shows that whites understood the limitations on their power. They revealed that understanding in their different approaches to different minorities, dispensing unrestrained violence against blacks, ethnic Mexicans, and Indians but showing considerably more deference to the Chinese. Even though China was a weak state and one that weakened dramatically during the study period, Chinese diplomats enjoyed leverage over U.S. policymakers who sought to expand the “open door” trade relationship with China while minimizing the payment of indemnities to China and avoiding the possibility of reprisals against Americans in China. In this sense, this work echoes the conclusions of an earlier study of the “subtler” types of violence used by whites against Japanese nationals and the simultaneous use of extreme violence against Mexican nationals in Texas in the early 1920s. The possibility of death there for foreign nationals at the hands of American mobs was directly related to the power and influence wielded by the governments in their countries of origin and to the potential consequences for the U.S. government and, by extension, for the perpetrators. This advantage was clearly unavailable to most African Americans.<sup>103</sup>

In addition, this study provides several interventions into the historiography. First, by examining the southeastern Arizona Territory, it shifts the focus of anti-Chinese racism away from the American West Coast, which has received the most study, and onto an under-investigated area. In this sense, it builds on the work of scholars such as Liping Zhu, Stephanie Hinnershit, Julian Lim, and Grace Peña Delgado, all of whom have focused on places ranging from the Rocky Mountains to the U.S. Southeast and the U.S.-Mexico borderlands.<sup>104</sup>

Second, this study shifts the focus from sundown towns in anti-black municipalities in the Northeast, Midwest, and West to anti-Chinese municipalities in the Southwest—thus confirming that, despite hopes of escaping their West Coast oppression, the Chinese did not decide of their own volition that Arizona was an undesirable place to settle. Given the prevalence of sundown towns in Arizona, scholars should identify and investigate them systematically, as scholars of African American history have begun to do, to determine how and why sundown towns developed in the Southwest. By exposing anti-Chinese practices in sundown towns, they will help to clarify why so many people of color lived (and continue to live) in big cities and coastal areas, and why so few live in the vast and overwhelmingly white areas of rural America. Many observers, past and present, attribute this reality to the alleged free choice of people of color who supposedly had some natural affinity for urban living. However, examination of sundown towns may reveal that this

outcome was the direct result of conservative, pro-sundown whites expelling people of color from their environs, creating small pockets of racial diversity surrounded by large areas of whiteness—population patterns that still powerfully shape demographic, ideological, and political patterns in the present.

Third, this work affirms Lew-Williams’s assertion that scholars must expand their definitions of racist violence beyond lynchings and massacres before they can offer any comprehensive understanding of the white supremacist violence that seized the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Next to these murderous acts, as she notes, “Chinese expulsions seem insignificant” or “appear not to be violent at all.” Yet, by particularizing them as this study does, it becomes apparent that these expulsions played similar roles in extending white supremacy and other forms of social control, while reflecting the limits that the Chinese state imposed upon the exercise of white power.

Finally, this study challenges the assumption that the 1880s marked a frenzied climax of national anti-Chinese sentiment and anti-Chinese mob violence. Throughout the period, whites in the Arizona Territory were aggressive and creative in their efforts to block Chinese settlement and labor competition. From a historiographical perspective, this study argues that no conclusion regarding a climax of anti-Chinese violence can be established until the archival data have been sufficiently mined. This concern can be reinforced by recalling the certainty that once surrounded the scholarly appraisal of a now largely discredited anti-black “lynching era” that ran, supposedly, from 1880 until 1930.<sup>105</sup> Carroll Cook alluded to this possibility when he documented raging anti-Chinese agitation in San Jose, California, in 1910 and lamented that, according to the Chinese with whom he had spoken there, “matters are getting worse instead of better.”<sup>106</sup>

## NOTES

1. The author was generously supported in this research by grants from the Office of Global Engagement at the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley and the U.S. Department of Education International Studies and Foreign Languages Program. *Daily Tombstone* (Tombstone, Arizona), [untitled], May 13, 1886, 2. Unless otherwise noted, all newspapers used in this study originated in Arizona.
2. *Daily Tombstone*, “Town Talk,” May 18, 1886, 3.
3. Burlingame Treaty, “Peace, Amity, and Commerce: Treaty signed at Washington July 28, 1868, supplementing treaty of June 18, 1858,” Article VI, 683, <https://iowaculture.gov/history/education/educator-resources/primary-source-sets/immigration-regulation-response-and/burlingame-treaty>. See also Haiming Liu, “Chinese Exclusion Laws and the U.S.-China Relationship,” 152, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.513.1624&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.
4. Page Act, Forty-Third Congress, Sess. II, Ch. 141, 1875, <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/43rd-congress/session-2/c43s2ch141.pdf>.
5. Angell Treaty, “Immigration: Treaty signed at Peking November 17, 1880, modifying treaties of June 18, 1858, and July 28, 1868,” 686, <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/b-cn-ustoo006-0685.pdf>.
6. Chinese Restriction Act, “An act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese,” May 6, 1882, Forty-Seventh Congress, Sess. I, Ch. 126, 1882, <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/47th-congress/session-1/c47s1ch126.pdf>. For an illuminating discussion of the terms *restriction* and *exclusion* in relation to this act, see Beth Lew-Williams, *The Chinese Must Go: Violence, Exclusion, and the Making of the Alien in America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 8–9. Following Lew-Williams, I eschew the name “Chinese Exclusion Act” to describe the 1882 legislation.
7. *Chinese Immigration: Its Social, Moral, and Political Effect: Report to the California State Senate of Its Special Committee on Chinese Immigration* (Sacramento: F.P. State Office, 1978), 259, <https://curiosity.lib.harvard.edu/immigration-to-the-united-states-1789-1930/catalog/39-990042964360203941>.

8. Finding aid to the Horace Davis collection of Davis-Bancroft-King family papers BANC MSS 2015/182, 2017, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, [https://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/c8p2746d/entire\\_text/](https://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/c8p2746d/entire_text/) (hereafter “Horace Davis collection”).
9. *Chinese Immigration: Speech of Hon. Horace Davis, of California, in the House of Representatives, June 8, 1878* (Washington: 1878), 3, <https://archive.org/details/chineseimmigratoodavigoo>.
10. *Scrapbooks on Chinese Immigration, 1877–1893*, vol. 1, 9, Horace Davis collection.
11. Lew-Williams, *Chinese Must Go*, 21–22. On anti-Chinese sentiments in the West, see Nicholas Sean Hall, “The Wasp’s ‘Troublesome Children’: Culture, Satire, and the Anti-Chinese Movement in the American West,” *California History* 90, no. 2 (2013): 42–76. For their part, white Americans regarded these heavily male Chinese communities as sexually perverse threats. See, for instance, Jean Pfaelzer, *Driven Out: The Forgotten War against Chinese Americans* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 104–106, 110–111 (quoted material: 104). For a useful historiographical essay, see Nicholas W. Mason, “Anti-Chinese Mob Violence and the Legacy of Lynching Studies,” *Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 20, no. 1 (January 2021): 157–164.
12. Francis G. Newlands, “A Western View of the Race Question,” in *Chinese and Japanese in America* (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1909), 270.
13. Scott Zesch, *The Chinatown War: Chinese Los Angeles and the Massacre of 1871* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). On the number of victims, see 220, 251.
14. John R. Wunder, *Gold Mountain Turned to Dust: Essays on the Legal History of the Chinese in the Nineteenth-Century American West* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2018), 18, 7.
15. *Daily Inter Mountain* (Butte), “A Chinaman Murdered,” June 2, 1896, 8. For the name of the victim, see *Daily Missoulian* (Missoula, Montana), “Murder at Quigley,” June 2, 1896, 1. In some cases, whites allowed one or two people of color to remain in their sundown towns, individuals that the majority considered “good” people *despite* their supposedly inferior racial status. “Towns need not be quite all white to be considered sundown,” argued James W. Loewen in a discussion about anti-black sundown towns. “Sometimes the sole black resident might be the ‘shoeshine boy,’ living in the basement of the hotel. White residents invoked such exceptions to exemplify the rule to newcomers. Thus, a community could still meet the definition of ‘sundown town’ even with a black household or two.” James W. Loewen, “Sundown Towns and Counties: Racial Exclusion in the South,” *Southern Cultures* 15 (Spring 2009), 24. The presence of these “exceptions” did not mitigate the fact that the towns adhered to sundown practices.
16. Jean Pfaelzer, “Roundups of Chinese Americans in California, 1849–1906,” in *Driven Out* [unpaginated].
17. Lew-Williams, *Chinese Must Go*, 111. For additional works on Chinese immigration, anti-Chinese agitation, and violence in the U.S. West, see the collected essays in *The Chinese Experience in Arizona and Northern Mexico* (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1980); Wendy Rouse Jorae, *The Children of Chinatown: Growing Up Chinese American in San Francisco, 1850–1920* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Erika Lee, *At America’s Gates: Chinese Immigration during the Exclusion Era, 1882–1943* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Elliot Young, *Alien Nation: Chinese Migration in the America’s from the Coolie Era through World War II* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014); Julia María Schiavone Camacho, *Chinese Mexicans: Transpacific Migration and the Search for a Homeland, 1910–1960* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012).
18. Pfaelzer, “Roundups of Chinese Americans in California,” map [unpaginated].
19. Lew-Williams, *Chinese Must Go*, 1, 3.
20. For a discussion on the importance of both lethal violence and its threat in the achievement of the racist purposes of white mobs, see Brent M. S. Campney, *This Is Not Dixie: Racist Violence in Kansas, 1861–1927* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2015), 3.
21. Lew-Williams, *Chinese Must Go*, esp. 169–193. Lew-Williams argues persuasively that U.S. officials worried about the safety of “U.S. diplomats, merchants, and missionaries in China” (169).
22. William D. Carrigan and Clive Webb, *Forgotten Dead: Mob Violence against Mexicans in the United States, 1848–1928* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Monica Muñoz Martinez, *The Injustice Never Leaves You: Anti-Mexican Violence in Texas* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018); Brent M. S. Campney, “Anti-Japanese Sentiment, International Diplomacy, and the Texas Alien Land Law of 1921,” *Journal of Southern History* (November 2019): 841–878.
23. See, for example, Liping Zhu, *The Road to Chinese Exclusion: The Denver Riot, 1880 Election, and Rise of the West* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2013); Liping Zhu, *A Chinaman’s Chance: The Chinese on the Rocky Mountain Mining Frontier* (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2000).
24. On the CCBA, see Lawrence Douglas Taylor Hansen, “The Chinese Six Companies of San Francisco and the Smuggling of Chinese Immigrants across the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1882–1930,” *Journal of the Southwest* (Spring 2006): 37–61.
25. All in Lawrence Michael Fong, “Sojourners and Settlers: The Chinese Experience in Arizona,” in *The Chinese Experience in Arizona and Northern Mexico* (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1980), esp. 1–17.



26. *Thirteenth Census of the United States, Volume II, Population: 1910, Alabama-Montana* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1913), 77, 78.
27. *Ibid.*, 80. This census includes no category for Greenlee County; nor does it reference whether the numbers for Graham County include those for the county as it existed prior to or after its boundary changes in 1909. The gender imbalance in the Asian populations is evident in Arizona. Under the heading “Chinese and Japanese,” the 1910 census showed that men accounted for 1,593 individuals and women for just eighty-three (see 78).
28. *Daily Tombstone Epitaph*, “The Chinese Are Coming,” February 18, 1886, 3.
29. Kathryn Reisdorfer, “Charley Hong, Racism, and the Power of the Press: In Jerome, Arizona Territory, 1909,” *Journal of Arizona History* (Summer 2003): 133–146, republished at <https://parentseyes.arizona.edu/node/378>.
30. *Stockman* (Willcox, Arizona), reprinted as *Daily Tombstone*, “Boycott Them,” March 15, 1886, 3.
31. *Daily Tombstone Epitaph*, “Chinese Are Coming.”
32. *Daily Tombstone*, “Exit Pig-Tails!,” March 22, 1886, 3.
33. *Daily Tombstone*, [untitled], April 9, 1886, 3.
34. *Daily Tombstone*, “Exit Pig-Tails!”
35. *Daily Tombstone*, “Exit Chinese,” February 17, 1886, 3.
36. *Daily Tombstone*, “Declaration of Principles of the Tombstone Anti-Chinese League,” May 5, 1886, 3.
37. *Daily Tombstone*, “Boycott Them.”
38. Annie M. Cox, “History of Bisbee: 1877 to 1937,” master’s thesis, University of Arizona, 1938, 25–26.
39. *Tombstone Daily Epitaph*, [untitled], February 24, 1886, 3.
40. Cox, “History of Bisbee,” 26.
41. *Arizona Weekly Citizen* (Tucson), [untitled], April 9, 1882, 3.
42. *Arizona Weekly Citizen* (Tucson), [untitled], April 23, 1882, 4.
43. *Tombstone Epitaph*, “The Chinese Must Go,” April 24, 1882, 4. This study owes much to the work of John R. Wunder. Nevertheless, it excludes some of those incidents that he characterizes as “Anti-Chinese Violence” in Arizona. In his list of incidents, for example, he includes both an instance of editorial aggression in Prescott in 1869 and an 1873 massacre of ten Chinese at Tubac that was plainly violent but perpetrated by Apaches. See Wunder, *Gold Mountain Turned to Dust*, 21. His sources for these incidents can be found in Fong, “Sojourners and Settlers,” 6, 7.
44. Alan Dawley, *Struggles for Justice: Social Responsibility and the Liberal State* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Harvard, 1991); Jackson Lears, *Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877–1920* (New York: Harper, 2009).
45. On anti-black violence in the South, see W. Fitzhugh Brundage, *Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Virginia, 1880–1930* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993); William D. Carrigan, *The Making of a Lynching Culture: Violence and Vigilantism in Central Texas, 1836–1916* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004). On anti-black violence in the Midwest, see Matthew E. Stanley, *The Loyal West: Civil War & Reunion in Middle America* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2017); Campney, *This Is Not Dixie*.
46. Brendan C. Lindsay, *Murder State: California’s Native American Genocide, 1846–1973* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012); Benjamin Madley, *An American Genocide: The United States and the California Indian Catastrophe, 1846–1873* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016).
47. Carrigan and Webb, *Forgotten Dead*; Martinez, *Injustice Never Leaves You*.
48. *New York Herald*, “Chinese Claims,” February 20, 1886, 5.
49. On the lynching, see, for example, *Lewiston Teller*, “From Pierce City,” October 1, 1885, 3; *Semi-Weekly Idaho World* (Idaho City), “Fraser’s Murderers,” October 9, 1885, 3. On the Chinese investigation into the lynching, see, for example, *Semi-Weekly Idaho World* (Idaho City), [untitled], October 16, 1885, 3.
50. *New York Herald*, “Chinese Claims.”
51. *Oregonian* (Portland), reprinted in *Lewiston Teller*, “Investigating an Outrage,” July 29, 1886, 1.
52. *Semi-Weekly Idaho World* (Idaho City), [untitled], October 16, 1885, 3.
53. *Semi-Weekly Idaho World* (Idaho City), [untitled], October 6, 1885, 2.
54. *Semi-Weekly Idaho World* (Idaho City), “Report of Gov. Stevenson,” August 17, 1886, 2.
55. *Oregonian*, “Investigating an Outrage.”
56. *Oregonian* (Portland), reprinted as *Lewiston Teller*, “Committed by Unknown Parties,” September 16, 1886, 4.
57. *Wallace Miner*, “Judge I. B. Cowen, an Honored Pioneer, Passes His 87th Mile Stone,” September 16, 1915, 6. It did, however, reference the white man dressed up as an Indian, suggesting that this detail from the initial story was truthful—at least inasmuch as a white man did enter in disguise into the jail cell with the imprisoned Chinese.
58. *Daily Tombstone Epitaph*, “China Aroused” and “China Makes a Stand,” March 6, 1886, 2.
59. *Daily Tombstone*, “Exit Pig-Tails!”
60. *Ibid.*

61. *Daily Tombstone Epitaph*, "The President Withdraws," April 6, 1886, 3.
62. *Daily Tombstone*, "Declaration of Principles."
63. See the two appendices in Carrigan and Webb, *Forgotten Dead*.
64. Grace Peña Delgado, *Making the Chinese Mexican: Global Migration, Localism, and Exclusion in the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 75.
65. *Ibid.*, 74.
66. Marcus Braun, "How Can We Enforce Our Exclusion Laws?," in *Chinese and Japanese in America*, 360.
67. Robert Chao Romero, *The Chinese in Mexico, 1882-1940* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2010), 30-65; Hansen, "Chinese Six Companies," 37-61.
68. *Copper Era* (Clifton), "Smuggling Chinese into Arizona," July 15, 1909, 4.
69. *Tucson Citizen*, "Coroner Returns Verdict of Murder," June 22, 1910, 5.
70. Jason Oliver Chang, *Chino: Anti-Chinese Racism in Mexico, 1880-1940* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2017).
71. Lew-Williams, *Chinese Must Go*, 178-185 (quoted material: 183).
72. *Ibid.*, 185-192 (quoted material: 186).
73. *Ibid.*, 188-189.
74. Delgado, *Making the Chinese Mexican*, 55-63. The Chinese continued to live under the provisions of the Geary Act until the 1920s. For the description of "affirmative proof," see the Geary Act, "Text of the Geary Act of 1892," <https://loveman.sdsu.edu/docs/1892GearyAct.pdf>. See also "Chinese Exclusion Act (1882)," <https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=47>.
75. Liu, "Chinese Exclusion Laws," 155.
76. Lew-Williams, *Chinese Must Go*, esp. 170-175, 178-193.
77. S. C. M. Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 302-314 (quoted material: 303).
78. Lew-Williams, *Chinese Must Go*, 191.
79. Diana Preston, *The Boxer Rebellion: The Dramatic Story of China's War on Foreigners that Shook the World in the Summer of 1900* (New York: Walker, 2000); David J. Silbey, *The Boxer Rebellion and the Great Game in China* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2013). Badly weakened by the Sino-Japanese War, the ruling Qing dynasty collapsed in 1912. Paine, *Sino-Japanese War*, 302-314.
80. Charles Nagel to Charles D. Norton, October 25, 1910, in Cook papers, box 1, folder 10, "Correspondence relating to complaints against authorities in Tucson, Ariz., interfering with movement of Chinese merchants," Ethnic Studies Library, University of California Berkeley (hereafter "Ethnic Studies Library").
81. Cox, "History of Bisbee," 26.
82. *New York Press* (reprinted in *Duluth News Tribune*), "Life in a Mining Town," August 21, 1908, 7; *Arizona Daily Star* (Tucson), "Bisbee to Cast Aside Old Unwritten Law and Permit Chinese Student to Come," June 2, 1923, 1.
83. *Evening Star* (Washington, DC), "District Soldiers to Have Fine Camp Site in Arizona," July 9, 1916, Part 4, 1.
84. *Tucson Citizen*, "Big Ball Tourney for Tucson," September 12, 1905, 5.
85. Delgado, *Making the Chinese Mexican*, 53.
86. Brent M. S. Campney, *Hostile Heartland: Racism, Repression, and Resistance in the Midwest* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2019), 122.
87. *Copper Era* (Clifton), [untitled], September 25, 1902, 3.
88. *Tucson Citizen*, "Chinks Don't Want to Vamos," March 27, 1909, 8.
89. *Copper Era* (Clifton), "Chinese Gardener Murdered," November 26, 1903, 2.
90. *Copper Era* (Clifton), "No Chinamen Wanted," October 2, 1902, 2.
91. *Bisbee Daily Review*, "Race Trouble Talk in Sulphur Springs," June 10, 1910, 2.
92. On this population boom, see *Daily Arizona Silver Belt* (Globe), "Sulphur Springs Valley Filling Up," April 27, 1909, 7; *Arizona Daily Star* (Tucson), "Valley Lands Good but Must Be Prepared," August 17, 1910, 3. Cochise County increased in population from 9,251 to 34,591 between 1900 and 1910. See *Thirteenth Census of the United States*, 82.
93. *Copper Era* (Clifton), "Chinaman Shot at Nardelli Camp," December 16, 1909, 3. Nardelli reveals how various formerly white "races"—including Irish and Italians—melded into a more inclusive "white" race in their struggles and competition with African Americans, Asian Americans, Mexican Americans, and many groups of Indians. On this literature, see, for instance, Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); David R. Roediger, *Working toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White—The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs* (New York: Basic Books, 2005).
94. On this physical evidence, see *Daily Arizona Silver Belt* (Globe), "Chinese Slayer on Trial in Valley," April 14, 1910, 5. On the verdict and the alternative spelling of the victim's name, see *Daily Arizona Silver Belt* (Globe), "Waddill Claims Partners Are Innocent," April 16, 1910, 1.

95. Lew Beck Chang to Carroll Cook, April 18, 1910, in Cook Papers, box 1, folder 8, "Correspondence relating to murder of Lem King, Clifton, Ariz.," Ethnic Studies Library.
96. "All Chinese citizens of Clifton" to Carroll Cook, April 19, 1910, in Cook Papers, box 1, folder 8, "Correspondence relating to murder of Lem King, Clifton, Ariz.," Ethnic Studies Library. On the killing in Clifton, see *Copper Era* (Clifton), "Chinaman Shot."
97. Carroll Cook to Lew Beck Chen, April 25, 1910, in Cook Papers, box 1, folder 8, "Correspondence relating to murder of Lem King, Clifton, Ariz.," Ethnic Studies Library.
98. *Bisbee Daily Review*, "Chinese Are Held Up and One Is Slain," September 16, 1910, 1.
99. Ibid.
100. Carroll Cook to District Attorney, September 30, 1910, in Cook Papers, box 1, folder 4, "Correspondence relating to murder of Wong Gee King, Douglas County, Ariz.," Ethnic Studies Library.
101. *Bisbee Daily Review*, "Horses Lost by Ranchers; Posse Is Out," September 23, 1910, 1.
102. Carroll Cook to James N. Gillett, March 22, 1910, p. 1, 2, in Cook papers, box 1, folder 7, "Correspondence relating to unlawful treatment of Chinese in San Jose, Calif," Ethnic Studies Library. See also Carroll Cook to Hon. Li Yung Yaw, March 22, 1910, same folder.
103. Campney, "Anti-Japanese Sentiment," 878.
104. Zhu, *Road to Chinese Exclusion*; Zhu, *Chinaman's Chance*; Stephanie Hinnershit, *A Different Shade of Justice: Asian American Civil Rights in the South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017); Julian Lim, *Porous Borders: Multiracial Migrations and the Law in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017); Delgado, *Making the Chinese Mexican*.
105. On the "lynching era," see Brundage, *Lynching in the New South*. For challenges to this orthodoxy, see Christopher Waldrep, *The Many Faces of Judge Lynch: Extralegal Violence and Punishment in America* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Ashraf H. A. Rushdy, *American Lynching* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012). Recent scholarship shows that anti-black lynching was at least as common in the 1860s and 1870s as it was during the so-called "lynching era."
106. Carroll Cook to James N. Gillett, March 22, 1910, in Cook papers, box 1, folder 7, "Correspondence relating to unlawful treatment of Chinese in San Jose, Calif," Ethnic Studies Library.