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The Cyprus Crisis and the Southern Flank of NATO (1960-1975)¹

Tamer Balci²

Abstract: Independence of Cyprus in 1960 ended neither the Greek demand to annex the island to Greece, nor the Turkish demand to divide the island along the ethnic lines. This paper analyzes the policies of major actors on the Cyprus problem in its crucial years from 1960 to 1975. An overall examination of the British, Turkish, Greek, American and the Soviet policies on Cyprus along with the policies of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots in this period reveals that all sides except Greece developed alternative policies and proposals to solve the problem. Greece was the only side that did not abandon its Cyprus policy of enosis, union with Greece. The unaccommodating approach of Greece on the Cyprus issue not only paved the road for the end of Greek junta (1967-1974) but also for the eventual collapse of southern flank of NATO in 1975. By 1975, Greece left NATO and Turkey suffered the arms embargo of its NATO ally, the United States of America and in response it shut down the majority of American military bases in Turkey and further weakened the southern flank of NATO.

Keywords: Cyprus, NATO, Cypriots, Turkey, Greece, Enosis, Akritas plan, AKEL,

Introduction

The island of Cyprus occupies one of the most strategically significant locations in the Eastern Mediterranean. As the age of decolonization started, after a five-year negotiation process the former British colony of Cyprus became an independent state in 1960 alas the conflict was not resolved. Considering Greece's long-standing demand for enosis, union of Cyprus with Greece, on the one side, and Turkey's concerns for the security of the Turkish population on the island, on the other, brought two NATO allies to the threshold of a war during the Cold War. This paper examines the Cyprus problem from 1960 to 1975 and the policies of major powers on the problem. I argue that from 1960 to 1975 Turkey, Britain, and two superpowers United States and the Soviet Union as well as the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders developed various

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Cold War Cultures Conference at the University of Texas-Austin, Austin, TX, on September 30-October 3, 2010.

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policies on Cyprus that served the best of their as well as the Cypriots' interests. In this time period, Greece was the only side that never adopted a different policy than enosis. Greece neither considered an alternative policy on Cyprus nor offered an accommodating solution to address the concerns of the Turkish Cypriots, such as granting equal citizenship rights to Turks on the island instead of minority rights.

Initially, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots opposed the Greek enosis proposal and alternatively proposed taksim, division of Cyprus between Turkey and Greece. Turkish policy changed after 1964 as Turkey and Turkish Cypriots regarded a federal state as a viable solution to the problem. Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriot unwillingness to grant equal citizenship rights to the Turks on the island left this offer futile despite the explicit Soviet support for a federal solution. While Greece insisted on enosis, by the mid-1960s the Greek Cypriot leadership favored an independent Cyprus instead of enosis and thus was targeted by Greece. After securing a military base in south Cyprus, Britain gradually left the burden of diplomatic meddling to the US despite the American reluctance for engagement.

The primary concern for the US was the security of the southern flank of NATO. New Cyprus republic took its place among the non-aligned countries. This situation created a fertile atmosphere for the Soviet influence on the island. In order to prevent any Soviet involvement on the island, the US initially stayed aside and expected Britain to resolve the issue diplomatically. The US intervened in 1964 when the problem turned into a direct threat to the security of NATO. By 1964 the constitutional authority of Cyprus republic was dissolved. The foundation treaties of Cyprus allowed Turkey, Greece and Britain to intervene militarily in case the agreed terms were altered without the consent of the signatories. Appealing to this clause, Turkey planned to intervene on the island in 1964 but the US strongly warned Turkey not to do so. In his letter to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, US President Lyndon B. Johnson stated that if a Turkish intervention into Cyprus caused a Soviet attack against Turkey, Turkey's NATO allies might not come to its aid. Also, Johnson warned İnönü that Turkey was not allowed to use US arms for non-NATO purposes. The letter turned Turkish-American relations upside down and marked the beginning of an unfriendly era between two countries. Taking advantage of this political climate, the Turkish left successfully rallied masses toward anti-Americanism in Turkey.

It is against this background that the role of the US in the Cyprus issue took on a new significance. The US policy on Cyprus failed because of three main reasons: first amid all the turmoil of Cold War, the US intervened only after the conflict became a direct threat to the unity of NATO but it was too late

too little. Second, the US policy makers ignored the democratic voice of the people in Greece and Turkey by supporting military regimes. Third, the US policy was under the heavy influence of a Greek lobby that prioritized the Greek interests over the US interests. Consequently, the same policies caused the collapse of the southern flank of NATO.

As opposed to the US, the Soviets took their steps cautiously and reached their objectives by 1975. The best organized party in Cyprus was the communist party. The Soviets let the Cyprus Communist Party (AKEL) voice the communist agenda. The Soviets were open to any solution that left Cyprus an independent state so that Cyprus did not become a NATO entity. Thus, the Soviets were against both Greek enosis, union with Greece, and Turkish taksim, division, policy.

Next time another crisis started in Cyprus in 1974, resented Turks ignored the US and launched a unilateral military operation. Turkey reached its goal of preventing enosis and gained an upper hand in the conflict. As a result, the pro-American Greek junta fell in Greece and Greece pulled out of NATO alas the enosis policy of Greece on Cyprus remained unchanged. Soon Turkey faced a US arms embargo and it retaliated by shutting down non-NATO US military bases in Turkey. By 1975, the southern flank of NATO was weaker than ever.

The Roots of the Cyprus Conflict

The Cyprus problem started in the mid 1950s when Cyprus was a British colony. Cyprus was under British control since 1878. Britain rented the island from the Ottoman Empire in 1878 and annexed it in November 1914 when the Ottoman Empire joined WWI on the side of Germany. After the war, the article 16 of the Lausanne Treaty (1923), stated that should Britain decide to leave Cyprus, the future of the island would be determined by Turkey and Britain.³ The article 16 allowed Turkey to have a voice in the future of Cyprus.

As the decolonization started after WWII, Britain was initially willing to leave Cyprus. As the Cold War brought a new communist threat to the Middle East and Israel gained independence in 1948, Britain reevaluated the evacuation of Cyprus as it desperately needed a strategic military base in the Middle East. Consequently, in the 1950s Britain made Cyprus its military center in the region. The only problem was that the island lacked a natural port. Since building a port would be too expensive, Britain first built only a military airport and a base on Cyprus. During the Suez Crisis in 1956, Britain understood the

³ Ahmet Yavuz, TC'nin Andlaşmaları I, (Ankara: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992) 23.

strategic significance of Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean. Since Cyprus did not have a port, Britain had to receive support from Malta, 1,000 miles away from the Suez Canal.

During the British colonial administration, Greece several times asked Britain to allow Greece to annex Cyprus. The United Nations' declaration supporting the right to self-determination for every nation was a great opportunity for the Greek population of Cyprus. But Greeks were not the only nation on the island. Turkish Cypriots, who made up 30 percent of the island population, formed another nation in Cyprus. The British unwillingness to give up Cyprus attracted the fury of the Greek militant organization (EOKA)⁴, which targeted not only the British authorities but also Turkish Cypriots because of their support for the British. The Greek Cypriot violence pushed Britain to the negotiation table after 1955. As agreed in the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey became one of the parties in the negotiations. During the negotiations Greece and Greek Cypriot policy was enosis, annexation of island to Greece, while Turkey pursued a taksim, partition policy that aimed to divide the island between Turkey and Greece.

Eventually Cyprus achieved its independence on August 16, 1960 and it became a joint state of Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The London and Zurich Treaties,⁵ which served as the basis of Cyprus constitution, created a shared governance of Greek and Turkish Cypriots with Turkish and Greek as official languages. According to the foundation treaties, president and vice president of the Cyprus Republic were to be a Greek and a Turkish Cypriot respectively. Both president and vice president were granted veto rights over the decisions of Ministers of Council that included seven Greek and three Turkish Cypriots. Similarly seventy percent of the parliament seats were reserved for Greek Cypriots while Turkish Cypriots were to receive the thirty percent of parliament seats. Likewise, civil service positions as well as security forces were to be divided proportionally. Furthermore, a constitutional court was created for the disputes. The court had to have a Greek, a Turkish and a neutral member. The neutral member had to be the president of the constitutional court. Furthermore, the article 22 of the treaties clearly prohibited both the Greek goal of enosis and Turkish goal of taksim, partition. In the agreement, Britain secured two military bases on the island. Together with Britain, Greece and Turkey became guarantor powers of the new Cyprus Republic. They were authorized to intervene in the island in case the agreed constitutional

4 Ethniki Organosis Kiprion Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters).

5 Murat Metin Hakki, ed., *The Cyprus Issue, A Documentary History, 1878-2007*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007) 31-39.

authority was disrupted. The 1960 Cyprus Constitution was drafted based on the outlines listed in the foundation treaties⁶ Greek Cypriots considered the independence as a step toward enosis.⁷ The independence removed the British obstacle. The next target was the Turkish community. The Greek Cypriots were not satisfied with the Cyprus constitution. The constitution, according to the Greek president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios⁸, gave too many rights to the Turkish population. Makarios was not willing to give more than minority rights to the Turkish Cypriots. By violating the constitution, he refused to give civil service positions to Turkish Cypriots and subdued the Constitutional Court. Under the pressure and threats from Greek Cypriots, on May 21, 1963, the president of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Ernst Forsthoef and his assistant resigned from their posts.⁹

Makarios presented a thirteen-point constitutional amendment proposal to Turkish vice president Fazıl Küçük on November 30, 1963. Makarios proposed to remove the veto power of Turkish vice president, proportional representation of civil officers and security forces.¹⁰ He also wanted to remove the guarantee agreements from the constitution. Since these changes would reduce the Turkish Cypriots to a minority position, both Küçük and the Turkish government refused them. In December 1963, Makarios declared that he did not recognize the guarantee treaties.

Soon after Makarios' declaration, organized attacks against the Turkish Cypriots started. Despite the pleas of the Turkish vice president, Fazıl Küçük, there was no Cypriot state attempt to stop the violence against the Turkish civilians. In fact, the attacks against Turkish Cypriots were organized by Greek Cypriot authorities. Thus, Turkish Cypriots organized in the (TMT) Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, Turkish Resistance Organization. The atrocities against Turkish Cypriots turned into a massacre on December 24, 1963. In the last

6 Ibid., 41-87.

7 Abdulhaluk Çay, Kıbrıs'ta Kanlı Noel-1963, (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1989) 44-45.

8 On March 9, 1956, Cyprus' British Governor Harding exiled Makarios to the Schelles islands in the Indian Ocean because of his active role in EOKA activities. In fact, the Orthodox Archbishop played important role in organizing EOKA. He even had a code name, Haris, in EOKA. Kıbrıs Gerçeği'nin Bilinmeyen Yönleri, (İstanbul: İNAF 1992) 46.

9 Pierre Oberling, The Road to Bellapais: The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982) 79.

10 For the full text of Makarios' 13-point proposal see Hakkı, 89-90.

week of December 1963, more than 300 Turkish Cypriots were killed.¹¹ The annihilation plan took its name from a nineteenth century Byzantium legend, Akritas. The engineer of the Akritas plan¹² was the interior minister of the Cyprus Republic, Polikarpos Yorgacis. At the end of the Akritas plan, Yorgacis used the name Akritas instead of his name.

"It is estimated that we have better chances of succeeding in our efforts to influence international public opinion in our favor if we present our demand, as we did during the struggle, as a demand to exercise the right of self-determination, rather than as a demand for union with Greece (Enosis)...In the event of instinctive violent Turkish reactions, if our counter attacks are not immediate, we run the risk effacing panic in the Greeks in the towns and thus loosing substantial vital areas, while, on the other hand, an immediate show of our strength may bring the Turks to their senses and confine their actions to sporadic insignificant acts, ...effective use of force dealing with the Turks will facilitate to a great extent our subsequent actions for further amendments. It would then be possible for unilateral amendments to be made, without any Turkish reaction, because they will know that their reaction will be weak or seriously harmful for their community."¹³

Some parts of the Akritas plan were omitted in the publication. It is suspected that these parts included the annihilation plans against the Turkish Cypriot community.

Under these circumstances Turkey considered all the options to protect the Turkish community on the island. Initial step was diplomatic. Turkish president Cemal Gürsel sent a letter to US president Lyndon B. Johnson on December 25, 1963 and requested him to stop the violence and massacres

11 George W. Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs*, (New York: Norton and Company, 1982) 338.

12 The Akritas plan became known to public on April 21, 1966 when it was published in *Patris*, a right wing Greek newspaper controlled by the EOKA B leader General Grivas. Since Grivas turned against Makarios after the 1964 crisis, he had the Akritas plan published to diminish Makarios' authority in Cyprus. Çay, 57.

13 For the full text of Akritas plan see, Hakki, 90- 97. The Akritas plan was published as a UN Document A/33/115, s/12722 of 30 May 1978. Parts of the Akritas plan is available http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/akritas_plan.html (accessed 11 January 2012).

against Turkish civilians.¹⁴ On the same day, Turkish jets flew over Cyprus as a warning to the Cyprus government. In response, Makarios appealed to the UN to ensure his grip on Cyprus but he was not able to get a protectorate from the UN.

On December 27, British troops on the island restored order in Nicosia, creating a line between the Turkish and Greek sides of Nicosia. Later on, Turkey and Greece joined the British peacekeeping force. The joint peacekeeping force established a green line between the two sides. This action reduced the tension in Nicosia but the violence did not end in the countryside.

The representatives of Turkish and Greek Cypriots, Greece, Turkey and Britain met at the London conference to discuss the issue on January 15, 1964. During the conference, Greek Cypriots insisted that the constitution be amended, while Turkish Cypriots offered their pre-1960 plan, partition. The main issue was the security of the Turkish population on the island. Turkey, Greece, and Britain agreed to a deployment of a NATO peacekeeping force in Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots accepted this plan but Greek Cypriot leader Archbishop Makarios refused. Makarios' refusal to allow the deployment of a NATO force was motivated by several factors. Makarios' primary goal was to amend the Cyprus constitution. A NATO force, which would have protected the guaranteed treaties, the constitution, and the security of Turks, would not help him to achieve his goal of enosis.¹⁵ The deployment of NATO forces on the island would also have provoked a Soviet reaction and strengthened the political left in Cyprus. Makarios had to consider the upcoming elections in 1965. AKEL, the Cyprus Communist Party, was the most organized party on the island and it was strongly against NATO existence on the island. Archbishop Makarios did not mind flirting with AKEL. He kicked Turkish Cypriot deputies out of the Cyprus parliament and appointed AKEL members in their places.

Makarios, therefore, would only agree to a United Nations peacekeeping force. Neither Turkey, Greece, Britain, nor the US were initially willing to accept the UN peacekeeping force because if responsibility for the Cyprus issue were transferred to the UN, the Soviets would have an opportunity to play a role in finding a solution. The Soviets had already condemned the attempts of Britain, Greece, and Turkey to deploy a NATO force on the island.¹⁶ Eventually, it was

14 American Foreign Policy, Current Documents 1963, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1967) 470.

15 Oberling, Road to Bellapais, 103.

16 Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Tarafların Tutum ve Tezleri Açısından Kıbrıs Sorunu (1945-1986)*, (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1991) 69.

agreed that a UNFICYP (UN peace keeping force in Cyprus) should take an active role in Cyprus. However, the UNFICYP could not prevent the continuing violence in Cyprus either.

Subsequently, the US started playing a major role in the Cyprus issue. The American approach toward the Cyprus issue was different than that of Britain. While Britain tried to maintain its own interests in the Middle East using Cyprus as a military base, the US evaluated the issue as a security problem at the southern flank of NATO and in the eastern Mediterranean.¹⁷ The Cyprus problem brought two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece, to the threshold of a war.

As a result of the crisis, Turkish Cypriots lost their power in the ruling circles of the Cyprus Republic. Since then, the Greek Cypriot authorities have been accepted as the legitimate government of Cyprus, although they violated the Cyprus constitution and the international treaties that founded the Cyprus Republic. The crisis also separated the previously integrated population. In order to protect themselves, Turkish Cypriots gathered in a small territory. Greek scholars claim that the TMT "forced" Turkish Cypriots to separate themselves from Greek neighborhoods in order to set the foundations for partition.¹⁸ In reality, the Turks squeezed into a small area consisting of only 4.96 percent of the island.¹⁹ Thus, the exodus of the Turks cannot be considered as an integral part towards realizing their partition plan.

Turkey would not accept the ambiguous situation in Cyprus. Turkey's primary concern was the security of Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, Cyprus had a strategic significance for Turkey. Although Turkey and Greece were allies in NATO, they have never trusted each other. Had Cyprus been controlled by Greece, Turkey would have been surrounded by Greece from three sides. Under these political circumstances, and in order to force Makarios to stop the violence against the Turkish Cypriots on the island, the Turkish parliament authorized its government on March 16, 1964 to intervene militarily. Despite this authorization, the Turkish government did not have any intention of using its intervention right as a guarantor power largely because of lack of military equipment.

The Turkish parliament hoped that the intervention decision would be a

17 S. Şükrü Gürel, *Kıbrıs Tarihi II (1878-1960)*, (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1985) 44-49.

18 Theodore A. Coulombis, *The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Alliance*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983) 62.

19 Sabahattin Egeli, *1960 Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti Nasıl Yıkıldı*, (Istanbul: Kastan A.S: 1991) 35.

warning to stop Makarios to carry on enosis. Instead, Makarios invited more Greek troops to the island and mobilized the Cypriot Greeks. The new government in Greece, led by Georgios Papandreu, had both nationalist and anti-American tendencies. Cooperation between Makarios and Papandreu brought 10,000 Greek soldiers to Cyprus. According to the Zurich and London Treaties, Greece was only authorized to have 950 soldiers on the island, while Turkey was allowed to keep only 650 soldiers.²⁰

The Johnson Letter and Its Impact

Despite pressures from both the Turkish public and authorization from the Turkish parliament, the Turkish government was dragging its feet for a military operation in Cyprus. The Turkish army's shortcoming could not be revealed. In May 1964, the Cyprus parliament, whose Turkish members had been sacked, passed a bill to establish a strong army and purchase heavy weapons for the Cyprus National Guard.²¹ Makarios' last step forced the Turkish government to reconsider its decision to intervene in Cyprus. The mutual demonstration of force brought two NATO allies to the threshold of a war. The Turkish government decided to intervene in Cyprus on June 7, 1964. Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü informed US President Lyndon B. Johnson of Turkish plans with a hope that an American involvement would stop the Greek military movement on the island and make a risky Turkish military intervention unnecessary.²²

"As İnönü expected, a warning letter from US President Lyndon B. Johnson on June 5 caused the Turkish government to cancel its plan. Nevertheless, the negative tone of Johnson letter made Turkish leaders worry about not only Cyprus but also about the reliability of NATO and US in Turkey's security. In his letter to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, Johnson wrote that Turkey had decided to intervene in Cyprus without consulting the other guarantor powers. In addition, Johnson warned Turkey that it might be left alone in a military struggle against the USSR if Turkey's actions cause Soviet involvement:

...a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO Allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without

20 Couloumbis, 46.

21 Fahir Armaoğlu, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1914-1990), (V.1, Ankara: İş Bankası Yayınları, 1992), 788.

22 Hakki, 97.

the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies."²³

The Johnson letter shocked Turkish authorities because until then the US had not played a very active role in seeking a solution to the Cyprus problem. Even on December 15, 1963, the US secretary of state, Dean Rusk, said to Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin that "[the] US took position that guarantor powers were the ones which could best resolve the Cyprus problem. [The] US already had enough problems on its agenda without taking on the Cyprus dispute."²⁴ As Rusk revealed, the US had its own problems in this period and Cyprus was not considered as a primarily significant problem. The former US Secretary of State George W. Ball stated that Britain expected US diplomatic support, but the US was struggling with many problems around the world. Besides Vietnam, which was the US' biggest problem at that time, the US was faced with trouble in Panama and Congo. Also, the chilly relations with the USSR, because of the Berlin question, and the problems with Indonesia were on the US agenda. Therefore, the American government watched the Cyprus crisis from afar until it became a Cold War issue. The rising tensions between Turkey and Greece were jeopardizing the security of the southern flank of NATO. In this case, the US felt the necessity to intervene in the issue diplomatically.

The US, according to Ball, became involved in the Cyprus problem after the London Conference ended without a solution. In this period, President Johnson assigned Ball to bring about a solution for the Cyprus problem. Ball asserts that Duncan Sandy, the British Secretary of State for the Commonwealth and Colonies, informed Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou about the Anglo-American plan for a NATO force. This proposal was refused by Makarios immediately. Ball implies that had the Cypriot authorities been approached with a coordinated plan, it would have been more successful.²⁵

Johnson, despite the pleas from Turkish authorities, reprimanded neither the Greek government, who sent 10,000 soldiers to the island violating the London and Zurich agreements it signed, nor the Cyprus government, who violated both the international treaties and the Cyprus constitution. One of the most important reasons why Johnson never warned Greece not to violate the treaties was the heavy influence of the Greek lobby in the United States. In 1964, many Greek-American organizations worked to gain the support of US authorities on the side of Greece. Greek-Americans pressured Johnson

23 Ibid., 99. For the full text of the correspondence between Johnson and İnönü see Hakki, 98-100.

24 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, V.16, (Washington: US Printing Office 1994) 767.

25 Ball, 341.

by sending telegrams and letters to the White House. President J.F. Kennedy and later Johnson were worried about Makarios-AKEL collaboration,²⁶ but still American policy makers became a victim of one-sided propaganda of the Greek-American lobby.²⁷ Turkey's efforts were, however, limited to diplomacy. In his response to Johnson, on June 13, 1964, Turkish PM İnönü revealed his disappointment about the words and content of Johnson's letter. İnönü explained that Turkey had always consulted with the US and the guarantor powers, but no agreement had been reached. İnönü also complained that the US warned Turkey not to intervene in Cyprus, although intervention is one of Turkey's legal rights as a guarantor, but the US never warned the Greek government, who openly violated the international treaties that Greece itself had signed. The main issue İnönü mentioned in his letter was the role of NATO.

"Our understanding is that the North Atlantic Treaty imposes upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the assistance of any member victim of an aggression. The only point left to the discretion of the member states is the nature and the scale of this assistance. If NATO members should start discussing the right and wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this aggression was provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an obligation to assist the member should be made to depend on the issue of such a discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and it would lose its meaning. An obligation of assistance, if it is to carry any weight, should come into being immediately upon the observance of aggression."²⁸

İnönü's visit to the US on June 22-23 gave hope that relations could be mended. The US spent more efforts to bring a solution to Cyprus. Former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson submitted a proposal to Turkey and Greece. According to Acheson's plan, Turks would get local autonomy in the predominantly Turkish areas. In other parts of the island, they would be given minority rights. Also, Turkey would have a military base in northern Cyprus. The rest of the island would be left to Greece. Greek delegates objected to

26 Suha Bolukbası, *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, (New York: University Press of America, 1988), 54.

27 For a detailed account of Greek lobbying see Jacob M. Landau, *Johnson's 1964 Letter to İnönü and Greek Lobbying of the White House*, (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1979).

28 Halil Ibrahim Salih, *Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State*, (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1978), 150.

this plan; instead, they offered a smaller portion for the Turks and the Turkish military base would remain only for 25 years.

While the negotiations were going on in Geneva, Greek Cypriot forces attacked Turkish villages on August 6, 1964. As soon as Makarios learned about Acheson's proposal, he moved to sabotage negotiations. Had the Acheson plan been accepted, Makarios would have lost his presidency in Cyprus. The area that Greek Cypriots invaded was a strategic location through which TMT, the Turkish Resistance Organization, could get aid from Turkey. Thus, this time Turkish reaction was harsher. Turkey first demanded that the Greek Cypriot forces end the invasion of land that TMT controlled. Once it was not done, Turkish jets bombed the Greek military bases in Cyprus. The US' silence during Turkey's bombing campaign put political pressure on Makarios. The Turkish bombing campaign did not cause a negative US reaction, even though Turkey used US made jets and supplies. The first Greek demand for an arms embargo against Turkey started after Turkey's strike,²⁹ but the US did not want to add fuel to the fire. The US relations with Turkey were already tense because of the Johnson letter. It seems that the US authorities understood Turkey's sentiment; thus, they did not want to pressure Turkey once more.

Despite the Makarios' sabotage attempt, the negotiations in Geneva carried on. Acheson prepared a second proposal. He offered Turkey a military base in Cyprus for 50 years. In fact, the Greek delegation's main objection was against giving local autonomy to Turkish Cypriots. Neither Makarios nor Greece was willing to give any autonomy to Turks. Also, Turkey wanted a larger portion of land for the military base than Greece would accept.

Turkish negotiator Nihat Erim claimed that Acheson told him and his military consultant Turgut Sunalp that if Turkey invades the territory, as proposed in the first proposal, the US would not interfere. When Erim passed the message to İnönü, İnönü demanded a formal written promise.³⁰ The formal promise never came and the Geneva Conference ended without a solution. As a result of the 1963-64 crises, the constitutional authority of Cyprus Republic collapsed. Makarios illegitimately controlled the Cyprus Republic. Turkish deputies were kicked out of the Cyprus parliament. Previously mixed Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities were separated. The impact of the crisis on Turkish-American relations escalated even further.

29 Suha Bolukbasioglu, *The United States-Turkey Influence Relationship during the Cyprus Crises*, Unpublished Dissertation, (University of Virginia: 1987), 158.

30 Ibid., 148-149.

The Impact of Johnson Letter and the Rise of Anti-Americanism

The unsuccessful result of the Geneva Conference crushed Turkey's hopes of a peaceful resolution to the Cyprus problem. Turkish frustration turned into anti-American demonstrations. İnönü's Cyprus adviser, Nihat Erim, who later became Turkish Prime Minister in 1971, said that "until then there was only one country in the world [Turkey], in which Americans were never told to 'Go home' ".³¹ The Johnson letter incident changed that. The Turkish left was successful at exploiting the problem for its own gains. Since President Johnson openly opposed Turkish military intervention, the primary target of Turkish media and demonstrations was the US instead of Greece or Greek Cypriot leader Makarios.

The point in Johnson's letter regarding NATO's position worried Turkey. Turkey joined NATO only to protect itself from the Soviet threat but Johnson made clear that if Turkey provokes the Soviets, NATO would not defend Turkey against a Soviet attack. Johnson's approach to NATO's role brought the reliability of NATO and the US into question in Turkey. The US and NATO were declared unreliable and untrustworthy. Anti-American demonstrations intensified in August 1964. Demonstrators included many Turkish military officers including Cemal Tural, the Commander of the Turkish Ground Forces. Protestors shouted "Down with America".³²

After the demonstrations, the US declared that the US would come to Turkey's aid in case of an attack by the Soviets, even if the attack happens while Turkey acts on its right to intervene in Cyprus³³ but this statement changed nothing. Although the Turkish government had no serious intention to intervene in Cyprus, the Turkish public was convinced that the US prevented Turkey from saving Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, American policy makers reconsidered US Cyprus policy after the crisis by setting two basic principles in approaching the problem. Primarily, the struggle between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots should not cause a war between Greece and Turkey. Secondly, the Cyprus conflict should not jeopardize US relations with Greece or Turkey.³⁴ This shift and policy reevaluation was too late. Anti-Americanism was already widely spread in Turkey.

31 Armaođlu, 20.yy..., 790.

32 Bolukbasi, 154.

33 George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, (Washington D.C.: Hoover Policy Study, 1972) 120.

34 Thomas W. Adams & Alvin J. Cottrell, *Cyprus Between East and West*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1968) 69.

Former US Secretary of State George W. Ball regarded Johnson's letter as "the diplomatic equivalent of an atomic bomb".³⁵ In fact, the magnitude of the impact on Turkish politics was equivalent to the impact of an atomic bomb. Johnson's letter had shaken the roots of Turkish domestic politics and changed the Turkish political fault lines. Previously the dominant Turkish political groups were mainly defined as two groups: the Turkish military-judiciary bureaucracy and the Republican Public Party (RPP) have traditionally declared themselves as the guardians of progressive Kemalism and framed the rest either as religious or communist reactionaries. The Johnson letter incident destroyed this traditional progressive-reactionary frame by forcing Turkish politicians to seek alternatives to US.

In less than a month after the Johnson letter incident İsmet İnönü's government barely survived a vote of confidence in the Turkish parliament in June 1964.³⁶ Seasoned politician İnönü, who had served in many state posts including presidency and prime ministry, did not have a clean record dealing with Turkey's socialists. He had previously exiled or jailed socialist intellectuals. Nevertheless, he now did not hesitate to tilt the RPP to the left. The RPP, the first political party of the Turkish Republic, had previously did not identify itself either as a left wing or a right wing party but only as a Kemalist party. A month later İnönü declared the RPP as a 'left of center' party. This new policy was basically a soft socialism. İnönü's new adviser Bülent Ecevit had socialist leanings. The RPP entered the 1965 elections with a new executive committee dominated by socialists. This step was perhaps one of the strongest warnings to the US. Turkey's flagship party was becoming socialist. As the party turned to the left, the conservative wing of RPP, led by Turhan Feyzioğlu left the RPP leaving the party mainly to socialists.

Despite the public protests, the main opposition, the center right Justice Party (JP), did not openly target the US. Instead the JP blamed İnönü for the diplomatic failure. The JP leader Saadettin Bilgiç stated that the US had to prevent the breakout of a war between Greece and Turkey. In order to do that the US had to give the political pressure on the country that cared most about the US.³⁷ His soft message was certainly noted by the US policy makers.

The RPP's new 'left of center' policy did not help the party in elections. The JP won both the 1965 and the 1969 elections. Despite the victories of the conservatives in the elections, socialists broadened their influence in

35 Ball, 350.

36 Harris, 116.

37 Bolukbasi, 153.

intellectual circles. Turkish intellectuals with diverse political views all agreed that Turkey should not rely on the US anymore. While the conservatives proposed closer ties with the Islamic countries, the socialists proposed Turkey to leave NATO and join the non-alignment pact. Indeed, this was a strategic move. The majority of socialists desired for the improvement of Turkish-Soviet relations.³⁸

In the mid-1960s, socialist ideas spread among university students, professors, and labor union members. Using the Johnson letter as a base of criticism, the Turkish media, which was overwhelmingly controlled by socialists, demanded Turkey's withdrawal from NATO. The demands in the media turned into an anti-American student movement in the universities. The socialists organized into the Turkish Labor Party (TLP). The TLP could not get a large sum of vote in the elections but its socialist voice was strong in the media. The protests in some occasions turned into leftist activism and by the late 1960s, Turkey witnessed political violations. The rise of political tensions and violence across Turkey led to a military coup in Turkey in 1971. After socialist TLP was shut down in 1971, socialists found refuge in the RPP, pushing it further to the left. In the 1972 congress, Bülent Ecevit defeated the legendary party leader İsmet İnönü and socialists eventually gained the total control of the RPP.

The Turkish government's policy changes also encouraged the socialists. Because of chilly relations with the US, the new conservative JP government did not hesitate to flirt with the USSR after the 1963-64 crisis. Turkish and Soviet parliamentary delegations exchanged visits after 1964. Furthermore, the Turkish government revised its 54 military treaties with the US. The 1969 treaty replaced all previous 54 treaties and it restricted the US military and personnel activities in Turkey.³⁹ During the Lebanon crisis in 1958, the US had used its military bases in Turkey.⁴⁰ After 1965, the US was no longer allowed to use its bases for non-NATO purposes. During the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and the Lebanon crisis of 1969, the Turkish government did not allow the use of American bases in Turkey.⁴¹

New Policy Formations

After the 1963-64 crises, Turkey proposed a federal state in Cyprus. Turkey's

38 Ibid., 154.

39 Fahir Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991), 277-285.

40 Harris, 66-68.

41 Ibid., 166.

new proposal attracted the Soviet support in the UN in December 1964.⁴² The Soviets did not miss any opportunity to pull Turkey to their side. Nevertheless, the Soviets still supported Makarios' proposal to cancel the guarantee treaties that authorized Britain, Greece and Turkey to intervene in Cyprus. The main Soviet goal was to prevent the NATO control of Cyprus. Thus, the Soviets supported the independence of the non-aligned Cyprus Republic. The Soviets were against enosis, which would have given the control of island to Greece and taksim, the initial Turkish plan to divide the island between Turkey and Greece. A federal Cyprus state without guarantee treaties was acceptable to the Soviets.

The Turkish government was not the only side that sought the Soviet support. Greek Cypriot leader Makarios did what he could to keep the Communist Party of Cyprus AKEL happy and at bay⁴³ so that he could attract the Soviet support. AKEL was the sole organized party in Cyprus until 1969. Makarios rewarded communists with five seats in the parliament after he had kicked out Turkish parliament members.⁴⁴ In order to keep communists at bay Makarios had to abandon or postpone his enosis goal. Following the communist strategy of Soviets, AKEL was against enosis. It favored an independent Cyprus. Thus, when the Soviets supported the Turkish federation proposal for Cyprus, AKEL had a hard time on the island. Eventually, AKEL declared its objection to the federal state proposal.⁴⁵

Nevertheless, Cyprus policy of Greece remained the same. Greece was afraid that the full independence of Cyprus would cause the abandonment of enosis. The US was also concerned that full independence would prevent the NATO control of Cyprus. The Acheson plan, therefore, suggested Turkey's taksim thesis together with Greece's enosis plan but it did not suggest the independence of Cyprus.

The 1967 Crisis

After the 1963-64 crises, Greece had to deal with the political instability as well. Greek Prime Minister Georgios Papandreu's visit to the US at the same time as Turkish Prime Minister's visit in June 1964 did not result in a solution to the Cyprus issue. As soon as Papandreu returned to Greece, he publicly declared that he was proud of rejecting American political pressure. In less

42 Ömer Taşlı, *Ortadoğu'ya Süper Güçlerin Etkileri*, (Istanbul: Fikir Yayınları, 1991) 93.

43 Thomas W. Adams, *AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971) 5-7.

44 Adams, & Cottrell, 23-24.

45 Sönmezoğlu, 69.

than a month, on July 15, 1964 King Konstantin II removed Papandreu from power. A provisional government was set to carry the country to the elections on May 28, 1967. Papandreu was expected to win the elections but a military coup on April 21 by Colonel George Papadopoulos halted the democracy in Greece. Apparently, the US played a significant role in both the dismissal of Papandreu⁴⁶ and making of the military coup.⁴⁷

Not surprisingly, the colonel's junta took a strong pro-American position in foreign policy. One of the major goals of junta was to bring Cyprus to Greek control by reaching enosis. The junta increased its support to pro-enosis groups in Cyprus. Eventually, the Cyprus National Guard led by General Grivas, who was sent by Greece, attacked some Turkish villages on November 15, 1967.

Turkey's determined stance and decision to intervene militarily in Cyprus ended this crisis shortly before it escalated into a war. Turkey first warned Greece⁴⁸ and asked Greece that unless the Turkish demands are satisfied a military intervention was inevitable. Turkey demanded the demobilization of 20,000 men in the Greek National Guard, the removal of 12,000 Greek soldiers and General Grivas from Cyprus, and the removal of the Greek National Guard from the area it invaded. President Johnson appointed the former Deputy of the Defense Secretary Cyrus Vance for mediation. The US diplomatically made it clear that it had no intention to stop Turkish intervention by military force.⁴⁹ In this case, Greece had two options: to defend Cyprus or to accept Turkey's conditions. Greece chose the second one. Turkey's conditions were carried out by Greece and the 1967 crisis did not turn into a war.

From the 1963-64 crises to 1968, the Greek Cypriot Government considered Turks as "insurgents" and did not engage in negotiations. In 1968, after the Greek troops left the island, Makarios agreed to join bilateral negotiations with Turkish Cypriots. Secret negotiations took place in Beirut from June 1968 to October 1971. During the negotiations, Turkish Cypriot representative

46 Couloumbis, 49.

47 Ibid., 50-51. Also, for the detailed information about the US role in the coup see Laurance Stern, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy*, (New York: Times Books, 1977), 41-51.

48 Although many scholars write that Turkey sent a note to Greece, it was later clarified that Turkey did not send a written note, instead Turkish Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil orally informed the Greek ambassador about Turkey's conditions to cancel the military intervention. Özer Eskiuyurt, Erdoğan Teziç, Murat Sarıca, *Kıbrıs Sorunu*, (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1975) 144-145.

49 Adams and Cottrell, 71.

Rauf Denktaş focused on two points: equal political rights for Turks and the continuation of Turkey's guarantor status. Makarios, however, offered only minority rights to Turkish Cypriots.⁵⁰

Makarios did not have friendly relations with the Greek colonel's junta, either. The junta regarded Makarios as a big obstacle in front of enosis. The junta sponsored a terrorist organization in Cyprus, Aspida, to get rid of Makarios. Aspida several times attempted assassinations of Makarios but each time Makarios managed to escape. Makarios' relations with the Greek junta became chilly after an assassination attempt against Makarios on March 8, 1970. His only supporter was the Soviets so Makarios visited Moscow in the spring of 1971.⁵¹ His visit, undoubtedly, angered the pro-American Greek junta more.

Greece responded to Makarios' actions by secretly sending General Grivas, the former leader of the Cyprus National Guard, back to Cyprus in September 1971.⁵² Grivas founded the EOKA-B, an anti-Makarios terrorist organization in Cyprus. This was the junta's second attempt to get rid of Makarios so that enosis could be reached. EOKA-B had the same intentions as Aspida had had. EOKA-B arranged a terrorist campaign against Cyprus government authorities.⁵³ Despite these attacks, Makarios was still strong in Cyprus in the early 1970s.

While Greece was struggling under the rule of colonel's junta, Turkey was dealing with its domestic problems in the late 1960s. The Turkish army staged a coup by forcing the elected government of Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel to resign on March 12, 1971. A provisional government then controlled Turkey until the elections in October 1973. After the elections a strange coalition government of the leftist RPP the Political Islamic NSP (National Salvation Party) was established. The RPP and the NSP had different policies toward Cyprus. While the RPP defended the federal solution, the latter insisted on taksim, partition. The RPP leader and new Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, and the Vice PM, the NSP leader, Necmettin Erbakan, both took an explicit anti-American stance. The coalition government's decision to rescind the poppy cultivation ban on July 1, 1974 increased the tension between Turkey and the US. Since the previous government's decision was made under US pressure, the new government viewed the issue as a question of self-determination.

50 Rauf R. Denktaş, *Kıbrıs Davamız*, (Ankara: Koksav, 1991) 8-9.

51 P.N. Vanezis, *Cyprus: The Unfinished Agony*, (London: Abelard-Schuman, 1977) 45.

52 *Ibid.*, 49.

53 Çay, 90-92.

New developments in Cyprus now brought the attention of the US back to Cyprus.

The 1974 Crisis

The sudden death of General Grivas in January 1974 changed the rules of political game in Cyprus. Makarios used this opportunity to finish off EOKA-B. He first declared EOKA-B illegal then asked Greece to withdraw its 650 Greek army officers from the Cyprus National Guard.⁵⁴ The Greek junta had a new leader. In November 1973 General Dimitios Ioannidis ended the rule of George Papadopoulos with a military coup. The hardliner Ioannidis responded Makarios militarily. The Greek officers in the Cyprus National Guard overthrew Makarios government on July 15, 1974. Makarios barely escaped to London. The coup plotters declared a new state: the "Hellenic Republic of Cyprus." In order to legitimize their position, the coup leaders had to find a Greek Cypriot for their new state's presidency. Eventually, they found Nikos Sampson, whose political slogan was "Death to the Turks" when he was elected to the Greek House of Representatives in 1969.⁵⁵

On July 16, the Turkish government invited Britain to participate in a joint military operation in Cyprus. The next day, the Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit visited London to talk about the issue. Britain was not willing to use its right to intervene but declared Makarios as the only legitimate president of Cyprus.⁵⁶ Primary goal of Britain and the US was to prevent a military conflict between Greece and Turkey. The US also had its own agenda: it was the last phase of the Watergate crisis in the US and President Nixon was planning his resignation from office. Thus, Turkey prepared for a unilateral military action. American diplomats worked hard to prevent Turkey's military intervention. Joseph Sisco, the Deputy Secretary of State, visited London, Ankara, and Athens. He brought a letter from President Nixon to Turkish President Fahri Korutürk. In his letter, Nixon openly warned that should Turkey start a military operation it might result in an American arms embargo against Turkey. Unlike the Johnson letter, the Nixon letter was clear and diplomatic. The earlier poppy cultivation decision of Turkish coalition government indicated that the Turkish government would carry on as it desired to protect the Turkish interests. Indeed, the US policy makers were aware of Greece's coup plans and did nothing to prevent it. In June 1974, William Fulbright, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned Secretary of State Henry Kissinger about Greece's plan for a coup. Kissinger told him that "the US

54 Pierre Oberling, *Kıbrıs Faciası*, (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Yay., 1990) 16-17.

55 Oberling, *The Road to...*, 160.

56 Sönmezoğlu, 102.

should not interfere in the internal affairs of the Greeks".⁵⁷ Kissinger already considered Cyprus as part of Greece. Thus, the US policy was designed to stop Turkey.

Sisco carried Turkey's conditions to Greece. Turkey demanded the resignation of Nikos Sampson and the removal of the 650 Greek officers from the Cyprus National Guard. Greece, however, did not even admit to having played a role in the coup. When diplomacy did not work Turkey decided to carry on a unilateral military intervention to prevent the annexation of Cyprus to Greece and to provide security for Turkish Cypriots.

Turkey launched its attack on July 20, 1974. This time Turkey was not alone. The communist bloc, which was against a total NATO control on Cyprus, strategically supported Turkey. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria deployed troops on their borders with Greece.⁵⁸ Under this military pressure on its borders, the Greek junta could not initiate an attack against mainland Turkey. On July 22, Turkey achieved its goal and Nikos Sampson left the island. On the same day, conservative leader Constantine Karamanlis overthrew the Greek junta in Greece. The US could not prevent the Turkish intervention but under large diplomatic pressure Turkey was forced to declare a militarily premature cease-fire. The US warned Turkey it may pull back its nuclear weapons from Turkey had Turkey engage in a war against Greece.⁵⁹ The main political goal of the military operation was achieved so quickly that by the time cease-fire was announced the Turkish army controlled only seven percent of the island.⁶⁰ In case of a Greek attack, Turkish forces would not be able to defend their position in such a small area.

The peace negotiations were scheduled for July 25 in Geneva. At the first Geneva Conference, Greece and Turkey agreed that the Greek National Guard would end the invasion of Turkish populated areas and in exchange the Greek National Guard could be allowed to expand the area it controlled. On August 9, 1974 Greek and Turkish representatives met in the second Geneva Conference but there was no progress. Turkey was not satisfied with Greece's delaying tactics and launched the second offensive on August 14. During the second offensive campaign, the Turkish army was able to control 37 percent of the island. Turkey's second operation met with a worldwide criticism and was considered internationally as an invasion, whereas the first one was viewed as the legitimate right of Turkey.

57 Bolukbasi, 272.

58 Taşlı, 101.

59 Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1982) 1192.

60 Bolukbasi, 311.

On the day of the second Turkish offensive, Greece declared its withdrawal from NATO. Despite its support for Turkey in the first operation, the USSR suddenly turned against Turkey after the Greek decision to leave NATO.⁶¹ The 1974 crisis certainly brought many satisfactory results for the communist bloc. The pro-American Greek junta fell, a possible total NATO control of Cyprus was averted and Greece pulled out of NATO. As if the Greek government's decision to leave NATO was not enough to crumble the southern flank of NATO, the US initiated an awkward arms embargo against its other NATO ally because Turkey used American weapons during the Cyprus operation despite earlier American warnings. According to the military aid treaties between Turkey and the US, Turkey was supposed to use American weapons only for security purposes. The Cyprus crisis was seen by Turkey as a security issue. The lives of Turks on the island were threatened. The control of the island by Greece would have threatened the security of the Turkish mainland because by controlling Cyprus, Greece would surround Turkey from the south, west, and north.

American arms embargo, which started on February 5, 1975, further alienated Turkey. Turkey's immediate reaction was the declaration of Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) in the Turkish controlled northern Cyprus on February 13. Turkey was still pursuing a federal solution in Cyprus. Once President Gerald Ford's political attempt to end the arms embargo failed Turkey took a step to cancel its 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement with the US in July. The Turkish decision allowed only NATO related duties of American military in Turkey. All other military bases were controlled by the Turkish army.⁶² The Soviets finally reached their goal of achieving the collapse of the southern flank of NATO. The self-inflicted wounds of NATO took some time to heal. Eventually, the US arms embargo was removed in September 1978 but no new military treaty was signed with Turkey until March 1980.

61 Armaođlu, 20.yy...,805-807.

62 Armaođlu, Belgelerle..., 286-287.

Conclusion

From 1960 to 1975, three major crises erupted in Cyprus: the 1964, the 1967 and the 1974 crises. Ironically, although the major actors of the problem, Britain, Greece, Turkey and the US as well as Greek and Turkish Cypriots were largely pro-West, the real winner out of this fiasco was the Soviet Union. The Soviets' indirect involvement on the problem through their local voice Cyprus Communist Party (AKEL) proved a lot more productive by 1975. The Soviets avoided getting a direct negative reaction from the public in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus while the US became a target of demonstrations in both Turkey and Greece. The Soviets had a clear and solid Cyprus policy. They wanted an independent Cyprus state without NATO influence on it.

Furthermore, although US traditionally presented itself as the defender of democracy and freedom of expression, American political decisions made in this period contradicted this traditional belief. American administrations worked closely with authoritarian military regimes and bypassed the voice of people with top-to-down decisions, in Turkey and Greece while the Soviets and their communist outlets voiced their opinions through media, grassroots organizations or political parties. Not surprisingly the democratic steps of authoritarian communists prevailed over the authoritarian practices of democrats.

After 1960, Britain preferred to remain on the side and expected US to intervene diplomatically. British and American policy goal on Cyprus was not different. Both aimed to put the island under NATO control, either through partition between Greece and Turkey or through the annexation of the island by Turkey or Greece. The first option, partition, was opposed by Greece. The second option, annexation, brought about the question of whether Greece or Turkey should control the island. The influence of a strong Greek lobby in the US and the pro-US Greek junta's faithfulness to the US, brought the US policy makers to the side of Greece. The annexation of the island by Greece could have ended the communist influence in Cyprus, but Turkey's threat to intervene and the Cypriot leader Makarios' determination to keep Cyprus as an independent state were serious obstacles in front of that goal.

American policy makers' attempts to provide a peaceful solution to the problem by trying to satisfy both parties simultaneously only served to undermine its credibility as an ally to either side. In the post-Johnson letter incident Turkey's consequential reevaluation of its foreign policy damaged US interests because Turkey now looked to the Soviet Union for support. Turkey was able to obtain Soviet support in both the 1967 and 1974 crises. The US reevaluated its Cyprus policy after 1964. When Turkey bombed the Greek National Guard's bases with US-made jets and supplies in 1967, the US did

not show the same reaction as it did in 1964. This in turn angered Greece. Turkey's post-1964 federal state proposal would have created two separate states run by one center but neither the US nor Greece was willing to accept an independent Cyprus state. Greece proposed no solution other than enosis. Pro-American Greek military junta targeted Makarios because he became an obstacle in front of enosis and cooperated with the communists on the island. From the American policy-makers' point of view, once Cyprus was freed from Makarios, Turkey had to be stopped through negotiations. The last step of the plan did not work because in 1974 Turkey intervened militarily. At the end of the 1974 crisis, the Greek junta fell and Greece left NATO. The US put an arms embargo on Turkey and in response Turkey shut down the US military bases in Turkey, except one. In an attempt to keep both Turkey and Greece peacefully in NATO, the US almost lost them both creating instability in the southern flank of NATO.

The previously mixed Turkish and Greek neighborhoods of Cyprus divided up after 1964. The Turkish military intervention brought thirty seven percent of island under Turkish control. From 1955 to present for over sixty years Turkey, US, Britain, Soviet Union and later Russia along with the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and United Nations developed various policy proposals on Cyprus. Greece remained as the only side that consistently kept one policy goal, enosis. This goal was partially achieved as Cyprus joined the European Union in 2004 alas without the Turkish side on the north.

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