

University of Texas Rio Grande Valley

ScholarWorks @ UTRGV

Political Science Faculty Publications and
Presentations

College of Liberal Arts

6-2022

Nationalism in the 'Nation of Immigrants': Race, Ethnicity, and National Attachment

Joe R. Tafoya

Álvaro José Corral

The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, alvaro.corral@utrgv.edu

David L. Leal

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.utrgv.edu/pol_fac



Part of the [Political Science Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Tafoya, Joe R., Corral, Álvaro J. and Leal, David L.. "Nationalism in the 'Nation of Immigrants': Race, Ethnicity, and National Attachment" *The Forum*, vol. 20, no. 1, 2022, pp. 161-183. <https://doi.org/10.1515/for-2022-2047>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Liberal Arts at ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. For more information, please contact justin.white@utrgv.edu, william.flores01@utrgv.edu.

Joe R. Tafoya, Álvaro J. Corral and David L. Leal*

Nationalism in the ‘Nation of Immigrants’: Race, Ethnicity, and National Attachment

<https://doi.org/10.1515/for-2022-2047>

Abstract: This paper compares nationalist attitudes among Whites, Latinos, and African Americans. The research on nationalism and national attachment draws varied conclusions about how race and ethnicity structure such attitudes; some find that Whites have the strongest views, while others see more similarities than differences. Using the General Social Survey of 2014, we examine three separate dimensions of nationalism: American nationalism, American national identity, and American national pride. We test for differences across race and ethnicity as well as how such attitudes structure opinions about immigrants. Despite some expectations in the literature that views might vary by group, we generally find (albeit with some complexities) “minimal effects” of race and ethnicity. Latinos, Blacks, and Whites agree with the three nationalism measures at similar levels, despite the very different national histories of each group. This is consistent with work finding “a great deal of consensus on the norms, values, and behaviors that constitute American identity” (Schildkraut 2007. “Defining American Identity in the Twenty-First Century: How Much “There” Is There?.” *The Journal of Politics* v69 (3): 597–615, 605). In addition, while nationalism is associated with immigration opinions, such effects are predominantly among Whites and African Americans and relatively weak for Latinos.

Keywords: nationalism, race and ethnicity, public opinion, identity, immigration attitudes

This paper examines the nexus between race-ethnicity and national attachment in the United States. Although the extant literature includes some variation in terms of methodological and conceptual approaches, we identify a broad ongoing debate between works highlighting interracial differences in nationalism and national attachment (Greene et al. 2020; Huddy and del Ponte 2021; Shelton 2010) versus those finding more similarities than differences in national attachment across race (Schildkraut 2007, 2014). Additionally, we note disagreements among

*Corresponding author: David L. Leal, Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA, E-mail: dleal@austin.utexas.edu

Joe R. Tafoya, Department of Political Science, DePaul University, Chicago, IL, USA

Álvaro J. Corral, Department of Political Science, The College of Wooster, Wooster, OH, USA

scholars about which group is an outlier on these various metrics of national attachment. Some find that differences are driven by White attachment to forms of nationalism (Huddy and Del Ponte 2021) while others point to the uniqueness of the Black experience in the U.S. as the underlying factor. We also contribute to the small literature that includes an examination of Latino views (Greene et al. 2020) in order to more fully understand such dynamics in an increasingly diverse America.

We begin by outlining the contours of national identities among Whites, Blacks and Latinos. Our quantitative analysis then examines the component parts of three different forms of national attachment – American nationalism, American national identity, and American national pride. We subsequently explore the role of race-ethnicity in shaping such attitudes and conclude by testing how national attachment and racial identity influence how Americans view immigrants.

To preview our findings, only modest racial-ethnic differences in national attachment are seen in the aggregate, and further analysis indicates that such views are largely driven by factors other than race. Second, Latino attitudes toward national attachment have only small or nonexistent effects on immigration attitudes, although such views play a stronger role for Blacks and Whites. We also find that nationalism and national pride exert contrasting forces that (1) help explain the divergent attitudes of a polarized American electorate on the question of immigration, and (2) suggest the underlying complexity of national identity. Finally, this project highlights the value of examining how these nationalistic psychological constructs operate for racial-ethnic minorities who have fraught relationships with national attachment due to legacies of slavery (African Americans) and conquest and colonization (Latinos).

1 Race and National Attachment in the United States

Previous work (e.g. Masuoka and Junn 2013) has highlighted the multiple ways that racial identities inform perceptions of belonging in the nation according to whether one is a member of the core in-group (Whites), the peripheral in-group (Blacks), or the peripheral out-groups (Latinos and Asian Americans). We consider Masuoka and Junn’s discussion of the racial prism of group identity to be particularly relevant for the study of national attachment because racial minorities have, as they state, “experienced incomplete membership and a conditional welcome in the nation” and “therefore embrace their national identity as American in a systematically different way from whites by developing attachments to the categories that mark their difference from core members” (2013, 120).

African Americans have the most complicated relationship with attachment to the nation. Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. famously stated in his "I Have a Dream" speech that "America has given the Negro people a bad check, a check which has come back marked 'insufficient funds.'" Therefore, despite African American fealty to the nation's founding ideals, their position as "perpetual losers in U.S. democracy" (Hooker 2016, 449) has given way to a profound sense of disenchantment that can manifest itself in alternative political ideologies, principally Black Nationalism (Brown and Shaw 2002; Dawson 2003).

Prior research about Latinos and their orientations toward U.S. national attachment tells a different story from that of African Americans. Despite popular arguments that cast Latinos, especially Mexican Americans, as representing an existential threat to the nation's founding "American Creed" (see Huntington 2004), research suggests that Mexican Americans, the largest Latino ethnic group, exhibit levels of American patriotism that match or exceed that of native-born Whites (de la Garza, Falcon, and Garcia 1996). De la Garza et al. found, perhaps most surprisingly, that Mexican Americans who displayed the *lowest* levels of acculturation reported the *highest* level of patriotism, even above that of Whites.

This comports with other research which finds that Latinos, especially immigrants, are more trusting of U.S. government institutions and display higher levels of political efficacy than do their native-born co-ethnics, who have more real-world experience of marginalization (Michelson 2003). Sidanius et al. (1997) found that in both a student sample and a national survey of adults, African Americans displayed significantly lower levels of patriotism than did Whites but that levels of patriotism between Latinos and Whites were statistically indistinguishable. This suggested that Latino ethnic groups deal with stereotypes about being a perpetual foreigner as well as the frequent accusations of alleged divided loyalties by rallying around the American flag.

Thus, as argued by Greene et al. (2020, 397), national attachment is a "two-way" street whereby an individual's sense of belonging depends on whether they feel like the nation "love[s] you back." Indeed, they found that Whites expressed the highest levels of American identity, and that differences among Blacks, Latinos, and Asians, though lower than those of Whites, were not distinct among each other.

Meanwhile, Huddy and Del Ponte (2021) found evidence of Black exceptionalism with regard to nationalism, since Blacks were found to be slightly more nationalistic than Whites. The work of Greene et al. (2020) and Huddy and Del Ponte (2021) represent a larger ongoing debate in the literature between voices highlighting the presence of interracial differences (Greene et al. 2020; Shelton 2010) versus those finding more similarities than differences in national attachment across race (Schildkraut 2007; 2014). In addition, whether or not differences

in nationalism exist along the axis of Whites versus people of color, or whether the uniqueness of the Black experience underlies the divide between Blacks and non-Blacks, remains a pending question. With this complex interplay between racial positioning and national attachment in mind, we explore how members of distinct racial-ethnic groups express their orientations to the nation as well as how this shapes attitudes toward immigrants.

2 Conceptualization and Measurement: National Attachment

We rely on the foundational tripartite framework for understanding national attachment provided by Huddy and Khatib (2007) to conceptualize our measures. This three-pronged understanding of national attachment is based on measures of (1) Pride, sometimes referred to as patriotism (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003), (2) Nationalism, or chauvinism (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001), and (3) American Identity (Hjern 1998; Kunovich 2009). The literature on social identity theory helps illuminate the psychological micro-foundations of these three concepts (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner 1982). That is, the perceptions of shared group membership (in this case national membership) form the basis of in-group favoritism and out-group hostility.

In their cross-national study of national pride, de Figueiredo and Elkins (2003) contend that national pride can be manifested as either patriotism or nationalism. Patriotism has been defined previously as “a deeply felt affective attachment” (Conover and Feldman 1987, 1) or the “degree of love for and pride in one’s nation” (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989, 271). It contrasts with nationalism, which is people’s belief in the superiority of their country over others or a “commitment to the denigration of the alternatives to the nation’s institutions and principles” (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003, 175).

Nationalism as an inherently relational construct might provide insight into views of ‘American Exceptionalism’ because it not only implies that the U.S. is unique but is somehow superior relative to other countries. Nationalism is also related to other variants of national attachment that are predicated on a sense of superiority, such as national chauvinism (Knudsen 1997) or the disinclination to criticize the actions of one’s country as implied by “blind patriotism” (Schatz and Staub 1997, 231; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999). Therefore, individuals who characterize their sense of patriotism from the standpoint of pride, as opposed to chauvinistic forms of nationalism, express their reverence for their country through high esteem or regard, irrespective of views of other countries. National

pride can thus be understood as a “self-referential” concept whereas nationalism is derived from an “other-referential” valuation of one’s belonging (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008).

These subtle differences in the underlying component parts of national attachment point to ways that these beliefs might influence an individual’s perception of foreigners. Prior literature has explored the effects of pride and nationalism on xenophobia and found that although nationalism is associated with negative predispositions toward immigrants, individuals who exhibit high levels of pride (“patriots”) in their country are not necessarily any more likely to hold negative views of immigrants (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). Later work indicates that pride and nationalism exert opposing forces on views of immigrants. Jeong (2013) found that nationalism bred animosity toward immigrants, as first suggested by de Figueiredo and Elkins (2003), but pride increased support for immigrants.

Our paper builds on this work by examining the nationalism views of multiple racial-ethnic groups, specifically how such attitudes compare in the aggregate, whether race and ethnicity are statistically significant determinants when other political and socio-economic factors are included, and how they may shape immigration attitudes.

3 Expectations

Our paper contributes to the field of race and public opinion by paying particular attention to how forms of national attachment (nationalism, patriotism, and national identity) operate among Latinos in relation to Blacks and Whites. While political science has mostly focused on exploring national attachment among non-Hispanic whites (Anglos), we hope to further broaden the scope of the literature by applying extant theoretical concepts and methodological approaches to a group that constitutes a large and growing share of the U.S. population. We then build upon previous research exploring how racial identity moderates the effect of national attachment on attitudes towards immigrants (Byrne and Dixon 2016; Carter and Pérez 2016; Huddy and Del Ponte 2021).

The following section considers the formation of national attachments for Latino, Black, and White American respondents among a nationally representative sample. We identify key measures that contribute to the construction of scales representing underlying constructs and weigh their validity for respondents of different racial-ethnic backgrounds. Our expectations on the relationship between race-ethnicity and national attachments are informed by the preceding review of the literature, particularly the analysis by Schildkraut (2014). We hypothesize that

there will be broad consensus on orientations toward America among White, Black, and Latino respondents. While we may see some racial-ethnic differences in national attachment, by-and-large, there should be little evidence that groups oppose one another in how they see the United States. If the data are consistent with such expectations, this would affirm Schildkraut's (2014) conclusion that evidence does not support the concern that increasing racial and ethnic diversity are eroding consensus on what it means to be American.

We also build on Schildkraut by separately modeling national attachments for White, Black, and Latino respondents to test for variations across group identity. Schildkraut notes that "variation among the public is often better explained by age, education, and political orientation than by race or ethnicity" (2014, 448). Our models for national attachments will therefore consider whether factors such as age, education, and political orientation explain any aggregate opinion variations for Whites, Blacks, and Latinos. Furthermore, we ask whether the underpinnings (or predictors) of national attachments are similar or different for these three groups.

The answer to such questions could provide evidence that national attachments are arrived at via different means despite broad consensus across race and ethnicity. Huddy and Del Ponte (2021) find that national attachments for White and Black Americans show remarkable parallels in shaping views toward immigrants. This leaves out Latinos, whose peripheral out-group status necessitates learning about the norms and values of what it means to be American. We expect that the relationship between national attachment and education will be highest for Latinos. If this is the case, such a finding would emphasize the importance of education to Latinos for seeing themselves as American.

4 Data and Analysis

Our paper examines the 2014 General Social Survey (GSS), which contained a special module on national attachment. This module, "2014 Topical Module: National Identity III," queried survey respondents about their attachments to the United States and offers the most recent publicly available measures on the topic. The 2014 survey date also presents an opportunity to examine the development of national attachments prior to the emergence of Donald Trump as a presidential candidate in 2015. Trump's "Make America Great Again" campaign relied on exclusivist notions of nationalism and mobilized anti-immigrant sentiment. Therefore, using data that predates Trump's campaign should limit the degree to which changes in nationalism or immigration attitudes are attributable to short-term positive and negative reactions to his candidacy.

In this section, we construct scales for three measures of national attachment. Table 1 lists the component items comprising the conceptualizations Nationalism, National Identity, and National Pride. Each entry is a single survey question, and

Table 1: Measures of national attachments, overall and by race/ethnicity.

Question text	All	White	Black	Latino
Nationalism				
1. I would rather be a citizen of America than of any other country in the world	4.40	4.49	4.32	4.21
2. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Americans	2.96	2.97	2.86	2.99
3. Generally speaking, America is a better country than most other countries	3.87	3.90	3.75	3.87
<i>Coding: (1) Disagree Str., (2) Disagree, (3) Neither, (4) Agree, (5) Agree Str.</i>				
Index mean	3.75	3.79	3.64	3.69
Cronbach's α	0.65	0.65	0.59	0.61
Observations	1226	827	182	217
National identity				
1. How important it is to feel American	3.38	3.40	3.25	3.37
2. How important it is to have American ancestry	2.42	2.31	2.82	2.51
3. How important it is to have been born in America	2.97	2.92	3.27	2.94
4. How important it is to have lived life in America	3.04	2.93	3.33	3.23
<i>Coding: (1) Not Important at all, (2) Not Very Important, (3) Fairly Important, (4) Very Important</i>				
Index mean	2.95	2.89	3.17	3.01
Cronbach's α	0.81	0.81	0.84	0.76
Observations	1226	827	182	217
National pride				
1. Proud of the way democracy works	3.03	3.06	2.99	2.94
2. Proud of America's economic achievements	2.92	2.93	2.87	2.91
3. Proud of its social security system	2.49	2.48	2.39	2.58
4. Proud of its scientific and tech. achievements	3.36	3.44	3.22	3.16
5. Proud of its achievements in sports	3.22	3.20	3.43	3.15
6. Proud of America's armed forces	3.57	3.65	3.59	3.31
7. Proud of its history	3.41	3.51	2.99	3.32
8. Proud of its fair and equal treatment of all groups	2.68	2.69	2.42	2.82
<i>Coding: (1) Not Proud at all, (2) Not Very Proud, (3) Somewhat Proud, (4) Very Proud</i>				
Index mean	3.09	3.12	2.99	3.12
Cronbach's α	0.72	0.72	0.75	0.74
Observations	1226	827	182	217

Table entries are weighted sample means of observations from the 2014 General Social Survey. Missing data filled with multiple imputation procedure Amelia II. Subgroup entries are derived by Taylor Series estimation using STATA's "svy" procedure for survey data.

we report the mean value for the sample population (under “All”) as well as for White, Black, and Latino respondents. Under Nationalism, possible values range on a 5-point Likert Scale from a low of (1) Strongly Disagree, with a midpoint of (3) Neither, to a high of (5) Strongly Agree. Factors for National Identity and National Pride are scored on a 4-point scale indicating (1) Not Important/Not Proud to (4) Very Proud.

An initial observation is that national attachments are generally strong across the board. White, Black, and Latino respondents in the GSS all report fairly high attachment to the United States. The first conceptualization of national attachment is Nationalism, which is comprised of three items: (1) “I would rather be a citizen of America than of any other country in the world,” (2) “The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Americans, (3) “Generally speaking, America is a better country than most other countries.” The mean values for these three items indicate the respondents agree that their American citizenship is valuable and that the U.S. is better than other nations. Item 2, that the world would be better if it were like America, receives less support; the average response is slightly below the middle option, which indicates some disagreement or neutrality.

These observations largely hold across racial and ethnic lines. When combined, the survey items provide a Nationalism variable with alpha reliability scores of 0.65 for Whites, 0.59 for Blacks, and 0.61 for Latinos. These statistics indicate that the three survey items work fairly well in approximating the underlying, latent construct that we label as Nationalism. In addition, the responses are not very different for Whites, Blacks, and Latinos, suggesting the absence of major divisions across race and ethnicity.

The items comprising the National Identity scale are four questions also listed in Table 1. Respondents were asked: (1) “How important it is to feel American,” (2) “How important it is to have American ancestry,” (3) “How important it is to have been born in America,” and (4) “How important it is to have lived life in America.” These items shared a 4-point scale, with four indicating “Very Important.” The mean of this composite scale is 2.95, which indicates that the typical respondent rated these factors just under “Fairly important.” The alpha score of the measure for all respondents is 0.81, and it is not very different for Whites (0.81), Blacks (0.84), and Latinos (0.76).

The third measure of national attachment is National Pride, which includes eight individual survey measures. Respondents were asked how proud they felt about aspects of this country, including: (1) “the way democracy works,” (2) “America’s economic achievements,” (3) “social security system,” (4) “scientific and technological achievements,” (5) “achievements in sports,” (6) “America’s armed forces,” (7) “its history,” and (8) “its fair and equal treatment of all groups in

society.” Possible responses were (1) Not proud at all, (2) A little proud, (3) Somewhat proud, and (4) Very proud.

The overall mean is 2.95, indicating that the typical respondent was close to being “somewhat” proud of these factors. The scale created by the eight measures has an alpha reliability score of 0.72, which remains high for Whites (0.72), Blacks (0.75), and Latinos (0.74). As we have seen with Nationalism and National Identity, the construction of National Pride from a list of individual survey measures is supported by reliability scores. The same reliability scores also report that Blacks and Latinos build very similar linkages across survey items as do Whites.

The above initial findings contain limited evidence that Black and Latino respondents think about national attachments differently than do Whites. An additional aspect to consider is whether the national attachments overlap in meaning for the individuals surveyed. In Table 2, we present a correlation matrix reporting associations among the three measures of national attachment for each racial-ethnic group. A notable finding is that no single measure accounts for a majority of variance for any other. The relationship between National Identity and Nationalism generates a correlation of 0.48 for Whites, 0.50 for Blacks, and 0.40 for Latinos, meaning that 50 to 60 percent of variance represented by Nationalism is accounted for by the measure itself and no other. We also see limited association between Nationalism and National Pride, with correlations of 0.38 for Whites, 0.36 for Blacks, and 0.44 for Latinos. These statistics indicate that although all three measures involve connections to the U.S., the type of connections they represent differ from one another. Furthermore, the independence of the three measures is seen across respondent race and ethnicity, supporting our “minimal effects” expectation.

The findings of this section indicate that the component parts of the concepts for national attachment perform well at measuring Nationalism, National Identity, and National Pride. Further, Black and Latino respondents largely formulate the same linkages across survey items as do Whites. Nationalism, National Identity, and National Pride are unique in the degree of variance that they account for without large overlap, and this is consistent across race and ethnicity.

In addition, we saw that respondents from the three racial-ethnic groups display a strong degree of national attachments that are not isolated to White respondents. Blacks and Latinos express strong and sophisticated notions of Nationalism, National Identity, and National Pride. The degree to which such views are different from those of Whites, and for what reasons they might differ, are discussed below.

An initial exploration into whether Black and Latino respondents differ from White Americans in their national attachments brings us to cross-tabulations of the averages for each concept. Table 3 displays difference of means tests of the national attachment scales presented in Table 2, showing whether the values differ meaningfully across groups of respondents.

Table 2: Correlation matrix for national attachments.

	Nationalism	National Identity	National Pride
White			
Nationalism	1.00	–	–
National identity	0.48	1.00	–
National pride	0.38	0.25	1.00
Black			
Nationalism	1.00	–	–
National identity	0.50	1.00	–
National pride	0.36	0.36	1.00
Latino			
Nationalism	1.00	–	–
National identity	0.40	1.00	–
National pride	0.44	0.22	1.00

2014 General Social Survey. Entries are correlations among measures of national attachments disaggregated by respondent race/ethnicity.

Cross-tabulations show that compared to Whites, Blacks report less nationalistic and national identity sentiment. Latinos join Blacks in expressing slightly lower levels of National Pride than do Whites. Latinos also report somewhat lower levels of National Identity compared to Blacks, but the difference is only significant at the 90 percent level. In addition, Blacks report a greater sense of National Identity than do Whites. This measure includes questions about feeling American, being born here, living one's life here, and having American ancestry. African American respondents agree with these indicators more than do other respondents, so the value of possessing certain ascriptive features of U.S. national identity is most salient for this group.

Do White and non-White differences in national attachments persist after accounting for demographic and political factors? Tables 4, 5, and 6 display results from multivariate linear regressions that identify the significant predictors of Nationalism, National Identity, and National Pride.

The bivariate differences across racial groups we highlighted in Table 3 mostly disappear once we control for factors such as age, education, and political orientation. The results show that racial-ethnic differences in terms of Nationalism (Table 4) and National Pride (Table 6) disappear once we account for these additional factors. The one exception is National Identity (Table 5), as Black respondents report a greater sense of identification than do Whites with the ascriptive factors of being American, *ceteris paribus*. Below, we consider these results for each measure of national attachment.

Table 3: National attachments, means and differences by race/ethnicity.

	White (W)	Black (B)	Latino (L)	B-W Diff.	L-W Diff.	L-B Diff.
Nationalism 1: Str. Disagree – 3: Neither – 5: Str. Agree	3.79	3.64	3.69	-0.15 ^a	-0.10 ⁺	-
National identity 1: Not important at all – 4: Very important	2.89	3.17	3.01	0.28 ^c	-	-0.16 ⁺
National pride 1: Not proud at all – 4: Very proud	3.12	2.99	3.03	-0.13 ^b	-0.09 ^a	-
Observations	827	182	217			

Table entries are weighted sample means of observations from the 2014 General Social Survey. Missing data filled with multiple imputation procedure Amelia II. Subgroup entries are derived by Taylor Series estimation using STATA's "svy" procedure for survey data. ^a $p < 0.10$, ^b $p < 0.05$, ^c $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: Predictors of nationalism, linear regression estimates.

	Aggregate	White	Black	Latino
Black	-0.081 (0.067)	-	-	-
Latino	-0.091 (0.063)	-	-	-
Age	0.009 ^d (0.001)	0.009 ^d (0.002)	0.014 ^d (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)
Family income	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.001 (0.029)
Education	-0.089 ^d (0.021)	-0.110 ^d (0.021)	-0.029 (0.051)	-0.025 (0.055)
Female	-0.092 ^a (0.048)	-0.064 (0.052)	-0.115 (0.122)	-0.176 (0.117)
Partisan ID	0.018 (0.015)	0.025 (0.018)	0.006 (0.041)	-0.003 (0.047)
Ideology	0.077 ^d (0.020)	0.078 ^c (0.026)	0.081 ^a (0.047)	0.048 (0.056)
Catholic	0.093 ^a (0.050)	0.099 (0.066)	0.034 (0.140)	0.111 (0.114)
Service attendance	0.022 ^c (0.007)	0.022 ^b (0.010)	0.010 (0.020)	0.026 (0.020)
Constant	3.116 ^d (0.133)	3.106 ^d (0.151)	2.857 ^d (0.352)	3.255 ^d (0.299)
F-statistics	18.22 ^d	17.47 ^d	2.75 ^b	1.05
Observations	1219	813	162	244

2014 General Social Survey. OLS coefficients presented, standard errors in parentheses. ^a $p < 0.10$, ^b $p < 0.05$, ^c $p < 0.01$, ^d $p < 0.001$.

The regressions in Table 4 model Nationalism attitudes for the whole sample and for subsets of White, Black, and Latino respondents. In the first column, we see that Blacks and Latinos do not have unique views, as factors including age, education, political ideology, and Church attendance are statistically significant. Respondents who reported relatively high levels of Nationalism were older, more conservative, more likely to attend religious services, and lower in education.

Table 5: Predictors of national identity, linear regression estimates.

	Aggregate	White	Black	Latino
Black	0.233 ^c (0.082)	–	–	–
Latino	0.036 (0.075)	–	–	–
Age	0.009 ^d (0.002)	0.010 ^d (0.002)	0.013 ^c (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Family income	–0.030 ^d (0.008)	–0.020 ^c (0.007)	–0.024 (0.027)	–0.066 ^b (0.025)
Education	–0.117 ^d (0.023)	–0.157 ^d (0.022)	–0.090 (0.077)	0.015 (0.063)
Female	0.073 ^a (0.042)	0.083 ^a (0.047)	–0.027 (0.132)	0.065 (0.098)
Partisan ID	0.004 (0.015)	0.006 (0.018)	0.012 (0.048)	–0.022 (0.042)
Ideology	0.096 ^d (0.021)	0.109 ^d (0.024)	0.068 (0.044)	0.065 (0.048)
Catholic	0.077 (0.063)	0.002 (0.075)	0.099 (0.118)	0.252 ^a (0.139)
Service attendance	0.005 (0.008)	–0.002 (0.010)	0.038 (0.025)	0.015 (0.021)
Constant	2.526 ^d (0.138)	2.503 ^d (0.142)	2.460 ^d (0.331)	2.831 ^d (0.352)
F-statistics	27.96 ^d	32.01 ^d	3.06 ^c	3.28 ^c
Observations	1219	813	162	244

2014 General Social Survey. OLS coefficients presented, standard errors in parentheses. ^a $p < 0.10$, ^b $p < 0.05$, ^c $p < 0.01$, ^d $p < 0.001$.

Table 6: Predictors of national pride, linear regression estimates.

	Aggregate	White	Black	Latino
Black	–0.053 (0.058)	–	–	–
Latino	–0.061 (0.049)	–	–	–
Age	0.005 ^d (0.001)	0.006 ^d (0.001)	0.005 ^c (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)
Family income	–0.004 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	–0.030 ^b (0.012)	–0.007 (0.015)
Education	0.018 (0.014)	–0.000 (0.013)	0.045 (0.042)	0.077 ^b (0.034)
Female	–0.085 ^c (0.030)	–0.070 ^b (0.034)	–0.124 (0.087)	–0.114 (0.083)
Partisan ID	0.015 (0.010)	0.012 (0.012)	0.043 (0.026)	–0.015 (0.023)
Ideology	0.032 ^b (0.015)	0.042 ^b (0.019)	0.014 (0.032)	0.025 (0.030)
Catholic	0.087 ^b (0.037)	0.105 ^c (0.039)	0.155 (0.138)	0.025 (0.089)
Service attendance	0.004 (0.006)	0.003 (0.007)	0.017 (0.014)	0.002 (0.016)
Constant	2.668 ^d (0.086)	2.594 ^d (0.105)	2.642 ^d (0.204)	2.848 ^d (0.162)
F-statistic	10.18 ^d	10.32 ^d	2.09 ^a	1.45
Observations	1219	813	162	244

2014 General Social Survey. OLS coefficients presented, standard errors in parentheses. ^a $p < 0.10$, ^b $p < 0.05$, ^c $p < 0.01$, ^d $p < 0.001$.

This demographic and political profile is largely repeated for White respondents. Columns three and four contain coefficients for models of Black and Latino respondents, and these tell a different story. Nationalism among Black respondents is largely explained by age, with older respondents reporting more nationalistic views. Conservative ideology may also help to explain Nationalism

among Blacks, but the result is only significant at the 90 percent confidence level. For Latinos, by contrast, no variable is a statistically significant explanation of Nationalism. These standard measures fail to account for how Latinos form Nationalistic attitudes, and one possibility is that predictors involving acculturation may be necessary to include.

Table 5 presents similar models explaining National Identity. In the first regression column, we see that Black respondents reported increased levels of National Identity compared to Whites, who are the reference category. This result, seen first in the bivariate table, remains statistically significant even after controlling for a wide range of factors. In addition, National Identity was relatively high among older, more conservative, lower income, and less educated respondents, and these results are largely replicated for Whites.

This suggests that Blacks possess a unique relationship with National Identity. It is telling that the Black experience cultivates relatively high agreement that National Identity involves American ancestry, being born in America, and living life in America. Blacks' elevated levels of national identity based in citizenship comports with Carter's (2019, 66) work arguing that the reason why Blacks place such a premium on citizenship is because its full rights and privileges were long withheld from them. Column three provides some elaboration on this sentiment, showing that increased age among Blacks is the principal socio-economic predictor of high National Identity.

Latinos are found to report heightened National Identity when family income is low (as well as for Catholics, although this is significant only at the 90 percent level). This suggests a parallel with Whites – both groups share similar levels of National Identity, and one reason may be that respondents for both groups report heightened levels when income is low but which moderate when income is high. This is an indication that Latinos have socialized to National Identity through class status in a way similar to Whites. The parallel between Whites and Latinos also provides additional evidence for the “minimal effects” hypothesis.

Table 6 contains models explaining variation in National Pride. We continue to find evidence of racial-ethnic “minimal effects” in the aggregate, as the first column indicates that neither Blacks nor Latinos differ from White respondents after controlling for other factors. Instead, a stronger sense of National Pride was associated with respondents who were older, more conservative, Catholic, and male. These results are again replicated for White respondents, but we then see additional, unique factors emerge for Blacks and Latinos. Black respondents reported higher National Pride at lower incomes—this result is not apparent for any other group, nor does it emerge in the overall model. In addition, education is associated with National Pride for Latinos, an effect not found elsewhere. It

appears that Latinos with greater education possess a heightened sense of National Pride.

On the whole, these results advance the “minimal effects” thesis, but they also show that reasons for national pride can differ despite similar magnitude. In particular, we see that income and education shape the National Pride views, respectively, of Blacks and Latinos. It could be that these varied underpinnings involve the nature of socialization toward national attachment by racial and ethnic minorities.

Table 7 contains additional analysis of whether groups arrive at those meanings differently. Found in the Appendix, it displays linear regression models with racial and ethnic identity as a moderator for demographic and political factors that explain Nationalism, National Identity, and National Pride. The purpose is to test whether the effects of demographic and political factors on national attachment are significantly different across respondent race and ethnicity.

The results indicate that Latino identity is the only racial-ethnic identity that alters the relationship between education and National Identity and education and National Pride. In the first case, we observed in Table 5 that lower-education respondents reported high levels of National Identity. The result is replicated for Whites but not for Latinos. Latino identity moderates the relationship between education and National Identity because there is such a strong effect of education among Whites that is not paralleled among Latinos. In such a case, we might ask why low-education Latinos do not express higher levels of National Identity as do Whites. One explanation might be that Latinos with low educational attainment are more familiar with the discriminatory aspects of the immigration experiences and therefore do not develop heightened National Identity based on ascriptive characteristics like being born in the U.S., living life here, and having American ancestry.

The second case indicates that Latino identity moderates the relationship between education and National Pride. Table 6 showed that education is a significant predictor for National Pride among Latinos but not Whites. The statistical significance of this interaction term in Table 7 shows a positive effect of education on National Pride for Latinos but not for Whites.

Figure 1 illustrates the effect of education on National Pride; the overall effect among Latinos is quite small but the linear direction is nonetheless positive and significant. From minimum (less than high school) to maximum (four-year degree and above), education is significantly associated with National Pride. The significance of the interaction term testing the rate of change between Latinos and Whites is indicated by comparing the sloping trend line for Latinos to the flat line for Whites. This shows that differences between Whites and Latinos are strongest at the lowest levels of education. That is, Latinos with less than a high school




Figure 1: Post-estimation relationship of responses to national pride and level of education by respondent race/ethnicity.

Source: 2014 General Social Survey.

education report significantly lower National Pride than similarly situated White Americans. This deficit is reversed as education levels increase. Taken together, this indicates that education is a powerful socializing tool for Latinos.

5 Implications for Immigration Attitudes

The final step is to explore how national attachments shape attitudes towards immigrants. Jeong (2013) found that Nationalism – defined as feelings of superiority and contempt for foreigners with features of positive in-group evaluations resulting in out-group derogation – is negatively associated with support for immigrants in the US; National Identity – defined as a sense of being or feeling American, unrelated to liberalism or conservatism – is not predictive of immigrant views; and National Pride – defined as individual sentiments of pride directed toward the nation-state’s accomplishments – is associated with positive views of immigrants due to the country’s historic experience with immigrants. We will test whether these national attachments are associated with a composite scale of Immigrant Attitudes that we replicate below.

An additional feature of our analysis is an evaluation of whether immigration attitudes are a function of national attachments for White, Black, and Latino respondents. One potential explanation for any such differences is the status of

host and arriving populations. Compared to Whites and Blacks, who may be seen as the “host population,” Latinos are closer to the immigration experience. Although this population has considerable diversity, a third of all Latinos in the U.S. are foreign-born and over half of U.S.-born Latinos have at least one foreign-born parent (Pew Research Center 2009, 2021). Therefore, although Latino views of immigrants are generally positive, it is unclear whether such views are affected by varying degrees of national attachment.

The extant literature about links between national attachment and immigration attitudes finds little to no difference on the basis of race. Huddy and Del Ponte (2021) explore how Nationalism and National Pride shape immigration attitudes as part of their wider study of partisanship. They find that Nationalism is associated with immigration restrictionism, meaning that at low levels the public is pro-immigration while at higher levels it is opposed. National Pride, by contrast, undermines restrictionism by encouraging strong identifiers to hold positive views of immigrants, while those with low pride are anti-immigrant. In addition, they found no racial-ethnic differences, as “nationalism boosts and pride undermines an anti-immigration stance to the same degree for Blacks and Whites.” We therefore expect to find similar linkages for White and Black respondents between immigrant attitudes and national attachments, and we expand the analysis by including Latino attitudes.

Table 8 in the Appendix contains the five items that contributed to the scale, which include: (1) “Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in America,” (2) “Immigrants are generally good for America’s economy,” (3) “Immigrants make America more open to new ideas and cultures,” (4) “Immigrants increase crime,” and (5) “Immigrants undermine American culture.” Scales for the items were on a 5-point Likert scale, with 3 indicating “Neither” disagreement nor agreement. We recoded responses so that values ascended toward support for immigrants. Inversely, lower values indicate unsupportive views toward immigrants.

The index variable has an average of 3.39, which is above the “Neither” category and indicates that public is, on the whole, slightly positive about immigrants. There is little difference in these views between Whites (3.30) and Blacks (3.23), while Latinos report the highest support (3.72). The scale reliability score performs well (0.77), and while the statistic for Latinos is a lower 0.66, it remains above the threshold level of 0.60.

Table 9 (in the Appendix) shows the regression models of Immigrant Attitudes, including those for the overall sample as well as for White, Black, and Latino respondents. Illustrations of the effects of national attachments are provided in Figures 2, 3, and 4. Altogether, our expectation of few differences based on race-ethnicity is supported. Specifically, national attachments for Whites and Blacks




Figure 2: Post-estimation relationship of responses to nationalism and immigrant attitudes by respondent race/ethnicity.
Source: 2014 General Social Survey.




Figure 3: Post-estimation relationship of responses to national identity and immigrant attitudes by respondent race/ethnicity.
Source: 2014 General Social Survey.

are remarkably parallel in explaining attitudes toward immigrants; all three measures are statistically significant and directionally parallel for both groups. Nationalism and National Identity are negatively, and National Pride is positively, associated with immigrant attitudes. Latinos are mostly unaffected by national




Figure 4: Post-estimation relationship of responses to national pride and immigrant attitudes by respondent race/ethnicity.

Source: 2014 General Social Survey.

attachments, with the exception of National Identity (which is statistically significant and directionally negative).

As Nationalism and National Identity are negatively associated with support for immigrants, this means that White and Black Americans who developed heightened Nationalism and National Identity (for the reasons we presented in the previous section) also reported diminished openness to immigrants.

However, our findings suggest a caution in how to interpret these results. While Huddy and Del Ponte found that Nationalism is associated with anti-immigration views, our data show that it mostly moves respondents from positive to more neutral assessments. As indicated in Figures 2 and 3, Whites and Blacks at the highest levels of Nationalism and National Identity approach the score of 3 on the y-axis, which indicates “Neutral” on the 5-point Likert scale for Immigrant Attitudes. When Nationalism and National Identity are at their lowest levels, support for immigrants is the highest. Furthermore, Latinos remain highly supportive of immigrants regardless of their level of Nationalism, although there is a subtle decline according to levels of National Identity. That decline is so substantively small that we can only conclude that Latino support for immigrants may soften but it never becomes anti-immigrant with higher levels of National Identity.

On the whole, our findings are consistent with the view of the literature that National Pride is antithetical to anti-immigration attitudes. Graph 4 illustrates that both Whites and Blacks report the highest levels of anti-immigrant sentiment when

National Pride is at its lowest. As National Pride rises and reaches its maximum value, Blacks and Whites are decidedly pro-immigrant. By contrast, changes in National Pride do not shape the Immigrant Attitudes of Latinos.

6 Conclusions

Despite some expectations in the literature that differences in national attachment might be substantial across race and ethnicity, we generally found “minimal effects.” Members of all three groups express fairly similar levels of agreement with all three measures – Nationalism, National Identity, and National Pride. Such similarities exist despite the very different historical experiences with the nation among Whites, Blacks, and Latinos. In addition, the models show that the explanation for national attachment attitudes is predominantly found in factors other than race-ethnicity. This is consistent with work by Schildkraut (2007, 2014), whose analysis points to “a great deal of consensus on the norms, values, and behaviors that constitute American identity” (Schildkraut 2007, 605). In addition, our paper highlights the strength of national attachment in determining anti- and pro-immigrant sentiment. For Blacks and Whites, all three measures operate in similar ways, although Latino views are only shaped by one such variable.

Although we largely find minimal effects across race and ethnicity, we would like to highlight several exceptions. First, Black respondents register a uniquely high sense of National Identity, a variable built on attachments to American ancestry, residency, and deep ties to the U.S. One possibility is that the legacy of slavery means that nationalism among African Americans is based in a profound (if complicated) sense of American identity. As noted by Carter (2019), “Americanness was the idiom available to register their dissatisfaction with their ongoing exclusion.”

The data also show a parallel between Latinos and Whites – both groups report heightened levels of National Identity when income is low, an effect that moderates as income increases. This suggests that Latinos have socialized to National Identity through class status in a manner similar to that of Whites. Furthermore, rising education levels are associated with higher levels of National Pride for Latinos, but not for Whites.

Taken together, this indicates that as Latinos gain in socioeconomic status, they will adopt a more capacious version of American national identity while simultaneously developing greater pride in what the U.S. represents. Thus, we can expect that social mobility among Latinos will only serve to increase their pride in the U.S. and deepen their sense of American identity (albeit one that is likely more broadly defined). This suggests that forms of anti-Latino exclusion which limit the

group's access to social mobility will likely only weaken Latino national attachment. Thus, if the development of national attachment is a goal for U.S. immigrant groups, social mobility and educational incorporation are powerful means to foment a sense of national identity and national pride.

Appendix

Table 7: Predictors of national attachments moderated by race/ethnicity, linear regression estimates.

	Nationalism	National Identity	National Pride
Black	-0.249 (0.375)	-0.043 (0.365)	0.048 (0.223)
Latino	0.149 (0.336)	0.328 (0.354)	0.254 (0.205)
Age	0.009 ^d (0.002)	0.010 ^d (0.002)	0.006 ^d (0.001)
Black # age	0.005 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.002)
Latino # age	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.006 ^a (0.004)	-0.005 (0.003)
Family income	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.020 ^c (0.007)	0.001 (0.005)
Black # family income	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.028)	-0.031 ^b (0.013)
Latino # family income	-0.001 (0.029)	-0.046 ^a (0.025)	-0.008 (0.015)
Education	-0.110 ^d (0.021)	-0.157 ^d (0.022)	-0.000 (0.013)
Black # education	0.082 (0.055)	0.067 (0.082)	0.045 (0.042)
Latino # education	0.085 (0.056)	0.172^b (0.065)	0.077^b (0.036)
Female	-0.064 (0.052)	0.083 ^a (0.047)	-0.070 ^b (0.034)
Black # female	-0.051 (0.135)	-0.110 (0.136)	-0.055 (0.097)
Latino # female	-0.112 (0.121)	-0.018 (0.111)	-0.044 (0.090)
Partisan ID	0.025 (0.018)	0.006 (0.018)	0.012 (0.012)
Black # Partisan ID	-0.019 (0.045)	0.005 (0.051)	0.031 (0.029)
Latino # Partisan ID	-0.028 (0.049)	-0.029 (0.047)	-0.026 (0.026)
Ideology	0.078 ^c (0.026)	0.109 ^d (0.024)	0.042 ^b (0.019)
Black # ideology	0.003 (0.056)	-0.041 (0.050)	-0.027 (0.034)
Latino # ideology	-0.030 (0.064)	-0.044 (0.054)	-0.016 (0.036)
Catholic	0.099 (0.066)	0.002 (0.075)	0.105 ^c (0.039)
Black # Catholic	-0.065 (0.154)	0.097 (0.143)	0.049 (0.144)
Latino # Catholic	0.012 (0.139)	0.250 (0.164)	-0.080 (0.099)
Service attendance	0.022 ^b (0.010)	-0.002 (0.010)	0.003 (0.007)
Black # service attendance	-0.013 (0.023)	0.040 (0.028)	0.014 (0.017)
Latino # service attendance	0.004 (0.024)	0.017 (0.024)	-0.000 (0.018)
Constant	3.106 ^d (0.151)	2.503 ^d (0.142)	2.594 ^d (0.105)
F-statistics	7.58 ^d	13.71 ^d	4.95 ^d
Observations	1219	1219	1219

2014 General Social Survey. OLS coefficients presented, standard errors in parentheses. ^a $p < 0.10$, ^b $p < 0.05$, ^c $p < 0.01$, ^d $p < 0.001$.

Table 8: Measures of immigrant attitudes, overall and by race/ethnicity.

Question Text	Sample	White	Black	Latino
1. Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in America: (1) Agree Str. – (3) Neither – (5) Disagree Str.	3.07	2.95	2.76	3.63
2. Immigrants are generally good for America's economy: (1) Disagree Str. – (3) Neither – (5) Agree Str.	3.42	3.29	3.26	3.88
3. Immigrants make America more open to new ideas and cultures: (1) Disagree Str. – (3) Neither – (5) Agree Str.	3.63	3.55	3.45	3.92
4. Immigrants increase crime: (1) Agree Str. – (3) Neither – (5) Disagree Str.	3.40	3.31	3.50	3.61
5. Immigrants undermine American culture: (1) Agree Str. – (3) Neither – (5) Disagree Str.	3.44	3.44	3.20	3.56
Index mean	3.39	3.30	3.23	3.72
Cronbach's α	0.77	0.80	0.69	0.66
Observations	1274	827	182	217

Table entries are weighted sample means of observations from the 2014 General Social Survey. Missing data filled with multiple imputation procedure Amelia II. Subgroup entries are derived by Taylor Series estimation using STATA's "svy" procedure for survey data.

Table 9: Predictors of supportive immigration attitudes, linear regression estimates.

	Aggregate	White	Black	Latino
Black	0.021(0.072)	–	–	–
Latino	0.489 ^d (0.061)	–	–	–
Nationalism	–0.137 ^d (0.034)	–0.150 ^c (0.044)	–0.187 ^b (0.085)	–0.033(0.068)
National identity	–0.242 ^d (0.027)	–0.301 ^d (0.038)	–0.169 ^b (0.072)	–0.164 ^b (0.065)
National pride	0.276 ^d (0.054)	0.327 ^d (0.065)	0.541 ^d (0.123)	0.024(0.099)
Age	0.001(0.001)	0.001(0.002)	0.002(0.003)	0.003(0.003)
Family income	0.002(0.007)	0.006(0.009)	0.017(0.019)	–0.020(0.012)
Education	0.093 ^d (0.023)	0.100 ^d (0.025)	0.065(0.053)	0.064(0.049)
Female	–0.017(0.042)	–0.019(0.051)	0.047(0.098)	–0.093(0.097)
Partisan ID	–0.018(0.013)	–0.024(0.017)	0.041(0.034)	0.013(0.036)
Ideology	–0.039 ^a (0.023)	–0.036(0.032)	–0.045(0.040)	–0.015(0.048)
Catholic	0.09 ^a (0.057)	0.029(0.053)	–0.316 ^b (0.151)	0.268 ^c (0.097)
Service attendance	0.004(0.009)	–0.011(0.011)	0.033(0.021)	0.033 ^a (0.018)
Constant	3.531 ^d (0.163)	3.634 ^d (0.195)	2.371 ^d (0.448)	3.923 ^d (0.302)
F-statistics	35.12 ^d	30.28 ^d	8.20 ^d	2.11 ^b
Observations	1219	813	162	244

2014 General Social Survey. OLS coefficients presented, standard errors in parentheses. ^a $p < 0.10$, ^b $p < 0.05$, ^c $p < 0.01$, ^d $p < 0.001$.

References

- Brown, R. A., and T. C. Shaw. 2002. "Separate Nations: Two Attitudinal Dimensions of Black Nationalism." *The Journal of Politics* v64 (1): 22–44.
- Byrne, J., and G. C. Dixon. 2016. "Just Not like Us: The Interactive Impact of Dimensions of Identity and Race in Attitudes towards Immigration." *Social Sciences* v5 (4): 59.
- Carter, N. M. 2019. *American while Black: African Americans, Immigration, and the Limits of Citizenship*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Carter, N. M., and E. O. Pérez. 2016. "Race and Nation: How Racial Hierarchy Shapes National Attachments." *Political Psychology* v37 (4): 497–513.
- Ceobanu, A. M., and X. Escandell. 2008. "East Is West? National Feelings and Anti-immigrant Sentiment in Europe." *Social Science Research* v37 (4): 1147–70.
- Citrin, J., C. Wong, and B. Duff. 2001. "The Meaning of American National Identity." In *Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Resolution*, edited by Ashmore, R., Jussim, L. and Wilder, D., 71–100. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Conover, P. J., and S. Feldman. 1987. *Memo to NES Board of Overseers Regarding 'Measuring Patriotism and Nationalism'*. Ann Arbor: Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research.
- Dawson, M. C. 2003. *Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- de Figueiredo, R. J. P., and Z. Elkins. 2003. "Are Patriots Bigots? An Inquiry into the Vices of In-Group Pride." *American Journal of Political Science* v47 (1): 171–88.
- de la Garza, R. O., A. Falcon, and F. C. Garcia. 1996. "Will the Real Americans Please Stand up: Anglo and Mexican-American Support of Core American Political Values." *American Journal of Political Science* v40 (2): 335–51.
- Greene, S., G. Gray, N. M. Carter, and R. Block. 2020. "Americanness and the "Other" Americans: An Examination of the American Identity and Political Behavior of Racial and Ethnic Minorities in the United States." *National Review of Black Politics* v1 (3): 396–429.
- Hjerm, M. 1998. "National Identities, National Pride and Xenophobia: A Comparison of Four Western Countries." *Acta Sociologica* 41 (4): 335–47.
- Hooker, J. 2016. "Black Lives Matter and the Paradoxes of US Black Politics: From Democratic Sacrifice to Democratic Repair." *Political Theory* v44 (4): 448–69.
- Huddy, L., and N. Khatib. 2007. "American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political Involvement." *American Journal of Political Science* v51 (1): 63–77.
- Huddy, L., and A. del Ponte. 2021. "The Rise of Populism in the USA: Nationalism, Race, and American Party Politics." In *The Psychology of Populism*, edited by Forgas, J. P., Crano, W. and Fiedler, K. Oxon: Routledge.
- Huntington, S. P. 2004. "The Hispanic Challenge." *Foreign Policy* 141 (March/April): 30–45.
- Jeong, H. O. 2013. "Do National Feelings Influence Public Attitudes towards Immigration?" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* v39 (9): 1461–77.
- Knudsen, K. 1997. "Scandinavian Neighbours with Different Character? Attitudes toward Immigrants and National Identity in Norway and Sweden." *Acta Sociologica* v40 (3): 223–43.
- Kosterman, R., and S. Feshbach. 1989. "Toward a Measure of Patriotic and Nationalistic Attitudes." *Political Psychology* v10 (2): 257–74.
- Kunovich, R. M. 2009. "The Sources and Consequences of National Identification." *American Sociological Review* v74 (4): 573–93.

- Masuoka, N., and J. Junn. 2013. *The Politics of Belonging: Race, Public Opinion, and Immigration*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Michelson, M. R. 2003. "The Corrosive Effect of Acculturation: How Mexican Americans Lose Political Trust." *Social Science Quarterly* v84 (4): 918–33.
- Pew Research Center. 2009. *Latino Children: A Majority Are U.S.-Born Offspring of Immigrants*. Also available at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2009/05/28/latino-children-a-majority-are-us-born-offspring-of-immigrants/>.
- Pew Research Center. 2021. *Key Facts about U.S. Latinos for National Hispanic Heritage Month*. Also available at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/09/09/key-facts-about-u-s-latinos-for-national-hispanic-heritage-month/>.
- Schatz, R. T., and E. Staub. 1997. "Manifestations of Blind and Constructive Patriotism: Personality Correlates and Individual-Group Relations." In *Patriotism: In the Lives of Individuals and Nations*, edited by Bar-Tal, D. and Staub, E., 229–47. Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers.
- Schatz, R. T., E. Staub, and H. Lavine. 1999. "On the Varieties of National Attachment: Blind versus Constructive Patriotism." *Political Psychology* v20 (1): 151–74.
- Schildkraut, D. J. 2007. "Defining American Identity in the Twenty-First Century: How Much "There" Is There?" *The Journal of Politics* v69 (3): 597–615.
- Schildkraut, D. J. 2014. "Boundaries of American Identity: Evolving Understandings of "Us"." *Annual Review of Political Science* v17: 441–60.
- Shelton, J. E. 2010. "E Pluribus Unum? How Racial, Ethnic, and Religious Group Memberships Impact Beliefs about American National Identity." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* v16 (1): 67–91.
- Sidanius, J., S. Feshbach, S. Levin, and F. Pratto. 1997. "The Interface between Ethnic and National Attachment: Ethnic Pluralism or Ethnic Dominance?" *Public Opinion Quarterly* v61 (1): 102–33.
- Tajfel, H. 1981. *Human Groups and Social Categories*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tajfel, H., and J. C. Turner. 1986. "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior." In *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. 7–24, edited by Worchel, S. and Austin, W. G. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Turner, J. C. 1982. "Towards a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social Group." In *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, edited by Tajfel, H., 15–40. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.