Radicalization in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina: Social Disorganization and Its Consequences

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RADICALIZATION IN POST-WAR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:

SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

A Thesis

by

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis will explain how social disorganization leads to the radicalization. During the process of rapid change (e.g. abrupt democratization of previously authoritarian Bosnian society) new situations cause development of new desires (e.g. a need for greater independence from social controls) which results in development of new attitudes (e.g. individualism). When the society is unable to satisfy the new desires and attitudes, people resort to illegal acts and even violence to meet their new needs, and social disorganization develops. Due to lack of research that focuses directly on Bosnia this thesis will analyze similar researches conducted in other regions (e.g. India and Northern Ireland), and examine whether their findings could be applicable to Bosnian conditions.

Keywords: radicalization, social disorganization, ethnic violence, genocide.

DEDICATION

I would like to thank my mother and my father for teaching me from a very young age that hard work and sacrifice is essential for one's success. Without their understanding and support, albeit from nearly halfway across the world, this project would have been impossible. To Dr. S. George Vincentnathan for always encouraging me to do more; to Dr. Thomas G. White for moral support when I needed it the most; to Dr. Philip A. Ethridge and Dr. Daniel Dearth for the encouragement and pep-talks; to Daniel Hernandez and ARCH for helping me make my dreams come true; to Dr. Sara Apsley-Ambriz and Robert Ambriz without whose generosity I would never have had an opportunity to pursue a higher education.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The primary reason for writing this thesis was a lack of academic research on the topic of post-war social disorganization in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its link to radicalization (for simplicity's sake, Bosnia-Herzegovina from here on will be referred to only as *Bosnia*). Most of the current research on Bosnia focuses either on the 1992-1995 genocide, ethnic cleansing, and war-time rapes, or on post-war security issues such as disarmament, demilitarization and the return of the refugees. Insufficient attention has been paid to the increased social disorganization marked by the rapid dissolution of the traditional Bosnian family, increased youth crime, and one of the highest unemployment rates in the world, all of which contributed to the rejection of a weak and ineffective Bosnian government as a legitimate power and adoption of radical views and ideologies as a way to cope with everyday stresses.

During the rapid change brought by the abrupt democratization of previously authoritarian Bosnian society, new desires such as the need for greater independence from collective controls resulted in the development of perceptible egocentric concerns and individualistic attitudes. When society is unable to satisfy new desires and expectations, people resort to illegal acts and even violence to meet their perceived new needs, resulting in social disorganization. The situation in Bosnia will be analyzed in the context of social disorganization and its consequences; several research studies conducted in India, Ireland, Egypt and Sri Lanka will be used to highlight the Bosnian experience.

Prior to 1991, Bosnia, a country roughly the size of West Virginia with a population of 4.5 million, was under the control of Yugoslavian socialist regime. During that time, Orthodox Christians constituted the largest ethnic group in the former Yugoslavia, while Catholics made up the second largest ethnic group and Muslims the third. However, in one of the former Yugoslavian states, Bosnia, the ethnic composition was different. In Bosnia, Muslims constituted the largest ethnic group, while Orthodox Christians made up the second largest ethnic group and Croats the third. Although, all three groups spoke the same language, they had somewhat different customs as a consequence of their respective histories, ethnicities and religions. Following the increased democratization of all European communist countries in the 1980s, the continuing ethnic and religious divisions among Bosnian Christians and Muslims became the cause of a severe group conflict.

Still, even with the many struggles for political control of Bosnia, Bosnian society was well organized between 1946 and 1980. But, after the death of the last Yugoslavian totalitarian leader, Marshall Josip Broz Tito in 1980, authoritarian social control weakened resulting in liberating social changes that begun to disorganize Yugoslavian society, including Bosnia. Left unchecked, increasing ethnic hatred flared up which led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and subsequent wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The 1992-1995 ethnic war in Bosnia further accelerated the social disorganization leading to social disruptions, radical nationalism and ethnic cleansing.

This thesis will provide a brief social history of Bosnia in order to portray a clearer picture of the multi-cultural populations and their backgrounds, as well as the political and religious frictions between Christians and Muslims which resulted in the devastating ethnic war in 1992. The historical data presented will be as brief as possible, but at the same time detailed enough to provide a clear insight into this region's extremely complicated political and religious issues. For example, the historical data will examine the influences of authoritarian regimes dating back to the Roman Empire, continuing through the rule of the Ottomans, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, before ending with the Yugoslavian socialist control which existed from 1946 -1991.[*]

Three interrelated hypotheses, this study tests are:

1. The pre-war social order increasingly disorganized upon the impact of modern democratic values and rising economic desires, especially because of globalization.
2. Social disorganization weakens social, personal and political controls by producing a variety of social problems such as disorganization of the family structure, increased divorce rates, reduced birth rates, high rates of unemployment, and an increased crime rate and group conflicts aggravated by the inability of the state to respond to social changes.
3. Social disorganization in a weakened political system, associated with rising radical nationalism and religious awareness among Bosnian Christians and Muslims, moved young adults toward violent radicalization and terrorist activities.

[*] Note:
Throughout this thesis, the reader will encounter expressions such as *pre-war Bosnia* and *post-war Bosnia*. The expression *pre-war Bosnia* signifies a period of socialistic and Yugoslavian control between 1946 and 1992 which was marked with totalitarian social order. Comparably, the expression *post-war Bosnia* is used to signify the period after the 1995 marked by abrupt social changes and high degree of social disorganization.

CHAPTER II

BOSNIAN SOCIETY AND HISTORY

Proof of human presence in the western Balkans region, including modern day Bosnia, can be traced back to the 6th millennium BC. However, due to the lack of any written records it is difficult to determine the exact size of pre-historic population of this region (World Museum of Man, 2012). What is known about the early western Balkans comes from the historic accounts of the ancient Greeks, who began expansion into the Balkans in the 4th century BC, when they conquered lands held by the Illyrian tribes.

Figure 1 – The Balkans (1st century BC)

Figure 2 – The Balkans (2010)

Covering roughly the area between today's Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and Croatia, Illyria* was located on the northern edge of the classical Greek world – see Figures 1 and 2 (Myths, Hypotheses and Facts, 2010; InterSoft, 2012). According to historian Jennifer Wallace (1998), the Greeks referred to Illyria as a land of tattooed barbarian warriors who worshiped non-Christian deities and practiced human sacrifice. Thayer (2008) noted that the famous Greek geographer and historian Strabo documented tattooing as a common practice among ancient Europeans, including the non-Christian tribes inhabiting the land of Illyria.

The ancient tattoos largely consisted of non-religious symbols such as the sun, moon, stars, grain stalks, and mill wheels (Truhelka, 1945). Following the Greek and Roman invasions of the area, the custom of tattooing nearly disappeared as the Illyrian tribes were assimilated into the invading Christian populations. In the late 1400s, after the invasion of the Ottomans, the ancient custom of tattooing was revived by the Catholics who began tattooing religious symbols, such as Catholic crosses, on their chests, necks, arms and hands, in an attempt to avoid forcible conversion to Islam by the conquering Ottomans (Truhelka, 1945).

The Expansion of Christianity

In the 3rd century B.C., the Romans conquered Illyria, and renamed it the province of *Illyricum* (Wallace, 1998). The place, and the name, lasted until the 6th century A.D. "when migrating Slavs changed the character of the whole region" (Wallace, 1998). The civilization

* Note:
Origin of the name of Illyria is unknown. There are some indications that it may have come from the Albanian word *iliret*. The root *i lir* meaning "free" and *iliret* corresponds to "freemen," thus it is possible that Illyria meant a "Land of the Freemen" (Everett-Heath, 2005).

that the Romans introduced not only “encouraged transmission of ideas, technology and institutions, but furthered the expansion of Christianity which became a powerful influence in the western Balkans” (Kovacevic, 2002).

However, due to the unrelenting pressure from surrounding Germanic tribes (Visigoths and Ostrogoths) and “the internal weakness of an aging political system”, the Romans lost the control of Illyricum to the Byzantine Empire (Kovacevic, 2002). The Byzantine rule lasted until the 6th century B.C. when Slav tribes moved into the region (Kovacevic, 2002). Following the Byzantine rule, the region was briefly occupied by the Hungarians (Pike, 2011).

The Expansion of Orthodox Christianity

The early Slav tribes were believed to have populated the area of modern day Ukraine and Belarus, however, starting at the end of the 2nd century A.D. they began large migrations to the east, west and south – see Figure 3 (Borzyskowski, 2003). When it comes to religion, according to the Encyclopedia Britannica (2009), the Slavs can be divided into two main groups:



Figure 3 – Expansion of Slav Tribes

1) those associated with the Eastern Orthodox Church, (Russians, Serbs, Macedonians and majority of Ukrainians, Belarusians) and, 2) those associated with the Roman Catholic Church (Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes and some Ukrainians and Belarusians).

According to Pogonowski (2000), by the 6th century Slavs were grouped into three distinct groups, 1) the West Slavs (the Poles, Czechs and Slovaks), 2) East Slavs (the Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians), and 3) South Slavs (the Bosnians, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Bulgarians).

The Rise of Anti-Christian Sectarianism

Bogumilism, a religious-political sect that originally started in 950 in Bulgaria, quickly spread across Europe (World Historia, 2006; Pilar, 1927). Because Bogumils held dualist beliefs that a human soul belonged to the God of Light while the human body belonged to the God of Darkness, which opposed established the Christian doctrines, they were identified as heretics and enemies of Christian states (Pilar, 1927). But, unlike the somewhat limited influence of Bogumil ideology that was experienced across Europe, in Bosnia Bogumilism was supported by the Bosnian royal family and it became a religion of the majority. However, as Bogumilism required extreme devotion and religiosity, the King of Bosnia abandoned it and turned to Catholicism (Pilar, 1927).

Following the King's conversion to Catholicism the Bosnian state, with a support of the Catholic Church, begun statewide property seizures and persecutions of Bogumils, prompting many Bogumils to either flee to other countries or convert to Catholicism (Pilar, 1927). Upon the arrival of the Ottoman Turks, many former Bogumils abandoned Catholicism and converted to Islam, introducing yet another religion in Bosnia (Pilar, 1927).

The Independent Kingdom of Bosnia*

Around 1200 A.D., Bosnia gained its independence from Hungary (Pike, 2011). Ruled by a local *Ban* (prince), Bosnia was named *Bosanska Banovina* (Bosnian Princedom). The name remained until 1377 when, after the crowning of King Tvrtko I, Bosnia became an Independent Kingdom of Bosnia (Clancy, 2007). During the rule of King Tvrtko I, Bosnia reached its maximum size stretching from the Sava River, which borders a northern edge of today's Bosnia, to the islands of Korcula and Hvar, which are now a part of Croatia, to Sjenica and Lim, which are now part of Montenegro and Serbia (Department of the Navy, 1994). Altogether, Bosnia remained an independent Christian state for more than 260 years before the Ottoman occupation.

Expansion of the Muslim Faith

Upon their expansion into western Balkans, in 1389, the Ottomans engaged Serbia in the infamous Battle of Kosovo (Horisberger, 2004). Bosnia was inevitably drawn into the conflict (Horisberger, 2004). The Serbs lost the Battle of Kosovo and the Ottomans subsequently occupied a large portion of the western Balkans, including Bosnia (Agatucci, 2011). The Ottomans maintained control of occupied Bosnia for over 400 years, during which Bosnia remained a distinct administrative unit (Bosnian Institute, 1997).

But more importantly, the expansion of the Muslim Ottomans into Bosnia introduced yet another religious, political and cultural context (Horisberger, 2004). The Ottoman's state

*Note:
It is believed that name *Bosnia* comes from an old Indo-European word *bosana* meaning "water." Bosnia has an abundance of beautiful rivers and waterfalls (Bosana Foundation, 2010).

political, legal and cultural life was entirely governed by the Islamic law of *sheriat* (Sowards, 2008). According to the Islamic law "the ruler (*sultan*), was seen as the agent of God and the subjects were his *flock*" (Sowards, 2008). Sowards (2008) claimed that, the Islamic law required the *flock* to "strictly obey the *sultan*; any action against the interests of the *sultan* or the state was regarded as an action against God, and violators were strictly punished." Yet, according to some historians, Ottoman rule was not entirely disliked (Sowards, 2008). Sowards (2008) pointed out that many of the Ottomans' supporters were attracted by the fact that: 1) the Ottoman Empire was politically stable and strongly organized and controlled, unlike the European kingdoms that were fractured as a result of frequent wars with each other and, 2) Ottoman taxes were lower than that of their European predecessors.

However, it was the Ottoman institution of *devshirme*, a form of slavery that attracted most attention. According to Steven Sowards (2008):

> "Christian boys were confiscated from the conquered population and converted to Islam. The brightest of these children were educated in laws, foreign languages, sciences, and administrative skills. Promoted on the basis of their skills, they could grow up to be provincial governors, treasury officials, physicians, architects, judges and high officials. They were allowed to marry and their children were born as free Muslims" (Sowards, 2008).

In 1878, weakened by the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), the Ottomans retreated from Bosnia after more then 400 years of occupation (Agatucci, 2011). As the borders of the Ottoman Empire began to shrink, Muslims from elsewhere in the Balkans migrated to Bosnia further adding to cultural diversity of the region (Horisberger, 2004).

The Austro-Hungarian Empire

Fearing that Russia would establish control over the western Balkans, European powers decided at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, to allow the Austro-Hungarians to occupy Bosnia (Horisberger, 2004). In 1908, although still officially part of the Ottoman Empire, Bosnia was annexed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Horisberger, 2004). Serbia opposed the decision because it believed that it had a prior claim on Bosnia.

World War I

In 1914, the hostility between the Serbia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire over the annexation of Bosnia, culminated in the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne and his wife Sofia, Duchess of Hohenberg (Goschen, 1914). They were killed by Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip while visiting Sarajevo, Bosnia (Goschen, 1914). The political objective behind the assassination was to precipitate a separation of Bosnia from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, so that it could be annexed to Serbia.

As a response to the assassination Austria declared war on Serbia (Duffy, 2009). Russia immediately came to Serbia's aid and declared a war on Austria, which prompted Germany to declare a war against Russia, which eventually led to the World War I (Duffy, 2009). At the end of the World War I, in 1918, Bosnia was annexed by Serbia as part of the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Mayfield, 2008). In 1929, the name of the country was changed to the *Kraljevina Jugoslavia*, which translates in English to *Kingdom of the South Slavs* (Mayfield, 2008).

World War II

In 1941, after the Hitler's Nazi Germany and Mussolini's fascist Italy invaded the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Bosnia was annexed to the Nazi-controlled Independent State of Croatia (Srkulj and Lucic, 2005). During the 1941-1945 Nazi occupation, Bosnia not only fought against the Nazis but also had experienced far more damaging effects of internal nationalistic hatred resulting from ethnic and religious differences. As a result, Bosnia saw the emergence of four opposing armed forces: 1) Croatian Fascist troops, the *Ustashe*, 2) Serbian nationalistic troops, the *Chetniks*, 3) the Muslim SchutzStaffel legions (Protective Squads), the *Handjars*, and 4) communist/socialist guerrilla, the *Partisans* (Mayfield, 2008).

According to Tomasevic (1975), three ethnic forces (*Ustashe*, *Chetniks*, *Handjars*) all engaged in atrocities against one another, and against the communist/socialist guerrilla, however, the largest number of massacres against the civilian population was committed by the Serbian *Chetniks* and Croatian *Ustashe*. Tomasevic (1975) noted that majority of the atrocities committed by the Croatian *Ustashe* were against the Serbian population, while majority of the massacres committed by the Serbian *Chetniks* were against the Bosnian Muslim civilians. For example, between 1941 and 1942, Serbian *Chetniks* massacred over three thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilians, including women and children, in small Muslim towns and villages of Foca, Visegrad, Zepa, Celebici and Srebrenica (Tomasevic, 1975).*

* Note:
Ironically, in 1991, after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, nearly identical atrocities happened in same towns where Serbian *Chetniks* systematically massacred thousands of Bosnian Muslims civilians.

At the end of World War II, Bosnia was separated from Croatia and became one of the six autonomous republics of the newly established Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, under the rule of Marshall Josip Broz Tito - see Figure 4 (Mayfield, 2008).

Figure 4 – Marshall Tito

The Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – see Figure 5, was a federation consisting of six states; Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia, and two administrative regions Vojvodina and Kosovo (Purdue University, 2009). The SFR Yugoslavia existed from 1945 until the 1991 when Macedonia, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from the federation. In March of the following year, Bosnia declared independence from the remnants of the former Yugoslavian federation.

Figure 5 – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1991)

By 1993, only Montenegro, Serbia, and the two administrative regions, Vojvodina and Kosovo, remained in union which was renamed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Then, in May 2006, Montenegro seceded from the union (BBC News, 2006). Left as the only state in the former Yugoslavian union, a few months later Serbia declared themselves a sovereign successor state and Yugoslavia ceased to exist (BBC News, 2012). Two years later in February 2008, the administrative region of Kosovo (one of the two administrative regions that were under the control of Serbia) declared its independence from Serbia and became an independent state (MSNBC News, 2008).

The 1991 collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and ethnic wars in three of its former states (Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia), followed by an ethnic war in the administrative region of Kosovo, was the direct result of several events occurring between 1980 and 1991. Three of the most important of those events were:

1. The death of Marshall Josip Broz Tito in 1980.

Tito's authoritarian rule successfully suppressed ethnic sentiments in Yugoslavian politics from 1945 until his death in 1980 (Somer, 2001). After Tito's death, political power was placed in the hands of an unstable collective presidency, which immediately began showing a rise in Serbian radical nationalism (Collier, 2005).

2. A sharp economic decline caused by the oil crisis in 1985.

As a result of the 1985 oil crisis, European communist regimes, including Yugoslavia, suffered a tremendous economic decline. Because of the flaws in the federal command system that relied heavily on borrowing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Yugoslavia's economy came to a standstill as soon as the loans dried out (D'Souza, 1994). By 1989, Yugoslavia owed US$ 19 billion to IMF; at the same time, inflation reached 800 percent, which further drained the Yugoslavia's treasury (D'Souza, 1994).

3. Dissolution of communism in Europe and the rise of democracy.

During the early 1980s, Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev, instituted greater political and social freedoms which resulted in the weakening of the central government and a growing discontent with the oppressiveness of the Soviet communist regime (Gaidar, 2007). The 1980s oil crisis and surging national debt quickly decimated Soviet reserves, leading to the bankruptcy of the Soviet government (Gaidar, 2007). In 1989, in order to "receive much needed loans from the international community, the Soviet Union had no choice but to allow Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to claim their independence from Soviet communism" (Gaidar, 2007). This prompted Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to also seek independence. As more and more states gained independence from the Soviet Bloc, communism in Europe declined.

As the Soviet's totalitarian control of other communist regimes across Europe, including Yugoslavia, vanished through the late 1980s, the capitalistic and democratic values resulted in competition for control of scarce resources. However, in societies divided by race, ethnicity, religion, or caste, the abrupt introduction of democracy often creates a major upsets (Vincentnathan, 1992). Democracy is desired, but existing social barriers prevent it from taking hold (Vincentnathan, 2012). This happens because individuals in dominant groups (either because of their number or powerful economic status) want to gain economic, social or political advantage over the rest of the society (Vincentnathan, 1992). As a result, dogmatic prejudice and hatred directed at powerless groups become even stronger to keep the powerless in line. The deprived groups then become radicalized as a way to respond to their deplorable situation.

Under Yugoslavian socialistic control, prior to the 1980 Serbs, Croats and Muslims managed to maintain a somewhat cordial relationship, which began to break after the death of Tito and subsequent weakening of Yugoslavian totalitarian control. As the ability of the Yugoslavian government to improve its economy and to suppress the rise of radical nationalism further weakened, Bosnian Orthodox Christian Serbs began vying for the scarce resources in the dwindling Yugoslavian economy. They singled out Bosnian Muslim majority as a primary target to be mistreated, and even killed, to prevent them from achieving the same rights and economic privileges the Serbs sought.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

This thesis is mainly focused on discovering whether social disorganization leads to violent radicalization? Data analyzed in this qualitative study is secondary data collected from various statistical databases, such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Criminal Justice Information Network (UNCJIN), as well as historical documents. Since this study utilizes only secondary data, there were no human subjects involved.

Some of the relevant information comes from the author's personal experience and knowledge gained through five years of employment with the United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina - The International Police Task Force (which had a mandate for reconstruction of an entire law enforcement system in Bosnia), and nearly two years of employment with the Office of the High Representative - Independent Judicial Commission (which had a mandate for reconstruction of an entire judicial system in Bosnia).

The analyzed secondary statistical data pertains to increased unemployment rates, declining fertility rates, increased extra-marital births, decreased number of marriages, increased divorce rates, and selected crime rates (e.g. homicide, rape, assault, robbery, burglary and drug related crimes). Comparisons were made with some statistical categories in the surrounding countries that emerged after the dissolution of the former-Yugoslavia (e.g. Slovenia and Croatia). In cases where comparisons were impossible due to lack of available data, comparisons were made to countries with similar former communist and/or socialist type regimes, such as Russia and Poland. Prior to 1991 Yugoslavian statistics were generally compiled by aggregating the entire nation. Since prior to 1991 Bosnia was a part of Yugoslavia in some cases the author had no choice but to use the statistical data for all of Yugoslavia in order to provide the reader some idea whether there was an increase or decrease in the post-war rates, resulting from increasing social problems.

CHAPTER IV

SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

The idea that a rapid change in human society leads to social disorganization, which then leads to an increase in deviant behavior, is not new. But in order to talk about the social disorganization, one must first understand what qualifies as *organized society*. Elliott and Merrill (1961) define social organization as a "harmonious operation of the different elements of a social system." They note that abrupt social changes, such as rapid urban development, massive economic crisis or war can compromise social organization by upsetting the harmonious operation of a society leading to social disorganization (Elliott and Merrill, 1961).

According to Elliott and Merrill (1961), *social disorganization* is at the polar end of social organization. They define social disorganization as "disruption in the orderly process of social interaction and effective functioning of a group" (Elliott and Merrill, 1961). Vincentnathan and Vincentnathan (2008) are a little more specific in their definition of a social disorganization. They point out that social disorganization is a social condition marked by an "inability to control behavior and solve common community problems, poverty, multiple ethnicities, lack of common ethos and activities" (Vincentnathan and Vincentnathan, 2008).

According to Vincentnathan and Vincentnathan (2008), the antagonistic views that people develop under conditions of social disorganization may lead to mutual hate, group conflict, radicalization and terrorist activities. When a society has many of these problems it goes into a state of *anomie,* where traditional social controls become weak and people resort to dangerous actions to express their hatred (Vincentnathan and Vincentnathan, 2008).

Durkheim (1893) initially introduced the concept of *anomie* to explain a state of *normlesness* where social expectations have less impact on behaviors, or where norms are confused or unclear. Durkheim used the concept of *anomie* to refer to a situation in which the effectiveness of cultural norms breaks down because of rapid change in society. This meant that "rules on how people ought to behave with each other were breaking down, and they began creating new ways to deal with new situations" (Durkheim, 1893). In Bosnia, the people began to change from being collectivistic to individualistic, which created issues such as disruption of families, increase in unmarried population, decline in fertility rates and family size, and increase in crime. Additionally, prior to 1980, the social bonds that existed among the Yugoslavians, including the Bosnians, that encouraged unity and collective pride declined with the emergence of sectarian group orientations. Bosnian Orthodox Christian Serbs insisted on building their own national identity at the expense of Bosnian Muslims, which led to both sides becoming increasingly radicalized.

A review of research on the topic of social disorder from the 20th century reveals some interesting findings. Thomas and Znaniecki (1918) conducted a research amongst several European peasant societies affected by rapid growth and change. They found that the "rapid growth and social change acted as a disorganizing force, which contributed to a breakdown of prior social rules, and led to increased deviance" (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1918). Shaw, et al. (1929) also noted similar transitions occurring in Chicago when the city was industrializing. Comparably speaking, post-war Bosnia experienced tremendous social changes that led to increased social disorganization. Faced with tens of thousands of internally displaced people during the 1992-1995 ethnic war Bosnian society was in disarray. Cities such as Tuzla, Sarajevo and Zenica experienced increase in criminal activity among the youth, a rapid religious revival, and an increase in radical nationalism within Bosnian society.

Radical nationalism is a term used to describe violent attitudes and actions that members of a nation undertake in order to establish their national identity based on their common origin, ethnicity, or cultural ties (Miscevic, 2010). Nationalism is often linked to mass murders and violent ethnic cleansing of non-nationals, such as in the cases of systematic extermination of the Jews in Nazi Germany during World War II, mass murders and ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Bosnia, genocide of Tutsi and moderate Hutus in Rwanda, and the forcible expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo (Miscevic, 2010).

Sutherland (1924) used Durkheim's concept of *social disorganization*, to develop a theory of *differential social organization* in order to explain the increase in deviance that follows rapid social changes within peasant communities. Sutherland (1924) noted that, "deviance increases at a different rate following rapid social changes within peasant communities where influences surrounding a person are steady, uniform, harmonious and consistent, compared to the modern Western civilization which is characterized by inconsistency, conflict and disorganization" (Sutherland, 1924). Sutherland (1924) also pointed out that persistent disorganization fosters a creation of new cultural traditions that supports continued delinquent behavior. Similarly, one could surmise that after the breakdown of the Soviet, and later Yugoslavian political control, the divisions that arose between the Bosnian Serb and Croat Christians and Bosnian Muslims became institutionalized leading to the creation of nationalistic attitudes, mutual group hatred, genocidal war, radicalization and terrorist activities. These problems are symptoms of a state of *anomie*, where traditional social control becomes too weak to regulate people, and the people under appropriate circumstances develop hostile ideas and attitudes.

In 1938, Merton's model of *anomie* stressed that "societal pressure emphasizing the pursuit of economic success, coupled with limited means for the full realization of such goals, causes people to adopt illegal ways of realizing those goals" (Merton, 1938; Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994). When economic opportunities drastically declined with the fall of Tito's rule, Yugoslavians failed to achieve their economic expectations or maintain their standard of living. Comparing themselves with their European neighbors who were economically doing well, Yugoslavians experienced strain. As Yugoslavian resources dwindled under the impact of the 1980s oil crisis, the Yugoslavian leadership began aggressively competing for increased economic benefits for Serbia at the expense of the other states. This eventually prompted Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia to seek independence from the central Yugoslavian government, which led to Serbian aggression against all three states.

According to Merton's (1938) there are five dimensions of adaptations that people make when they are experiencing a discrepancy between goals and the means of achieving (conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion). In light of the increase in radicalization in post-war Bosnia, Merton's (1938) concept of *rebellious* adaptation could be used to explain the radical adjustments that continue to stimulate inter-group conflicts in Bosnia. Therefore, even though crime has not significantly increased in the post-war Bosnia, rebellious and radical orientations have increased in many Bosnian Christians and Muslims, in the context of prejudice and hatred fueled by economic insufficiencies and ineffective social controls of the weak Bosnian government.

This relationship calls to mind the recent events in Egypt where the Muslims and Christians related better under the Mubarak's totalitarian government (Green, 2011). But, after the revolution which aimed toward a reduction of governmental control and promotion of a larger scale economic improvement, Christian and Muslims could not get along and persecution of Christians surged (Green, 2011). Similarly, after Sri Lanka obtained independence from the British, the economically advanced Tamil minority became a target of envy and discrimination by the Singhalese majority who attempted to subordinate the Tamils (Vincentnathan, 2006). The democratic rights and the need for equal treatment of the Tamils were violated, which led to the Tamils rebelling against Singhalese oppression. The prolonged conflict subsequently led to increased radicalization, violence and killings on both sides (Vincentnathan, 2006).

In light of the available research concerning the Bosnian social history, it becomes clear that there are certain commonalities among societies that experience a decline of hierarchical control and the influence of emerging democratic values. Democratic changes in other societies have also caused ethnic conflicts, but in different cultural, social, historical and geographical contexts. When a society is plagued by racism, or religious and ethnic divisions, the concomitant results are similar. Bosnian cultural, historical and localized experiences may be unique, yet the ethnic and religious subordination Bosnia experienced produced severe stress, anger, destructive and radical responses, and often a sense of worthlessness and hopelessness, similar to that suffered by minorities elsewhere.

In examining the relationship between crime and social disorganization among the British communities, Sampson and Groves (1989) found that "limited social networks, family disruption, unsupervised teenagers, residential mobility, low economic status, and ethnic heterogeneity" have the greatest impact on crime rate. The same factors are also the cause of divisions in Bosnian communities based on religious and ethnic differences that encourage group participation at the expense of community integration (Vincentnathan, 2012). In societies where the relationship between individual and society is not very close, such as in Britain, social conditions often prompt individuals to commit crime, while in a group oriented society, such as Bosnia, the divisions caused a formation of a group-based conflict and radicalization (Vincentnathan, 2012). Therefore, the Bosnian example reflects how agrarian, underdeveloped, collective and group-based societies, adjust less toward crime and more toward achieving group ends, with an emphasis on the exclusion of other groups (Vincentnathan, 2012).

Bursik and Grasmick (1993) differentiated among three distinctive types of social control (personal, parochial and public) believed to affect levels of social organization. According to Bursik and Grasmick (1993) *personal social control* refers to the interpersonal relationships and social ties among residents of a community; *parochial social control* refers to relationships between the people in the immediate local area and social institutions such as the church, schools and businesses; *public social control* refers to the relationship between the people and the government and/or the justice system. Bursik and Grasmick (1993) found that people could exhibit different levels of social control among each of the three mentioned types. For example, residents could possess strong and widespread social ties within a community - *personal social control*, and strong network ties with social institutions - *parochial social control,* but at the same time they could have very low influence on governmental agencies - *public social control* (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993). This was exactly the case in pre-war Bosnia where people had strong ties within their immediate community, strong ties to social institutions, while at the same time having very weak connection with the Yugoslavian totalitarian government that became ineffective. More specifically, since Bosnians avoid moving too far from their parents, siblings and extended family members, they have extremely strong ties to their immediate neighborhoods. Within the religious context, Bosnians develop very strong social ties within their respective ethnic communities because they tend to settle in areas where their group represents an ethnic majority (additional information provided in the next chapter).

Taylor (2001) introduced yet another concept that focuses on the positive end of social disorganization; a concept he called *collective efficacy*. When *collective efficacy*, or “a situation where residents get along, work through local organizations to better the community and take steps to informally control trouble in their neighborhood” is lost, the people will experience a high level of social disorganization, as it happened in Bosnia (Taylor, 2001). When differences between Orthodox Christian Serbs, Catholic Croats and Muslims in Bosnia, surged with the decline of Yugoslavian political control, the ethnic war divided Bosnia into two politically divided and ethnically homogenous regions; *Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine* (Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina), largely populated by Bosnian Muslims and Catholic Croats and *Republika Srpska* (Republic of Serbs), primarily populated by Orthodox Christian Serbs - see Figure 6 (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2012).

Figure 6 - Map of Bosnia (2012)

As separate *entities* (distinct regions), the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Serbs, have their own flag, constitutions and elect their own parliaments that are mainly concerned with representing their own regional interests (European Stability Initiative, 2004 - Making Federalism Work). The representatives of these governments are ethnically homogenous. Representatives of the government of Republic of Serbs are elected among the Serbs, while representatives of the government of Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina are primarily elected among the Muslims and Croats (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2012).

Simultaneously, there is a central government which represents both entities and oversees the representation of Bosnia in the international arena. Because of the concern about a fair representation of each of the three major ethnic groups in the Bosnian central government

(Muslims, Serbs and Croats), the Dayton Peace Accord, which ended the Bosnian ethnic war in November 1995, imposed a complex process for election of the central Bosnian government. As a consequence, the Bosnian central government does not elect members based on the size of the three main ethnic populations. Instead, an equal number of Muslims, Serbs and Croats are elected to hold offices in the central government. Additional checks-and-balances are also created through the continuing supervision by the European Union's representatives.

To make things even more complex, Bosnia is controlled by tripartite Presidency (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2012). Each member of the Presidency (Muslim, Croat, and Serb) is elected to a four-year term, while the Chairmanship of the Presidency rotates every eight months among the three members. The three members of the Presidency are directly elected; the Federation votes for the Muslim and Croat while the Republic of Serbs votes for the Serb (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2012).

Additionally there is one completely independent district, District Brcko. With its population of barely 71,000 people, District Brcko has its own flag, constitution and the government and it is independent from the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Serbs (European Stability Initiative, 2004 - Making Federalism Work). The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is further divided into ten autonomous *cantons* (administrative regions). There are a total of twelve autonomous regions in Bosnia. Each of twelve autonomous regions have their own local governments and ministries who rely very little on the input of a central government when deciding on issues concerning health, education, policing, local economy and social life (European Stability Initiative, 2004 - Making Federalism Work).

This simultaneous existence of three layered government was a mistake, which was never corrected. In 1994, under the Washington Agreement, Bosnia was intended to be a state, however, after the Dayton Accord was signed and ratified, in 1995, Bosnia was divided creating three distinct regions: 1) the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2) the Republic of Serbs, and 3) District of Brcko. Thus, Bosnia became a federation within a federation (European Stability Initiative, 2004 - Making Federalism Work), which continues to exist under the protectorate of international community despite of its obvious redundancy and weakness.

From a comparative point of view, what has happened in Bosnia resembles the social changes in India where achievement of the human rights, economic success and modernization is difficult because of social and ethnic diversity. Vincentnathan and Vincentnathan (2008) looked at several different factors that contributed to social disorganization amongst a Dalit (untouchable) community in India. This was a society that was predominantly hierarchal as evidenced by caste divisions, economic inequalities, and age based authority structure. However, rapid modernization decreased the obligation to perform caste roles within the traditional society, which led to caste conflicts and radicalization. The Dalits, in response to the atrocities and violence inflicted upon them, are becoming more and more violent. According to Vincentnathan and Vincentnathan (2008) Dalits became strong participants of the communist party and organized groups, such as the militant *Panther Movement*, whose creation was directly inspired by the African-American *Black Panther Party*.

Vincentnathan and Vincentnathan (2008) pointed out that modernization specifically produces individualism, equality, intergenerational differences, and resentment toward poverty and caste divisions. Therefore, societies such as India and Bosnia, where the people are experiencing pressure to improve their quality of life at the individual and group level, but are, at the same time, divided based on caste or ethnicity and religion, are experiencing increased, competition, radicalization and group conflicts due to limited economic resources.

Radicalization is also not a new concept. The term *radical* "derives from the Latin word *radix*, which means *root* … and indeed, there is a long and well-established discourse about the *root causes* of terrorism and political violence" (Hamm, 2007). Before 2001, hardly any reference to radicalization could be found in the academic literature on terrorism and political violence. Even now, the term continues to offer numerous definitions. The most widely used definition is as follows:

> "Radicalization is a process in which an individual changes from a non-violent activist to more extremist; a process that is often associated with youth, alienation, social exclusion, or the perception of injustice to self or others" (Silber and Bhatt, 2008).

However, since the destruction of the World Trade Center in 2001, the use of the term *radical* became synonymous with Islamic terrorism. Although the threat from Islamic terrorism is relatively recent, the West has had a long history of fighting terrorism, such as American militia groups, the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Northern Spain, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland (Gelleman, 2010; The European Commission, 2005). Their ideologies range from the extreme right or left, anarchist and religious, or nationalist based (Gelleman, 2010; The European Commission, 2005).

Still, most current researchers focus their studies heavily on Islamic radicalization. Their studies are focused on identifying general characteristics of Islamic radicalization, factors that influence Islamic radicalization, pathways to Islamic radicalization, environments where Islamic radicalization may occur, and attempts to create a standard profile of the types of individuals who may become radicalized (Homeland Security Institute, 2006). Other topics that appear in the radicalization literature include definitions and terminology, theories, research limitations, and recommendations for addressing radicalization (Homeland Security Institute, 2006).

Abuza (2003) indicates that one major factor, encouraging Islamic radicalization is the growth in *madrasas* (Islamic schools). He says "*madrasas* are schools that adhere to the rigid *Wahhabi* fundamental version of Islam that encourages radicalism that are mostly outside the control of the state educational system" (Abuza, 2003). Abuza (2003) also notes that in general, attendance at mosques and Islamic education has increased in recent years, but most importantly, "the growth in Islamic fundamentalism in many countries can be attributed to the failure of the domestic political economy to include all sections of people who are hoping for advancement." In a post-war Bosnia, where the economy is at a near standstill, where government still relies heavily on international donations, it is not surprising that influence of Saudi Arabian aid is still visible (Karcic, 2010). In the 17 years following the ethnic war in Bosnia, the Saudis have funded construction of dozens of *madrasas* across Bosnia (Karcic, 2010). As these schools often offer free meals and even a small stipend for the purchase of books and supplies, it is not surprising that Bosnian children, who are suffering from a prolonged post-war economic crisis, are attending these schools in larger and larger numbers.

Archik, Rollins and Woehrel (2005) claim that European Muslims may be vulnerable to radicalization because of their "failed integration into the mainstream society and limited avenues to economic success." However, Archik and colleagues stress that "the biggest concern about radicalization in Europe is due to the presence of jihadist fighters who remained behind after Balkans conflicts." According to some estimates, several hundred of *mujahedeens* (jihadist fighters) remained in Bosnia after the 1992-1995 ethnic war (Trifunovic, 2010). By 2005, majority of them have become Bosnian citizens, mainly through marriage with Bosnian women, while some have even changed their names in effort to blend with the local population.

Leiken (2005) reports that Muslims who moved to Western Europe after WWII "crowded into small, culturally homogenous enclaves; they are now citizens in name but not culturally or socially and they reject the minority status to which their parents acquiesced." Leiken (2005) also points out that the "isolation of these communities allows radicals to fundraise, prepare, and recruit with a freedom not widely available in Muslim countries." In post-war Bosnia all ethnic groups, including the Muslims, are primarily living in ethnically homogenous communities – see Figure 10 on page 43. The reason for clustering is a fear of repeat ethnic conflict, which leads to distrust of other groups and avoiding living in the same area. Correspondingly, in an ethnically homogenous community, which is overwhelmed with a feeling of fear and distrust of the other ethnic groups, it is much easier to spread radical ideologies. According to Karcic (2010), in an effort to "reach" as many Bosnian Muslim youth as possible, members of the former *mujahedeens* (jihadist fighters) founded the Bosnian Active Islamic Youth organization. They subsequently also begun publishing a monthly Islamic magazine SAFF (the prayer row) that featured "Islamic propaganda, anti-American rhetoric and inflammatory speech" (Karcic, 2010). Karcic (2010) noted that "Active Islamic Youth organization has become the best organized Islamic organization in Bosnia while the SAFF magazine's circulation grew to 5,000 copies."

Dittrich (2006) points out that, "most Muslims are not radical but that violent radicals are exploiting and misusing Islam as a framework for recruiting terrorists." She identifies a number of sources of Muslim radicalism, including "modernization, cultural, social, political dissatisfaction or exclusion, discrimination, and bad immigration policies" (Dittrich, 2006). Similarly, Richards (2003) found that, high unemployment and increasing poverty have alienated large sectors of the Muslim youth in the Middle East and North Africa (Richards, 2003). Yet another study, conducted by Coolsaet (2005), found that radicalization, and specifically self-radicalization, is far more likely to occur "as a result of job and housing discrimination, economic despair, and feelings of social exclusion due to ethnic or racial discrimination," than it is to occur as a result of religious teachings. Coolsaet (2005) claims that, "individuals may turn to religion as a way to cope with the victimization, social neglect, and discontent with society." Under these conditions the individual may be more easily nudged by charismatic religious leaders toward violent retaliation against the society.

Given the similar needs of the Bosnian people for equality, freedom, inclusion, good life, and dignity, many of the Bosnians, who adopt radical *Wahhabist* teachings are turning to radical ideologies because of their growing despair over more than a decade long economic crisis and continuing ethnic separatism, and because the radical groups tend to offer certain economic incentives. In many cases the radical groups donate money for food, medicine, clothing or school supplies as a way to attract individuals to their meetings. As nearly 43 percent of Bosnians are unemployed (Carpenter, 2011), and majority of Bosnians are Muslims, it is clear why such incentives would be attractive to many of them.

CHAPTER V

DATA AND DISCUSSION

Social disorganization can be identified in terms of various changes that occur in social institutions, social groups and social conditions. According to Elliott and Merrill (1961) there are many indicators of the social disorganization. In this chapter, the major emphasis is given to the dissolution of family (decreasing marriage rates, increasing divorce rates, decreasing overall fertility, increasing extramarital births), high unemployment rates, increasing crime rates, and increasing deterioration of inter-group relations marked by an increase in radicalization. Further, this section will investigate the effect of such social changes on crime, inter-group conflict and radicalization, which may have led to recent terrorist activities.

Dissolution of the family and changes in the family structure, in post-war Bosnia, are hypothesized to be the result of the emergence of egalitarian ideas. Egalitarian ideas reduce the authority of elders and weaken social control. Egocentric orientations derive from egalitarianism are thought to have resulted in reductions in family size and the number of married persons. The reduction in the number of births and marriages, which are addressed in this section, are seen as a reflection of increasing personal desires to live in a society where Bosnians can enjoy a better life.

Dissolution of family

According to Elliott and Merrill (1961), family disorganization is closely related to the disorganization in the larger society. The moral norms, values, individual behaviors, and attitudes of the family members tend to reflect the larger culture of the society where the family is located (Elliott and Merrill, 1961). As family members work together with other members of society within the economic, educational, religious and political institutions, they absorb the larger cultural values (Elliott and Merrill, 1961). The *family* can take many different forms, however, usually only one form is viewed as *normal*.

In pre-war Bosnia, the idea of a *normal* family was a family comprised of father, mother and children, as well as the grandparents (Simic, 1977). The reason a *normal* pre-war Bosnian family included grandparents was because, traditionally, one of the children would remain permanently with the parents (Simic, 1977). This duty usually fell upon a son. When the son marries, the wife moves in. In cases where a family had no sons, a daughter would remain living with the parents, and when she married, her husband moved in.

In the pre-war Bosnian family each member had a specific duty and status. Before the son's marriage, the father would be considered the primary bread-winner and the head-of-the-household. After the son's marriage, the father would retain this status as long as he was able to work and financially contribute to the family's budget. He often retained the role of primary bread-winner and head-of-the-household even when the son earned more than the father. After the father's retirement, the role of primary bread-winner would shift to his son, but the father would retain the role of head-of-the-household (Simic, 1977). As the father aged and became weaker the role of head-of-the-household slowly shifted to the son, but still, the wisdom and experience of the older male in the family was honored.

Although, this family unit may seem unusual to most Westerners, one must understand that pre-war Bosnia was a patriarchal society that evolved around a high level of parental control, family morals and values. Children were brought up to respect the authority of their elders, especially their fathers (Simic, 1977). In pre-war Bosnia it was not uncommon for children to be disciplined, including corporal punishment, by any adult for a transgression against the elderly (Simic, 1977). As children grew and became more active members of the society, their view of conventional social behavior expanded to include respect toward any authority figure, such as a police officer. The mere threat that punishment could be immediately exacted by any witnessing adult, prompted Bosnian children to keep their behavior within acceptable social norms.

Although, the pre-war Bosnian family norms have largely endured in post-war Bosnia, now the primary reason behind this family set-up is a result of the economic inability to obtain one's own house or apartment. The sense of *duty* to care for one's parents has begun to disappear as more and more children are exposed to the Western type values and norms that, in the wave of the increasing globalization, are transcending Bosnian borders via mass media. The media, movies and internet have introduced new ideas that place high value on individualism and immediate self-satisfaction, at the expense of the common good. As the mass media presents egalitarian values that undermine parental authority over children, children grow more detached from parental authority and begin engaging in harmful activities such as sexual promiscuity, drug use and theft. Some evidence of this is already visible in the increased teen pregnancy, drug use, alcoholism, and juvenile crime (UNFPA, 2010).

To make things worse, since post-war Bosnia has only 48 beds for juvenile offenders the prosecutors are forced to release all but a few of the most serious juvenile offenders. O'Donnell (2011) indicates there was a 70 percent increase of reported juvenile offending from 2001 to 2007, however, the increase in the number of juveniles prosecuted during these years is considerably less; only 21 percent (only 6 percent for the years 2000 to 2008). The situation is further complicated by the virtual nonexistence of juvenile treatment programs (Buric, 2011) and the fact that the Bosnian Penal Code does not acknowledge criminal responsibility for children under the age of fourteen. Because of this many juvenile offenders never get punished, which is basically teaching them that they can get by with committing crimes.

Due to the persisting economic crisis and lack of opportunities, these young Bosnians not only become hardened criminals, but they also begin to exhibit significantly altered patterns of social behavior. For example, some of the most important Bosnian pre-war norms were marriage and having at least two children per household. At the same time, divorce and extramarital births were strongly discouraged. But, since the ethnic war ended in 1995, Bosnia has been experiencing nearly a 30 percent decrease in the number of marriages; a far larger decrease than in post-war Slovenia 15 percent and Croatia 18 percent (Savostianov, 2011 – Marriages). Even more disturbing is the increase in the divorce rate. Between 1995 and 2005, the divorce rate in Bosnia increased by from 0.39 to 0.59, while the divorce rate in Croatia decreased from 1.17 to 1.01 (Savostianov, 2011 – Divorce Rates).

Experiencing a considerably lower number of marriages to begin with, while at the same time experiencing an increase in the divorce rate, indicates a significant change in the way the post-war Bosnian population perceives the institution of marriage and the importance of a family. Furthermore, the incidence of extramarital births per 100 live births has increased from 7.4 in 1990 to 10.1 in 2000 (Philipov, 2003).

This may not seem a significant increase for some western societies that offer more equal opportunities for men and women, but in a patriarchal society such as Bosnia, where the majority of jobs are held by males (UNFPA, 2012), the decrease in marriages and increase in extramarital births means that greater numbers of the female population will remain dependent on their fathers, while an increase in divorces and extramarital births causes even higher poverty among families consisting of single mothers and children.

The common practice of having at least two children per household in pre-war Bosnia is all but gone. Although nearly every country in Europe has experienced a decrease in fertility, Bosnia has seen a lowest fertility rate than any other European country. In 1990, the fertility rate per 100,000 people in Bosnia was 1.7, compared to 1.7 in Croatia and 1.51 in Slovenia (Philipov, 2003). In 2005, the fertility rate in Bosnia dropped to 1.2, compared to 1.4 in Croatia 1.4 and 1.3 in Slovenia (UNECE, 2005).

A cross-sectional population study of Bosnian females aged 15-49 conducted in 1998, found that every third woman had at least one intentional abortion (UNFPA, 2010). In 2005, Canton Sarajevo reported 13, 490 abortions per 100,000 births while in Tuzla Canton Medical Centre recorded a staggering 97,000 abortions per 100,000 births (UNFPA, 2010). There are many underlying causes for this: a bleak economic situation, the lack of empowerment of women to negotiate safe sex practices in a patriarchal society, misconceptions on the negative side-effects of using contraceptives, the lack of affordable contraception, and extremely easy access to abortion services (UNFPA, 2010).

The decreased number of new births, loss of hundreds of thousands of people due to war related deaths or migration to other countries, and a rapidly aging post-war population, all have major implications for the future economic sustainability of Bosnia.

Economic Crisis and Unemployment

In 1962, following a split between liberal Yugoslavian socialists and conservative Russian communists, the Yugoslavian government had to develop a defense strategy in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union (European Stability Initiative, 2004). Massive defense-related financial assistance was offered by the United States of America, which wholeheartedly supported the Yugoslavian split with the Soviet Union. Based on the great success of the Yugoslavian *partisans* (the socialist forces who resisted the Nazis in WWII using guerrilla techniques), the Yugoslavian government decided to turn the heavily wooded areas, natural caves, and harsh mountains of central Bosnia, into the center of the Yugoslavian military industry (European Stability Initiative, 2004). Rather quickly Bosnia became crisscrossed with an impressive network of roads, bridges and tunnels. The defense effort prompted building of many airstrips and underground hangars, underground arms factories, and underground command and control centers (European Stability Initiative, 2004).

During this period, 1962-1990, a massive military industry focused on building mortar barrels and guns, howitzers, multiple rocket launchers, explosives, jet aircraft, engines for tanks and armored personnel carriers, fuses for mines and grenades, detonators, radar, and electronics (European Stability Initiative, 2004). This became the driving force behind the industrialization of Bosnia. By 1990, Yugoslavia had one of the largest military industries in Europe, with nearly 55 percent of it located in Bosnia (European Stability Initiative, 2004). Many communities became cities and an urban way of life began to develop. The growth of military industry in Bosnia helped generate around US$20 billion during the 1980s by exporting military supplies to Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, Burma and Algeria (European Stability Initiative, 2004).

Yet, the Bosnian people reaped very little of the profit. Because of the volume of military investment Bosnia was denied civilian investments, even though it remained one of the poorest Yugoslavian republics (European Stability Initiative, 2004). Instead, profit was channeled into Serbia. Although Bosnia had an unemployment rate of nearly 65 percent (European Stability Initiative, 2004), instead of training Bosnians to work in these factories, workers from Serbia were brought in to Bosnia. All across Bosnia new apartment blocks were built to accommodate the soldiers and technicians who were relocated from Serbia. In 1971, Bosnian *per capita* income was merely at 53rd percentile of the Yugoslav average, and only one percent of Bosnians had university training (European Stability Initiative, 2004). About 36 percent of Bosnians had less than three years of primary education (European Stability Initiative, 2004).

None of the former military industry, which had been the backbone of the Bosnian economy, survives today. At the start of the ethnic war in Bosnia, in 1992, the Serbian-led Yugoslavian Army dismantled and transported as much as possible to Serbia (European Stability Initiative, 2004). Whatever they were unable to transport, they destroyed. The collapse of military industry was a huge shock to the Bosnian economy yet it received very little attention from either Bosnian or international policy makers (European Stability Initiative, 2004).

In 2009, with more than 41 percent of the work force unemployed, Bosnia has the highest unemployment rate in Europe (U.S. Department of State, 2012 – Bosnia). In comparison, post-war Croatia had a 17.9 percent unemployment rate while Slovenia had only 7 percent unemployment rate in 2009 (U.S. Department of State, 2012 – Croatia and Slovenia).

Unfortunately, the Bosnian labor market policies “largely target those who already have jobs which resulted in a continuous rise in wages since 1996, while still maintaining a high rate of unemployment” (UNFPA, 2012). Furthermore, “the highly static labor market, in which workers change jobs only slightly more frequently than in the pre-war period, favors the educated, older, and male population” (UNFPA, 2012).

According to UNFPA (2012) “the social groups with the least access to employment are women.” This is of the utmost importance considering that women make up about 51 percent of the Bosnian population, yet they hold only a 36 percent share of the work force (UNFPA, 2012). In addition to higher unemployment rates, females continue to earn less and hold less paying jobs than men (UNFPA, 2012).

Crime

The disorganization of family and its control over children in a deprived economy has brought Bosnian children, teens and young adults to a condition of hopelessness. These children, teens and young adults want improvement in their lives, but the ruined Bosnian economy has created diminished opportunities and disenchantment with the future. With the family disorganization and the family’s inability to socialize children properly, in the context of social conditions, many teens are turning to criminality, and those influenced by radical philosophies turn to terrorist activities.

Therefore, the crime rate in Bosnia, especially the juvenile crime rate, has been increasing since the end of the ethnic war in 1995 (Buric, 2011). Yet, it is difficult to determine the exact increase because, prior to its disintegration, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFR Yug.) combined the crime rates from its six states (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Monte Negro, Macedonia) and two administrative regions (Vojvodina and Kosovo), and reported an overall rate for the entire country.

1990	Homicide	Assault	Rape	Robbery	Burglary	Drug
SFR Yug.	8.52	70.27	4.72	6.4	16.09	1.72
Poland	2.05	37.66	4.83	42.56	1131.38	2.9
Russia(USSR)	11.32	11.16	10.14	56.29	137.84	10.98

Figure 7 - Crime rates per 100,000 (1990)

2005	Homicide	Assault	Rape	Robbery	Burglary	Drug
Bosnia	1.9	36.2	1.2	20	132.4	17.1
Slovenia	1.0	115.1	2.3	21.4	1012.0	33.4
Croatia	1.5	26.0	2.6	35.1	475.2	128.3
Poland	1.5	75.9	5.2	110.3	578.6	176.9
Russia (Fed.) No report	21.5	40.3	6.4	No report	214.7	

Figure 8 - Crime rates per 100,000 (2005)

The crime rates for SFR Yugoslavia – see Figure 7, collected by the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime in 1990, shows its crime rates were relatively low when compared to some other countries associated with former communist or socialist regimes, such as Russia or Poland (UNODC, 1990). Specifically, in 1990, the SFR Yugoslavia had lowest rates for all types of crimes except for homicide and assault. Comparably, in 2005 – see Figure 8, it is evident that a trend continued as Bosnia had lowest rates for all types of crimes except for homicide and assault (UNODC, 2005).

But these figures hardly provide an accurate picture because they fail to take in a consideration the fact that the crime reporting system in Bosnia is greatly politicized, even though the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia still maintains supervision over the Bosnian police. Furthermore, the practice of informal disposing of juvenile offenses, for those between the ages of 14-18, with only a recommendation to seek the assistance of a social worker may be significantly masking the true extent of the crime in Bosnia.

Social disorganization has an effect on deviant behavior because it affects informal social control in the community. Social control becomes weaker because of ideological and technological changes that call for different social adaptations. For instance in Bosnia these changes polarized the society by causing an imbalance in the distribution of income, power and status in a society.

Ethnic Division as a Response to Social Disorganization

Freilich and Pridemore (2005) identify weakened community social controls, lack of social networks, increased residential mobility, poverty, and ethnic heterogeneity as factors contributing to increased criminal behavior. In other words, the central foci of the social disorganization are the gradual decline of the neighborhood mechanisms that are responsible for social control, which leads to crime and disorder (Baldoza, 2009). Baldoza (2009) claims that similar factors can be used to explain the emergence of violent radical groups, especially in

Bosnia where group affinities are strong and stressed individuals express their frustrations through group initiatives that support radical and terrorist movements.

Other researchers claim that social disorganization does not necessarily cause increased mobility or decreased social control. Brewer, Lockhart and Rodgers (1998) claim that social disorganization in Belfast-Northern Ireland actually inhibited social change and facilitated the operation of informal social control. In Belfast, some residents used civil unrest as key factor in the revitalization of their community structures.

Additionally, according to Brewer, Lockhart and Rodgers (1998), the Irish Republican Army (IRA), was also involved in policing the neighborhoods. So, in a way, the civil unrest acted as a unifying force that kept the community together. In Belfast it would appear that "civil unrest has produced a voluntary *ghettoization* by restricting geographic mobility and producing socially homogeneous districts; this cohesion is reflected in the survival of extended kinship networks, close-knit neighborhood structures" (Brewer, Lockhart and Rodgers, 1998). In other words, "conflict with out-groups (the Protestants) reinforced the sense of solidarity of the in-group (the Catholics), where the enclaves encircled by another community was always articulating the strongest sense of community" (Brewer, Lockhart and Rodgers, 1998). Thus, social disorganization does not necessarily destroy every community. It can be helpful for groups to reorganize and channel people toward a desired goal.

We can see a similar *ghettoization* in post-war Bosnia. In 1991, just prior to the ethnic war in Bosnia, ethnic populations were estimated at 44 percent Muslim, 31 percent Orthodox Christian Serb, 17 percent Roman Catholic Croat, and 8 percent others, including Jews and some Protestants – see Figure 9 (University of Texas at Austin, 1993). The populations were heavily mixed with a high occurrence of intermarriage across ethnic groups.



Figure 9 – Ethnic composition in pre-war Bosnia (1991)

As a direct result of post-war ethnic tensions, the diffusion across ethnic lines all but disappeared. The current indications are that intermarriage across ethnic groups is pretty much non-existent as most ethnic groups are staying clustered within regions with their own ethnic majorities – see Figure 10 (University of Texas at Austin, 2005).



Figure 10 – Ethnic composition in post-war Bosnia (2005)

Semyonov and Gorodzeisky (2003) point out that “failure of customs and traditions to contain or explain social changes or inequities may lead to the development of political and religious fundamentalisms that foster negative attitudes towards and support exclusionary policies against minorities who pose a threat to the collective identity and the cultural, national, and ethnic homogeneity of the society.” The general idea behind Semyonov and Gorodzeisky’s claim is that people who live in poverty and who cannot afford to live in the mainstream economic system are more likely to become hostile and to resort to violent action against the rival groups and the government, which they perceive as responsible for the condition of inequality.

Historically speaking, Bosnia has suffered unequal treatment under the rule of many different conquering nations, starting with the Romans (3rd century BC-1395), Ottoman Turks (1463-1878), Austro-Hungarians (1908-1918), Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918-1941), Nazi Germany (1941-1946), ending with the rule of former-Yugoslavian socialists (1946-1991) who supported Serbian domination, which subsequently resulted in ethnic war (1992-1995). Due to frequent attacks by the conquering nations that vied for a control of its lands, Bosnia remained impoverished and undeveloped despite its sizable natural resources such as hydropower, timber, coal, iron ore, bauxite, manganese, copper, chromium, lead, zinc, cobalt, nickel, clay, gypsum, and salt (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2012). To put this in a perspective, in 1990, when the average employment of the working-age population in Europe was at 64 percent, only 35 percent of working-age Bosnians were employed (European Stability Initiative, 2004). A deliberate former-Yugoslavian politics, from 1946 to the 1960s, suppressed the development of Bosnia, forcing it to remain largely agrarian in nature. In the 1960s the creation of a massive military industry in Bosnia relocated into Bosnia thousands of people from other states, many of whom were Serbs, to fill the available positions instead of training and hiring the local population. The revenue made from the sale of weapons manufactured in Bosnia was then funneled to Belgrade (Serbia), instead of being used to develop much needed civilian employment opportunities in Bosnia.

If Bosnian ethnic and radicalization problems are looked at from this angle, one may say that the creation of antagonistic groups in Bosnia was a result of the adjustments to the social structure, created by the decline of powerful political and social control of the Yugoslavian government. Since social disorganization theory focuses on the breakdown of social control, it could be argued that there is an obvious link between disorganization theory and Hirschi's (1969) idea that deviant behavior could be explained by variation in attachment to others and common goals. Thus, a lack of unity, attachment, and common goals among the groups, as was the case between the Bosnian Muslims and Serbs, caused the increase in resentment and group conflict, which eventually led to increase in radical behavior.

Ethnic Conflict and Radicalization

Cilluffo and colleagues (2007) argue that "there is no single cause or catalyst for radicalization, as the road to extremism is influenced by a variety of motivational factors." Individuals generally appear to begin the radicalization process on their own; however, "as they progress through the stages of radicalization they seek like-minded individuals" (Yehoshua, 2010). This leads to the creation of "like-minded" groups. Silber and Bhatt (2008) who expanded on this research found that, once a group is created, members reinforce and encourage each other and progress to the critical stage that could involve committing a terrorist act. In the final indoctrination stage, “an individual progressively intensifies his of her beliefs, wholly adopts the radical ideology, and concludes, without question, that conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further one’s cause” (Silber and Bhatt, 2008).

During World War II, thousands of Bosnian Muslims were killed by the nationalistic forces of Serbian *Chetniks* and Croatian *Ustashe*. This prompted some Muslims to join the socialist forces, the Partisans, while others created their own nationalistic force, the *Handjars*. This division along ethnic lines caused severe splintering, which continued to fester even after the end of WWII and establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Tomasevic (1975), explains that Serbian and Croatian nationalists consider Bosnian Muslims as descendants of Ottomans. Therefore, they believe that their hatred and retaliation against Bosnian Muslims is a rightful action for the past wrongdoings committed by Ottomans against Serbian and Croatian population.*

Because of increased ethnic divisions in post-WWII Yugoslavia, Marshall Tito devised a plan to eradicate religious and ethnic tensions by officially silencing religion in both the public and private domain. The idea was that, if people were not allowed to engage in religious practices, they would eventually shed their ethnic identity and assume the new *Yugoslavian* identity. However, it soon became apparent that the SFR Yugoslavian government intended to silence the religion of only one ethnic group, the Muslims. Between 1945 and 1991, the

*Note:
Bosnian Muslims are actually descendants of Christian Slavs (Serbs and Croats) who converted to Islam during the Ottoman Turks occupation. Same ancestry means that there are no visible physical differences between Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats. Also, they speak the same language (with minor differences in dialects), although Bosnian Muslims and Croats use Latin script, while Serbs use Cyrillic. Furthermore, all three ethnic groups “define themselves in terms of birth into a religious community, rather than their personal adherence to faith” (Hayden, 1992).

Orthodox Serbs and Roman Catholic Croats continued to practice their religion, while the government looked the other way. During this same time Muslim mosques were confiscated and the ownership of those properties transferred to the national government, Muslim organizations were disbanded and Muslim intellectuals were persecuted (Karcic, 2010). A large number of Muslim intellectuals were sentenced to death for their religious activities while others received long prison sentences or faced death through extra-judicial killings (Karcic, 2010).

During the 1970s, the Bosnian Muslim community began reviving its religious identity with the help of *gasterbaiter* (guest workers) working mainly in Germany, Austria and Switzerland (Karcic, 2010). According to Karcic (2010) these guest workers donated money for reconstruction of the mosques that were destroyed during WWII and construction of numerous *masjids* (smaller prayer areas). As the Bosnian Muslim identity started regaining momentum, Marshall Tito died in 1980 and the Serbian and Croatian nationalism with their old ideas of splitting Bosnia in two and annexing it to their countries, returned with a vengeance. The increased nationalism and inability to find a compromise eventually culminated in the dissolution of SFR Yugoslavia and wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo.

Serbian and Croatian forces attacked the independent state of Bosnia in 1992. And even though Bosnian sovereignty and independence was recognized by the United Nations, the UN still insisted on imposing a weapons embargo on Bosnia, effectively preventing Bosnian Muslims from defending themselves against the well-armed Serbian forces (Clancy, 2007). According to Clancy (2007), at the onset of the ethnic war Bosnian Muslims had only two tanks and two armored personnel carriers (APCs), while Serbian forces in Bosnia had 300 tanks, 200 APCs, 800 artillery pieces and 40 aircraft. Because of Bosnian Muslim's inability to acquire weaponry by the end of 1992 Serbian forces occupied around 70 percent of Bosnian territory, and by the end of the aggression in November 1995 an estimated 63,050 Bosnian Muslims had been killed (Clancy, 2007).

Additionally, nearly all Muslim cultural and religious buildings located in the territories under Serbian or Croatian control were destroyed (Karcic, 2010). For example, the 414 year old Ferhadija Mosque was bulldozed by Serbian forces (Bose, 2002). Also, the 427 year old Mostar Bridge was systematically fired upon by Croatian forces using large artillery rounds, until it collapsed. During the 1992-1995 ethnic war, Serbian and Croatian forces established concentration camps for Muslims where they were tortured and killed. According to PBS News (2001), by the end of the ethnic war in 1995 there were dozens of concentration camps under the control of Serbian and Croatian troops - see Figure 11.

Figure 11 – Locations of the concentration camps in Bosnia

Some estimates reported 97,000 people killed and roughly 15,000 missing or presumed dead during the 1992-1995 ethnic war in Bosnia (Xinhua, 2007). An estimated 65 percent of them were Muslims, 25 percent were Serbs and 8 percent were Croats (Xinhua, 2007). Over 90 percent of those killed were men and 10 percent were women. The last pre-war census in Bosnia, conducted in 1990, claimed there were 4.38 million residents in Bosnia (UNFPA, 2012). A post-war survey, done in 2007, showed that the resident population of Bosnia had diminished to 3.45 million (UNFPA, 2012). This staggering figure shows a decrease in Bosnian population of nearly one million people (21 percent of the total population). These war statistics, although often inaccurate due to lack of reliable information, still offer a glimpse of the extent of the devastation.

But the biggest contribution to the population decrease was war-related migration. According to some estimates, in November 1992, the refugee population numbered nearly 1.5 million Bosnians (Collier, 2005). Although many of these refugees returned to Bosnia, about 200,000 decided to permanently settle in other countries, causing a large percentage of the population decrease.

One of the especially devastating aspects of the Serbian and Croatian aggression was the systematic rape of an estimated 20 thousand Muslim women and young girls (Collier, 2005). In a patriarchal society such as Bosnia, which culturally centered on values of male pride and female chastity, the rape of a woman, and especially the loss of virginity outside the confines of a marriage, was considered a taboo. To this day, some 17 years later, these women are still not offered any significant social, psychological or legal help by the Bosnian government. But even more devastatingly, because of their rape these women are considered unmarriageable and are ostracized by their own families.

An even bigger taboo in Bosnia that no one is willing to talk about is the rape of Muslim men. Some researchers estimate that thousands of Muslim men were subjected to sexual abuse or rape in the concentration camps, yet these men remain silent. Experts suggest that male and female rape in time of war is predominantly an assertion of power and aggression, rather than an attempt on the part of the perpetrator to satisfy sexual desire (Women Aid International, 1993). The main aim of such attacks is to damage their victims psychologically, to intimidate them, and rob them of their pride and their manhood. However, the prosecutors from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia claim that, due to their inability to find male victims willing to talk about sexual abuse, they are unable to put together even a single case involving male rape.

By the end of the ethnic war in Bosnia, world-wide media began calling it an *ethnic cleansing* (a euphemism for *genocide*). The term *ethnic cleansing* was used to describe the mass killings and expulsion of Bosnian Muslims from areas under the control of the Serbs and Croats (Collier, 2005). As the heart-wrenching images of massacred Bosnian Muslims flooded the media, the outrage of Muslims across the world and especially in the Middle East grew exponentially (Karcic, 2010).

The first countries to step in and offer substantial help to Bosnian Muslims were Saudi Arabia and Iran (Karcic, 2010). While Saudi Arabia sent humanitarian and financial aid, Iran provided weapons, military instructors and intelligence officers to Bosnia (Karcic, 2010). But, as soon as the Dayton Peace Accord was signed in November 1995, the Bosnian government was pressured to sever its ties with Iran (Karcic, 2010). The Bosnian government complied, however, Bosnia and Iran continued to maintain close ties through academic and cultural institutions. Only ten days after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord, Iran opened its brand new embassy in Bosnia (Karcic, 2010).

In post-war Bosnia the influence of Middle Eastern aid is still visible. The Saudis, for example, funded the construction of dozens of mosques across Bosnia, *madrasas* (religious schools), orphanages, and cultural centers (Karcic, 2010). But, most importantly, the influence of the Middle East can be seen in the reemergence of traditional dress and increased religious attendance (Karcic, 2010). Because of the still present influence of the Saudis, as well as the Iranians, Bosnia is also experiencing an emergence of the *Wahhabi* and *Shiite* movements (Karcic, 2010).

The *Wahhabi* movement is characterized by revival of the puritanical form of Islam (Karcic, 2010). *Wahhabis* call upon the return to early Islam. They tend to ignore the existing schools of legal thought, and blame the decline of Islam as a global force on modern innovations (Karcic, 2010). *Wahhabi* movement is prominent in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. The *Shiite* movement, on the other hand, offers a completely different interpretation of Islam than Bosnian Sunni Muslims or Saudi Arabian *Wahhabis* (Karcic, 2010). Yet, the *Shiite* movement is gaining strength through establishing numerous educational programs, presentations and media publications (Karcic, 2010). They even opened a college near the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, where they teach the Persian language and offer religious classes (Karcic, 2010). As an incentive for attendance, each graduating class is taken on a trip to Iran (Karcic, 2010). The *Shiite* movement is prominent in Iran and Iraq.

DuVall (2008) states that, “religion may not play an important role during the radicalization process, but rather it serves as a vehicle for fulfilling other goals.” Violent actions of the terrorist organizations, according to Ashour (2008), are against the *sheriat* laws (Islamic laws) which demands that “a truly religious Muslim who wishes to mend the ways of another, must do so pleasantly and must be patient and tolerant when giving advice.” A truly religious Muslim “severely criticizes the use of weapons as a method of changing the ways of other Muslims, and states that the *sheriat* explicitly forbids it” (Ashour, 2008). By this interpretation, extremists are not practicing the main-stream religion. They have either “developed their own interpretation of Islam, or simply use religion to spread their own extremist ideology” (Ashour, 2008).

Silber and Bhatt (2008) point out that there are three broad sets of radicalization causes:

1. Background factors **-** Background factors are those aspects of an individual history that make them susceptible to the lure of radicalism. These include a personal identity crisis where people experience alienation, discrimination, and perceived injustices.
2. Trigger factors **-** Trigger factors influence an individual transition from pre-radicalization to actual radicalization. These include a perceptibly unjust government policies and provocative events, the presence of a charismatic leader or spiritual advisor, and the glorification of the cause.
3. Opportunity factors **-** Opportunity factors are situations that provide a setting for radicalization by offering an opportunity to meet likeminded people. These settings include the Internet, prisons, mosques, schools and universities, and sports activities.

During the 1992-1995 ethnic war, a large number of Islamic fighters from abroad, traveled to Bosnia to offer aid to the Bosnian Muslims (Karcic, 2010). These fighters were seasoned *mujahedeens* (Islamic warriors) from Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, and Afghanistan. After the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord, Western governments pressured

Bosnia to expel all foreign fighters (Karcic, 2010). However, several hundred of them married Bosnian women and permanently settled in Bosnia. Western intelligence agencies believe that, among those who remained, a significant number are still active fundamentalist in Islamic organizations. During the Bosnian ethnic war, these foreign fighters, attached in small groups to the regular Bosnian units, engaged in retaliatory attacks against Serbian and Croatian population, sometimes massacring their victims in gruesome manners. This later prompted the western community to charge several Bosnian military leaders with war crimes against the Serbs and Croats.

By the end of the Bosnian ethnic war, the *mujahedeens* separated themselves from the regular Bosnian army and formed their own units. The primary reason for separation was the fact that most Bosnian Muslims were not devout practitioners of Islam (Karcic, 2010). In fact, the majority of the Bosnian Muslims did not practice any religious activities at all. But, some Bosnians fell under the influence of these foreign fighters and began sharing their more radical views of Islam, which subsequently contributed to the radicalization of certain segments of the Bosnian Muslim community (Karcic, 2010).

This radicalizing influence was clearly visible in April 2010, when members of the *Wahhabi* movement detonated a bomb at a police station in the town of Bugojno, located 70 kilometers southwest of Sarajevo (Jihadi Watch, 2008). One police officer was killed, and six others were injured during the attack. The most recent terrorist attack took place in October 2011, when a lone gunman affiliated with a local Wahhabi movement began shooting high velocity rounds at the U.S. Embassy in Bosnia, hitting the building and injuring one police officer (Sito-Sucic, 2012).

If one were to draw conclusions from the existing literature concerning Bosnia, they would find that scholars perceive ethnic conflict and radicalization from many different angles and often in very particular ways. In Bosnia, ethnic conflict and radicalization arose from several factors clustering together: 1) people trying to attract scarce economic resources for themselves and their groups, 2) the Serbs trying to subordinate the Bosnian Muslims to gain advantages for themselves, 3) an ethnic divide that was there in obscure form becoming more developed and open in this context, and, finally, 4) the struggle of the oppressed Muslims for survival, which resulted in groupism and acceptance of Muslim fundamentalism and radicalism with the support coming from Muslim countries.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Bosnian society was more stable and unchanging while it was controlled by the authoritarian government of Tito's Yugoslavia which incorporated socialistic notions of common good. During this time the strict rules that were enforced by the Yugoslavian government over the Bosnian people were accepted because they were considered to be useful for all and both the ruler and the ruled learned to relate well with each other. But, with the increasing impact of western democratic notions, Bosnians gradually became dissatisfied with the unequal treatment, inferior life conditions and the unfair controls exacted over them by the Yugoslavian government, while other states were given preferential treatment. As Bosnians looked at other countries, where people were economically successful and free to make their own choices in regard to social and political issues, they became dissatisfied and angry with the Yugoslavian regime because it prevented them from being able to have that kind of life. The dissatisfaction and anger felt by Bosnians increased when the Yugoslavian economy began failing in the late 1980s.

As a result, the Bosnians determined to give up their socialistic patterns of living in favor of independence, democracy and their seeking of personal and group related goals as an independent nation. The Serbs and Croats opposed Bosnian independence and enlarged the ethnic divide that had been there but was somewhat dormant. This ethnic division was revived to the advantage of Serbs and Croats who tried to exclude the Bosnian Muslims from an equal division of social and economic capital.

Generally speaking, popular dissatisfaction arises especially at the time when the economy is in shambles and the political system is unable to effectively rectify the situation. This is what happened during final years of socialistic Yugoslavian rule, as well as what happened to other Soviet Bloc countries. Unable to control their own people, the Soviet Union granted independence to one country after another, as it felt that it could not control the emancipation of their people.

Because of the people's new interests and attitudinal changes, their thinking and behavioral patterns began to change. New habits began to increase hold and gradually replaced the old ways: 1) authoritarian government was replaced by democratic government, 2) subjection of people to autocratic control was replaced by freedom of choice 3) limited or lesser economic desires encouraged by the collectivistic way of life was replaced by higher desires for better standard of living. In other words, the former organized way of life began to disorganize in Bosnia as it had in Soviet Bloc countries.

However, what was new was also built on some earlier traditions in history. What may be seen currently is a combination of past and present, but moving toward the new set of goals that have emerged. These changes are apparent in all societies moving from traditional to modern ways of living. Such changes can also be found among socialistic countries that came under the Soviet Bloc and are now rapidly developing, including Bosnia. As did the other countries, Bosnians are now responding to similar changes in different ways, relevant to their common objectives, historic experience and culture, internal problems and external influences.

Even though people often think that democracy is a solution to radicalization and terrorism, it also sometimes encourages those very acts. Democracy often alienates people who, when frustrated with their society, can be easily influenced by radical leaders and their philosophies. Such people often become radicalized and follow the radical leadership.

In countries where despotism, autocracy and collectivism prevail, the desire to become democratic arises, especially in the context of developing democratic values. However, it should be said when the countries adopt democracy, the flavor of their democracies vary. Some of the current democracies, that were originally under the socialist control, have more connective links between individuals and respect for authority of their governments. They also respect their elders somewhat better than western European nations. From the history of modern western democracies it can be said that many of the countries started democracy in obscure form, but developed them gradually to modern form of democracy. It seems more probable that in Bosnia and in other countries that were under Soviet control, will eventually develop their own democracies toward the patterns of western societies, with some minor adaptations. Currently, Bosnian radicalization and terrorism is oriented toward achieving group ends, when the democracy moves well into the direction of western democracies, their patterns of radicalization and terrorism could adjust and take the pattern of western societies. It is therefore important, as Durkheim has noted in his book "*Moral Education*" that democracies should learn the ideas and behavior patterns that are appropriate to live safely and happily in a democratic society (Durkheim, 1903).

What is needed in Bosnia now is strong government that can guide people to move toward democracy by bringing bonds between individuals, as well as groups, and enhance cooperation, satisfaction of mutual interests, and promote human dignity by creation of democratic laws that ensue peace, order and justice.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

The author, Mirela Dapo, is an international student from Bosnia. Prior to starting her education in the United States she worked with several international organizations deployed to Bosnia, such as, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations – International Police Task Force (UN – IPTF) and the Office of the High Representative – International Judicial Commission (OHR – IJC).

After her arrival to the United States she attended St. Philips College and San Antonio College in San Antonio (TX) earning an Associate degree in Criminal Justice in Dec. 2006. During this time she earned many academic honors and awards while, at the same time, volunteering with the San Antonio Police Department. She graduated with the highest honors, and as a result she was elected to present a Student Commencement Speech which earned the standing ovations. She then attended the University of Texas-Pan American for both her undergraduate and graduate education. During this time she volunteered with several local criminal justice agencies and was a president of UTPA's chapter of the Alpha Phi Sigma – National Criminal Justice Honor Society. In May 2010 she graduated with the highest academic honor, *Summa Cum Laude*, earning a Bachelor of Science degree in Criminal Justice.

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