

8-2006

Federico González Garza: A vanished hero of the Mexican Revolution

Mario A. Ferron
University of Texas-Pan American

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.utrgv.edu/leg_etd



Part of the [History Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Ferron, Mario A., "Federico González Garza: A vanished hero of the Mexican Revolution" (2006). *Theses and Dissertations - UTB/UTPA*. 734.

https://scholarworks.utrgv.edu/leg_etd/734

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations - UTB/UTPA by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. For more information, please contact justin.white@utrgv.edu, william.flores01@utrgv.edu.

FEDERICO GONZÁLEZ GARZA:
A VANISHED HERO OF THE
MEXICAN REVOLUTION

A Thesis

By

MARIO A. FERRON

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Texas-Pan American
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS


August 2006

Major Subject: History


FEDERICO GONZÁLEZ GARZA:
A VANISHED HERO OF THE
MEXICAN REVOLUTION

A Thesis
By
MARIO A. FERRON


Approved as to style and content by:



Rodolfo Rocha PhD.
Chair of Committee



Michael Faubion PhD.
Committee Member



Brian S. Butler PhD.
Committee Member

August 2006

ABSTRACT

Ferrón, Mario A., Federico Gonzalez Garza: A Vanished Hero of the Mexican Revolution. Master of Arts (MA), August, 2006, 90 pp., references.

The purpose of this study is to reveal Federico Gonzalez Garza as a foremost figure of the Mexican Revolution. Chapter I examines the circumstances that gave form to Federico's ideology. Chapters II and III, analyze Federico's transcendental role during the 1910's presidential elections, and his involvement during the consequent revolution. Chapters IV and V analyze the challenges Federico encountered to transform a revolution into a government. Chapter VI reviews Federico's contribution to the insurgency against Victoriano Huerta and Venustiano Carranza.

Chapter VII gives closure to this study, summarizing Federico's political and diplomatic achievements, and claiming recognition for his transcendental contribution to the history of Mexico. The study is mostly based in primary sources, including Federico's personal archive and the memoirs of contemporary characters of the revolution.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
TITLE PAGE	i
APPROVAL PAGE	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I: THE BEGINNING	5
CHAPTER II THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN AND THE ELECTIONS OF 1910	14
CHAPTER III: THE REVOLUTION OF 1910	27
CHAPTER IV: TRANSFORMING THE REVOLUTION INTO GOVERNMENT	42
CHAPTER V: THE PRESIDENCY OF FRANCISCO I. MADERO	54
CHAPTER VI: A REVOLUTION WITHIN A REVOLUTION	67
CHAPTER VII: THE LEGACY OF FEDERICO GONZALEZ GARZA	81
REFERENCES	91
VITA	93

INTRODUCTION

The Mexican Revolution is one of the most conflicted stages in Mexican history. For more than ten years, an eclectic group of individuals competed against the standing governments and among themselves, to generate a political change in accordance with their own ideals and expectations. They established reformist groups that associated and dissociated according with the changing opportunities. Unfortunately, Mexico's official story developed idealized figures from characters like Francisco I. Madero, Venustiano Carranza, Emiliano Zapata and Francisco Villa, leaving behind other personalities that have been somehow "vanished" from history. Historical characters whose sweat and suffering largely contributed to the results of this outstanding Mexican epopee, and whose neglect must not continue.

Such is the case of Federico Gonzalez Garza, a foremost figure of the Mexican Revolution, who remains poorly researched. Even though his involvement during this heroic episode in Mexican history is not only enormous but also highly transcendental, his name is completely unknown by most contemporary historians. The purpose of this study is not to denigrate the contribution of other historical figures of the Mexican Revolution, but to recognize the extensive contribution, this enthusiastic Mexican patriot made during the Mexican Revolution.

For more than thirty years, Federico Gonzalez Garza fought for the establishment of a true democracy in Mexico. His democratic plight started in 1907, when he met

Francisco I. Madero. With Federico's support, this young and idealistic member of one of the wealthiest families in the north of Mexico soon became the head of the first social rebellion in the twentieth century. The passionate ideals of Federico, in conjunction with his outstanding writing skills and his diplomatic maneuvering, fueled the movement up to the point of defeating a tyranny entrenched for over thirty years.

Federico Gonzalez Garza helped to define the Maderista stage of the revolution. He collaborated with Madero in the writing of "La Sucesión Presidencial". He took part in the futile establishment of the Partido Democrático Nacional, and the successful founding of the Partido Anti-Reeleccionista. His incisive political essays fueled the political campaign up to the point to attain official harassment and persecution. Eventually, this same harassment placed Federico into the highest post of the party, becoming president of the Party's campaign just in time for the historical presidential elections of 1910.

The electoral fraud of 1910 transformed the political campaign into a social revolt, where Federico occupied one of the highest ranks. He was the one who chose San Antonio, Texas, as headquarter for the incipient insurgency. He actively participated in the writing of the Plan de San Luis Potosi, and became Secretary General of the Mexican Revolution, in charge of both the military operations as well as the civilian and diplomatic strategy. From this post he established communication with important figures of American politics including Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, William Taft, and William Jennings Bryan.

When the revolution succeeded, Federico Gonzalez Garza occupied important roles in the new administration. Federico Gonzalez Garza was appointed Secretary of

State in Madero's provisional. Few weeks later and even though Federico was against the political compromise proposed by the Tratados de Ciudad Juarez, he took part in the new government as Sub-Secretary of State and Secretary of Justice, under the provisional Presidency of Francisco Leon de la Barra. When Madero became Constitutional President of Mexico after the elections of 1911, Federico Gonzalez Garza became Sub-secretary of State, Chief of Staff, and Governor of Mexico City.

Federico Gonzalez Garza insisted in his plight to accomplish the democratic ideals proposed by the Maderistas. With the support of revolutionary leaders like Lucio Blanco and Francisco Villa, Federico implemented one of the most important promises of the Revolution of 1910, the re-distribution of land. Unfortunately, political egocentrism hindered the project, generating secession amid the revolutionary forces. It would be until the triumph of Alvaro Obregón, that Federico González Garza was able to return to Mexico to implement some of the promises of the Revolution of 1910. During Obregón's administration, Federico collaborated with Jose Vasconcelos in the establishment of the Secretary of Public Education and became the first Secretary of Agrarian Reform.

Eventually, the democratic ideal of Federico Gonzalez Garza collided with the political ambitions of Plutarco Elias Calles and his new political machinery, embryo of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (P.R.I.). His hope for a political and peaceful return of democracy vanished with the assassination of Alvaro Obregón and the futile presidential candidacies of Jose Vasconcelos and Juan Andrew Almazán. In return for his advocacy in favor of democracy, Federico Gonzalez Garza was intentionally vanished from Mexican History.

Fortunately, Federico Gonzalez Garza maintained an extensive personal archive that provides historians with an assorted collection of original documents that follows his path during the revolution. Many revolutionary characters, including Sanchez Azcona, Roque Estrada, and Jose Vasconcelos wrote extensive memoirs about this epic time in Mexican history that included passages confirming Federico's participation.

Chapter I

The Beginning

Federico Gonzalez Garza was born in Saltillo, capital city of Mexico's northern state of Coahuila, on March 7, 1876. Offspring of a middle class family, Federico attended the Ateneo Fuente, one of the most prestigious high schools in Mexico. In September 1892, he was the main speaker at the Independence's anniversary. His political awakening took place the following year, when social turmoil in Nuevo Leon allowed him to witness the harshness of repression.

In 1894, Federico traveled to Mexico City to enroll in law school, but abandoned school due to the sudden death of his parents. He got a job at the Mexican Telegraph, occupying managerial positions in several cities and towns in northern Mexico. This job took Federico to San Pedro de Las Colonias, hometown of Francisco I. Madero, where he established rapport with the future leader. In 1899, Federico was transfer to Mexico City, getting the opportunity to finish law school. Even though young and inexperienced, Federico became the legal representative of the Mexico City Banking Company. This job brought Federico back in touch with the Madero family. He traveled to Coahuila, hired by the Madero family as financial advisor, the same year Madero started writing *La Sucesión Presidencial*.

Federico's influence in Madero's book is undocumented, however, his political ideals and literary style are very similar to the ones portrayed in Madero's book. In this book,

Madero's ideals and literary style are outstandingly different from his previous writings. Even Madero's family doubted about the authorship of his book. In a letter written in January 1909, Madero's father expressed: "Your book...has passages truly high and even sublime...that is why dad (Don Evaristo) was amazed, and asked you who was helping you. There is a noticeable difference... known by the style and repetition of words".¹ Enrique Krause expressed his doubts about Madero's authorship. In the prologue he wrote for the 1994 edition of "*La Sucesión Presidencial*" Krause questioned Madero's authorship by asking: "Was truly Panchito (Madero) the only author?"² In a highly controversial letter, written in December of 1912, Luis Rivas claimed: "Many people in Mexico know that you (Federico Gonzalez Garza) are the true author of 'La Sucesión Presidencial', in conjunction with Juan Sanchez Azcona".³ Unfortunately, there is no documented replay to this letter, accepting or denying the claim. Anyway, even though there is no physical proof to exhibit Federico's influence in the political writing and idealism of Madero, the political developments demonstrate an ideological parallelism between these two characters.

Federico returned to Mexico City in 1907, establishing a partnership with Wilbur Wilson Burton, American lawyer representing foreign interests in Mexico. For months, Federico divided his time between defending American interests and promoting the establishment of local clubs for the incipient National Democratic Party. Unfortunately, a group of Reyistas, headed by Francisco Vasquez Gomez, took control of the political party, forcing Madero to search for a new denomination for his group. Federico

¹ Juan Sánchez-Azcona. *Apuntes para Historia de la Revolución Mexicana*. (México: INEHRM, 1961), 20.

² Francisco I. Madero, *La Sucesión Presidencial*. (México: Editorial Clío, 1994), 9.

³ *Fondo CMXV: Archive Federico González Garza*; Condumex, Fólde:28, Legajo: 2787 (Archive FGG, 28-2787).

sustained his partnership with Wilbur Wilson Burton until January of 1909, just in time to join Madero in his odyssey for democracy. The 20th of January, Madero told his father, his determination to participate in politics, and a few days later, Gonzalez Garza and Jesus Flores Magón informed Benito Juarez Maza their decision to leave the Organizing Club of the National-Democratic-Party.

The first documented communication between Francisco I. Madero and Federico Gonzalez Garza is dated February 1, 1909, when Federico sent a letter to Madero, asking for a copy of Madero's book, *La Sucesión Presidencial*. Coincidentally, the following day Francisco I. Madero sent one of his most remarkable letters to Porfirio Diaz, stating that "The whole nation wishes that your successor to be, The Law!"⁴

In May of 1909, Francisco I. Madero and Federico Gonzalez Garza took part in the establishment of the *Centro Anti-Reeleccionista*, basal ground for the National Anti-Reelectionist Party. The original committee was conformed by Paulino Martinez, Filomeno Mata, Emilio Vaquez Gomez, Alfredo Robles Dominguez, Manuel Urquidi, Roque Estrada, Jose Vasconcelos, and Federico Gonzalez Garza.⁵

Federico became one of the most important panegyrists of the Anti-Reelectionist Party. Taking advantage of the party's newspaper *El Anti-Reeleccionista*, Federico published several editorials that displayed not only his commitment towards democracy and social equity.

In his first editorial, entitled *Why we have to Affiliate to the Anti-Reeleccionist Party*, published June 13, 1909, Federico provided a clear picture of the political scenario, where four political groups were competing for power. According to Federico, three of

⁴ Chantal López & Omar Cortés, *Madero y los Partidos Anti-Reeleccionista y Constitucional Progresista* (México: Ediciones Antorcha, 1988), 19.

⁵ José Vasconcelos, *Ulises Criollo* (México: Editorial Jus, 1964), 226.

these parties offered no real social change: the Cientificos, headed by Limantour, minister in Diaz's government; the Reyistas headed by Bernardo Reyes, important military leader; and the Democratic Party, whose leaders hold tight relationships with Don Porfirio. The only political option that promised true social change was the Anti-Reelectionist Party. In this first article, Federico attacked the other political parties without attacking Diaz.

His second editorial was bolder than the first. Published under the title *The Nation has never implored General Diaz's Permanency in Power*, it purported a timid attack against the elderly leader. Federico recognized the social peace and economic progress Mexico experienced during Diaz administration, but criticized the patriarchal tutorship Diaz had imposed over the people. Federico displayed for the first time, his writing ability to attack his enemies using their own words and actions against them. He refuted the idea that the people beseeched Diaz to remain in power. However, he claimed that, by affirming his permanency was due to the will of the people, Diaz was recognizing the people's democratic capabilities and therefore, his patriarchal system was unnecessary. Madero sent a letter to Fulgencio Palavicini, editor of *El Anti-Reeleccionista*, praising Federico's article.

In his third article *False notion of Prestige in Politics*, Federico left behind his attacks against Diaz and directed his batteries against the servile attitude of the corrupted press and bureaucrat officers. The main criticism of the press against the oppositionist leaders was their lack of experience in public office. Federico claimed this argument as a virtue because their lack of public experience only demonstrated the lack of corruption and servile attitude among the independent figures.⁶

⁶ Archive FGG, 7-667.

In his fourth article, *Where is the Evil; who is Guilty*, Federico reestablished his warring attitude towards Don Porfirio, blaming him for the political commotion. He claimed that Don Porfirio, while publicly declaring himself an advocate of democracy, was at the same time preparing an electorate fraud.

In July of 1909, Federico published *A Schism begins within the Corralistas*. This essay offered a severe critique to the political campaign of Mr. Corral, Diaz's vice-presidential candidate. Federico pounded the official press, criticizing the exaggerated effort made by the press to promote such an unpopular candidate.

His article *The Retardatarians*, represents Federico's most outstanding criticism to the Científicos. It claimed the Científicos suffered a severe moral dysfunction that incapacitated them to develop a normal moral formation. Due to this moral handicap, they became highly intelligent but extremely selfish individuals, with an acute revulsion for common people. "These spiritually-mutilated-individuals...pretend to rule the destiny of Mexico, aspiring to establish a total slavery, disguised in democracy".⁷ In his next publication, titled *To the Corralista Agitators*, Federico promoted the concept of social responsibility for the ruling elite, exposing the inequalities of the Mexican government. He claimed politicians like Limantour and Corral had the opportunity to do much good to the people; but instead, they cared only for themselves, amassing power and wealth.⁸

In *Flock of Souls*, Federico exposed his commitment towards social equality. He criticized the wealthy and educated society who benefited from the social and economic inequalities generated by Diaz's regime. They blamed the poor for their misery, but did

⁷ Archive FGG, 7-675.

⁸ Ibid, 7-676.

nothing to correct the social wrong. For Federico, this society had a moral responsibility towards less fortunate sectors of society, and should work in favor of their betterment:

You boast you are the enlightened; why don't you enlighten?

If you know, you are all offspring of the same nation, why you keep betraying your kin. You are a miserable flock of souls that happily pasture in the sheepfold of dictatorship!⁹

In his ninth editorial, *To our Adversaries, Supporters of Illegality*, Federico talks for the first time about the possibility of social insurrection. He claimed that if social oppression has not diminished in the near future, it would generate a violent rupture.

Week after week Federico's writings grew in intensity and passion as he hardened his attacks against Diaz and his associates. His editorial *Has General Diaz completed his Work*, reassumed the attacks against Don Porfirio. Claiming that "the Nation wants the successor of General Diaz to be...The Law" Federico provided two possible outcomes: Diaz could finish his term supporting popular sovereignty, or he can impose Corral as his successor. This editorial brings back the argument about the writing parallelism between Federico and Madero. The most impressive phrase in this essay; "the Nation wants the successor of General Diaz to be...The Law", is identical to a phrase used by Madero in the letter he sent to Diaz in February of this same year, stating "the Nation wishes your successor to be, The Law".¹⁰ Coincidentally, Madero sent the mentioned letter to Diaz, just one day after receiving a letter from Federico.

His next editorial, published under the Latin title *Sursum Corda*, was an awakening call for civil commitment. Gonzalez Garza claimed that a small minority retains power

⁹ Archive FGG,7-673.

¹⁰ López, C. 19.

thanks to the cowardice and lack of civility of the populace, inviting the people not to remain on their knees but to stand and suffrage.

His twelfth publication, *How the Corralistas procure the Happiness of the Nation*, contains Federico's strongest admonition about the possibility of social insurrection; disguising a threat as an analogy. He claimed that, as the people of Coahuila in 1903, tired of the tyrant, revolted and ejected the local government; today, the people's patience has a limit and eventually might react likewise. This article won again fine remarks from Francisco I. Madero.¹¹

Federico directed his next attack against the young intellectuals who surrender to the corruptive forces of the despotic government, betraying the hope society has endowed upon them. In his article, *Poor Youth: A Fraud to the People's Hope*, Federico glorified the commitment of the oppositionist intellectuals who have renounced to economic advancement through the road of servility.

They call us inept, (and) they are right...we are inept to enter public life through the narrow door of adulation and indignity...but they should remember that...just by crawling...we could have got where they are.¹²

In his editorial, *General Diaz Supports Again the Democratic Movement*, Federico confronted Diaz's arguments against the "official" press. What seemed to be a laudatory essay in favor of Don Porfirio was instead a sharp attack against the official supporters of his tyrannical rule. Drawing from a Diaz's speech about democracy, Federico claimed lower authorities and paid-press were betraying Diaz's conviction that all Mexicans could freely exercise their electoral rights, even if against the official candidates. He claimed

¹¹ Gonzalez-Garza, F. 53.

¹² Archive FGG, 7-689.

Diaz directed his admonition about using public force against the official press and the public officers, who were the only true transgressors of the law.

Federico's editorials were a remarkable collection of literary attacks against an eclectic range of political targets. His valiant essays attacked all the major actors in this antidemocratic tragedy. From the immoral disregard of the accommodated society and the corrupted collaboration of the illustrated masses to the servility of press and authority, they all collaborated in the blatant confabulation between the authoritarian ruler and a group of pseudo political parties, to sustain in power an antidemocratic and tyrannical regime. For months, Federico exercised his constitutional right to publish his opinion, an uncommon occurrence in a subdued society. His writings spread the ideals of the Anti-Reelectionist Party, collaborating to the advancement of the movement.

Federico published his last collaboration to *El Anti-Reeleccionista* in September of 1909, under the title *Mexico is a Country without Political Freedom, Without Freedom of speech, Without Freedom of Press, Without Freedom of Suffrage*, using as battleground the news article *Barbaric Mexico*, published by the American Magazine in New York and harshly criticized by the official press. Federico argued it was painful for many Mexicans to see "our cousins" able to express shameful truths about Mexico, while we were unable to publicize them in their own country. In his article, Federico exposed some of Mexico's greatest moral miseries, including the unconstrained exploitation of the poor, the lack of respect to Mexico's Constitution, and a total disregard to the people's rights and liberties, claiming all these wrongs were caused by the moral deprivation a re-election system endows to government.

Federico's writings finally infuriated Don Porfirio, who ordered the closure of *El Anti-Reeleccionista* and the arrest of Gonzalez Garza on September 28, 1909. Luckily, Federico was able to escape, accompanied by the newspaper's editor, Jose Vasconcelos.¹³ By this time, Gonzalez Garza had already established rapport with Mexican refugees in the south of Texas, especially in San Antonio. His writings in the *Anti-Reeleccionista* were circulating widely in the area, thanks to the collaboration of local publishers like Manuel Cepeda, editor of *El Progreso*.

¹³ Vasconcelos, J. 235.

Chapter II

The Political Campaign and the Elections of 1910

For many activists, political persecution was a good-enough reason to abandon the cause; however, less than a month after his escape, Gonzalez Garza was back in Mexico City. In October of 1909, Federico was designated Secretary of the Anti-Reelectionist Center by Emilio Vasquez Gomez, leader of the political group.¹⁴

A few weeks earlier, Vasquez Gomez drew together a group of notable citizens, who considered reelection as the greatest political problem in Mexico. Emilio was a good political leader, however, although he criticized the vice-presidential reelection, he was in favor of the reelection of Porfirio Diaz. This contradiction generated a lack of confidence within the group. They needed a leader totally committed with the Anti-Reelectionist ideal.

Madero started his political career based in the same contradiction. He criticized reelection as the main obstacle for democracy; however, he was in favor of allowing Diaz to retain the presidency until his death. Fortunately, Madero changed his perspective right on time, convinced that by allowing the permanence of Diaz, he was justifying Diaz's tyrannical attitudes and thus, defeating democracy. The influence of people like Federico Gonzalez Garza caused such a transcendental paradigm shift in Madero's perspective.

¹⁴ Archive FGG, 7-706.

During the next six months, Francisco I. Madero, Emilio Vasquez Gomez and Federico Gonzalez Garza transformed an incipient partisan group into the only true opposition party for the presidential election of 1910. The goal was to unify all the different groups into one single political force, the Anti-Reelectionist Party.¹⁵ Many oppositionists affiliated with the Reyista Partido Nacional Democrático. These included important intellectuals and politicians like Francisco Vasquez Gomez, Jesus Urrieta, Luis Cabrera, Manuel Zubarain Capmany, and Venustiano Carranza. They all supported Bernardo Reyes, the military leader who challenged the perpetuation of the “Cientificos” oligarchy. The debacle of the Reyismo emerged by the end of 1909, when Reyes subdued to Diaz, refusing his presidential nomination and yielding to leave the country in a diplomatic task. Many Reyistas, disappointed with the unexplainable tribulations of Reyes, joined Madero and his Anti-Reelectionist group.

In December of 1909, the Anti-Reelectionist Center, headed by Emilio Vasquez Gomez invited all oppositionists to a national convention, promoting a single presidential candidature. The idea impressed the Partido Nacional Democrático, headed by Francisco Vasquez Gomez, who asked for a political alliance. Madero had a very high perception of the Vasquez Gomez brothers. Since 1908, he requested Juan Sanchez Azcona, to highlight the personality of Francisco Vasquez Gomez. Madero’s intention was to promote Francisco as presidential candidate during the national Convention. Meanwhile Gonzalez Garza and Emilio Vazquez Gomez continued the propaganda, taking care of the organization of the National Convention.

In April of 1910, Emilio Vasquez Gomez, President of the Anti-Reelectionist Center, designated Federico Gonzalez Garza as delegate to attend the National Convention of

¹⁵ Lopez, C. 55.

Independent Parties.¹⁶ Porfirio Diaz, worried by the unexpected response, decided to impede Madero's nomination, ordering his detention. To circumvent this strategy, Federico hid Madero in his own home, located near the Tivoli Theatre, site of the Convention.

The Convention opened April 15, 1910, presided by important characters like Jose Pino-Suarez, Jesus Gonzalez, Abraham Gonzalez, Juan Sanchez Azcona and Aquiles Serdan.¹⁷ During that first day of session, and due to his extraordinary writing skills, Federico Gonzalez Garza was left in charge of writing the *Party's Political Standards*, in conjunction with two other distinguished delegates: Alfredo Robles Dominguez and Urbano Espinoza. Together, they defined the political guidelines that would steer the party, becoming a political guiding-light for the Anti-Reelectionists. During the Convention, Madero incorporated these guidelines into his political discourse, displaying total congruence between his personal beliefs and the Convention's ideals. Eventually, they became the basis of Madero's political campaign, the Ideals of the Revolution of 1910 as stated in the Plan de San Luis, and ultimately incorporated as the fundamental principles of the Constitution of 1917.

The Convention proceeded to elect their candidates for the presidential election to take place during the month of July. Against Madero's candidacy, The Partido Nacional Democrático presented Toribio Esquivel Obregón as their candidate. Even though many delegates were forced to vote in favor of Esquivel Obregón, Madero gained the election and became the official presidential candidate of the Convention. Francisco Vasquez Gomez won the vice-presidential ticket thanks to Madero's support.

¹⁶ Archive FGG, 8-729.

¹⁷ Manuel Ramírez, Manifiestos Políticos: 1892-1912 (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1957), 131.

The next step was to inform the nation about their results. The Convention established a committee to write this transcendental document, and Federico is endowed with the honor and the responsibility, in conjunction with Jose Maria Pino-Suarez and Juan Sanchez-Azcona. They divided the document writing in accordance with their writing skills. Sanchez Azcona wrote the opening part in a poetic style, Federico wrote the main body of the document, consigning the ideological message, and Pino-Suarez wrote, in a very political style, the closing of the document. The last step was to establish the Electoral Executive Committee. in charge of the political campaign, integrated by Emilio Vasquez Gomez as Honorary President, Francisco Martinez as President, Sanchez Azcona as Vice-president, and Roque Estrada and Federico Gonzalez Garza as Vocals.¹⁸

From that moment on, Federico devoted all his energy and intelligence to promote the triumph of Francisco I. Madero. One of Federico virtues was his ability to take advantage of any event that could provide support to the political campaign. On April 23, 1910, Theodore Roosevelt provided such an opportunity. During his visit to France, Roosevelt gave a speech at The Sorbonne, addressing issues about democracy and the rights and responsibilities of citizens:

No individual or Nation that respects itself, should submit itself to injustice... Valor and Intelligence, are worthless if used only in self-benefit; neglecting others... I believe sincerely in peace, but if peace and justice conflict, we must scorn the man who not side with justice, even if the whole world raise arms against him.¹⁹

¹⁸ Roque Estrada, *La Revolución y Francisco I. Madero* (Guadalajara: Estrada, 1912), 207. & Sánchez-Azcona, J. 79. & Ramírez, M. 139.

¹⁹ Archive FGG. 8-736

Federico took advantage of the opportunity. He translated the speech into Spanish and distributed it as an endorsement to their political ideology. By doing so, Federico gave the public impression Roosevelt was backing the ideals of his political party.

Thank you, Roosevelt... You are with us; you are with the cause of our people, in this moment that an abominable regime is about to crumble and fall... you approve our ideals, you sanction our acts.²⁰

Federico's essay, entitled *The Gospel of Democracy: Duties and Rights of a Citizen in a Republic*, gave thrust to the campaign and was acclaimed by most of the leaders of the movement.

On May 22, 1910, the Anti-Reelectionist Party nominated Federico for a seat in congress. After the startling success of the National Convention of Independent Parties, the government increased its harassment against members of the Anti-Reelectionist Party. However, this circumstance did not hinder Federico's pledge in favor of social change or limit his advocacy against Diaz. On May 25, 1910, Federico Gonzalez Garza gave a magnificent speech, accepting his nomination to congress. He promised to obey the people's will, not the president's will, to procure for public education to reach the most humble and poor, to alleviate the economic and moral scarcities of the workers, and to promote public service responsibility. "So there can be no more, another tyrant like you (President Diaz), I will work to make constitutional, the principle of No Re-election".²¹ Many party leaders including Sanchez Azcona, Roque Estrada, and Pino-Suarez, sent messages congratulating Federico's valiant discourse.

²⁰ González-Garza, F. 71.

²¹ González-Garza, F. 103.

This kind of political audacity was uncommon at the time. The two main leaders of the party, Emilio Vasquez Gomez and Francisco Martinez Baca, abandoned the cause due to political harassment, forcing Sanchez Azcona to take care of the Party. In conjunction with Federico, they organized two important protests in support of the Anti-Reelectionist candidates, allowing Madero to accomplish two successful political tours through Puebla and Veracruz. Francisco Vasquez Gomez did not accompany Madero, scared by the wicked harassment. During his visit to Orizaba on May 22, 1910, Madero gave a final blow to the Reyista movement by criticizing their vicious attacks towards Limantour. Madero claimed the Cientificos were not the problem, nor the Reyistas the answer, but the real evil was Porfirio Diaz.²² His statement brought an immediate backlash, augmenting persecution.

Even though Federico initially occupied a small rank in the party's leadership, the political turmoil pushed him into the highest ranks. As harassment and persecution increased, many party members and officers were either killed, arrested, or forced to exile into the United States. The dictator tried to crush the movement by holding Madero as prisoner. On June 6, 1910, and just a few weeks before the presidential elections, Madero, accused of insulting the president, was sent to jail. Roque Estrada was also incarcerated, and Francisco Vasquez Gomez was forced into home isolation.

Sanchez Azcona and Gonzalez Garza took charge of the campaign. They published a manifesto, denouncing Madero's illegal incarceration. To discredit this editorial, the paid-press published rumors, incriminating the candidates as instigators of bloody revolts. Sanchez-Azcona and Gonzalez Garza reacted, publishing a new manifest, denouncing this political slander. This publication generated a new wave of harassment; Emilio

²² Vasconcelos, J. 242. & González-Garza, F. 417.

Vasquez Gomez, who was no longer president of the Party, was also confined. Sanchez Azcona traveled to Monterrey to parley with Madero. During his visit, he learned that the government had issued a warrant for his detention. By advice of Gonzalez Garza, Sanchez Azcona left the country, seeking refuge in San Antonio, Texas.²³

Harassing conditions forced Federico to take charge of the political campaign, while the political climate rapidly deteriorated. On June 14, 1910, Madero sent a letter to Porfirio Diaz and published a political manifesto, denouncing his incarceration as a political maneuver. He blamed Diaz for all the harassment suffered by him and his party members during the campaign, making Diaz accountable if the imminent electoral fraud distressed the nations' peace. For the first time, Madero was publicly speaking about the possibility of a social revolt.

Federico immediately implemented a damage-control policy. Signing as Second Vocal in Functions of President, he sent a memo to all the Anti-Reelectionist committees, instructing them to keep working normally, but also to prepare substitutes to be ready in case of detentions. "Albeit harassment and persecution, we must always be ready to support our ideals, and to peacefully, make them succeed". The following day, Madero appointed Federico as President of the Electoral Executive Committee.²⁴

From this point on, harassment became unconstrained. Diaz's regime suppressed all independent journalists and the amount of Anti-Reelectionists imprisoned surpassed the five thousand people. However, Federico maintained his thrust. In June 21, 1910, Federico published one of his most passionate editorials titled *Comply with a Duty in virtue of a Right*. This essay appealed to the pathos and ethos of the reader, inviting them

²³ Gonzalez Garza, F. 109.

²⁴ Archive, FGG, 8-773 & 8-784.

to exercise their right to vote, as a civic duty in favor of democracy and the betterment of the nation.

Diaz was committed to utilize all his resources to eliminate the threat that the Anti-Reelectionists represented for his hegemonic rule, and the apparition of a new political party proposing the Diaz-Dehesa formula, was just part of these resources. The intention was to confuse the populace, dividing the oppositionists, diluting their suffrage strength. Federico immediately denounced the concealed political maneuver through a new manifesto, published June 24, just two days before the election.

The presidential elections took place the June 26, 1910. The people, amid the menace of violence, incarceration, or death, attended the suffrage call. The affluence of voters forced Diaz to recur to a major electoral fraud to retain power. Federico knew this would happen, so he published a manifesto instructing the local committees to document any fraudulent maneuvers and submit them as proof to the Electoral College. He provided clear instructions how to work during the Electoral College to avoid, as much as possible, the continuance of the electoral fraud.

To increase the pressure, Federico published a magnificent editorial titled *The Moral Triumph of the Anti-Reelectionists*.²⁵ He claimed the attitude of the people represented a moral triumph for the Anti-Reelectionist party. Their peaceful stance during the electoral process was not due to fear or lack of motivation, but an organized and deliberate intention to act within the law, in accordance with the principles of the Anti-Reelectionist party. This attitude demonstrated the control that the party had upon the populace. In this occasion, the party made peaceful use of their control; next time their attitude could be completely different.

²⁵ Archive FGG, 9-866. & González-Garza, F. 116 & 441.

On July 4, 1910, Madero sent a letter to Federico, congratulating him for his actions and recommending him to follow the procedure until exhausting all the legal recourses.²⁶ Two days latter, Federico informed the party that the Electoral Executive Committee would keep working until the Congressional resolution about the elections. As Federico predicted, the fraudulent maneuvers prevailed at the Electoral College. He informed the local committees about the most recent electoral fraud and requested documentation. The national response was overwhelming. Federico received hundreds of documents to corroborate the fraud to the people's will.

Meanwhile, Madero remained in jail, committed to continue the electoral process until the last consequences. He sent a letter to Federico, applauding the way he conquered the heart of the people, keeping alive their determination to oppose Diaz's Regime.²⁷ On September 1, 1910, Federico Gonzalez Garza personally attended Congress to present his nullification request.²⁸ In an extensive document with more than 600 pages, Federico denounced the violent and fraudulent procedures used by the official party and requested Congress to nullify the elections. Several newspapers published the Memorial and some of the most important figures of the movement sent congratulation letters to the author of such a challenging document, including Madero, Pino-Suarez, Roque Estrada, Abraham Gonzalez and Sanchez Azcona. Unfortunately, it took just a few days to eradicate the last hope for a peaceful solution. On September 17, 1910, Congress rejected Federico's proposal for nullification.²⁹

²⁶ Archive FGG, 9-889.

²⁷ Josefina Moguel, Guía del Archivo del Lic. Federico González Garza (Mexico: Condumex, 2000), 9.

²⁸ Ramirez, M, 154 & Archive FGG, 9-833.

²⁹ Ramirez, M. 156. González-Garza, F. 151 & 191.

The idea that social insurrection was necessary had existed since the Convention of 1910. Madero's imprisonment fueled the rebellious idea. However, Madero and Gonzalez Garza made clear the need to first endeavor all pacific means. The electoral fraud showed the only option left was insurgency, and Federico was aware of it. In his writings he had stated that the Mexicans were not going to tolerate another presidential imposition. He visited Madero in San Luis Potosi where planned Madero's escape and convened the revolutionary uprising would start by the end of November. This decision, generated discrepancies between the followers of Francisco Vasquez Gomez, who opposed the revolt, and the followers of Madero, who supported it. Federico did not refuse the idea of war. On the contrary, he rejected to consider peace as the greatest good. Paraphrasing Machiavelli, he wrote "Wars are humanitarian acts when there is no more hope than them...do not let the rascal to disguise with the word patriot, tyranny to mask under the word democracy, nor abjection to be called love for peace".³⁰

Violence emerged on September 11, 1910, when Federico organized a public protest, trying to compel Congress to accept his nullification proposal. Felix Diaz, Mexico City's Chief Police Inspector, repressed the event, infuriating the populace who reacted by lapidating the despot's residence. Although convinced there was no other option but revolution, Federico pretended to support a pacific solution. He convinced Diaz the oppositionists would be satisfied with the nullification petition. Meanwhile, the conspiracy was taking form.

Federico's law office became headquarters for the emerging rebellion, where he informed partisans about the revolutionary plans. Madero was going to signal the uprising date, depending on the Congressional resolution. In a letter sent to Federico

³⁰ González-Garza, F. 257

Gonzalez Garza, Congress gave its final decision, indicating they found in his Memorials no evidence to justify the electoral nullification.³¹

To maintain the pacifist veil, Federico published his *Last Manifesto* as president of the Electoral Executive Committee of the Anti-Reelectionist Party, September 29, 1910. He wrote about the shameful Congressional resolution and declared the disbaring of the Electoral Committee. He recognized that, even though the results of the political campaign seemed a defeat for the people, they represented a moral victory because the people resisted repression, confirming their moral superiority above their rulers.

On October 1, 1910, Madero applauded Federico's last Manifesto, congratulating his ability to go through the political ordeal unharmed by government's repression. Sanchez Azcona, Vice-President of the Anti-Reelectionist Party and representative of the Partido Nacional Democrático, wrote in his memories that Gonzalez Garza heroically resisted the attacks of a powerful enemy, accomplishing all the legal procedures available, in an attempt to obtain a peaceful resolution.³² In October of 1910, Sanchez Azcona informed the party about the dissolution of the Electoral Executive Committee, expressing his admiration to Gonzalez Garza.

Meanwhile, some Anti-Reelectionist figures were losing faith in the cause. Since the day of the elections, Francisco Vasquez Gomez declared his antagonism with Madero and his opposition to the use of violence. His brother Emilio, freed the day after the elections, later denied any relationship with the movement.³³ Jose Maria Pino-Suarez sent

³¹ Estrada, R. 283 & Gonzalez-Garza, F. 151 & 191.

³² Sanchez Azcona, J. 174.

³³ Gonzalez-Garza, F. 149.

a letter to Emilio Vasquez Gomez, calling for the end of the movement. He wrote, "The only option is to maintain the party alive, without meetings or protests".³⁴

Other oppositionist elements were already planning a revolutionary movement under the flag of the Partido Liberal Mexicano and the leadership of Ricardo Flores Magón. People like Antonio Villarreal, Catarino Garza, Paulino Martinez, and the Flores Magón brothers, had been fighting against Diaz's regime for several years, prior to the Maderista movement. However, their radical proposals and anarchist actions- limited their public support. As the political crusade needed a leading character to be successful, the revolution also depended on the moral figure of Madero to attain triumph.

San Antonio was sanctuary for hundreds of Mexicans forced into exile by the official persecution. The local population was receptive and supportive to the Mexican refugees, trying to keep informed about the events happening in Mexico. Several local newspapers kept track of the political events in Mexico and applauded the Anti-Reelectionist cause. Federico, knowledgeable about the region's support, decided to take advantage of it. Since the beginning, he maintained contact with several newspaper editors in the area, including Manuel Cepeda, editor of *El Progreso*. During the summer of 1909, he sent copies of *El Anti-Reeleccionista*, for Cepeda to reproduce in his local tabloid. When Diaz closed the *Anti-Reeleccionista*, Federico immediately informed Cepeda. His goal was to maintain San Antonio conscious of the spread of the Anti-Reelectionists, and supportive to their movement.

When Paulino Martinez and Juan Sanchez Azcona faced political persecution, they both escape to San Antonio. Madero instructed Sanchez Azcona to initiate a media campaign in the United States, under the distant guidance of Federico Gonzalez Garza.

³⁴ Archive FGG, 10-975.

Paulino Martinez, on his arrival in San Antonio, established his own newspaper, *La Voz de Juarez*, a libertarian and Anti-Porfirist tabloid avidly read by the local population. The increase of harassment and persecution generated a massive influx of ideological refugees into San Antonio that exacerbated the support. By September of 1910, San Antonio was already the neuralgic center of the Mexican dissidence, boiling with libertarian passion and in expectancy of their leader, Francisco I. Madero.

During the entire political ordeal, Federico maintained communication with Madero, who remained incarcerated in San Luis Potosi. A few days after the consummation of the electoral fraud, and thanks to the support of Jose Ives Limantour, Madero obtained his conditional freedom under parole. Once Congress declined Federico's Memorials and especially after Gonzalez Garza published his "*Last Memorial*", where he declared the closure of the party's political activities, the supervision upon Madero was abridged. This gave Madero the opportunity to escape from San Luis Potosi to San Antonio, Texas, where he arrived in October 7, 1910.³⁵ Several rebel leaders like Roque Estrada, Aquiles Serdan, Roque Gonzalez Garza, Francisco J. Mujica, and Jose Maria Maytorena, followed Madero. A few weeks later Venustiano Carranza also arrived to San Antonio.

Federico remained in Mexico City until October 12, 1910. Since July, Sanchez Azcona recommended that Federico escape to San Antonio, where he could be more useful to the revolutionary cause. However, in accordance to his plan, and to retain the secrecy of the insurrection, Federico decided to remain in Mexico, following through the last steps of the pacifist campaign. His arrival in San Antonio signaled the beginning of a new phase in their quest for democracy. The revolutionary stage was set, and now, they just needed a plan.

³⁵ Estrada, R. 283.

CHAPTER III

THE REVOLUTION OF 1910

Considered one of the most important documents of the Mexican Revolution, the authorship of El Plan de San Luis Potosí is commonly attributed to Madero. The truth is Madero assembled a group of thinkers to give form to this transcendental call to arms that included Juan Sanchez Azcona, Roque Estrada, Enrique Bordes Magel, and Federico Gonzalez Garza.³⁶ According to Sanchez Azcona, “Madero distributed the task among the committee, in harmony with their capabilities. When finished, Federico Gonzalez Garza collected the individual drafts and assembled the final document”.³⁷ Since the beginning, Federico explained the risks of violating the Neutrality Acts of the United States, which is why, when the document was finished, it was fictitiously dated October 5 of 1910, as if written by Madero while residing in San Luis Potosi.

To win the American support, Madero published a document directed to the people of the United States, providing a detailed explanation of the political mishaps that forced the Maderistas to revolt. Its writer demonstrated enormous writing skills and the ability to use the arguments of the adversary in his favor, displaying expertise in the ideological conditions of the American people. Once again, the writing skills of Federico blend with Madero's; Federico's archive contains the drafts of such a politically important essay.

³⁶ Estrada, R. 308. & Ramírez, M. 200. Sánchez Azcona, J. 173.

³⁷ Sánchez-Azcona, J. 175.

The Manifesto brought favorable consequences to the revolutionary movement. Published nationwide by the Associated Press, it gained the heart of the American people, limiting the reaction of the American administration. Washington treated the Maderistas more leniently than the way it treated the Magonistas, even though both were, in essence, radical movements fighting against a friendly nation, and therefore in violation of the Neutrality Act.

Before starting the rebellion, Federico took one very intelligent step. He asked Madero to publish a document informing Mexican Army officers about the forthcoming movement and inviting them to join in. Drawing again from the reader's mindset, it used the military's pride in honor and loyalty, against government and in favor of the cause. It claimed that the army's loyalty was towards the people, not the regime, and to retain their military honor the army must defend the people against the despotic ruler. Aware of the human condition of the military, the document offered to upgrade their military ranks upon changing sides. By military pride, patriotic honor or human ambition, it worked, attracting many army officers.

An important group of Anti-Reelectionists, including prominent leaders like Emilio and Francisco Vasquez Gomez, did not consider the revolution as an acceptable option. They surrendered to the harassing pressure and refused to follow the Maderistas in their revolutionary adventure.³⁸ Since Madero's apprehension, Francisco Vasquez Gomez took a healthy distance from his political partner. In June of 1910, he wrote a letter explaining his dissociation, claiming that nothing could be done; "triumph can only be attained through violence and this must not be used".³⁹ His kin Emilio maintained a

³⁸ Vasconcelos, J. 256.

³⁹ Archive FGG, 9-860.

similar attitude. After released from jail, he distanced himself from the group. In September of 1910, when the official press signaled Emilio as the author of the Anti-Reelectionist Manifesto requesting the elections' nullification, Emilio immediately claimed innocence, declaring he had nothing to do with such article.

For Federico, Vazquez Gomez renounced any moral claim to the vice-presidency in October of 1910, when he declared to a Mexican tabloid: "all that originated in the National Convention (of April 1910)...finished with the declaration of Congress (of September of 1910)...there is no more campaign and there are no more candidates".⁴⁰ According to Alfredo Robles Dominguez, Francisco Vasquez Gomez accepted the triumph of the Diaz-Corral ticket, and declared himself enemy of the Maderista revolution. The Reyistas followed their leader's example, also condemning the revolt.

Without the support and experience of the Reyistas, Madero started the revolution with the support of younger and less experienced collaborators, whose loyalty and commitment was beyond doubt. On September 20, 1910, Madero appointed Federico Secretary General of the Revolution.⁴¹ Since then Madero and Gonzalez Garza signed all the official appointments. The first appointment signed by Federico as Secretary General was for Abraham Gonzalez as Governor of Chihuahua.

One of Federico's first duties as Secretary General was to notify the American regime about the reasons and objectives of the Mexican revolution, in an attempt to obtain belligerence recognition. To fulfill this task, Federico sent Sanchez Azcona as diplomatic envoy to Washington. Unfortunately, Sanchez Azcona became one of the first victims of the Neutrality Act, arrested in Washington in December of 1910.

⁴⁰ Gonzalez-Garza, 318.

⁴¹ Archive, FGG, 12-1157.

Federico Gonzalez Garza, in conjunction with Alfonso Madero, established in San Antonio, the Central Headquarters of the Mexican Revolution. On December 10, 1910, Francisco I. Madero appointed Federico as the Civil Representative of the Revolution, with full authority to name and replace authorities and to coordinate the military forces.⁴² This new post forced extensive contact between Federico and the revolutionary leaders, granting Federico the second highest rank in the revolution, second only to Madero. Federico took charge of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Treasury, National Affairs, and War Supplies.

When Madero visited San Antonio, he normally stayed in Federico's house, known by the Maderistas as the "White House" because it was the official site of the Provisional Government of Mexico in exile.⁴³ Federico maintained his position as Secretary General of the Revolution until the siege of Ciudad Juarez, in May 1911. an event that symbolized the end of the Maderista revolution and the beginning of a new democratic struggle.

In December 1910, Federico Gonzalez Garza received a letter from Abraham Gonzalez, revolutionary governor for Chihuahua, informing him about the successful results in Chihuahua. This news convinced him about the possibility of attempting a military incursion into Mexico through the border of Chihuahua. He convinced Madero to meet with Abraham Gonzalez in Federico's office in San Antonio.

By the middle of January, Federico learned Diaz was sending Francisco Leon De la Barra to Washington, to pressure for a more severe enforcement of the Neutrality laws. Aware of the risks this diplomatic maneuver could engender against the revolution, Federico published a manifesto directed to the American People. Placing the reader's

⁴² Archive FGG, 12-1167. Moguel, J. 9.

⁴³ Gonzalez-Garza, F. 247.

ideology in his favor, he described Diaz as an abominable tyrant the American people would not stand for a single moment, illegitimately maintained in power by public repression. Federico claimed that the task of a diplomat is to observe, negotiate, and protect the people he represents; however, according to Federico, De la Barra did not fulfill this role. He was unable to observe the hardship of the Mexican people; he negotiates, but only to favor the interests of a tyrant; and, instead of protecting the people, he was to bring more suffering to the Mexican people, exiled in America.

This editorial generated a wave of support in favor of the revolution and against Diaz, generating a reaction from the Mexican government, which requested the enforcement of the Neutrality laws and the extradition of Gonzalez Garza. Taft declared he would use all the American army if needed to enforce the Neutrality laws, ordering mobilization of twenty thousand soldiers to the border.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, the revolution faced another problem because several leaders were upset due to the lack of supplies. Vasquez Gomez used this lack of confidence in Madero's leadership to attack the rebellion. To solve the crisis, Madero authorized Gustavo A. Madero, and Federico Gonzalez Garza to negotiate a loan for one million dollars. Thanks to this money, success was just a matter of time.

To subdue the attacks against the revolt, Federico proposed two concatenated actions: first, to establish a secret service office to investigate and obstruct any antirevolutionary efforts in the region, and second, to isolate Francisco Vasquez Gomez by appointing him as Confidential Agent for the Revolution in Washington. Federico appointed Alfonso Madero and Ernesto Fernandez as Attaches, to bound Vasquez Gomez. Due to his experience, Jose Vasconcelos was designated Secretary of the Diplomatic Mission in Washington, replacing Juan Sanchez Azcona who remained incarcerated.

⁴⁴ González-Garza, F. 231.

Upon arrival in Washington, Francisco Vasquez Gomez isolated himself from the rest of the delegates, leaving Jose Vasconcelos in charge of releasing information to the press, under the advisory of Sherburne Gillette Hopkins, one of the most intriguing characters in the Revolution's diplomatic endeavor. Hardly mentioned in academic literature, Hopkins played an important role of mediation between the rebels and the American government. Federico contacted Hopkins in January of 1911, maintaining constant communication throughout the entire revolutionary affair.

The goal for the diplomatic mission was to obtain Washington's recognition of belligerence. To attain this objective, Federico wrote a diplomatic note in February 1911, to inform all nations about the causes, intentions, and characteristics of the movement.⁴⁵ The document elucidated the reasons that forced the Mexican people to take arms against Diaz's tyranny, explaining how the people unsuccessfully attempted all legal recourses to reestablish a Constitutional regime.

Francisco Vasquez Gomez understood the relevance of this document. He abandoned his passive attitude and traveled to El Paso to receive from Gonzalez Garza the eighteen copies of the diplomatic note, to deliver among the diplomatic representations of the friendly nations in Washington. The text caused a paradigm shift among the foreign chancelleries. They realized the rebellion was a well-organized and well-sustained movement, rather than a disarrayed revolt of peasants and rustlers, as the official version publicized. In response, Washington promised to recognize belligerence by June 1, 1911, or as soon as the insurgency could take hold of an important Mexican city.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Estrada, R. 398.

⁴⁶ Sanchez Azcona, J. 187 & Gonzalez-Garza, F. 219.

To fulfill requirements to obtain recognition, Federico focused in two basic issues: to take hold of an important Mexican city and to insure revolutionary troops would observe the laws of war. In February 1911, Pascual Orozco reached the outskirts of Ciudad Juarez, and its capture was imminent. However, before the attack, it was relevant to demonstrate the revolution was not only justified, but also enforced by an educated army, respectful to the laws of war, and subordinate to an organized civil authority.

To comply with the diplomatic agreement, the revolution needed to educate its leaders about the laws of war. To accomplish this goal, Gonzalez Garza wrote an essay explaining how to make war in the least-cruel and most-civilized ways possible. To support his text, Federico studied the works of recognized experts in international law. The article covered a variety of topics including the illegality of barbaric means like killing of wounded or surrendered enemies, the use of illegal weapons, and the rights of war prisoners.⁴⁷ Insurgent officers had to declare their subordination to the provisional president and to the San Luis Plan. Due to the lack of uniforms, troops must wear a distinctive sign recognizable from distance. They must carry their weapons openly and the superior officer must authorize every military attack by writing.

One element of the memorandum that demonstrates the diplomatic implications of this document is the third point in the recommendations, that requires that “before a town is being attack, you must, at least, notify the Consul of the United States”.⁴⁸ Once the diplomatic stances were covered, they were able to proceed and capture a border town.

The capture of an important border city was the missing link to accomplish the requirements to obtain belligerence recognition. Ciudad Juarez became the main target

⁴⁷ Gonzalez Garza, F. 241.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 239.

for the Revolution. To supervise the military operations, Federico moved to El Paso, Texas. Being in charge of both, civilian and military administrations, gave Federico a strategic position on the Revolution.

The siege of Ciudad Juarez created great expectations. Many former detractors joined the movement when they felt triumph was near. Venustiano Carranza, former critic of the revolution, decided to join in. His involvement allowed some leadership reorganization. Madero designated Carranza Chief of the Third Military Zone in Coahuila. However, Sara Perez de Madero and Federico Gonzalez Garza were doubtful about Carranza's inclusion, convinced that Carranza was expecting the return of Bernardo Reyes.⁴⁹

When Vasquez Gomez knew Madero was moving towards Juarez, he abandoned his post in Washington and traveled south, claiming some leadership and recognizing the revolution as a consummated fact. However, he insisted the Plan de San Luis needed reframing because "it revealed protagonist attitudes and lack of democracy".⁵⁰ His proposal requested the provisional president to surrender the government to a substitute in case he intended to participate as presidential candidate in the new electoral process.

A politico-diplomatic issue to resolve was the antagonism of Ricardo Flores Magón. This leader of the Partido Liberal Mexicano had been revolting against Diaz since 1904. His straightforward attitude against Porfirio Diaz gained popular support in Mexico; however, his anarchist procedures and socialist discourse alienated him from the American support.

⁴⁹ Archive FGG, 13-1272, 13-1291 & 13-1292.

⁵⁰ López, C. 85.

The political turmoil generated by the electoral fraud of 1910, gave Ricardo Flores Magon a justification to organize his own revolutionary faction, becoming a diplomatic hinder for the Maderistas. Madero tried to convince the radical leader to leave behind his attitude and join Madero's movement. Flores Magón refused, inviting the Maderistas to incorporate into the military movement leaded by the Partido Liberal Mexicano. The political ideologies of the two leaders were different and, as the revolution advanced, the breach between them augmented. To achieve triumph Madero needed the support of the Magonista forces, but without their political load.

Federico took charge of attracting Magonist leaders to break apart from Flores Magón and support Madero. Federico established contact with some of the most important leaders of the Magonista movement, including Antonio I. Villarreal, commander of the liberal forces in Nuevo Leon and Lucio Blanco, liberal representative in Tamaulipas. In March 1911, Federico negotiated the defection of Villarreal, followed by an entire army of liberals.⁵¹ The fact that Gonzalez Garza first informed Sanchez Azcona, diplomatic delegate in Washington, about Villarreal's incorporation, demonstrates the diplomatic transcendence of the negotiation. Few days later, Federico informed Abraham Gonzalez about Villarreal's incorporation, and the arrival of twenty thousand American soldiers to the border.

The military support of Villarreal was important, but the political consequences of his deflection were even more significant, and Federico was well aware of it. In March 1911, Federico sent a letter to Madero, explaining his editorialist intentions.⁵² He wrote a Manifesto, signed by Villarreal, where the radical leader explained the reasons for his

⁵¹ Archive FGG, 15-1449.

⁵² Ibid, 15-1440.

defection. He harshly criticized Flores Magón, recognized the leadership of Madero and the Plan de San Luis, and invited other liberals to follow the example.⁵³ He claimed “If (Ricardo Flores) Magón conquers a public post, he would be a tyrant more abominable and more brutal than Porfirio Diaz”.⁵⁴

Federico requested Sanchez Azcona and Vasconcelos to publish the Manifesto, and to distribute it among the liberals, generating important consequences. One month later, Federico was organizing military expeditions headed by Antonio Villarreal and Lucio Blanco. Their incorporation to the movement, and the memorial against Ricardo Flores Magón represented a severe blow against the Magonistas, giving Madero complete supremacy of the revolution.

As the revolution advanced, Federico became entangled in the logistical organization of the war. He remained close to Madero, providing frequent advice in important issues. This logistics position allowed Gonzalez Garza to be acquainted with top military leaders of the Revolution; people like Abraham Gonzalez, Pascual Orozco, Lucio Blanco, Pablo Gonzalez, Antonio Villarreal, and Francisco Villa, with whom Federico established a solid friendship that would acquire transcendental importance during his future revolutionary participation.

The fall of Diaz was just a matter of time. Ciudad Juarez represented the last hope of the tyrannical regime to retain power. The raid against Ciudad Juarez became center of the political debate among revolutionaries and Federico was right in the middle. Radical members demanded a total renovation of the public administration. On the other side, conservative elements only requested the destitution of Corral and the incorporation of

⁵³ Archive FGG, 15-1454.

⁵⁴ González Garza, F. 219.

some revolutionary figures in the cabinet, allowing Diaz to continue as president until his death. Finding a satisfactory middle ground became a central issue.

Madero was aware their military superiority could grant victory upon the federal troops. However he hoped their diplomatic strength could terminate the war without more bloodshed. Francisco Vasquez Gomez seeded this idea in Madero's mind. In a letter sent to Madero March 24, 1911, he claimed a "transaction" would allow Mexico to initiate its political evolution in a peaceful manner, without any more war or hate.⁵⁵ By establishing a "transaction government" and achieving power through an electoral process, the revolution would ratify its democratic roots.

Meanwhile, Limantour kept negotiating his permanence in power, with the assistance of Toribio Esquivel-Obregón, former presidential pre-candidate of the Anti-Reelectionist Party during the National Convention of 1910 and the Madero family. They claimed the revolution had forced Diaz to accept the revolutionary principles. Now, the revolution must step aside, letting Diaz to implement such principles.

Vasquez-Gomez wanted to exclude Limantour from the negotiations. He sent several letters to Federico, requesting the eradication of Limantour and the Madero family from the debate. To gain Federico's support, Vasquez Gomez recommended Federico's appointment into the new Cabinet as Secretary of State.⁵⁶

Gonzalez Garza was not convinced about the need of these negotiations. He informed Sanchez Azcona of his displeasure about Maderistas and Porfiristas working together and recommended Madero to stay away from a negotiation. The political changes offered by Diaz did not guarantee a complete solution to the social disarray, but only a temporary

⁵⁵ González-Garza, F. 459.

⁵⁶ Archive FGG, 15-1422.

palliative offered to eliminate the revolt. For Federico, the revolution should not accept a solution that does not eradicate the main cause of their problem, and that cause was Porfirio Diaz and his administration; “the blood spilled so far, is worth’s more than a simple change of decoration in the same comedy”.⁵⁷ He trusted that a nearby victory in Ojinaga or Ciudad Juarez would prompt belligerency recognition and the debacle of the totalitarian regime. Gonzalez Garza sent a letter to Francisco Vasquez Gomez, declaring his support to Madero’s statements, his opposition to an unsatisfactory negotiation, and his confidence in a nearby military victory.

Other important political leaders supported the continuation of the military ordeal. Pino-Suarez sent a letter to Gonzalez Garza, recommending caution during the peace negotiations and recognizing Federico as one of the best heads of the movement. Jose Maytorena recommended Gonzalez Garza to delay negotiations until military actions prompt belligerence recognition. Based in these recommendations, Gonzalez Garza sent a letter to Madero, explaining both perspectives but supporting the military option: “Porfirism is agonizing; the triumph is yours”.⁵⁸

Vasquez Gomez insisted in his peaceful solution. He recommended that Federico listen to Esquivel Obregón, in an attempt to attain triumph without belligerence. Concerned by the imminence of an attack, he sent a Telegram to Federico, requesting to hold the attack until he was able to send an ultimatum to Diaz. Federico retained his position, answering Vasquez Gomez that to delay the attack would cause great problems; he recommended Madero to proceed with the attack, or to be very cautious if accepting an armistice.

⁵⁷ Archive FGG, 15-1481.

⁵⁸ Archive FGG, 16-1532.

Madero was doubtful; in a first message, sent April 19, 1911, he told Gonzalez Garza there was no need for an armistice; however, in a second message dated the same day, he accepted the armistice under two conditions, the immediate surrender of Ciudad Juarez and the appointment of De la Barra as provisional President.⁵⁹ Federico requested General Navarro, Federal Commander in Ciudad Juarez, his capitulation in less than 24 hours; otherwise, he will proceed with the attack. At the same time, and according with his diplomatic affiliation, he informed the American consul in Ciudad Juarez about the imminent attack.

Meanwhile, Vasquez Gomez insisted against the attack, claiming an attack on Juarez would generate an American invasion. This statement contradicts a letter he sent to Gonzalez Garza claiming: “there are no plans for an American invasion to Mexico, as assured by Limantour”.⁶⁰ Actually, E.Z. Steever, the Military Commander in Fort Bliss, sent a message to Gonzalez Garza, authorizing Madero to attack Ciudad Juarez, “in accordance with the President of the United States”.⁶¹ These stressful political conditions prevailed when Esquivel Obregón and Oscar Braniff arrived to talk with Madero.⁶² Due to the importance of the negotiations, Madero requested the presence of Federico Gonzalez Garza and Juan Sanchez Azcona. The group disdained the proposal. Roque Gonzalez Garza, Madero’s Chief of Staff and Federico’s brother, claimed the revolution should not trust fallacious promises, and should carry on their military operations, to accomplish Diaz’s resignation. They decided to uphold their demands and proceed with the attack.

⁵⁹ Archive FGG, 16-1563 & 16-1562.

⁶⁰ Archive FGG, 16-1525.

⁶¹ Archive FGG, 16-1572.

⁶² Sánchez-Azcona, J. 205& 233.

The insurgents continued their military preparations towards the attack. To motivate their support, Madero and Gonzalez Garza promoted several military leaders including Lucio Blanco, Jose Garibaldi, and Francisco Villa as Colonels; Roque Gonzalez Garza and Raul Madero as Majors; and Pascual Orozco as Brigadier General.⁶³ Gonzalez Garza signed all these military appointments.

The arrival of Madero's father, however, upset the military plan. After talking with his father, Madero accepted Limantour's proposal, against the advice of Gonzalez Garza and Sanchez Azcona. Madero's decision worried many political leaders including Jose Vasconcelos, who immediately expressed his concern to Gonzalez Garza. Fortunately, Gonzalez Garza and Sanchez Azcona convinced Madero to repeal the accord. The governmental response granted the opportunity to denounce the agreement. Diaz delayed the acceptance, because De la Barra and Francisco Vasquez Gomez were negotiating a new deal.

For many, the peace negotiations represented a betrayal to the revolutionary sacrifice; for others, represented the end of a nightmare and the eve of a new era of peace and prosperity. Once again, Federico was at the center of the debate. Some considered him an obstacle to achieving the so-desired peace. Rafael Aguirre, founding father of the Anti-Reelectionist party, claimed Federico was the initiator of the revolution, so it was his responsibility to end it.⁶⁴ For others, like Roque Estrada, Federico, in conjunction with Vasquez Gomez, was betraying the revolution by delaying the attack.

The armistice abruptly ended on May 7, 1911. Without an explicit order, the troops started the attack. Federico and Madero, concerned by the possibility of an American

⁶³ Archive FGG, 16-1601, 16-1604, 16-1610, 16-1605, 16-1607 & 16-1610.

⁶⁴ Archive FGG, 17-1664.

reaction, tried unsuccessfully to stop the attack. Fortunately, the American government justified the attack and promised not to intervene.⁶⁵

Once in control of Ciudad Juarez, Madero was able to establish a civil government, demonstrating his movement was not merely militaristic or vandalic. To integrate his cabinet, Madero picked characters with national recognition, even though some of them were not truly committed to the revolutionary movement. He appointed Francisco Vasquez Gomez as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gustavo Madero as Minister of Treasury, Pino-Suarez as Minister of Justice, and Federico Gonzalez Garza was appointed Minister of State. For some members of the revolution, post and title had enormous significance, for others, the title was less important than the opportunity of serving their country. On May 18, 1911, Federico sent a letter to Madero, stating he needed no title to remain loyal to Madero and to his country. He liberated Madero from any compromise, allowing him to appoint anybody else in the position of Ministry of State.⁶⁶ However, Madero was sure no one else could serve that transcendent position with more loyalty, honesty, and intelligence than Federico Gonzalez Garza could.

Facing total defeat, Porfirio Diaz proposed the Tratados de Ciudad Juarez. Pressured by Francisco Vasquez Gomez and some prominent members of his family, Madero signed the agreement. For some insurgents, the peace treaty represented “the capitulation of the Porfirista regime and the triumph of the Revolution”.⁶⁷ For others, it was a tragic mistake because it represented the perpetuation of the Diaz Regime, just without Diaz.

⁶⁵ Archive FGG, 17-1712.

⁶⁶ Archive FGG, 18-1762.

⁶⁷ Sánchez-Azcona, J. 269.

Chapter IV

Transforming the Revolution into Government

On May 25, 1911, Porfirio Diaz announced his resignation and the designation of Francisco Leon de la Barra as Provisional President of Mexico. The armed rebellion was over and the construction of a new government was about to begin. The Ciudad Juarez Compromise opened a new political era for Madero and his movement; the challenge of transforming a social insurgency into a democratic and well-organized government. Unfortunately, the political turmoil affected Madero's maneuvering capability and a spirit of indiscipline permeated the revolution. Radical elements of the revolution accused Madero of treason by dealing with the enemy. They felt that by signing the compromise, Madero betrayed the Plan de San Luis, allowing the permanence of the old regime. After an enormous military success, the revolution was falling apart due to Madero's decisions.

Madero had good reasons for signing the Tratados de Ciudad Juarez. He fought a revolution to overthrow a tyrant who retained power by force and against the will of the people. Congruent to these democratic principles, he opposed the idea to reach power by force. He was confident that, without the repressive government of Diaz, he could reach power by the democratic principle of suffrage; however, and according to the fifth point, second paragraph, of the Plan de San Luis, being Provisional President, he could not become Constitutional President if he wanted to respect the principle of no-reelection.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ López. 14.

Madero was convinced he could transform the San Luis Plan into a political platform that would consolidate the insurgent ideals into constitutional principles. This political maneuver would also spare the country from the nuisance of paying political tribute to a group of military leaders who were an asset during the war, but a drawback during peace. As expressed by Jose Vasconcelos, “by terminating the revolution, Madero spared the nation from the revolutionaries”.⁶⁹

Madero published a political manifesto announcing the triumph of the revolution and his resignation as provisional president. He recognized the legitimacy of De la Barra as new President of Mexico, and invited the people to collaborate with the new regime. In this document Madero publicly recognized the impossibility to fulfill the principles contained in the third clause of the Plan de San Luis, convinced that to fulfill this promise would require the continuation of a bloody war, and confident that as Constitutional President, he would be able to negotiate this issue under more favorable conditions.

With the resignation of Madero, his cabinet automatically dissolved. To fulfill the political necessities of the compromise, Madero had to divide his team. Some members of the revolution occupied important posts in the De La Barra’s administration. He appointed Ernesto Madero as Minister of Treasure and Rafael Hernandez took charge of the Department of Justice. Both were uncles of Madero, fervent Limantouristas and critics of the Revolution. Francisco Vasquez Gomez took care of the Department of Public Education while his brother Emilio became Secretary of State; Federico Gonzalez Garza was Madero’s first choice for Secretary of State; however, due to his young age, he was unable to take office, so he accepted the appointment as Sub-Secretary of State under Emilio Vasquez Gomez.

⁶⁹ Vasconcelos, J. 269.

According to Pascual Ortiz Rubio, Madero's greatest mistake was the acceptance of De la Barra as provisional president, allowing the perpetuation of corruption in important segments of the new administration.⁷⁰ Madero was aware of the indecency of many governors and members of Congress. However, he considered De la Barra as an honorable man and a warranty for democracy.⁷¹ He thought that a politically eclectic administration like De la Barra's, would insure the required conditions to implement democratic elections; unfortunately, he was wrong.

When Diaz left Veracruz aboard the German cruiser Ypiranga, he left behind social turmoil, fueled by greed and ambition of several individuals, who viewed in Diaz's departure their opportunity to seize power.⁷² While Madero thought he was according an inclusive government, he instead was allowing the establishment of a group whose main objective became the avoidance of Madero's presidential election. In this new regime, the only committed supporter of Madero was Federico Gonzalez Garza. His presence became a hindrance for the ideological leaders of this political masquerade: Francisco and Emilio Vasquez Gomez.

Confident of the loyalty of the new government towards the democratic objectives of the revolution, Madero retired from the public administration and initiated his political campaign towards the presidential election. The political unrest obliged Madero to reorganize his political platform without the assistance of many of his previous supporters, with only Juan Sanchez Azcona devoted to support Madero in his new political adventure.

⁷⁰ Sánchez-Azcona, J. 274.

⁷¹ Ramírez, M. 221.

⁷² Lopez, C. 13. & Sanchez-Azcona, J. 273.

Emilio and Francisco Vazquez Gomez, endowed by the revolution with two important ministries in the new government, began their own search for political protagonism, moving away from Madero's leadership and taking decisions to benefit their own political purposes.⁷³ Aware that Gonzalez Garza represented an obstacle for their seditious intentions, they decided to remove him from the political scenario.

Following Madero's instructions, President De la Barra appointed Gonzalez Garza as Sub-Secretary of State, on June 26, 1911.⁷⁴ Madero's plan was that, as Sub-Secretary of State, Federico would participate in the most important political decisions taken by the new government, while monitoring the activities of the Secretary of State, Emilio Vasquez Gomez.

Jose Vasconcelos accompanied Federico during the train trip to Mexico City, charged by Federico to take care of the official newspaper. During their stop at Nuevo Laredo, Vazquez Gomez tried to impress the populace, claiming an un-existing role in the rebel success. To counteract this fallacy, Federico took the stand, clarifying Madero's true leadership. This was the last challenge the Vazquez Gomez would allow from Federico to their leadership takeover. Upon arrival to Mexico, Emilio Vasquez Gomez disobeyed Madero's instructions and removed Federico from the Sub-Secretary of State.

Madero immediately contacted Francisco Vasquez Gomez, insisting on Federico's appointment; however, his recommendation was unattended. The fact Madero contacted Francisco instead of Emilio, who actually dismissed Gonzalez Garza, demonstrates his awareness that Francisco Vasquez Gomez was the mastermind of the political defiance.

⁷³ Ramirez, M. 271.

⁷⁴ Archive FGG, 19-1882.

Madero made a terrible mistake by tolerating this indiscipline. He limited to protest to De la Barra for the appointment and demanded the appointment of Federico Gonzalez Garza as Sub-secretary of Justice.⁷⁵ Without Federico's vigilance, Emilio office became the center of the anti-Maderista movement. The greatest mistake of Madero was his naïve confidence in people like the Vasquez Gomez. Manuel Gonzalez Ramirez, in his book *Manifiestos Políticos*, recognized Madero's mistake not eliminating Francisco Vasquez Gomez from the political debate. Federico's dismissal broke the revolutionary discipline and hindered Madero's leadership.⁷⁶

Meanwhile, Bernardo Reyes was about to reappear in the political scenario. To pick up his political leadership, Reyes offered his military expertise to fight against the revolt. Diaz accepted, but Reyes took too long to arrive. The signature of the Tratados de Ciudad Juarez changed the political conditions, and by the time Reyes was about to arrive, the political leadership was already in the hands of Madero.

With his advent, Reyes fueled the confidence of many former Reyistas like Francisco Vasquez Gomez and Venustiano Carranza, confident that, if elected, Madero would appoint De la Barra as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Reyes as Minister of War. Many Maderistas did not welcome this alliance; however, as Juan Sanchez Azcona documented in his memories, they never dared to speak against it.⁷⁷ Reyes tried to gain their confidence eight days after his arrival to Mexico. Bernardo Reyes's son sent a letter to Federico congratulating him for his appointment as Sub-secretary of Justice and inviting him to parley with his father. Federico gallantly declined the invitation.

⁷⁵ Archive FGG, 19-1882

⁷⁶ Ramirez, M. LII.

⁷⁷ Sánchez-Azcona, J. 295.

In June 1911, Madero issued a manifesto, expressing the socio-economic ideals of the Maderismo. Here again, the writings of Madero blend with the writings of Federico. His archive contains the original manuscript of this text. The essay proposed to elevate the life quality of the poor by reducing their exploitation by the rich, inviting all sectors of society to “think in the nation...consider the collective interests...repress any personal ambition and inspire in the most pure patriotism”.⁷⁸ It claimed Madero was not going to tolerate the corruption and impunity that characterized the previous regime. His essay won the hearts of many Mexicans but also the hatred of many others, who understood that the time of privileges and excesses would end if Madero attained the presidency.

The Cientificos initiated a covert campaign to find a character willing to challenge Madero in the presidential campaign, trying to impede his ascendance to the presidency. Nine days after De la Barra’s inauguration, a group of Cientificos formed a political party named ‘Partido Popular Evolucionista’ and immediately published a political article attacking the new government for the inclusion of two members of the Madero family. Simultaneously, they prepared a plan to assassinate Madero.⁷⁹ Fortunately, Federico had kept alive the secret service he established as Secretary General of the revolution. His dismissal as Sub-Secretary of State did not hinder Federico’s intention to monitor the political climate. Thanks to this secret service, the Maderistas discovered the sinister plans of the “Cientificos” in time to avoid its consequences.

Madero’s political challenges were not limited to the administration. His political campaign would suffer the same type of attacks. According to the democratic principles of Madero, to truly represent the diverse ideologies that form the revolution, he needed to

⁷⁸ Archive FGG, 19-1878.

⁷⁹ Sánchez-Azcona, J. 302.

establish a more inclusive political platform, which The Partido Anti-Reeleccionista, who supported Madero during the political campaign of 1910, was not able to provide.

In July 1911, Madero established the Partido Constitucional Progresista.⁸⁰ To organize the new party, Madero appointed a commission integrated by Roque Estrada, Jesus Flores Magón, Robles Dominguez and Roque Gonzalez Garza.⁸¹ Sanchez Azcona and Vasconcelos headed the Committee.⁸² To avoid any criticism about favoritism, Madero avoided the inclusion of Maderistas working in the De la Barra regime,.

According to Sanchez Azcona, the new denomination signified their commitment to rule under the Constitution and the incorporation of the progressive ideals of the era. This statement represents an intriguing assertion, because the most outstanding figure of the Progressive Era was certainly Theodore Roosevelt, with whom Federico declared an ideological relationship. One thing is clear; Madero's political platform was developed under new socio-democratic principles; quite different from Madero's original ideals.

Strained by the political turmoil and the proximity of the new presidential elections, Madero decided to spend a few days at a thermal resort in Tehuacan, Puebla. Federico's secret service discovered the assassination plot of the Cientificos, just in time for the Maderistas to restrain it. Madero thought this represented the defeat of his opponents. This was far from truth, Cientificos, Vazquistas and Reyistas kept conspiring against Madero, and his positivism blinded him; he needed a true friend to call his attention.

In July 1911, Federico wrote one of his most outstanding documents, reflecting his political expertise and documentation of the political whereabouts as well as his personal commitment to Madero. In a personal letter written two months after the Ciudad Juarez

⁸⁰ López, C. 15.

⁸¹ Ramírez, M. 258.

⁸² Vasconcelos, J. 273.

Treaty and eighteen months before the assassination of Madero, Federico talked about what he considered a major threat to Madero's political future.⁸³ He claims Madero's overconfidence did not allow him to perceive the hypocrisy of some of his teammates. He recommended the substitution of the Secretary of State and the maintenance of the revolutionary troops but under the leadership of officers truly committed with the cause.

Federico tried to alert Madero about the existence of real dangers, denouncing the harmful intentions of those who Madero considered his allies. He expressed his lack of confidence in people like Vasquez Gomez, De la Barra, Reyes and Carranza. Sadly, Madero dismissed Federico's advice. A few days before his assassination, Madero recognized that not trusting the advice of his true friends was his major mistake.⁸⁴

Madero took some time to answer Federico's letter. While in Tehuacan, he received disturbing news about the conflicting attitude of Emilio Vasquez Gomez and the electoral purposes of Bernardo Reyes. In addition, Magonistas and Cientificos were successful in Coahuila, where the wrongdoings of Carranza fueled the anti-revolutionary sentiment; the Liberals proposed Federico as their governorship candidate against Carranza.⁸⁵

On July 30, 1911, Francisco I. Madero sent an extensive response to Federico, which clearly demonstrates his political naivety. He validated his optimism based in his faith in the people. He claimed to have no enemies ahead; the Cientificos were defeated, Reyes had committed his loyalty to Madero, and the army leaders would need "lacking of all idea of personal dignity and patriotism" to support a rebellion.⁸⁶

⁸³ Archive FGG, 21-2033.

⁸⁴ González-Garza, F. 348.

⁸⁵ Archive FGG 21-2041.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 29-2904, Lopez, C. 116. & Gonzalez-Garza, F. 351.

For Madero, the attacks of the media did not diminish his political prestige; on the contrary, by criticizing his lack of severity, they validated his democratic principles. However, he recognized the need of a supportive press.

In his letter, Madero also displayed an absolute confidence in De la Barra and his cabinet. He maintained great expectancies for the novel administration, convinced that they would never work against him or attempt to commit an electoral fraud.

Madero's response demonstrates that, while Federico was well aware and deeply concerned by the political turmoil and the coalescence of antagonist forces against them; Madero was still extremely confident in the future, and towards people like De la Barra and Bernardo Reyes. His optimism veiled the true force of his enemies, hindering Madero's forceful response against them.

How different history could have been if Madero had paid more attention to Federico's letter. He would have been less confident and reacted more severely against people like Francisco Leon De la Barra, Bernardo Reyes, and Francisco Vazquez Gomez, who, uncontrolled were dedicated to undermine the revolution. In July of 1911, Madero had enough time to implement such changes before it was too late. Unfortunately, Madero's naiveté defeated Federico's political assertiveness.

To subdue Federico's insistence, Madero sent a letter to President De la Barra, requesting the demotion of Emilio Vazquez Gomez and the appointment of Federico Gonzalez Garza as Sub-Secretary of State.⁸⁷ At the same time, and in relation with his benevolent attitude towards his adversaries, Madero claimed that it facilitated his work, requesting Federico not to press the issue.

⁸⁷ Archive FGG, 21-2069.

The leadership struggle between Madero and the Vazquez Gomez weakened the revolution and undermined the new government. According to historians like Chantal Lopez and Omar Cortez, the confrontation reached its zenith when Madero forced Emilio to resign from the Secretary of State.⁸⁸ According to Gonzalez Ramirez, “the secession was sealed with the departure of Emilio from the Cabinet of (president) De la Barra”.⁸⁹

Since his appointment as Secretary of State, Emilio Vazquez Gomez initiated his protagonist attitude, challenging Madero’s leadership. He displaced Gonzalez Garza from the sub-Secretary of State, aware that under Federico’s surveillance he would be unable to develop his counter-revolutionary plans. He developed a plan to overthrow De la Barra and impede Madero’s ascent to the presidency, using government’s funds and establishing concessions with several insurgent leaders. His audacity eventually led to a leak of information, when he informed General Alfredo Alvarez about his plans. Alvarez, a loyal Maderista, instantly traveled to Tehuacan to inform Madero about the seditious plot. Once Emilio’s plan was exposed, Madero immediately ordered his demotion. Two days latter, Juan Sanchez Azcona personally informed De la Barra about Madero’s decision to replace Emilio Vazquez Gomez.

Emilio was not willing to leave the political scenario gracefully. He tried to obtain benefit from this demotion, placing himself as a political martyr. On August 2, 1911, Emilio published his resignation, claiming that De la Barra ordered his demotion because “De la Barra represents the Conservative tendency in the new regime ...and I (Emilio, represent) the revitalizing tendency of the triumphant revolution”.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Lopez, C. 15.

⁸⁹ Ramirez, M. 273.

⁹⁰ López, C. 122.

Francisco Vasquez Gomez looked for an opportunity to retaliate, and politics gave him the opportunity he wanted. A group of Vazquistas, headed by Aquiles Elorduy and General Candido Navarro, took leadership of the Anti-Reelectionist Center. They demanded Madero to recognize the Anti-Reeleccionista as his sole political party, to relinquish the services of Bernardo Reyes and to negotiate the reincorporation of Emilio Vazquez Gomez as Secretary of State.⁹¹

Madero responded that the political life of the Centro Anti-Reeleccionista had ended; however, the principles established by the National Convention of 1911 supported his political program, with some modifications, required to attain the principles of the Plan de San Luis. (It is interesting that Federico Gonzalez Garza wrote both documents that inspired Madero's political ideology). Madero rejected any compromise and confirmed the dismissal of Emilio Vazquez Gomez, claiming he betrayed Madero's confidence by publishing more than twenty decrees under Madero's name without his authorization.

Candido Navarro then threatened Madero, stating that the military leaders were against the substitution of Vazquez Gomez. Madero reprimanded Navarro for taking part in politics, stating, "If the army intervenes in politics, anarchy would arouse".⁹² Madero considered the solution to the political problems in Mexico required the active participation of educated individuals like Federico Gonzalez Garza, truly committed with the democratic principles of the revolution; and not the involvement of ruthless politicians like Vazquez Gomez, searching for political protagonism, or military warlords like Orozco or Navarro, searching for personal wealth and individual glory.

⁹¹ López, C. 129.

⁹² Ibid.

The evident rupture between the two most visible representatives of the revolution seemed a sign of political weakness within the revolution, and proved an opportunity for dormant challengers to activate their seditious plans. Cientificos, Vasquistas, Magonistas, Reyistas; they all considered the rupture among the revolutionaries as their opportunity to attain or retain power. Their subversive activities eroded even more the confidence of the Maderistas in their supreme leader. Eventually, valuable elements like Emiliano Zapata, fell prey of the conspiracy, and distanced themselves from Madero.

When President De la Barra received Madero's recommendation to demote Emilio Vasquez Gomez, he immediately followed the recommendation. However, his loyalty fell short when he failed to accomplish the second part of the recommendation, to appoint Federico Gonzalez Garza as Sub-Secretary of State, in charge of the Ministry. The same day he deposed Emilio, he appointed Federico Gonzalez Garza as Sub-Secretary of State; however, he also appointed Alberto Garcia Granados as new Secretary of State.⁹³

Once again, Madero did not react accordingly to the challenge. Surprised and maybe angered by the situation, Madero thought it was not the time to quarrel with De la Barra. After so many displays of disobedience and treason, Madero became convinced that, as previously stated by Federico, the Maderismo had in De la Barra a terrible enemy. The elections were so near, however, that Madero limited to denounce De la Barra's attitude, hoping the people would support him with their vote.

⁹³ Archive FGG, 21-2104.

CHAPTER V

THE PRESIDENCY OF FRANCISCO I. MADERO

On August 11, 1911, representatives from all over Mexico convened to elect their presidential and vice-presidential candidates for the upcoming election. The confrontation between Francisco I. Madero and Francisco Vazquez Gomez generated an extremely tense environment.

Francisco Vazquez Gomez, aware of Madero's popularity, tried to convince the convention that Madero was insane and therefore incapable to govern. He projected himself as natural heir of the revolution's leadership as second in the line of command and mastermind of the revolution. Vazquez Gomez was convinced that, in line with his "good Samaritan" personality, Madero would not follow the rough play; he was wrong.

Gonzalez Garza and Vasconcelos were in charge of discrediting Vasquez Gomez during the national convention.⁹⁴ They considered it was necessary to separate Vazquez Gomez from the party before he could make any more damage. Madero resisted the idea to modify the original ticket; after all, Madero was the designer of the political image of Vazquez Gomez. Since he published *La Sucesión Presidencial*, Madero considered Vazquez Gomez a possible presidential candidate. However, convinced of his treacherous attitude, Madero conceded to the exigencies of Vasconcelos and Gonzalez Garza and accepted Vasquez Gomez's demotion.

⁹⁴ Vasconcelos, J. 283.

During the convention, Federico accused Vazquez Gomez of always being against the revolutionary movement. He claimed that since the beginning, Vazquez Gomez displayed antidemocratic values by recommending that his delegates, in case of defeat, disobey the people's will. To support his arguments, Federico displayed several compromising telegrams signed by Francisco Vazquez Gomez.⁹⁵ He also accused Vazquez Gomez of being a coward and a defector, afraid to escort Madero during the risky campaign tour of 1910, and conspiring against Madero from his post as Minister of Education.

Gonzalez Garza's allegations against Vazquez Gomez had great impact among the convention members. He not only convinced them to react against Vazquez Gomez, but some radical elements, led by Antonio Diaz Soto y Gamma, Convention leader of the Magonista "Partido Liberal", nominated Federico as their vice-presidential candidate.⁹⁶

Federico declined their offer, claiming that the liberals were proposing him as a compromise candidate in search for unity; however, even though he felt able of such challenge, his mission would terminate with this political post he considered needless.⁹⁷

Luis Cabrera, adamant defender of Vazquez Gomez, declared that, by rejecting Vazquez Gomez, Madero was doing a great mistake. Aware of the transcendental role that Gonzalez Garza was playing in Madero's campaign, Cabrera initiated a political campaign against Gonzalez Garza and Jose Vasconcelos.

The political turmoil generated during the Convention, disappointed some of the possible vice-presidential candidates, like Iglesias Calderon or Robles Dominguez, who were the original first choices for Gonzalez Garza and Vasconcelos. This granted Pino Suarez the opportunity to run for the Vice-Presidency.

⁹⁵ Lopez, C. 174.

⁹⁶ Archive FGG. 22-2129

⁹⁷ Archive FGG, 22-2125, 22-2191 & 22-2190.

The political havoc facilitated a reaction from different segments of the political assemblage. Bernardo Reyes visualized it as an opportunity to reach power through suffrage. The Reyistas launched him as their presidential candidate. Due to the election's proximity, they requested a postponement. To force a decision, the Reyistas organized a public protest but were subdued by the Maderista infantry, led by Federico Gonzalez Garza.⁹⁸ When Congress rejected their request, Reyes withdrew his candidature.

Ricardo Flores Magón was convinced Madero was a blatant defender of capitalism. He published a manifesto, claiming that Madero, allied with the Catholic Church and the financial tycoons, intended to maintain the social inequities and the privileges of the rich. Due to this reason, he declared war against Maderistas, Vazquistas, and Reyistas.⁹⁹

Vazquez Gomez considered it an opportunity to regain Madero's allegiance, claiming that the only option to avoid political havoc was an alliance between Maderistas and Vazquistas. Convinced by Federico, Madero rejected the proposition. The advice proved correct and a vast majority elected Francisco I. Madero President of Mexico.

Many revolutionary leaders thought that the election of Madero represented the end of political havoc in Mexico. Revolutionary leaders like Emilio Madero, were looking forward to disassemble their regiments, now that the conflict was over. Federico opposed the measure, claiming it was not time to lay the weapons down.¹⁰⁰ Magonistas, Reyistas, Vazquistas, and Cientificos, they were all trying to impede Madero's arrival to the presidential chair. Seditious plans appeared everywhere and De la Barra's administration did nothing to control the situation, on the contrary, it fueled the havoc, generating antagonism between Federal forces and revolutionary troops.

⁹⁸ Sánchez-Azcona, J. 305.

⁹⁹ Ramírez, M., 369.

¹⁰⁰ Ramírez, M. 336.

Federico's secret agents kept him informed about the contra-revolutionary plans of Bernardo Reyes and the Vazquez Gomez. They knew that to remain in power Madero needed the allegiance of both military forces. By fueling hateful sentiments among them, Reyes and Vazquez Gomez tried to hinder their reconciliation. To interfere with their seditious plans, in October 1911, Federico Gonzalez Garza gave an outstanding speech to honor all those who lost their lives during the revolution.¹⁰¹ By rendering public tribute to both, federals and insurgents, he tried to extinguish the animosity among them. He described both armies as equally worthy; one, loyal to their duty, the other, loyal to their ideals. He claimed the nation was proud of both; after all, the people had not fought against the army, but against a tyrant rule whom the army defended, loyal to their duty.

Other great challenge in Madero's route towards the presidential chair was Francisco de la Barra. Congruent with his Porfirista background, De la Barra was committed to reestablish the benefits and privileges of the rich, in detriment of the revolution. The army supported the wealthy and suppressed the popular reaction. Radical governors, like Jose Renteria from Sinaloa, complained with Federico, hoping he would be able to help.¹⁰² They claimed that the Secretary of State Alberto Garcia Granados, had done nothing to solve this problem, forcing the governors to order their insurgent troops to attack and subdue the federal army. De la Barra, instead of controlling the Federal army, ordered the immediate disintegration of the insurgent forces, establishing a ten-day deadline for the federal troops to attack.¹⁰³

The deadline left no time to maneuver; Federico knew he had to expose this blatant treason towards the revolution before it was too late. Risking his post as Sub-Secretary

¹⁰¹ Archive FGG, 22-2154

¹⁰² Ramirez, M. 366.

¹⁰³ González-Garza, F. 291.

of State, he denounced his discrepancy with the military decisions of the government, accusing Secretary of State Garcia Granados of destabilizing the country in an attempt to impede Madero's rise to the presidency. Federico declared the actual regime promised not to interfere with the fulfillment of the democratic ideals; however, its actions were nothing else but disloyal.¹⁰⁴

Madero's arrival to the presidency forced the establishment of a new cabinet. Once again, the lack of commitment from some leaders, and the political ambition in others, hindered Madero's opportunity to conform a successful team. Federico Gonzalez Garza suggested the inclusion of Abraham Gonzalez as new Secretary of State. With Abraham Gonzalez in charge, Gonzalez Garza's role as Sub-Secretary was no longer needed, so he joined the Cabinet as Madero's Chief of Staff. From this new post, Federico worked to transform revolutionary promises into realities; for example, he worked with Roberto Esteva Ruiz to launch progressive labor legislation.¹⁰⁵

Unfortunately, social strife impeded Federico to continue this constructive policy. Forced to return to his vigilant role, he became again the intelligence source of Madero's administration. Madero's presidency inaugurated November 6, 1911. That same day, Emilio Vazquez Gomez initiated his rebellion against Madero, in alliance with Pascual Orozco. Meanwhile, Federico's secret service discovered Bernardo Reyes was planning his own insurrection. Reyes issued a manifesto, declaring a new rebellion was about to begin. He invaded Mexico in December of 1911, but after a few days, he surrendered, disappointed with his supporters and convinced of the impossibility to overthrow Madero.

¹⁰⁴ Archive FGG, 22-2162.

¹⁰⁵ Archive FGG, 23-2258.

Other rebellions were not led by greed or political ambition. Some leaders, like Emiliano Zapata, expecting immediate results from the Revolution, ran out of patience and revolted, blaming Madero for the revolution's shortcomings.

On November 28, 1911, just twenty-two days after Madero's inauguration, Zapata published his *Plan de Ayala*, pushing forward the reforms promised by the revolution of 1910. It claimed Madero was betraying the revolution by allowing the permanency of negative elements of the Diaz's regime, and neglecting the insurgent elements that supported him. In December of 1911, Zapata sent a letter to his representative in Mexico City, ordering him to suspend any dealing with Madero, and claiming Madero had no intention to fulfill the expectations of the revolution.¹⁰⁶

By the beginning of 1912, things were getting out of control. Troops in Ciudad Juarez rebelled in support of Orozco and Zapata, while Emilio Vazquez Gomez launched the Tacubaya Plan, reforming the Plan de San Luis. The plan's intention was to launch Emilio to the Presidency. The uprising was so severe that Federico authorized Carranza to organize a rural force to fight the sedition.¹⁰⁷ Federico's secret service played a crucial role during this period. Every week Federico received a detailed report of the revolutionary movements along the border. They provided crucial information about the alliance between Pascual Orozco, Emiliano Zapata and Emilio Vazquez Gomez.

In February of 1912, Jose Maytorena informed Federico about seditious activities of Magonistas and Vazquistas in Sonora, trying to promote an insurrection among the native Yaqui community.¹⁰⁸ The rebel's intention was to expose as a failure, one of the first

¹⁰⁶ Alfonso Reyes, *Emiliano Zapata: Su vida y obra*. (México: Asociación Nacional de Egresados Universitarios, 1976), 36.

¹⁰⁷ Ramirez, M. 337. & Archive FGG, 25-2431

¹⁰⁸ Archive FGG, 23-2282.

programs of social justice implemented by Madero. In 1911, Madero accorded with the Yaqui Nation the adjudication of national land in their favor, to distribute it among the tribal families. It represented the first attempt to restore to the indigenous communities, land previously deprived of them. Its success would have proved that the socio-economic purpose of the revolution was attainable. The program became a political target for many: wealthy landlords perceived it as a threat to their hegemony, while other political leaders perceived it as a political hinderance because it validated Madero's regime.

The social turmoil affected Madero's cabinet. Forced by the contra-revolutionary upheavals, Abraham Gonzalez took the command of the military forces in the north, leaving the Secretary of State in the hands of Jesus Flores Magón, who tried to reduce the political influence of Federico, generating a wedge between their two ministries. Aware of the situation, Abraham Gonzalez alerted Federico, claiming that Flores Magón, as Secretary of State, was "Madero's worst enemy".¹⁰⁹ Sanchez Azcona, in a confidential note, informed Federico about the intentions of Flores Magón to conquer the presidency.

Once again, Madero's naïve attitude worked against the cause. To avoid conflicts among his cabinet, he removed Federico from his post and appointed him Governor of the Distrito Federal.¹¹⁰ Some rebel leaders like Luis Rivas, a former Anti-Reelectionist, tried to generate a wedge between Federico and Madero. He recognized Federico's contribution to the revolution and the authorship of Madero's book "La Sucesión Presidencial", in conjunction with Sanchez Azcona, claiming that from Madero, Federico received only ingratitude.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Archive FGG, 24-2352.

¹¹⁰ Archive FGG, 27-2673.

¹¹¹ Archive FGG, 28-2787.

The humiliation did not hinder Federico's loyalty, paying no attention to the seditious arguments. From his post, he continued working in favor of the cause, especially in issues related to the agrarian reform. Meanwhile, his secret service continued providing transcendental information about the contra-revolution. Federico was convinced that many of the congressional members were under extreme political pressure. The future of Mexico was in their hands. They had the responsibility to pass new laws in benefit or detriment of the nation. To develop a closer relationship, Governor Gonzalez Garza organized a reception in honor of the XXXVI Legislature in September of 1912. It was an ideal moment to fulfill the insurgent promises, by action and by legislation. In his speech, Federico congratulated the new legislature for being the first Congress truly elected by popular sovereignty, urging them not to disappoint the people. He demanded the promulgation of new laws to satisfy the needs of the countryside people, claiming that the problem of land was "an ineludible need".¹¹² He demanded judicious and sensible laws, intended to solve the people's needs, and not to sustain personal interests of some egocentric individuals. During the ceremony, Madero addressed the agrarian problem, describing it as the most serious predicament of his administration.

After the event, Gonzalez Garza continued working towards betterment in the living conditions for the campesinos, exchanging notes with Congressional representative Gabriel Vargas, in order to propose agrarian initiatives.¹¹³ These initiatives, together with the Yaqui agreement, and a wide group of documents included in Federico's archive, demonstrate that the Maderistas were the first ones to worry about the agrarian issue, long before the Carranza administration.

¹¹² Gonzalez Garza, F. 377.

¹¹³ Archive FGG, 28-2775.

Since March of 1912, important figures of the revolution, like Robles Dominguez, predicted Madero's regime would crumble in less than two months.¹¹⁴ Gonzalez Garza did all he could to avoid the fulfillment of this prophecy. Eventually, he was able to delay it, though not to impede it. By December of 1912, Federico found out that Felix Diaz, former chief of police and nephew of Don Porfirio, was conspiring against Madero, in conjunction with Bernardo Reyes, incarcerated in Mexico City. They were calling for a national uprising to occur in March of 1913. Their plans included the assassination of the Madero and any governors who would oppose the conspiracy.

Meanwhile, Felix Diaz attempted an uprising in Veracruz. However, Federico's secret agents warned the administration in time to repeal the revolt and capture its leaders. Federico demanded a stringent punishment against Diaz. Unfortunately, Madero's response was congruent with his ideals. According to Vasconcelos, "Madero, the apostle, prevailed upon Madero, the politician".¹¹⁵ He limited Felix Diaz's punishment to incarceration, where he received all the courtesy and privileges possible.

With Reyes and Diaz incarcerated, Madero became confident there were no more enemies against him. Once again, Federico's secret service proved efficient, providing detailed report of the seditious activities of Diaz. During his captivity, distinguished Vasquistas, including Aquiles Elorduy, visited Felix Diaz, trying to arrange his escape. The secret service also informed Federico that Rubio Navarrete, a Reyista colonel, was asking the troops to support a military uprising against Madero.¹¹⁶ Federico warned Madero about the seditious activities, requesting to strengthen the attention upon Reyes and Diaz. Once again, Madero disregarded his advice.

¹¹⁴ González-Garza, F. 284.

¹¹⁵ Vasconcelos, J. 300.

¹¹⁶ Archive FGG, 29-2816.

The “Decena Tragica” brought an abrupt ending to Madero’s presidency and Federico was a crucial witness. The revolt started February 9, 1913, when a group of soldiers rose up to liberate Bernardo Reyes. Federico Gonzalez Garza and Vice-President Pino-Suarez met with Madero at Chapultepec Castle, presidential residence at the time. They marched towards National Palace, escorted by the police and the Military College Cadets, under the leadership of Felipe Angeles.

When they arrived downtown, confusion arose. The Palace was under severe fire and General Garcia, Madero’s minister of War, was doubtful to continue the advance. Aware of Garcia’s hesitancy, Victoriano Huerta saw the opportunity to attain leadership. He requested Madero’s authorization to lead the assault. Madero, aware of Garcia’s indecision, accepted Huerta’s request, opening the door to treason. Once in command, Huerta incorporated some of his followers, including Rubio Navarrete, the Reyista colonel that a few days before was promoting the troops rebellion. Navarrete was now under Huerta’s command because his supreme leader, Bernardo Reyes, died during the assault to the National Palace.

The rebel troops, now under the leadership of Felix Diaz, withdrew from the National Palace and sheltered at “La Ciudadela” allowing Madero’s arrival to the Palace. The rebels initiated a brutal bombardment against populated areas, thinking that, by exposing the populace to extreme suffering, they could force Madero to resign. Federico ordered the evacuation of the endangered areas, providing shelter, food, and provisions for the refugees.¹¹⁷ By furnishing this socio-political response, Federico obtained an enormous support in favor of Madero.

¹¹⁷ Archive FGG, 29-2820.

Federico did not trust Victoriano Huerta. His secret service kept him informed about the meetings Felix Diaz had with Emilio Rabasa, representative of Huerta. He found suspicious that Antonio Tovar, a fervent Reyista, proposed Madero a political way out, which included Madero's resignation and Huerta's appointment as interim president.

Henry Lane Wilson, American ambassador in Mexico was also in contact with Diaz, under the excuse of protecting foreign interests. Federico recommended Madero to speak with President Taft, to clarify the American intentions. Taft responded that the United States had no intention to interfere in Mexico's political turmoil or negotiate with the rebels.¹¹⁸ For Federico, the American government was concealing information, or Lane Wilson was acting without authorization. One way or the other, the information clearly proved a conspiracy was moving on, and Federico recommended extreme caution.

On February 18, 1913, the arrival of General Blanquet and his troops convinced Madero that the uprising was about to be subdued. However, Alfredo Robles Dominguez called Sanchez Azcona to explain that Huerta and Diaz had reached a treacherous agreement. Madero not only disregarded the information, but also reprimanded Sanchez Azcona, claiming that an exaggerated lack of confidence was the real source of problems.

That afternoon, Colonel Jimenez Riverol entered the building, leading a platoon of soldiers. Aware of the conspiracy, Federico shout that the soldiers were there to detain Madero. Amid the confusion, the troops fired their weapons, killing two Maderistas. In an audacious move, Madero walked towards the troops, with his arms wide opened, asking the troops to calm down and stop shooting; astonished, the troops withdrew. Federico, Pino-Suarez, and Madero left the room, in search for Blanquet, whose loyalty was yet undoubted; however, upon arrival, Blanquet ordered their detention.

¹¹⁸ Archive FGG, 29-2825.

Treason had finally prevailed. Madero, his brother Gustavo, Pino-Suarez, Felipe Angeles, and Federico Gonzalez Garza were retained as prisoners. That evening, the troops took Gustavo Madero and Felipe Angeles to another quarter. Due to his popularity among the troops, Felipe Angeles was released unharmed. Gustavo's fate was different, he was taken to La Ciudadela, where he was tortured and assassinated. Madero, Gonzalez Garza and Pino-Suarez remained together. Madero, conscious of his liability, recognized:

As a politician, I have committed two big mistakes...trying to please everybody, and not trusting my true friends...if I had listen my true friends, our fate would have been different, but I attend more those who had no sympathy for the revolution and now, we are suffering the results.¹¹⁹

Huerta demanded their immediate resignation in exchange for sparing their lives. Their deaths would represent the collapse of the revolution; however, if they were exiled, they could organize a successful return. They accepted Huerta's proposal under conditions: all governors would remain in their posts, Madero's supporters would not be bothered, and they would be allowed to exile. The ambassadors of Japan and Chile would escort them to Veracruz, where Madero and Pino-Suarez would deliver their resignations.

Huerta accepted the conditions but demanded immediate delivery of the resignation notes. To prove his good will, he guaranteed the release of Gustavo Madero, (who was actually dead), Felipe Angeles (who had already been liberated), and Federico Gonzalez Garza. Madero accepted, endowing his Attorney General, Manuel Vazquez Tagle, to deliver their resignation to Congress, assembled for a special session.

¹¹⁹ González-Garza, F. 400.

When Federico learned about the assassination of Gustavo Madero, he understood Huerta was not going to fulfill the agreement. He rushed to Congress to impede the delivery of the resignations, but unfortunately it was too late. The army had surrounded the building, forcing Congress to admit the resignations and to appoint Huerta as the new president. As Federico predicted, once appointed President, Huerta disdained his promise, and allowed Madero's assassination.

Federico was certain his life was in danger, being the only living witness of Huerta's disloyalty. He abandoned Mexico and sought shelter in the United States. He wanted to expose the wicked attitude of Huerta's regime. He was convinced there were still many people willing to follow-up Madero ideals, under a new leadership. He was confident he could restructure the revolution under the leadership of Abraham Gonzalez; the character Madero selected as his heir at the revolution's leadership. Their commitment towards the Maderista ideals granted the ideological continuance the revolution needed to survive this treacherous moment. Unfortunately, Victoriano Huerta, aware of the threat the leadership of Abraham Gonzalez represented, ordered his assassination. To continue the revolt, Federico needed a new leader and Venustiano Carranza seemed the ideal candidate.

CHAPTER VI

A REVOLUTION WITHIN A REVOLUTION

Federico settled in New York in March of 1913, committed to avenge Madero's assassination and to restore democracy in Mexico. Meanwhile, a new revolutionary leader was in ascent. Venustiano Carranza, a former Porfirista, Reyista, and Maderista, was convinced Huerta was planning his assassination. Since December, Federico's secret service had discovered a seditious plan to assassinate several governors, including Carranza. The assassination of Abraham Gonzalez proved the plan was on.

Venustiano published a manifesto denouncing Huerta's maneuvers and rebelling against him. Convinced of the patriotic intentions of Carranza, Federico offered his services to the new movement. However, Venustiano was not interested in his support. Federico was concerned in a continuation of the Maderismo, while Carranza had his own plans and political ideals. In March of 1913, Carranza published the Plan de Guadalupe, repudiating Huerta's regime. To support the plan, Federico asked his brother Roque to develop revolutionary juntas from El Paso to San Antonio. Meanwhile, he continued using his writing skills and diplomatic abilities to support the revolution. He wrote a memorandum to Woodrow Wilson, new president of the United States, providing him with a complete account of Huerta's treason.¹²⁰ Few days later, Wilson repudiated

¹²⁰ Archive FGG, 29-2857.

Huerta's regime, claiming he would never support an assassin. Without the American support, the political situation deteriorated rapidly for Huerta.

To stay away from American reaction, Federico advised Carranza to avoid fighting along the border, urging him to designate a confidential agent in Washington, to preserve the good relationship with the White House. S.G. Hopkins informed Federico that Wilson promised not to recognize Huerta's regime. He also informed him about the possibility to establish an appointment with "a very important person"; this person was no other than the American president himself.¹²¹ On April 13, 1913, Henry Brown, President Wilson's personal attaché, sent Federico tickets to attend a public meeting with Woodrow Wilson, providing the instructions how to access to the event.¹²²

Wilson remained loyal about not recognizing the Mexican regime, even when other important nations, like Great Britain, did. To counteract the British recognition, Federico suggested Heriberto Barron, a distinguished congressional representative, to write a note to the British ambassador in Washington, protesting the recognition and accusing Huerta of treason. Meanwhile, Vasconcelos traveled to London, to negotiate with the British Parliament. This political maneuver angered Carranza. He considered Federico was "too linked with Madero", and demanded him to stop his political activities.¹²³

The epistolary exchange between Federico and Wilson continued for a long time. In May of 1913, Federico sent a Memorial to Wilson, asking permission to import weapons to Mexico. The next month, Federico requested Wilson's authorization to translate his book entitled *The Constitutional Government of the United States*; obviously, Federico was trying to implement the same approach he used with Theodore Roosevelt.

¹²¹ Archive FGG, 29-2878.

¹²² Archive FGG, 29-2888

¹²³ Archive FGG, 29-2903.

Federico continued using his writing skills to counteract the diplomatic efforts of Huerta's regime. In June of 1913, the New York Times published an editorial written by Emeterio de la Garza, justifying Madero's assassination. Federico considered essential to issue a refutation. His editorial, *Reseña Histórica*, provided the public opinion with a witness version of the events, diametrically opposed with the Mexican official account. Once again, Federico's writing stirred the political debate against Huerta.

For several months, Gonzalez Garza waited patiently for a positive response from Carranza. However, Venustiano was not interested in Federico's support, convinced he wanted to sustain Madero as the "apostle" of the revolution. Carranza was not interested in sharing glory with the late president, and his revolutionary principles were different. He perceived Federico as an apologist of an unnecessary competition. Vasconcelos and Sanchez Azcona tried unsuccessfully to convince Carranza to work with Federico.

In June of 1913, Carranza accepted Roque Gonzalez Garza into the Constitutional Army. He ratified his military rank as Lieutenant Colonel and appointed him in charge of the "Madero Regiment".¹²⁴ Federico traveled to San Antonio, to manage the rebel juntas organized along South Texas. This move infuriated Carranza, who criticized the rebel juntas, claiming they fomented ambition and disunity among the leaders. This criticism was awkward because few weeks earlier, during Roque's martial reappointment, he recognized the transcendence of the Texan revolutionary clubs. His remarks clearly demonstrated the antagonism Carranza felt for Federico.

When Federico learned about the high esteem General Lucio Blanco had for him, he traveled to Matamoros, convinced Blanco could provide the strong recommendation he

¹²⁴ Moguel, J. 11. & Archive FGG, 30-2939.

desperately needed. As expected, Lucio Blanco was willing to recommend Federico, but the reference was once again unattended.¹²⁵

Anyway, Federico's trip to the border was not useless. During his stay in Matamoros, he was able to share his socio-democratic ideals with Lucio Blanco, especially those in favor of a social redistribution of the agrarian land. Federico took the agrarian reform as a personal goal. He expanded his tour along the border to discuss the topic with several important leaders of the Constitutionalist army, including Pablo Gonzalez and Antonio Villarreal, with whom Federico maintained a personal friendship. Federico sent a letter to Hopkins informing him about the success of his interviews. Hopkins transmitted the information to Woodrow Wilson who, intrigued by the issue, asked Henry Lane Tupper, International Peace Forum Commissioner, and Jack T. Armstrong, Congressional Representative from Texas, to travel to the border to talk with Federico.

On August 10, 1913, Federico brought Wilson's emissaries to the border to parley with prominent leaders of the revolution, including Carranza's brother Jesus. The meeting was so successful that Jesus Carranza described it as "transcendental for the revolution's success".¹²⁶ Before traveling back to Washington, Allen Tupper insured Federico that Woodrow Wilson and his Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, were "anxious to learn about his visit".¹²⁷ The American attitude towards the insurgency dramatically improved after Tupper's visit. The lenient enforcement of the Neutrality Act was evident and the aggressiveness towards Huerta's regime mounted. In September 1913, Gonzalez Garza, Vasconcelos, and Jesus Acuña wrote to Wilson, asking him to allow the Mexican people to export weapons to Mexico to fight the usurpation. Morris

¹²⁵ Moguel, J. 14 & Archive FGG, 30-2996.

¹²⁶ Archive FGG, 30-2998.

¹²⁷ Archive FGG, 30-3007.

Sheppard, Democrat Senator from Texas, personally delivered the document to the American president.¹²⁸ Just a few days later, Wilson requested Congress to repeal the Neutrality law, to facilitate the introduction of weapons in favor of the revolution.

Wilson's positive response to Federico's activities gave the revolution the needed support. Carranza however did not consider it worthy enough to incorporate Federico into the movement. Frustrated by Carranza's disregard, Federico wrote several editorials, criticizing Carranza's apathy to implement an agrarian reform. He sent a letter to Lucio Blanco, claiming Carranza had no intention to solve the agrarian problems. Blanco asked Federico to join him, and convinced by Federico's ideals, became the first revolutionary leader to implement an agrarian reform. Unfortunately, Carranza canceled the program because Blanco implemented it without his authorization.

Once again, Federico Gonzalez Garza became isolated from the revolution, waiting for a new opportunity. He wrote a letter to Serapio Aguirre, General Treasurer of the Revolution, claiming that "is not me who has isolated; are others who have placed a fence around me...I have offered my services in vain". Influenced by Aguirre, Rafael Zubaran Capmany, former member of the Partido Democrático and close supporter of Carranza, recommended the incorporation of Jose Vasconcelos and Federico Gonzalez Garza.¹²⁹ Again, Carranza rejected Federico's incorporation. yet, Federico maintained frequent communication with Capmany.

By December 1913, Federico Gonzalez Garza became convinced all his efforts to take part in the revolution had been in vain, and decided to retire; however, one document changed his decision. In January of 1914, he received a New Year's post card from a

¹²⁸ Archive FGG, 31-3034 & 31-3029

¹²⁹ Archivo Del Primer Jefe del Ejercito Constitucionalista. (México: Condumex). Fondo XXI, Fólde 5, File 649. (Archive VC, 5-649)

distant friend, he had known when he was the Secretary General of the Revolution. This friend was Doroteo Arango, also known as Francisco “Pancho” Villa. Since their acquaintance in 1910, Villa had escalated dramatically in his martial career, becoming General Commander of the Northern Division. Convinced such recommendation would grant his incorporation to the Constitutional Army, Federico wrote a letter to Villa, explaining his ordeal and asking for his intermediacy. Villa’s response was outstanding. Instead of recommending Federico’s merger to the Constitutional Army, he requested Federico’s immediate inclusion to the “Division del Norte”, as his political advisor.¹³⁰ After months of waiting for an opportunity, Federico was back into the revolution. He informed Carranza about his appointment, pledging to his authority. Carranza right away used the negotiating capabilities of Federico, asking him to negotiate with the Madero family a loan for one hundred thousand dollars. Federico obtained the loan right away.

The American press was delighted with Federico’s reincorporation. They interviewed him to obtain his opinion about the war and about his commanding officer, Francisco Villa. Federico’s popularity infuriated Carranza, who ordered Federico to abstain from making public statements about the revolution to the international press.

Federico’s ideological influence redefined Villa’s attitude. In April of 1914, Villa authorized the first redistribution of land in the state of Chihuahua.¹³¹ Once again, Carranza ordered its cancellation. However, Villa challenged Carranza’s authority and maintained the land reform. Villa’s military victories and agrarian reforms increased his popularity, causing Carranza to perceive him as a political threat. Federico’s intelligence discovered General Chao was undermining Villa’s authority by instruction of Carranza.

¹³⁰ Archive FGG, 31-3072.

¹³¹ Archive FGG, 32-3185.

Manuel Bonilla, former Maderista minister now exiled in Los Angeles, informed Federico that Carranza was generating a schism between Maderistas and Carrancistas.¹³²

The American invasion of Veracruz temporarily defused the imminent rupture. For many revolutionary leaders, the American troops became the enemy, and to defeat this new enemy they were committed to recur to any needed procedure, even if it represented an alliance with Huerta. Federico recommended prudence and dispassion, claiming the American invasion was an attack towards Huerta and not towards Mexico. Francisco Villa sided with Federico, denouncing the American invasion as Huerta's problem.

Their diplomatic discretion was highly appreciated by Woodrow Wilson, who immediately sent a personal attaché to Villa's headquarters, to establish permanent communication with the insurgent leader. Upon Arrival, George Caruthers requested an interview with Federico Gonzalez Garza, aware of his influence upon Villa. The White House saw Villa as an alternative in case Carranza proved ineffective in defeating Huerta and restoring peace. This situation infuriated Carranza.

In May 1914, Villa appointed Fidel Avila as Governor of Chihuahua, recommending Federico's appointment as "political advisor" for the new Governor. From this new post, Federico could supervise the implementation of the revolutionary ideals in Chihuahua, while assisting Villa's political and diplomatic decisions. He strived to maintain alive the image of Madero, publishing an English translation of "La Sucesión Presidencial". He kept correspondence with outstanding figures of the Maderismo, including Sanchez Azcona, Vasconcelos, Pablo Gonzalez and Manuel Bonilla. His secret service kept him informed about the political negotiations between the White House and the different rebel forces, defusing Huerta's attempts to take advantage of the disagreements.

¹³² Archive FGG, 32-3188.

Villa's victory in Zacatecas, became decisive against Huerta. Aware that if captured he would be executed, Huerta escaped to Europe, leaving behind a nation in chaos. His departure increased the quarrel between Villa and Carranza. Federico proposed the issue be resolved peacefully through a caucus where all insurgent factions could participate. Carranza agreed, confident his leadership among the Constitutional Army would grant him an electoral triumph. The 1914 Aguascalientes Convention symbolized the most civilized attempt for the revolutionary leaders to solve their differences.

Federico became the mastermind behind Villa's representation. Since July 1914, he started a political and diplomatic maneuvering in support of Villa, maintaining vast communication with political figures in Mexico and the United States. His negotiating ability incorporated under Villa's leadership, the support of Maderistas, Zapatistas and several Magonista elements. Aware of the important role Alvaro Obregón would play in the conflict, Federico sent his own nephew as his political attaché to Obregón's group.

Federico supervised all the proposals his faction submitted to the convention. His personal style is evident in the Manifesto the "Division del Norte" presented during the opening ceremony. The Carrancistas criticized Federico's political intervention, claiming he was generating a split amid the revolutionary movement. They demanded Federico to amend this schism, convinced his negative influence was generating the quarrel.¹³³

Federico avoided a protagonist role in the convention. Roque Gonzalez Garza and Manuel Bonilla were his two most important representatives at the convention. Roque was in charge of gaining the political and military supports, while Bonilla was endowed with the responsibility of gaining the support of the civic and agrarian factions. Bonilla's role in the Convention's Agrarian Commission was fundamental to uphold the alliance

¹³³ Archive VC, 16-1622.

with the Zapatistas. Federico convinced Villa to pledge to Zapata's Plan de Ayala. He wrote a Manifesto recognizing Villa's allegiance to the Plan, and distributed five thousand copies among the convention members and their troops.¹³⁴

On October 23, 1914, Federico launched his most forceful attack against Carranza, arguing Carranza was forced by his democratic principles to accept the Convention's sovereignty.¹³⁵ His arguments convinced many members, bringing the Convention to a stalemate and forcing the inclusion of a compromise candidate. Antonio Diaz Soto y Gama, representative of the Magonistas, proposed Federico as their choice.¹³⁶ Federico declined, proposing the candidacy of Eulalio Gutierrez, a recognized leader of the revolution, for whom he had great confidence and respect. Eventually, Federico's proposals triumphed, and the Convention of Aguascalientes appointed Eulalio Gutierrez as provisional president of Mexico. For Federico, the Convention symbolized the success of democracy. Through a democratic convention the most important warlords of the nation were able to achieve an accord to bring peace, stability and a new social order for their country. Carranza must submit to the will of the people and collaborate in the new order or abandon the country.

Venustiano Carranza decided not to obey the Convention's resolution and prompted an armed confrontation. He denounced the Convention as a fraud and declared war against the leaders of the convention, including Federico Gonzalez Garza. The renewal of hostilities demoralized many leaders, including Eulalio Gutierrez who relinquished his presidential appointment. In substitution, the Aguascalientes Convention designated Roque Gonzalez Garza as Interim President of Mexico in January of 1915. Convinced

¹³⁴ Archive FGG, 36-3608.

¹³⁵ Moguel, J. 11. & Archive FGG, 36-3602.

¹³⁶ Archive FGG. 22-2129

Federico could renegotiate the American support, Roque appointed him as representative in Washington. Nevertheless, Villa, confident in his military strength, considered the diplomatic arrangement unnecessary and requested Federico to stay beside him.¹³⁷

Federico was cognizant that, if supported by Wilson, Carranza would become undefeatable. They would need to bring the country into a bloodbath to subdue Carranza, and Federico was unwilling to do so. Federico's confidence demolished when Allen Tupper informed him Washington was in favor of the constitutionalist cause. Upset by the escalate of violence, he withdrew from the military adventure.

Federico abandoned the warfare but not the democratic cause. He was convinced his contribution to the rebellion would be more effective as a political and diplomatic hand rather than as a martial strategist. Before leaving the country, he recommended Roque, to seek Zapata's support and protection. He suggested the Conventionist Army to seek an agreement with Carranza. However, Carranza arrogantly rejected this armistice. To defeat Carranza, it would be necessary to disassociate him from the American support.

Federico traveled to Los Angeles, searching the support of Ricardo Flores Magón. He published an article in the Los Angeles Times, entitled *Mexicans Deserve more Indulgence*, claiming that the ambition and greed of political warlords, and the passive indifference of the American government hindered the fate of the Mexican people.¹³⁸ Flores Magón praised Federico's essay, but rejected an alliance.

Federico moved back to New York, to continue his activities as lawyer and investment advisor. Meanwhile, Carranza maintained permanent supervision upon his activities. In June 1914, the New York Evening Post, in its article *The Mexican Case*,

¹³⁷ Archive FGG, 38-3724 & 38-3732.

¹³⁸ Archive FGG, 38-3807

described that, concerned by the antagonism among Maderistas and Carrancistas, Wilson placed his attention in a group headed by Pancho Villa and Federico Gonzalez Garza.¹³⁹

In June 1915, Roque's presidential administration was defeated. Villa offered to resign to his military command and to withdraw from the political scenario if Carranza followed the example. He recommended the appointment of a renowned democrat for president. His proposed candidates included the names of Manuel Bonilla, Felipe Angeles and Federico Gonzalez Garza.¹⁴⁰

Carranza hindered the possibility of a peaceful solution, confident that his allegiance with the United States would lead him to victory. Meanwhile, his adversaries tried in vain to generate a schism between Carranza and Washington. Villa's attack on Columbus, New Mexico, and the "Plan de San Diego" were designed to generate a confrontation amid the two nations.

By January 1916, the opposition against Carranza was almost over, specially in the north. Federico sent a letter to Carranza, accepting his defeat and requesting permission to return to their country. Carranza not only disregarded Federico's proposal but also propelled slanders against him, ordering this detention upon arrival.¹⁴¹ Rumors flourished all over Mexico, claiming a new revolt was thriving, led by Federico Gonzalez Garza and Felipe Angeles. Several insurgents pledge their allegiance to Federico, if he decided to head a new rebellion. Federico declined because his diplomatic expertise and his valuable sources of information convinced him that the political fate of Carranza was linked to the political fate of Wilson.

¹³⁹ Archive VC, 43-4649.

¹⁴⁰ Archive FGG, 39-3857.

¹⁴¹ Moguel, J. 18.

To pacify the claims for social reform, Carranza recommended the promulgation of a new Constitution. Many oppositionist leaders offered to collaborate with the legislation. Federico used his influence upon some Constitutional Congressmen like Antonio Diaz Soto y Gama, to include radical reforms into the new constitution. The promulgation convinced the oppositionist elements that Carranza's intentions were honest, granting Carranza a landslide victory during the presidential elections of 1917.

Federico became an advocate for the new Constitution, especially Articles 3, 27, and 123, related to education, public land, and labor conditions. Federico considered public education, the greatest problem to solve in Mexico. He claimed, as Horace Mann did in 1837, that public education was the "great equalizer" of society. In July of 1917, he wrote an essay about *The Educative Problem in Mexico*, winning the recognition of field experts like Jose Vasconcelos, who later became the first Secretary of Public Education during the Administration of Alvaro Obregón.

Carranza was not committed to bring forward the social changes promised by the new constitution. By autumn of 1917, Felipe Angeles decided to initiate a new revolt against Carranza, and called for Federico's support.¹⁴² During several weeks, the two leaders exchanged ideas about the political ideology and objectives for the new rebellion. Felipe Angeles wanted a radical revolution, while Federico promoted a more social-democratic principle. Federico's ideology prevailed and together they drew a new political proposal for Mexico. Federico wrote the Manifesto Felipe Angeles published before initiating his military excursion into Mexico. The popularity of Felipe Angeles among the army would grant its support, while Felipe's affiliation with the Magonistas, and Federico's leadership among the Maderistas, would grant them the required political support.

¹⁴² Archive FGG, 44-4344.

To subsidize the revolutionary project, they established the “Sociedad Mexicana de Beneficencia” in conjunction with Emilio Madero and Antonio Villarreal. To represent their rebellion in the political arena, they created the “Alianza Liberal Mexicana”. Felipe Angeles negotiated an alliance with Pancho Villa to increase their military strength.¹⁴³

By the beginning of 1919, the insurgency had grown tremendously, supported by Magonistas like Jesus Flores Magón and Ramon Prida, and important American figures like Samuel Gompers, first president of the American Federation of Labor.¹⁴⁴ Gonzalez Garza considered it was time to inform the world about their political intentions and proceeded to publish the Manifesto he wrote for Felipe Angeles. He sent Miguel Diaz Lombardo to Europe as diplomatic envoy of the Alliance.

The incorporation of reactionary elements like Enrique Santibañez, and Jesus Flores Magón proved mistaken. Their ideologies defeated the original principles and alienated public support. Federico was confident his diplomatic negotiations would bring success, reducing the death toll. Unfortunately, the radicals demanded an immediate warfare, regardless of the bloodshed. Outnumbered, Federico and his followers were forced to withdraw from the alliance. Without public support, the rebellion ended in disaster. In April 1919, Felipe Angeles was defeated, captured, and sentenced to death. Federico tried, by several means, to save his friend’s life. He wrote to Carranza, trying unsuccessfully to save Felipe Angeles. He even sent a telegram to Margaret Wilson, the daughter of President Wilson, begging her intermediacy. His last attempt was a telegram sent to Alvaro Obregón, reminding that during the revolution Angeles saved Obregon’s life. Unfortunately, Obregon’s telegraph arrived one hour after Angeles’ execution.

¹⁴³ Archive VC, 152-17364. & Archive FGG, 47-4685.

¹⁴⁴ Archive FGG, 47-4692 & 47-4700.

The execution fueled Federico's aversion against Carranza, prompting him to join the new insurrection, led by Alvaro Obregón. In a letter sent to Francisco Villa, Federico described Carranza as "a dictator of the worst kind", and hoped he would be demoted by the Obregonistas¹⁴⁵ Several close friends tried to convince Federico to return to Mexico; however, Federico decided to wait for the nearby presidential elections. His defense of Felipe Angeles granted him the resentment from important elements of the Carrancismo, including Plutarco Elias Calles. He accused Federico to be the mastermind of the Alianza Liberal Mexicana and the instigator of Felipe Angeles. Plutarco Elias Calles promised to prosecute Federico if he ever attempted to return to Mexico.

¹⁴⁵ Archive FGG, 51-5042.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

THE LEGACY OF FEDERICO GONZALEZ GARZA

The presidency of Alvaro Obregón eventually brought some of the expected change, giving closure to the Revolution. In November 1919, Obregón announced his intention to run for president, against the will of Carranza. Federico Gonzalez Garza, Antonio Villarreal, and Jose Vasconcelos took charge for Obregón's political campaign in the United States. Carranza's attempts to obstruct Obregón's candidature generated a military confrontation among them. This time, the rebellion would be less bloody. Military outnumbered, Carranza fled Mexico City in May of 1920, in route to Veracruz, where he expected to embark to Europe. He never made it, his train detained in Tlaxcaltenongo and his own bodyguards assassinated him.

Carranza's departure allowed Federico's safe return to Mexico. Antonio Villarreal requested Federico's expedite return, because Obregon urgently required his services.¹⁴⁶ Plutarco Elias Calles, Federico's main concern, reached an accord with Obregón, granting all the "Obregonistas", Federico included, safe passage back home. He returned to Mexico convinced that the only way to bring a long-lasting social change was through the enhancement of public education and the implementation of an agrarian reform.

¹⁴⁶ Moguel, J. 18. & Archive FGG, 52-5157.

Jose Vasconcelos invited him to participate in establishment of the new Secretary of Public Education.¹⁴⁷ To support his ideas, he expanded his prior article into a book titled *La Educación Pública, El Problema Fundamental de México*. With Vasconcelos as Secretary in charge, and Federico as his chief advisor, education took preponderance in the new administration. Together they built hundreds of schools and employed thousands of teachers to fulfill the educational needs of the Mexican youth.

During Obregón's administration, Federico also collaborated at the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, generating the first social redistribution of land administered by the Federal government. For the first time, the government was fulfilling the claims that Francisco I. Madero and Emiliano Zapata demanded during the revolution.

Another main contribution of Federico was his passionate support to the memory of Francisco I. Madero. Since 1912, Madero's image had gradually tarnished; first by Madero's own political misfortunes; later, by Huerta's attempts to hide his horrendous crime, by blaming Madero of the most insidious accusations, and ultimately by Carranza, who refused to share glory with the late president. Between 1913 and 1919, official historians criticized, condemned, or simply ignored Madero's role during the revolution.

Federico transfigured Madero into the "Apostle of the Revolution", transforming him into a political icon, symbol of morality, idealism, and democracy.¹⁴⁸ On November 20, 1920, Federico organized the first national ceremony to commemorate the anniversary of the Mexican Revolution. President Obregón, who attended the event, celebrated the act claiming that finally, history was granting justice to Madero. Since then, the official historians granted Madero its well deserved place in Mexico's history.

¹⁴⁷ Archive FGG, 52-5167.

¹⁴⁸ Moguel, J. 21.

Federico continued his political career for several years, occupying important posts and running for Congress in several occasions. However, his political clashes continued. Plutarco Elias Calles, Secretary of State during Obregón's administration, continued his feud with Federico. When Elias Calles won the presidency in 1924, Federico knew his political career was in jeopardy. In 1926, Federico run for congress, but the blatant harassment of the authorities convinced him to abandon the political arena.

Even though a fervent Anti-Reelectionist, in 1928 Federico supported the political return of Alvaro Obregón, convinced that only under his administration, the nation would return to the democratic path. Along with his permanent allies, Vasconcelos and Sanchez Azcona, they paved the way for Obregón's return. Obregón's assassination, in July 17 of 1928, hindered their expectations. They nominated Jose Vasconcelos as candidate to run against Pascual Ortiz Rubio, representative of the newly formed Partido Revolucionario Mexicano, precursor of today's P.R.I. Federico's team included novel politicians who would gain prestige during the following years. The new figures included Manuel Gomez Morin, former dean of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, and who in 1939, would establish the Partido Acción Nacional. The political campaign failed when the brutal official harassment forced many supporters to exile, including Jose Vasconcelos and Manuel Gomez Morin.

In 1936, Federico published *La Revolución Mexicana: Mi Contribución Politico-Literaria*, where he not only posted valuable memories of this epic stage in the history of Mexico, but also submitted his own socio-political ideology. Written in 1936, during the pinnacle of European militarism, his political wisdom becomes evident when predicts the collapse of National Socialism, Fascism and Bolshevist Communism.

For Federico, democracy was the only political system able to provide “the greatest degree of welfare and progress for the individual and for society”. He advocated for a “social democracy” where the individual, “never in detriment, but always in benefit of society... can obtain the highest degree of personal development”. He promoted a society based in a strong sense of cooperation and solidarity among all, claiming, “It is not by the mean of hate that divides, but by the mean of love that unites, how we resolve our problems”. He perceived moral as a fundamental problem of society and conceived a civic and moral public education as the only mechanism able to solve the problem.¹⁴⁹

Supported by the newly born “Partido Acción Nacional”, in 1940 Federico led the campaign of Juan Andrew Almazán against Manuel Avila Camacho, through one of the most contested elections in Mexican history. The political machinery of the ruling party (PRI), consummated an outstanding electoral fraud, ending the democratic aspirations of Gonzalez Garza. Upon defeat, Federico retired from politics and dedicated to write about history, democracy, and education. In 1943, The Secretary of Public Education published Federico’s last manuscript, entitled “Education, the Fundamental Problem of Mexico.

Until the end of his life, Federico Gonzalez Garza supported the image of Francisco I. Madero as the “Apostle of Democracy”. His books, political memories and extensive archive provided a wealth of data about the revolution to some of the most important contemporary historians in Mexico. Federico’s narrative about the Decena Trágica, is considered fundamental for the academic analysis of this historical event, due to the fact that he was the only witness of Madero’s last moments, who survived the experience. Federico Gonzalez Garza died in Mexico City October 21, 1951.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ González-Garza, F. Prologue.

¹⁵⁰ Diccionario Porrúa, 1528.

Since his political awakening, Federico Gonzalez Garza committed his life to an epic pursue of democracy in Mexico. His acquaintance with Madero provided a unique opportunity to accomplish his political ideals. Aware of the advantages Madero had due to his wealthy position, Federico fueled Madero's ideology with his own, giving birth to a new political icon. Madero gradually transformed into the "Apostle of Democracy"; his writings suddenly bust with a political passion, unseen in his previous prose. *La Sucesión Presidencial de 1910: El Partido Nacional Democrático* gave Madero national relevance, just in time to participate in the national elections.

They thrived for the formation of a nationwide democratic party; unfortunately, the intromission of political opportunists like Francisco Vasquez Gomez hindered their work. When Madero started his political quest for democracy, he was not interested in becoming president, but just to force Diaz to incorporate Limantour as Vice-presidential candidate. Certain that the permanency of Diaz would perpetuate despotism, Federico convinced Madero to become presidential candidate for the Partido Anti-Reeleccionista.

Through a magnificent handling of the political discourse, Federico's editorials captured the heart of the populace. His daring editorials aimed to an eclectic range of targets, from the educated society and the greedy politicians, to the tyrant himself. The audacity of his publications was unprecedented at the time, winning the recognition of his peers and the hate of his adversaries, included Don Porfirio who ordered his confinement.

Federico is notorious by his outstanding writing skills and his exceptional ability to visualize political opportunities. The way he utilized Theodore Roosevelt's speech as an asset for his political campaign is a proof of this ability. His translation of Roosevelt's speech convinced the people that the famous American leader was supporting Madero.

The success of Madero's candidacy was an unforeseen outcome for Diaz as well as for Francisco Vasquez Gomez. Diaz responded with harassment, a traditional recourse of the tyrannical regimes. Some feeble elements, like the Vasquez Gomez, easily subdued to the treatment and withdrew from the confrontation. Federico inherited the colossal duty of maintaining the political campaign alive, when Madero appointed him President of the Electoral Committee on June 16, 1910.¹⁵¹

Federico not only kept the crusade alive but also continued his prolific editorialist task, pounding his adversaries with style and eloquence. With his writings, he kept the party united and in tract for the proximal elections, even though convinced Diaz was preparing a blatant electoral fraud. Since the beginning, Federico was convinced Diaz would not subdue to the will of the people. The only way to achieve the democratic goal would be through an armed revolt. However, he committed to follow the democratic and peaceful route until exhausting all the legal recourses. Only then, they would have the right to recur to violence. This thesis was clear in several of Federico's writings.

After the electoral fraud, Federico controlled his party's response, manipulating the government's response. He continued his pacifist attitude, asking for the elections to be annulated. He even published that his party's activities will cease after publication of the congressional resolution. These actions convinced Diaz the threat was over, abridging Madero's surveillance, who took advantage of this to escape to San Antonio.

Federico organized one of the largest public manifestations in Mexico's history. The protest concluded when the populace lapidated the tyrant's residence. This was the first sign that the democrats would not subdue to the tyrant. Roque Estrada recognized the outstanding leadership of Gonzalez Garza in this symbolic event. Great ideological

¹⁵¹ Vasconcelos, J. 241.

leaders of the revolution, like Vasconcelos and Sanchez Azcona, recognized Federico heroically resisted the violent attacks of the tyrant enemy. Even Madero himself, applauded Federico's attitude, surprised he was able to surpass the ordeal unharmed.¹⁵²

Once the electoral fraud obliterated the attempt to achieve democracy by peaceful means, the democrats had no other option but the armed rebellion. Federico handpicked San Antonio to host the headquarters of the incipient revolution. Since the beginning of the campaign, Federico established rapport with local newspaper editors to engender a supportive environment for his plans. When official persecution forced Sanchez Azcona to exile, Federico recommended San Antonio; that way, Sanchez Azcona became onsite operator for the revolution. When Madero arrived in San Antonio, everything was ready to initiate the armed revolt. It would have been impossible for Madero to organize a general upheaval in such a short period.

Madero waited until the arrival of Federico to proceed with the plan. Once officially invested as leader of the rebellion, Madero proceeded to appoint Federico as Secretary General of the revolution, second in the line of command. From this post, Federico controlled both, the military operations as well as the civilian and diplomatic maneuvers. His home in San Antonio, known as the "White House", became the center of the provisional government.

Another important asset Federico brought to the cause was his unrivaled diplomatic skills. The note he wrote in 1911, brought a paradigm shift among the chancelleries, forcing Washington to promise belligerence recognition. Federico maintained open communication with significant foreign figures including William Taft, Woodrow Wilson, William Jennings Bryan and Henry Wilson Lane.

¹⁵² Archive FGG, 12-1131.

Unfortunately, the success of the revolution affected Federico's influence upon Madero, bringing into the movement, elements foreign to the insurgent ideals. People like Vasquez Gomez, Limantour and Madero's father, contended with Federico to influence Madero's decisions. Their sway upon Madero brought terrible consequences to the revolution, including the infamous Treaty of Ciudad Juarez. Federico expressed his refusal to accept a solution that would not eradicate the despotic regime. He demanded an unconditional surrender of the tyrannical regime rather than a doubtful compromise.¹⁵³ Madero neglected Federico's advice and accepted the compromise convinced that, by integrating some loyal elements into the negotiated administration, the revolution would persevere. From that moment on, Federico became target for the counter-insurgence.

Federico remained loyal to Madero. His foretelling letter written in July of 1911, demonstrates his commitment. Unfortunately, Madero neglected his friend's advice. Anyhow, Federico continued supporting his leader, trying to defuse the hazards they encountered. Eventually, the naivety of Madero engendered a deadly finale to their democratic crusade. Federico remained loyal to his friend, committed to die with his leader; however, a sinister plan of Huerta and the intercession of the Ambassador of Spain saved Federico's life.¹⁵⁴

Federico devoted his life to avenge the assassination of Madero and to maintain alive the pristine image and the ideal of the revolutionary leader; unfortunately, this rationale brought him at odds with Carranza. Even though his political experience, Federico was not a true politician, able to leave aside his principles and accommodate. He demanded the recognition of Madero as ideological leader of the revolution and an absolute

¹⁵³ Archive FGG, 15-1481. & Gonzalez Garza, F. 463.

¹⁵⁴ Archive FGG, 29-2890.

adhesion to his ideals. Unfortunately, leaders like Carranza were pursuing their own political agenda and ideology. For them, Madero was a figure of the past, whose shadow was interfering with their protagonist expectations. Carranza kept Federico segregated from the movement, even though he could provide valuable services to the cause.

Federico's ideological influence went beyond Madero. Leaders like Lucio Blanco and Francisco Villa implemented important social reforms, including land redistribution, becoming the first to implement such fundamental demand of the revolution. In Villa, Federico found a strong leader, willing to listen to his advice. Under Federico's tutorship, Villa reached enough political support to challenge the political leadership of Carranza. This political clash degenerated into a bloody confrontation. Even though Federico tried to achieve a peaceful solution through the Aguascalientes Convention, the American support granted Carranza the poise he needed to defeat the convention's resolution.

Eventually, the triumph of Alvaro Obregón allowed Federico's return to Mexico to implement his democratic ideals. His influence is evident, especially in areas such as public education and agrarian reform, which distinguished Obregón's regime. Sadly, Federico's ideals clashed with the political manipulation of Plutarco Elias Calles and his new political machinery. During the following years, Federico unsuccessfully continued his crusade for democracy. Federico's involvement in the futile presidential campaigns of Vasconcelos in 1925 and Almazán in 1940, demonstrates his political transcendence. After all, these elections are quite symbolic; the first one is considered the first electoral fraud in the post-revolutionary era, while the second is considered the mayor electoral fraud in the history of Mexico.

Federico's ideals were not enough to defeat the massive political machinery that Plutarco Elias Calles endowed to the Mexican political society. This same political machinery is the one who wrote the official version of Mexican history, reason why Federico Gonzalez Garza was intentionally vanished from the official account and ungratefully forgotten in the archives of history. However, the political ideology of Federico Gonzalez Garza remains valid up to date; the ideological debate described by Federico in the prologue of his book, resembles the ongoing political debate in Mexico:

“Democracy must not be based in an inhuman [neo]liberalism that goes, in its indifference for human misfortune, to repudiate the right to life that every human being has, for the simple fact of existing. But at the same time, democracy must not fall...to the opposite extreme [populism], trying to monopolize all human activities, even the most intimate spiritual life of men”.¹⁵⁵

It is unfair that, while other characters of the revolution deserve statues and ceremonies, and important streets and avenues all over Mexico carry their name; the name of Federico Gonzalez Garza remains unknown, even for the most distinguished members of academia. History must not be hostage of political ideologies and interests. The historical contribution of Federico Gonzalez Garza is enormous and must not remain neglected. It is our duty as historians, to recuperate the historical account of Federico Gonzalez Garza, and his plight for democracy.

¹⁵⁵ Gonzalez Garza, F. Prologue,

References

Diccionario Porrúa: historia, Biografía y Geografía de México 1995 ed., s.v. “Federico González Garza.”

Espejel, Laura, Olivera, Alicia and Rueda, Salvador. Emiliano Zapata: Antología. México: INEHRM, 1988.

Esquivel-Obregón, Toribio. Democracia y Personalismo. México: Jus, 1961.

Estrada, Roque. La Revolución y Francisco I. Madero. Guadalajara: Estrada, 1912.

Fondo CMXV: Archivo del Licenciado Federico González Garza; 1889-1920. México: Condumex, 2005-2006.

Fondo XXI: Archivo Del Primer Jefe del Ejercito Constitucionalista: 1889-1920. México: Condumex, 2005-2006.

González-Garza, Federico. La Revolución Mexicana: Mi contribución Político-Literaria. México: Del Bosque, 1936.

López, Chantal and Cortés, Omar. Madero y los Partidos Antireeleccionista y Constitucional Progresista. México: Ediciones Antorcha, 1988.

Madero, Francisco I. La Sucesión Presidencial. México: Editorial Clio, 1994.

Moguel, Josefina. Guía del Archivo del Lic. Federico González Garza. Mexico: Condumex, 2000.

Ramírez, Manuel. Manifiestos Políticos: 1892-1912. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1957.

Reyes, Alfonso. Emiliano Zapata: Su vida y obra. México: Asociación Nacional de Egresados Universitarios, 1976.

Sánchez-Azcona, Juan. Apuntes para Historia de la Revolución Mexicana. México: INEHRM, 1961.

Valdiosera, Ramon. Zapata: 3000 días de Lucha.
México: Editorial Universo, 1982.

Vasconcelos, Jose. Ulises Criollo.
México: Editorial Jus, 1964.

Vásquez Gómez, Francisco. Memorias Políticas.
México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1965.

Womack, John. Zapata y la Revolución Mexicana.
México: Siglo XXI Editores, 1969.

VITA

Mario A. Ferron was born in Mexico City on January 19, 1960. He attended several public and private universities in Mexico, including The Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana (U.A.M.), Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de Mexico (I.T.A.M.) and The Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Mexico (U.N.A.M.), from which he obtained the Bachelor in Business Administration in 1998. He continued his college education in 2003, attending the South Texas College and the University of Texas Pan-American, from which he expects to obtain his Master in Arts in History on August of 2006, and his Masters in Bilingual Education and Educational Leadership in December of 2006.

Mario A. Ferron's professional record began in Mexico, where he performed managerial positions in several corporations, including pharmaceutical companies and travel agencies. He entered the American educational field in 2003, teaching GED and ESL for the Migrant program at McAllen ISD. In 2004 he obtained his Teaching Certificate for the State of Texas and today, he performs as Social Studies Teacher for the Two Way Dual Program at Liberty Middle School, PSJA ISD.

His leadership experience began as a member of the International Association of Students in Economic & Commercial Sciences (AIESEC) between 1979 and 1981, where he was elected national vice-president of AIESEC-Mexico. Years later, he was elected Tourism vice-president of the Chamber of Commerce of Reynosa, Mexico and between September of 1999 and May of 2001, he worked as Tourism Director for the City of Reynosa, Mexico. Today, he lives at 3409 W. Gardenia, McAllen, TX 78501.