Economics and Finance Faculty Publications and Presentations
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
3-9-2022
Abstract
We develop a theory that addresses the existence of stable vaccine allocations in a political economy where vaccination offers both private and social benefits. These are allocation policies that a political leader can enforce without losing their popularity. We show that a stable allocation may not exist if vaccine supply is sufficiently low relative to the number of individuals eligible to receive a dose. We then characterize the minimum number of vaccine doses guaranteeing the existence of a stable vaccine allocation. Moreover, when individuals have unequal voting rights in the political economy, stable allocations favor those with greater voting power. We generalize our results to economies where spatial proximity between individuals varies and preferences are unselfish due to positive vaccine externalities. Applying the theory, we find that a political leader can enforce stable vaccine allocation policies that are minority-inclusive only when the supply of doses is sufficiently high.
Recommended Citation
Nganmeni, Zephirin and Pongou, Roland and Tchantcho, Bertrand and Tondji, Jean-Baptiste, Stable Allocations of Vaccines in a Political Economy. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4053328 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4053328