Theses and Dissertations - UTB/UTPA

Date of Award


Document Type


Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)



First Advisor

Dr. Dave O. Jackson

Second Advisor

Dr. Cynthia Brown

Third Advisor

Dr. Judith Swisher


During the last two decades, the number of cross-listed firms has been rising steadily. Recently, exchange-traded cross-listings from emerging markets have outnumbered those from developed countries. Chapter I shows an introduction to cross-listings. Chapter II analyzes the implications of ownership structure on the cross-listing premium of emerging-market firms that cross-list on U.S exchanges. Insider ownership is an important determinant of the value of cross-listed firms. The spike and fall in excess-value around the cross-listing year described in the extant cross-listing literature is substantially higher if the firm has insider ownership. In fact, investors are worse-off in the long-run when they invest in insider-owner firms. Capital-rasing firms tend to have a higher long-term valuation. Insider ownership and capital-raising intentions are important to explain market valuation of cross-listings. There is no evidence of a long-term cross-listing premium. The behavior of the cross-listing premium lends support to the market-timing hypothesis. Chapter III studies the operating and stock performance of emerging-market firms cross-listed in the U.S. Managers of cross-listed firms, with insider ownership, choose to cross-list following extraordinary operating performance, consistent with the market-timing hypothesis. However, investors seem to foresee the subsequent underperformance as stock returns begin to deteriorate one to two years before the decline in operating performance. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act has mitigated the opportunistic behavior of cross-listed firms. Abnormal stock returns decline more substantially for firms with insider-ownership, consistent with the market-timing hypothesis. Finally, capital-raising firms have better operating performance than non-capital-raising firms, consistent with Charitou and Louca (2009). Chapter IV shows that firms with insider ownership tend to increase dividend distribution to shareholders and are more likely to become dividend payers following cross-listing in the U.S. However, cross-listed, exchange-traded firms tend to pay lower dividends and are less likely to be dividend payers compared to non-cross-listed firms. The average decrease in dividend payments following exchange-traded cross-listings lends support to the market segmentation hypothesis and the substitute model of dividends. A cross-listing event by itself does not signal future shifts in dividend policy; however, the cross-listing level and ownership structure convey information on future dividend policy. Chapter V concludes this dissertation.


Copyright 2012 Omar Alejandro Esqueda. All Rights Reserved.

Granting Institution

University of Texas-Pan American