Economics and Finance Faculty Publications and Presentations

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

5-31-2012

Abstract

This article models the imperfect detection of tax evasion motivated by the existence of a corrupt tax administration. Consistent with previous literature, fines and audit probabilities both have a positive effect on compliance. Moreover, the model shows that they have a negative effect on the bribes paid to corrupt tax officials. More corruption decreases compliance levels, giving honest auditors incentives to work harder to detect evasion. Giving inspectors a share of the detected evasion (tax farming) makes auditors work harder; however, increasing their wages reduces their exerted effort to discover evasion. Higher compliance can as well be achieved by hiring more efficient inspectors.

Comments

Copyright © 2012, Springer Science Business Media, LLC.

https://rdcu.be/c3DR1

Publication Title

Public Organization Review

DOI

10.1007/s11115-011-0172-5

Plum Print visual indicator of research metrics
PlumX Metrics
  • Citations
    • Citation Indexes: 12
  • Usage
    • Downloads: 26
    • Abstract Views: 4
  • Captures
    • Readers: 44
see details

Included in

Finance Commons

Share

COinS
 
 

To view the content in your browser, please download Adobe Reader or, alternately,
you may Download the file to your hard drive.

NOTE: The latest versions of Adobe Reader do not support viewing PDF files within Firefox on Mac OS and if you are using a modern (Intel) Mac, there is no official plugin for viewing PDF files within the browser window.