On the design of an optimal immigration policy

Authors

Armando R. Lopez-Velasco, The University of Texas Rio Grande ValleyFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-2025

Abstract

This paper constructs a model for the study of optimal immigration from the perspective of natives. They have preferences over redistributive transfers, a public good subject to congestion, and over the level of family-based migration. Border enforcement is costly. The model derives conditions for an optimal immigration policy, which balances skill-based against family-based migration, equalizes the fiscal opportunity cost of unauthorized immigration with the marginal cost of enforcement, and balances the effects on transfers against the implied congestion effects. A parameterized version of the model studies the 1994–2008 period and finds legislation projects on immigration consistent with the model's predictions.

Comments

Original published version available at

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/share/S6T2THTFUCCPCBKJZ6TD?target=10.1111/ecin.13260

Recommended Citation

Lopez‐Velasco, A.R., 2025. On the design of an optimal immigration policy. Economic Inquiry, 63(1), pp.47-97. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.13260

Publication Title

Economic Inquiry

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.13260