Economics and Finance Faculty Publications
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
12-2025
Abstract
This paper leverages random assignment of female quotas for leadership positions on Indian village councils to assess its causal effect on corruption. Since the mid-1990s, India has mandated that at least one third of village council chief positions be randomly reserved for women. Using data from the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS) 2006, we find that an additional term reserved for a female head as opposed to just a single one reduces both the occurrence and bribe amounts paid to the local government by households. This reduction is also observed in bribes paid to other local officials suggesting downstream effects of electing female officials on corruption. As a potential mechanism, we provide speculative evidence that it takes time for women political leaders to establish and settle, and when they are able to do so, they appear more efficient and transparent, especially in terms of selecting households as beneficiaries for government programs.
Recommended Citation
Chatterjee, S., Hastawala, S. and Taveras, E. (2025) “Female politicians and corruption in rural India,” European Journal of Political Economy, 90, p. 102764. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102764.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Publication Title
European Journal of Political Economy
DOI
10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102764
