Rationing to avoid conflict: A centralized assignment problem

Authors

• Zéphirin Nganmeni, Université Paris 8 Vincennes-St Denis
• Roland Pongou, University of Ottawa
• Bertrand Tchantcho, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Yaoundé
• Jean-Baptiste Tondji, The University of Texas Rio Grande ValleyFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

10-1-2026

Abstract

When can a leader allocate scarce resources without triggering conflict from excluded groups? We study this question in a centralized assignment problem in which a conflict-averse leader allocates indivisible resources under an influence structure that determines which coalitions can block outcomes. We characterize when stable assignments exist, identify the minimum resource level required to guarantee stability, and determine how resources are allocated when stability is feasible. Our main result is that the relationship between resource availability and stability is non-monotonic: stable allocations may arise under extreme scarcity and abundance, yet fail at intermediate levels. The exact thresholds governing these regimes depend entirely on the underlying influence structure. The model provides a framework for studying conflict avoidance in environments such as political appointments, land allocation, public procurement, and aid distribution.

Comments

Preprint: Nganmeni, Zephirin and Pongou, Roland and Tchantcho, Bertrand and Tondji, Jean Baptiste, Rationing to Avoid Conflict: A  Centralized Assignment Problem (February 12, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5040984 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5040984

Recommended Citation

Nganmeni, Z., Pongou, R., Tchantcho, B. and Tondji, J.B., 2026. Rationing to avoid conflict: A centralized assignment problem. Journal of Mathematical Economics, p.103289. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103289

Publication Title

Journal of Mathematical Economics

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103289