Economics and Finance Faculty Publications and Presentations

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2-2019

Abstract

We find that firms where women have more power in the top management team, measured by female executives’ plurality and pay slice, face fewer operations-related lawsuits. This effect is robust to several treatments of endogeneity and does not appear to be driven by female executives' greater willingness to settle the cases. Evidence from a simultaneous equations approach suggests that firms where women executives have more power avoid lawsuits partly by avoiding some risky but value-increasing firm policies, such as more aggressive R&D, intensive advertising, and policies inimical to other parties.

Comments

© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Original published version available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.09.004

First Page

202

Last Page

225

Publication Title

Journal of Accounting and Economics

DOI

10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.09.004

Included in

Finance Commons

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