Date of Award
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Dr. Ahmed Elnahas
Dr. Andre Mollick
Dr. Lei Gao
This dissertation consists of two essays on corporate finance. In my first essay, we investigate whether and, if so, how the information disclosure preferences differ systematically between Republican CEOs and Democrat CEOs in the context of management earnings forecasts. We find that Republican CEOs tend to prefer a less asymmetric information environment than Democrat CEOs, and thus make more frequent, timelier, and more accurate disclosures than Democrat CEOs. Results using the propensity score-matched sample and the difference-in-differences analysis show that our results are unlikely to be driven by potential endogeneity. Our results are robust to controlling for various CEO characteristics, including personal characteristics, compensation incentives, overconfidence, and managerial ability, and are stronger for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership and litigation risk.
In my second essay, exploiting the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws as an exogenous shock to derivative lawsuits, we investigate the relationship between shareholders’ litigation rights and stock price crash risk. Our difference-in-differences estimates show that the adoption of a UD law reduces managerial short-termism and bad news hoarding and improves disclosure quality, leading to a lower propensity of stock price crash risk. Our results are robust to addressing selection bias using propensity score matching and to controlling for the adoption of directors’ duty, poison pill, control shareholder acquisition, business combination, and fair price laws. These results shed further light on the dark side of shareholders’ litigation, which may place pressure on firms’ short-term performance and encourage managers to mask bad news and expose firms to a greater risk of crashes.
Hossain, Md Noman, "Two Essays on Corporate Finance" (2021). Theses and Dissertations. 892.