Information Systems Faculty Publications
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2-2026
Abstract
Unmanned delivery is reshaping last-mile logistics and challenging traditional courier operations. This study employs a game-theoretical framework to examine two strategic delivery models: one offering conventional human delivery and self-pickup options, and another integrating unmanned delivery services. The analysis focuses on strategic decisions regarding the timing and conditions under which courier firms introduce unmanned delivery, as well as the resulting impact on consumer choices among available delivery modes. Findings indicate that unmanned delivery becomes profitable only when customer preferences are moderate—neither strongly favoring nor entirely indifferent to specific service types. This challenges the common assumption that expanding delivery options inherently enhances operational efficiency. Furthermore, the introduction of unmanned delivery, especially when supported by subsidies, may unintentionally suppress demand for traditional services due to internal competition among delivery modes. Although subsidies can stimulate demand for unmanned delivery, they do not necessarily improve overall profitability or ensure widespread adoption, as the crowding-out effect may offset potential gains. In certain contexts—such as rigid consumer preferences or limited public funding—subsidies aimed at promoting unmanned delivery may even reduce social welfare. Given the diminishing marginal returns of technology subsidies associated with larger incentives, small to moderate subsidies are more effective.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Publication Title
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
DOI
10.1016/j.tre.2025.104591
Comments
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2025.104591