A Phenomenological Approach to Legal Epistemic Injustice

Authors

Christopher Thomas Phillippe-Rodriguez, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

4-6-2024

Abstract

Injustices in legal contexts are widespread, yet we usually tend to think of them through a social lens. The study of epistemic injustices increases the resolution of this lens; it identifies how we wrong others as "knowers." In this paper, I propose that the tradition of phenomenology may be invoked to describe and identify instances of epistemic injustice in legal contexts. In order to justify this claim, I establish a phenomenological methodology predicated on the synthesis of two ideas: (1) the phenomenological recognition of the Other, and (2) society's duty to endow its members with an epistemic sphere of action.

Comments

Student publication.

Copyright (c) 2024 Christopher Phillippe-Rodriguez

Recommended Citation

Phillippe-Rodriguez, Christopher. “A Phenomenological Approach to Legal Epistemic Injustice”. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal, vol. 17, no. 1, Apr. 2024, pp. 12-25, https//doi.org/10.33043/S.17.1.12-25

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.

Publication Title

Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal

DOI

10.33043/S.17.1.12-25