Theses and Dissertations

Date of Award

5-1-2026

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts (MA)

Department

Political Science

First Advisor

Dongkyu Kim

Second Advisor

Mi-son Kim

Third Advisor

Mark Kaswan

Abstract

This study examines why some authoritarian regimes bid for mega sporting events while others do not. While existing research focuses primarily on the impacts of hosting, this paper shifts attention to the political logic of bidding itself. It argues that bidding is not merely a preparatory step but a strategic political act. Drawing on selectorate theory, audience cost theory, and research on authoritarian institutions, the study proposes that variation in bidding behavior is driven by differences in institutionalization. Authoritarian regimes with nominally democratic institutions, such as legislatures, parties, and controlled media, face broader domestic audiences and stronger incentives to demonstrate competence and distribute resources. Mega-event bidding provides a visible platform to achieve both. At the same time, media control helps mitigate domestic political risks. Using an original dataset of authoritarian regime bids from 1980 onward, the findings show that more institutionalized regimes are significantly more likely to bid, particularly under conditions of media control and governance constraints.

Comments

Copyright 2026 Zanela Denise S. Bajarias. All Rights Reserved. https://proquest.com/docview/3371128761

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